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ABSTRACT 
This thesis provides a framework of economic analysis which both Governments and 
the petroleum industry can draw upon in their negotiation of fiscal terms that offer a fair 
and just basis of wealth allocation. Its principal objectives are to critically evaluate the 
petroleum fiscal regime in the UK North Sea since 1975, and identify a fiscal regime 
that is acceptable to Government and oil industry alike. 
Government and oil companies are the key decision-makers in the upstream sector of 
petroleum industry. However, their individual focus is one of competing rather than 
complementary objectives. Governments of oil producing countries face important 
challenges when designing a tax system that meets the two fundamental objectives of 
ensuring a fair share of revenues for themselves whilst simultaneously providing 
sufficient incentives to encourage investment. Besides, petroleum resource has special 
features that can impose further difficulties in the design and implementation of an 
appropriate tax system aimed at achieving a balance between both Government and 
industry interests'. 
Over the years, achieving this balance has given rise to significant controversy in the 
UK. The structure of the current fiscal regime was formally legislated through the Oil 
Taxation Act of 1975. However, the regime has been frequently reviewed and amended. 
Its current structure is significantly different from its original version. Th~ various 
amendments to the regime have led researchers and specialists to either criticising or 
supporting Government actions. 
This thesis conducts an in depth analysis on the principal fiscal packages that have 
applied to the UKCS and analyses their effect on the balance between the Government 
and oil companies' objectives. The research is carried out in the light of an essential and 
timely feature, the current maturity of the UK oil province. The thesis demonstrates 
that, in practice, it is very difficult to develop an ideal fiscal package. Several 
complications are associated with petroleum taxation, resulting mainly from the 
difficulty in determining a suitable tax base as well as the inevitable compromises to the 
criteria that are required to categorise an optimal tax. Consequently, it is not surprising 
to find that none of the tax instruments proposed in previous studies or those applied in 
the UK represents an optimal tax. 
The UK petroleum fiscal regime suffered from several limitations. However, currently, 
the UK fiscal regime is one of the most attractive regimes in the world, from an 
investor's standpoint. Government take is lower than the pre-1993 fiscal structures, but 
any future concerns about UKCS taxation must take into account the current maturity of 
the petroleum reserve base. A high level of Government take is not recommended in 
cases of high-risk exploration, high-cost development, or for those provinces with 
modest petroleum potential, as is the case in the UK North Sea. 
11 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
My experiences during the conduct of this thesis have provided the most stimulating 
moments in my academic endeavours. I have studied to distinguish between contrasting 
research findings, each side being backed by compelling analysis. I have experienced 
various research methods, quantitative analytical techniques and presentation styles. I 
have developed a deep understanding of the petroleum industry operations, a sector that 
was completely new for me at the very beginning of my research. Despite the various 
challenges I went through over the last four years, I look at my thesis now and a sense 
of pride and happiness grow inside my heart. 
For the accomplishment of this work, I would like to express my sincere thanks to my 
supervisors Mr. Rawdon and Professor Runt who offered me timely and valuable 
advice, guiding me to think harder about my topic and assisting me to improve the 
quality of my work. Likewise, I would like to acknowledge the worthwhile and 
continuous support of my dear friends and tax specialists Mr. Shevlin and Mr. Wastell. I 
also would like to thank all the respondents for the valuable time they gave to 
participate in the survey, as well as WoodMackenzie for providing me with GEM. 
Last but not least, I would like to thank my family and friends, in particular my father, 







Petroleum exploration and exploitation, like other primary industries, creates wealth 
from the earth's natural resources. However, the location of petroleum production is 
entirely dictated by geology and geography. Few, if any, other industries are as site 
specific and few natural resources have at the time of their production a value out of all 
proportion with their production costs, as is the case with petroleum. 
As these words are being written in 2004, there is once again growing concern regarding 
the security of supply of crude oil to the developed and developing economies of the 
world. In particular, the issue of continuing access to crude oil resources on reasonable 
terms, not simply to meet the needs of economic growth but also to ensure security of 
supply, is once again to the foreground of economic debate. Central to that debate now 
and in the future will be the issue of the allocation of the wealth created by the 
development of petroleum in both traditional as well as in new producing provinces of 
the world. This wealth allocation process will of necessity need to take account of the 
interest of all stakeholders and in particular local Governments as well as various sectors 
of the international petroleum industry. 
In today's world no major industry can exist in a vacuum. The international petroleum 
industry is today much affected by changing political, sociological and economic trends. 
It is against this background that this thesis has been prepared with the overarching 
objective of providing a framework of economic analysis which both Governments and 
the petroleum industry can draw upon in their negotiation of fiscal terms that offer a fair 
and just basis of wealth allocation. 
1.2. PETROLEUM TAXATION IN THE UK 
Petroleum taxation has received considerable attention since the discovery of oil in the 
1960s in the UK sector of the North Sea. The structure of the current fiscal regime was 
first set out in a 1974 White Paper and was formally legislated through the Oil Taxation 
Act of 1975. The regime consisted of three main instruments, Royalty, Petroleum 
Revenue Tax (PRT) and Corporation Tax (CT). At the outset the Government had two 
key objectives. These were to secure a fairer share of profits for the nation and ensure a 
suitable return for oil companies on their capital investment (Inland Revenue, 2003a). 
Although the fiscal regime for the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) was established in 
1975, virtually from the commencement of oil production it has been frequently 
reviewed and amended. Rowland & Hann (1987) argue that no other sector in the UK 
economy has been subject to such fiscal instability. 
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The level of marginal Government take gradually declined from approximately 87 per 
cent in the 1980s to just 30 per cent in the mid-1990's. In April 2002, however, the 
Government increased its take for the first time since 1983 through the imposition of a 
10 per cent Supplementary Charge on CT based income. 
The vanous amendments to the regtme have generated much controversy, with 
researchers and specialists either criticizing or defending the changes. On occasions 
even extreme views have been expressed. For example, Bland (1988) argues that the 
UKCS fiscal regime is "a patchwork of separate taxes, each amended and adjusted in 
response to changing circumstances and forming a less than cohesive whole" (p.1). In 
concurring with Bland, Rutledge and Wright (1998) describe the fiscal regime in the UK 
as the "weakest in the world" (p.801). Opposing such views, Martin (1997) argues that 
Government action in particular that in 1983 and 1993 was responsible for the two 
production peaks in the pattern of the UKCS oil production. Johnston (2003) also 
maintains that although Government actions since 1983 appeared "crazy and 
irresponsible they were simply ordinary measures that led to hyperactivity in the UKCS 
and made its offshore the most active offshore province in the world" (p.6). 
More recently, as a result of the 2002 changes, the debate was further intensified. While 
the current Chancellor believes that the new changes will encourage long term 
investment, the UK Offshore Operators Association argues that taxes are being 
increased at the wrong time in the North Sea's life (UKOOA, 2002). 
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1.3. THESIS OBJECTIVES 
In the light of such controversy, the two overriding objectives of this thesis are to: 
1. critically analyse the petroleum fiscal regime in the UK North Sea since 1975 
and, 
2. ascertain a fiscal regime that is efficient, effective and also acceptable to both the 
Government and the oil industry. 
This thesis conducts an in depth analysis on the principal fiscal packages that have 
applied to the UKCS, taking into account the sustainability and unfolding international 
competitiveness of this oil province. It critically evaluates the possible outcomes of 
previous fiscal rates and structures, had they still applied today. It also researches the 
way in which the UK Government, through the design of its petroleum fiscal regime and 
the subsequent amendments, has affected the trade off between themselves and oil 
companies. Taking into consideration the UK experience, the thesis questions whether 
an ideal fiscal regime can be created in various petroleum provinces. 
The controversy surrounding the UK petroleum fiscal regIme and its vanous 
amendments arises from the need to balance the two chief but competing objectives of 
taxation. These are to capture a large share of economic rent while stimulating private 
investment in the sector (Bond, Devereux & Saunders, 1987). 
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Further, since there is no objective yardstick for sharing economic wealth between the 
various interests involved in the petroleum activity, controversy will always prevail. A 
trade off will always exist, since both Government and oil companies want to maximise 
their own rewards. Mercier (1999) argues that tax rates that are set too low leave the 
Government, the owner of the resource, a small and inequitable portion. Yet, if tax rates 
are too high, investment will be discouraged, not only in new projects, but in sustaining 
the capital investment required to maximise future value added from existing operations 
(Crowson, 2004). 
However, the exploration and exploitation of oil requires significant financial resources 
that can exceed the capability of most of oil producing countries. Further the high risk 
involved, as a result of geology and oil price volatility, renders a purely national 
approach to the exploitation of petroleum difficult (Blinn et aI, 1986). "It follows that 
exploration and exploitation activities present delicate legal, technical, financial and 
political problems and any solution requires a balancing act between the respective 
interests of the producing countries and the oil companies" (Blinn et aI, 1986, p.15). 
Consequently, despite the competing objectives of both Government and oil companies, 
a balance can still be reached. But, the right choice of fiscal regime can improve the 
trade off between each party's interest. "A small sacrifice from one side may be a big 
gain for the other" (Sunley, Baunsgaard & Simard, 2002, p.1). 
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National tax policies can greatly influence the petroleum industry long-term global 
sustainability. This research is carried out in the light of an essential and timely feature, 
the current maturity of the UK North Sea province. The larger fields (such as Forties, 
Brent and Ninian) were discovered in the early phases of exploration and brought into 
production between 1975-1979. Fields found during subsequent periods have become 
progressively smaller. This fact emphasises further the significance of taxation in 
impacting on the trade off between the opposing viewpoints of the Government and 
companies. As Colbert reportedly remarked "the art of taxation consists in so plucking 
the goose as to obtain the largest amount of feathers with the least possible amount of 
hissing l ". Crowson (2004) adds "it is also important not to frighten away the geese so 
that they no lay any eggs, golden or otherwise, let alone present themselves for 
plucking" (p.12). 
Another important aspect of this thesis, and which instinctively follows from the 
analysis of the fiscal impact, concerns the effectiveness of the evaluation techniques that 
are being used or recommended to measure the effects of taxation on profitability and 
revenue. The choice of financial evaluation technique is of particular significance to 
both oil companies and Government. An inappropriate technique can generate a 
misleading figure for profitability and taxable capacity leading, in tum, to incorrect 
decision making and an inappropriate assessment of a particular fiscal structure or 
instrument. In addition, major controversy still surrounds the choice of an appropriate 
evaluation technique. 
1 As referred to in Crossman (2004), p.12. 
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Accordingly, three evaluation techniques are used to calculate the effects of taxation in 
this thesis: traditional Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) and more recent techniques, 
Modem Asset Pricing (MAP) and Real Options Theory (ROT). The DCF method has 
been the one mostly applied in previous studies and is currently used by oil companies 
(Siew, 2001). Over the last few years, however, there has been an increasing interest in 
the use of other methods. MAP and ROT have been developed to overcome some of the 
weaknesses of the DCF approach. In fact, they can be considered as an evolved version 
of the traditional technique. The thesis compares the three techniques and critically 
analyses any significant difference in their results in order to determine if any method 
produces more useful results, particUlarly when evaluating a fiscal regime. 
1.4. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
The research undertaken in this thesis is timely and of particular relevance for several 
reasons. 
Firstly, the present maturity of the UK sector of the North Sea imposes a significant 
challenge on Government fiscal policy, which is of critical importance in maintaining 
the attractiveness of the oil province from an investor's standpoint. UK oil production 
peaked in 1999 at 2.8 mmbbl a day and is forecast to decline by about 60 per cent over 
the next ten years. Today, around 47 per cent of the UK proven reserve base of 63 
bnbbloe combined oil and gas reserves have been produced (Ruairidh, 2003). 
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From the UK's estimated total endowment of oil, about two-thirds have been already 
produced and only about one-third remains for future production (Zittel, 2001). 
Furthermore, the UKCS currently ranks 19th globally in terms of average commercial 
discovery size (Scottish Council for Development and Industry, 2002). Given the larger 
and more commercially attractive opportunities in other parts of the world and the higher 
Exploration and Development costs in the hostile and technically challenging UKCS 
environment, it is going to be harder for the UK Government to continue to attract 
investment (Morgan, 2000). 
Secondly, oil is a strategic commodity and is likely to remain as such for some time. In 
this regard, it has special characteristics relating to its price volatility and the fact it is an 
exhaustible resource with an uncertain level of reserves, particularly at the Exploration 
stage. It is also an important end-use commodity and an important factor of production, 
which affects the price of other goods. These characteristics are likely to complicate the 
design of a tax system. 
Thirdly, the UK is ranked the tenth largest oil producer, making it an important region 
for the industry (Deloitte & Touche, 2003). The oil industry contributes significantly to 
the UK economy. The first full year of production from the UKCS was in 1976 and by 
the early 1980s the UK had become self-sufficient in oil, with crude oil exports reaching 
a value of £5 bn. a year. This had a substantial impact on the UK's hitherto precarious 
balance of payments position. In 2001, oil and gas production reached 4.3 mmboe. per 
day, representing some 85 per cent of the UK's total primary energy production. 
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Since Exploration and Production (E&P) activity began in the mid-1960s, oil companies 
have invested almost £200 bn. in the UK offshore sector. It is also estimated that over 
380,000 people are employed directly and indirectly in over 6,000 businesses by the oil 
industry (UKOOA, 2001). Additionally, since the beginning of oil production, more than 
£106 bn. in taxes has flowed to the UK Treasury, contributing to healthcare, education 
and all the other services funded by the Government. In the year 2002, the Government 
collected £5.4 bn. from upstream taxes (DTI, 2003). 
Clearly, the oil industry is and has been a vital component of the UK economy. As such, 
it is not surprising that any UK Government involvement in setting the level of tax tries 
to ensure that UK's oil province is an attractive area for investment. 
1.5. THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
This thesis evaluates the UK petroleum fiscal regIme. Its major contribution to 
particularly this field and petroleum taxation more generally lies mainly in the novel 
approach adopted to study the issue, by attempting to bring together the interests of both 
the Government and the oil industry. Empirical analysis is carried out at two levels: 
firstly, in qualitative terms by undertaking a survey of opinions, and secondly, in 
quantitative terms by combining the different financial evaluation techniques then 
expanding the analysis to incorporate other internationally representative regimes. To 
date, no such a detailed analysis has been published on the UKCS several other 
provinces such as Iraq. 
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The survey is a unique undertaking in this field of economic research. It analyses the 
issues from the perspective of both the main constituents: the Government and the 
petroleum industry. Given their competing interests, these two bodies have different 
perspectives on petroleum taxation. As such, the survey provides significant information 
from specialists and benefits from their expertise. More importantly, this kind of 
analysis is unlikely to be found in the literature associated with this important topic. 
The succeeding quantitative analysis is undertaken at four separate stages. 
Firstly, a transparent detailed model of the UKCS fiscal regime is derived. The regime is 
often described as complex and this is probably the reason why few attempts have been 
made to fully establish a tax model for the UKCS. Nevertheless, developing a cash flow 
model is essential as it allows a clear understanding of the computation of each tax 
instrument and the interaction between the various instruments. 
Secondly, the evaluation of the profitability of 25 oil fields and the revenues generated 
from their operations is made under nine fiscal scenarios using two evaluation 
techniques, DCF and MAP. Such a quantitative comparison has been lacking in the 
literature of petroleum taxation, particularly for the UKCS. On one hand, the analysis 
covers a wider range of tax scenarios than previous studies. In fact, it is rather a time line 
analysis extending over a period of 27 years. On the other hand, to date the application 
of MAP for the evaluation of the UK petroleum regime is very limited. 
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DCF is a relatively straightforward technique, whereas MAP requires an understanding 
of wider financial theories such as Contingent Claim Analysis and the Derivative Asset 
Pricing Approach, in addition to incorporating more dynamic oil price models. MAP can 
allow a more appropriate valuation of risk by adjusting revenues for oil price risk, while 
discounting the net cash flow at the risk free rate. In the simple and common application 
of DCF, the effect of uncertainty is detennined by including a risk premium in the 
discount rate, which is applied irrespective of the risk profile of the different 
components of the cash flo~. 
Thirdly, the analysis is expanded to evaluate the possible effects of taxation on the 
timing of investment. This characteristic is of particular significance nowadays, given 
the maturity of the UKCS and the need to develop the discovered fields to maintain 
production and sustain self-sufficiency. In order to incorporate investment flexibility, 
ROT is implemented and it is further compared with DCF, which is based on the static 
investment concept of now-or-never. The application of ROT has been also limited in 
the field of petroleum taxation especially for petroleum activity in the UKCS. 
Finally, the research is further expanded to compare the UK petroleum fiscal regime 
.. 
with five internationally representative regimes; Australia, Norway, Indonesia, China 
and Iraq. The research evaluates the evolution of the international competitiveness of the 
UKCS since 1975 relative to the five selected countries. 
2 See, for example, Kemp & Rose (1983), Martin (1997) and Kemp & Stephens (1997). 
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The major contribution of this study lies in the time-line analysis of the international 
attractiveness of the fiscal terms in the UK. Another important aspect is the derivation of 
fiscal models for the other countries selected, principally Iraq, for which information is 
not easily accessible. 
An additional important feature of this quantitative analysis is that, unlike many of 
previous studies, it is based on real operating oil fields rather than hypothetical ones. 
Smith & Mccardle (1998) argue that the use of model fields and their consequences can 
greatly oversimplify the study. This is particularly relevant in the analysis of UK oil 
taxation, as no two fields are alike in the UK North Sea province. 
The uniqueness of oil taxation when compared to other commodities is a consequence of 
the oil industry's characteristics; the significant contribution it makes to the national 
economy, the high operating and development costs, high uncertainty in exploration 
activities, volatility of oil prices, and the maturity of the UK oil province. These all add 
challenges to both the Government and the industry. Consequently, the field of oil 
taxation requires specific knowledge by any regulator and a study such as this can yield 
new insights into the investment decision process with regards to the impact of the 
different fiscal packages and regimes on the oil industry. The results of this work can 
also aid a decision for changing or creating a new fiscal regime, in particular in Iraq, 
where future change seems inevitable. 
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1.6. STRUCTURE 
Following this Introduction chapter, which highlights the main research question, the 
study of the theoretical background of taxation in general and petroleum taxation in 
particular is covered in Chapter 2. The chapter analyses the set of criteria that can be 
used to assess petroleum related tax instruments and evaluates the various instruments 
proposed in previous studies. As such, it establishes the basis for evaluating the UK 
petroleum fiscal regime and sets the framework for the empirical analysis. 
In Chapter 3, a detailed study of the evolution of the UK North Sea tax system from its 
beginnings in 1975 through to the Budget changes introduced in 2002 is conducted. The 
study examInes the principal amendments introduced, which generated substantial 
changes to the fiscal structure and provoked significant controversies. Such an 
examination provides the background knowledge for the analysis of oil taxation in the 
UK. It also helps to understand the different arguments used in the debate. 
Chapter 4 initiates the empirical analysis of this thesis and presents the survey of 
opinions of the main players involved in the UKCS, with regard to the effects of the 
major fiscal packages. The findings are synthesized in an attempt to find ways in which 
the existing regime might be improved or how an alternative regime more acceptable to 
Government and industry might be created. 
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Chapter 5 starts the quantitative analysis of the UKCS fiscal regime. The chapter derives 
a cash flow model, clearly explaining the computation of the fiscal instruments and their 
interaction. This is a prerequisite to proceeding with the quantitative analysis. In anyone 
year or in anyone field the amount that the Government will take in the form of taxes 
cannot be simply evaluated or anticipated without an appropriate model (UKOG, 1983). 
The chapter further sets out the principal assumptions adopted in subsequent chapters. 
After the model is developed, the quantitative evaluation of taxation is conducted. 
In Chapter 6, oil field profitability and Government revenue are analysed under nine tax 
scenarios using two techniques DCF and the MAP. A detailed review of the basic 
concepts underlying each method is set out, in order to build a deeper understanding of 
the differences between the two methods and hence a more useful interpretation of any 
difference in their results. 
Chapter 7 continues the quantitative evaluation but incorporates an additional feature to 
decision making in investment, which is flexibility. The chapter investigates whether the 
tax structure and level of government take have any effect on the timing of the decision 
to develop a field, as such identifying investment distortions and addressing the 
neutrality of the regime. Several authors argue that ignoring flexibility can significantly 
undervalue a project. To undertake the research ROT is used and compared with DCF. 
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Chapter 8 completes the empirical analysis by comparing the UK fiscal regime with the 
Australian, Norwegian, Indonesian, Chinese and Iraqi regimes. A detailed study of the 
fiscal regimes is undertaken, and then a qualitative and quantitative analysis is carried 
out. Studying other regimes may reveal a benchmark fiscal regime with features that 
have not been revealed in the previous chapters' analysis. 




THE TAXATION OF OIL: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter one introduced the objectives of the thesis, mainly to evaluate the level and 
structure of taxation associated with petroleum extraction activity in the UKCS. The 
purpose of this chapter is to analyze the set of criteria with which to evaluate petroleum 
related tax instruments, to study the nature of economic rent resulting from such activity 
and to assess the various instruments proposed in previous studies to capture the rent. 
Consequently, this chapter establishes the basis for evaluating the UK petroleum fiscal 
regime and sets the framework for the empirical analysis undertaken in the later 
chapters. 
Furthermore, the chapter provides an understanding of the components of a suitable tax 
system taking into consideration the special features of the petroleum resource and the 
industry. These include inter alia exhaustibility of the resource, the economic rent 
generated, the uncertainties such as those associated with petroleum geology as well as 
volatile prices, the specific characteristics of individual oil fields and the possibility of 
re-investment. Such characteristics impose numerous difficulties in the design and 
implementation of an appropriate tax system aimed at achieving a balance between both 
Government and industry objectives. 
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Taxation in essence is the mechanism whereby Governments generate revenues on 
behalf of the society3, affect the overall investment climate and, as appropriate, intervene 
in certain industries. However, Governments of oil producing countries face important 
challenges when designing a tax system that meets two fundamental objectives: namely 
to ensure a fair share of revenues for themselves whilst simultaneously providing 
sufficient incentives to encourage investment. These two objectives are competing rather 
than complementary (Stauffer & Gault, 1985). Over the last 25 years oil revenues have 
played a vital role in both financing the UK Government's current expenditure and 
influencing its medium term economic strategy. However, in doing so a considerable 
slice of the producer's profits has been removed by taxation. 
"In the absence of a healthy and financially successful oil industry, the Government 
cannot realize the full benefit of resource extraction. Notwithstanding, a Government 
that agrees to terms that do not capture fair value for the resource betrays the trust of its 
citizens" (Watkins, 2001, pI). That said, such a trade off might be improved if an 
appropriate tax system is adopted. The UK Government, for instance, has set its 
objective from taxing oil activity in the North Sea, as being one of obtaining a fair share 
of revenues while keeping the UK North Sea an attractive province for investments 
(Inland Revenue, 2003a). 
3 The Government is considered as an agent of the rest of the society. Government failure can exist: 
however, this issue goes beyond the subject of the thesis. 
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Tax rates that are set too high will eliminate field value and create investment 
disincentives, hence both the producer and the Government are left with nothing. 
Conversely, too Iowa tax rate will increase the producer's share of field value leaving 
the Government a small and inequitable portion (Mercier, 1999). Therefore, an 
appropriate fiscal regime can generate a positive rather than a zero-sum outcome. In the 
former, both the Government and investors benefit respectively from a fair share of 
revenues and appropriate profitability whereas, in the latter, the return to Government 
cannot be increased without reducing the incentive to private firms (Stauffer & Gault, 
1985). 
This chapter is organized in six sections. Following this introduction, Section 2.2 
addresses the main functions of taxation with reference to petroleum industry activity. 
Section 2.3 studies the key features of an appropriate tax system, particularly as applied 
to an exhaustible resource such as oil. Section 2.4 includes a discussion of the concept of 
economic rent and examines the different types of rents recognizing that each has 
different tax policy implications. Section 2.5 analyses the main tax instruments applied 
in the upstream petroleum sector. Section 2.6 discusses the concepts highlighted in this 
chapter commenting on the practical applicability of a favorable tax instrument and 
qualitatively assesses the tax instruments proposed in the literature of petroleum 
taxation. Closing remarks on the main lessons of petroleum taxation are made in Section 
2.7. 
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2.2. THE FUNCTIONS OF TAX 
Raja (1999) describes taxation as "being simply a transfer payment by the private sector 
to the State since there is no direct productive activity on its own part in generating tax 
revenue" (p.1). However, taxation, in general, and taxation of petroleum in particular, 
goes well beyond the simple process of providing revenue to Government. The main 
functions of oil taxation are presented as follows: 
1. Financing Government expenditures: Taxes are the principal source of revenue 
that Governments use to finance public expenditures. Energy taxation, III 
particular, provides substantial revenue to virtually every advanced economy 
(Boskin & Robinson, 1985). The UK is no exception. Since the beginning of oil 
production, more than £106 bn. has flowed to the Inland Revenue thereby 
contributing to healthcare, education and various other services funded by 
Government (DTI, 2003). 
11. Rent extraction: Taxation is used to capture a large share of the economic rent 
accruing from the production of a scarce resource, such as oi14. The concept of 
economic rent is discussed in Section 2.4. 
4 Taxation is one of the mechanisms by which the Government attempts to capture economic rent from 
petroleum activity. Other mechanisms, such as competitive bidding, also known as auction licensing, can 
be used. "Competitive bidding in the absence of collusion should lead to the state's receiving a large part 
of any economic rent accruing from oil and gas production" (Robinson & Morgan, 1978, p.193). 
However, the concept of auction licensing goes beyond the scope of the thesis. 
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111. Distribution of benefits: "The distribution of benefits from natural resources is at 
the heart of many resource taxation policies. Many tax instruments have been 
adopted almost entirely on distributional grounds" (Heaps & Helliwell, 1985, 
p.426). A key distribution of benefit is between Government and the producer, 
especially as the natural resource is deemed to be owned by the State who is 
entitled to a fair share of the value of the exhaustible resource. 
Taxation also has other important objectives such as: 
IV. Impact on the economic environment: By increasing or decreasing the amount of 
income it collects, a Government can encourage, or discourage, different 
economic activity (Committee on Energy Taxation, 1980). Taxation can be used 
to mitigate certain economic problems such as the "Dutch Disease", where the 
petroleum industry adversely impacts upon the international competitiveness of 
the non-oil sector. It can also be used to moderate the pace of exploration and 
exploitation of petroleum and at the same time reduce the depletion rate. In other 
cases where, for instance, there is chronic balance of payments problem, the 
Government can use taxation to accelerate the development of export oriented 
natural resources, as occurred in the UK in the late 1970s. However, petroleum 
taxation is not a tool for macroeconomic policy, since it forms only one part of 
public sector funding (Watkins, 2001). 
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v. Demand management: For energy-producing countries, if the cost of domestic 
production of an energy source is very low compared to that in the international 
market then prices in the local market will be low. In this case, taxation can be 
applied to reduce the differential, hence discourage wasteful energy use as well 
as counteracting the distortion in the investment choice (Committee on Energy 
Taxation, 1980). The demand management function is of particular importance 
when the price of the commodity is determined in domestic markets. 
Nevertheless, it is of less importance in the case of oil, whose price is determined 
in the international market. 
VI. Control of pollution emissions from energy: Many proposals have been made for 
the use of taxes to control pollution from energy. "Green" taxes such as on C02 
emissions are designed to mitigate or prevent pollution and other adverse effects 
on the environment. 
2.3. EFFECTIVE TAX CRITERIA 
Six important criteria characterize an effective tax system. These are the attributes of an 
optimal tax 5 and they affect the design of a tax regime as follows: 
5 The theory of optimal taxation concentrates primarily on personal income taxes and focuses on the 
effects of taxation on households rather than producers, which is not the objective of this thesis. A detailed 
discussion of optimal taxation theory can be found in Ramsey (1927), Diamond & Mirrlees (1971 a,b), 
Dasgupta & Stiglitz (1971), Samuelson (1986), and Heady (1993). Altay presents a detailed summary of 
the different studies on optimal tax theory. 
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1. Efficiency: This criterion IS satisfied when resources in the economy are 
allocated in accordance with the tastes and preferences of individuals. This is 
defined as the social optimal position (Swan, 1984). Altay (2000) argues that the 
allocative efficiency concept has been the main point of departure for the 
economIC theory of optimal taxation. Raja (1999), however, refers to the 
difficulties in distinguishing between the social and private optimal levels of 
efficiency. Efficiency is often combined with the neutrality criterion, explained 
below. 
11. Neutrality: Garnaut & Clunies Ross (1983) define a neutral tax as one that 
"would reduce disposable income but not affect decisions on consumption, trade 
or production" (p.26). Raja (1999) refers to neutrality in terms of Government 
revenues, where a neutral tax will generate revenues when a company earns 
profits and nothing when it makes losses. As such, the focus of the neutrality 
criterion is on whether the tax system interferes with investment and operational 
decisions in such a way as to cause them to deviate from what is the social 
optimum (Amundsen, Andersen & Sannarnes, 1993). A neutral tax does not 
distort investment decisions while a distortionary tax affects the decision making 
process, such that individuals make inferior choices to those that would have 
been made in the absence of the tax and, consequently, resources are not 
allocated efficiently (Kemp & Rose (1982), Dickson (1999)). In the petroleum 
sector, for instance, a non-neutral tax can adversely affect decisions relating to 
the development of marginal fields. 
22 
Watkins (2001) argues that taxation should neither deter exploitation of a full 
range of field sizes, nor interfere with project rankings: if project A is more 
attractive than project B before tax, it should remain so after tax. 
111. Equity: This IS a broad criterion that can be considered from different 
perspectives. 
Firstly, firms in the same economic circumstances or oil fields with the same 
characteristics, including similar cost structures, can be taxed in the same way. 
This is referred to as "horizontal equity" (Dickson, 1999, p.3). Vertical equity 
refers to the equivalent treatment of companies or resources with different 
characteristics. A progressive tax is more likely to satisfy this criterion. Firms 
that exploit more valuable resources have a greater ability to pay and so their tax 
liabilities can be greater. Similarly, fields with high profitability can be taxed 
more heavily than those with low profitability. Stauffer & Gault (1985) 
emphasize the equity issue and argue that one way of improving a tax system is 
to reduce taxes on marginal fields and equalize each participant's after tax return 
across all fields. 
Secondly, extracting and consuming natural resources now will reduce the stock 
available for future generations. Dickson (1999) argues that a tax system, which 
satisfies the intergenerational equity criterion, is one that discourages rapid 
depletion of resources when prices are low at the expense of future generations. 
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In this sense, an equitable tax will ensure that future generations get a fair share 
of the resources or compensation for those that are depleted. 
Finally, SInce the State owns the natural resources, it should receIve a fair 
payment especially when it transfers exploitation and/or ownership rights to 
private companies (Mommer, 2001). 
IV. Risk sharing: Risk can be defined as the variation in the investor's expected 
returns (Stauffer & Gault (1985), Mercier (1999)). When the investor evaluates 
the profitability of a project, the required rate of return combines both a risk free 
rate and a risk premium6. The lower the premium the lower the required rate of 
return and vice-versa. There are several sources of risk in oil activity. 
Exploration activity is dominated by risks related to the geological and 
geophysical attributes of a project, in this case the probability associated with 
finding substantial and economic deposits when drilling (Raja, 1999). However, 
the risk is not only limited to the Exploration phase, "only when the deposit is 
exhausted do you know precisely what the reserve was" (Andrews-Speed, 1998, 
p.14). The volatility of oil prices is also an important source of risk, affecting all 
projects in the same direction. 
6 The concept of risk is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 
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Kemp & Rose (1982) argue that the attitude of the investor depends not only on 
the level of tax, but also on the extent to which the Government shares the 
project's risks. Mitchell (1982), however, has a different opinion. The author 
maintains that whilst oil companies have the means to diversify risks through a 
worldwide portfolio, the Government cannot accommodate oil business risks at a 
lower social cost than that achievable by the companies7. Other studies, such as 
those by Stauffer & Gault (1985) and Rodriguez-Padilla (1991) raised the issue 
of risk but in the context of fiscal risk. Such studies conclude that taxation can 
increase the risk of a project since it increases the political risk by means of 
additional fiscal risk (Rodriguez-Padilla, 1991). The latter issue is considered in 
the context of the criterion of stability, explained further below. 
v. Stability: Devereux & Morris (1983) argue that if a tax system changes 
frequently and prima facie in an unpredictable manner, it may seriously affect 
future development projects. In accordance with such a view, Kemp & Rose 
(1982) maintain that a tax system subject to continuous tinkering will tend to 
increase political risk and reduce the value placed by investors on future income 
streams. Further, Boskin & Robinson (1985) argue that temporary taxes are 
likely to be inferior to permanent ones. 
7 Mitchell's (1982) finding is of some relevance particularly in circumstances where the investor has a 
portfolio of projects. Although diversification is acknowledged to be an important element in risk 
reduction, this is considered to be at a corporate level and outside the scope of this empirical study, which 
deals with projects rather than company risk. 
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The stability of the fiscal regIme IS an important criterion as it affects the 
confidence of investors in Government policy, particularly in the case of 
petroleum extraction activity, which is characterized by long-tenn projects. 
Stability can be also considered in the context of Government revenue. Dickson 
(1999) argues that stable Government revenue will assist with expenditure 
forecasting and budgeting, while Devereux & Morris (1983) maintain that tax 
revenue should be as stable as possible and should not fluctuate wildly as a result 
of such exogenous factors as the crude oil price. 
VI. Clarity and simplicity: These criteria relate to the administration and monitoring 
of the tax system, where an ideal tax is simple to understand and inexpensive to 
administer. Devereux & Morris (1983) argue that a simple tax regime makes it 
easier for the taxpayer to judge the tax consequences of their actions. Dickson 
(1999) uses the tenn administrative efficiency in the context of clarity and 
simplicity. The author adds that an ideal tax is one which is levied on a well-
defined tax base that is simple and easy to collect. Watkins (2001) refers to the 
importance of transparency, arguing that "the more transparent the means by 
which the Government obtains revenues, the better infonned the investors and 
the less the scope for manipulation and administrative discretion-behavior that 
increases industry's perception of risk" (p.17). 
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These are the principal criteria of an optimal petroleum tax as argued in previous studies. 
However, the weight given to each of these criteria differs in the literature and many 
studies have limited their analysis to only some of those criteria. 
According to Heady (1993), the equity concept has absorbed the mam interest of 
economists; it has been widely discussed and is still a major part of the evaluation of any 
tax policy proposal. Kemp & Rose (1983) emphasize the importance of efficiency and 
risk sharing attributes, whereas Dickson (1999) ignores the concept of risk sharing and 
focuses on efficiency/neutrality and equity. Raja (1999) concentrates on the concept of 
neutrality and Watkins (2001), whilst including the majority of the criteria, emphasizes 
the concept of risk sharing. 
Despite such divergence in interests, the majority (if not all) of the work undertaken in 
the area of optimal taxation in the petroleum and wider energy sector follows a common 
theme, that of economic rent. In general, the studies contend that a tax based on 
economic rent is likely to be an ideal tax. To assist in understanding the validity of such 
views the concept of economic rent is defined and discussed in the next section. 
2.4. ECONOMIC RENT 
This section introduces and explains the concept of economic rent and its measurement, 
as used in other studies particularly in the case of petroleum resources. 
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It commences with the definition of economic rent in order to understand the reasons 
why previous studies consider it the most suitable base for an ideal tax. The section 
further emphasises the different types of economic rent and discusses their implications 
on taxation policy. 
2.4.1. DEFINITION 
Dickson (1999) defines economic rent as "the true value of the natural resource, the 
difference between the revenues generated from resource extraction and the costs of 
extraction. These costs include the costs of employing factors of production and their 
opportunity costs" (p.1). Similarly, Banfi, Filippini & Mueller (2003) define economic 
rent as "the surplus return above the value of the capital, labour and other factors of 
production employed to exploit the resource. It is the surplus revenue of the resource 
after accounting for the costs of capital and labour inputs" (p.2). In addition to the 
capital and labour inputs referred to, further inputs in respect of entrepreneurial reward 
and risk taking need to be incorporated. 
Consequently, economic rent can best be considered as "a bonus, a financial return not 
required to motivate desired economic behavior" (Raja, 1999, p.2). In this sense, 
previous studies presume a tax based on economic rent is optimal since it satisfies the 
tax criteria (Dickson, 1999). Since the magnitude of such profits is not relevant to 
economic decisions, they constitute a justifiable base for taxation (Rowland & Hann, 
1987). 
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Garnaut & Ross (1979) also argue that if taxes are only levied on economic rent, there 
will be no effect on the incentive of firms to undertake any activity since rent is not 
required by the firm to continue or initiate operations. Additionally, because the true 
value of the resource will be collected, the consumption of future generations will not be 
sacrificed cheaply (Dickson, 1999). 
Further, if the tax seeks to capture economic rent, then the tax-take falls when economic 
rent decreases and rises when it increases. As such, the tax base responds in the 
appropriate direction to variations in costs and crude oil prices (Kemp, Stephen & 
Masson, 1997). Kemp & Rose (1982) argue that a stable system increases the possibility 
of substantial economic rent. Rowland & Hann (1986) maintain that a fair progressive 
tax, aimed at absorbing economic rent, is neutral and stable. Swan (1984) argues that a 
tax system, which collects as much economic rent as possible, is fair to the community. 
More recently, Rutledge & Wright (1998) argue that a neutral tax should fall on 
economic rent and which, at the same time, will allow for risk sharing between 
Government and investor. 
The exploitation of exhaustible natural resources can generate significant economic rent. 
Oil, in particular, is not only an exhaustible resource but also a strategic commodity with 
no perfect substitute. This implies that the extraction of oil can earn substantial amounts 
of economic rent. 
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In their definition of economic rent generated from petroleum extraction activity in the 
UK North Sea, Rowland & Hann (1987) provide a more practical measure of that rent. 
"The economic worth of a license to produce oil from a tract of the UKCS may be 
measured by the present value of the flow of the future revenues from that tract's 
production less the present value of associated future costs, where the costs include 
monetary items such as equipment as well as non-monetary items such as exposure to 
risks. The difference between these two amounts, the net present value, (NPV) is the 
economic rent of that tract. It may be positive, negative or zero. If it is positive, it 
implies that the licensee is enjoying profits in excess of those necessary to induce the 
production of petroleum (pure profits)" (p.4). Similarly, Raja (1999) argue that taxes 
should be aimed at taxing positive NPV because the NPV method discounts all future 
cash flows and incorporates all the relevant rewards to factors of production. In certain 
of the literature, it is argued that a positive NPV could be considered as economic rent 
representing the surplus over and above that which is necessary to induce investment. 
This is considered by the author to be a simplistic representation of economic rent. The 
concept of NPV is developed in Chapters 6 and 7. 
2.4.2. TYPES OF RENT 
There are several types of rent. These need to be highlighted before further explaining 
the suitability of economic rent as a tax base, since such differences can be of particular 
significance to taxation policy. The three main types of economic rent are as follows. 
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1. Scarcity rent: This type of rent results from the natural scarcity of the resource, 
which limits the output available. It represents the "foregone future profits as a 
result of extraction today" (Dickson, 1999, p.2). It can be expressed as "the 
difference between marginal revenue and marginal production cost that can only 
come about as a result of the natural or policy induced scarcity of the resource" 
(Kooten & Bulte, 2001, p.65). 
11. Differential or Ricardian rent8: Ricardo compared the rent from three tracts of 
arable land where increasingly greater levels of rent accrue to land of increasing 
productivity, with land at the margin receiving no rent (Kooten & Bulte, 2001). 
This is analogous to the returns accruing to oilfields. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the concept of Ricardian rent, where AC and MC 
respectively represent the average costs and marginal cost of grain production. 
Fields A and B earn rent, but the marginal field C does not since its AC is too 
great and is equal to the unit price. The rent accruing to A and B are determined 
in comparison to C, as they benefit from greater productivity or better soil 
quality as compared with C. That is why such rent is referred to as differential 
rent or quality rent. 
8 As referred to by Kooten & Bulte (2001) 
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Figure 2.1 Ricardian Rent9 
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Banfi, Filippini & Mueller (2003) refer to differential rent in the context of 
hydropower plants, where the difference between the cost of the most expensive 
plant (equivalent to field C in Figure 2.1) and the production costs of cheaper 
schemes (equivalent to fields A and B in Figure 2.1) determine the additional 
quality rent. Further, Dickson (1999) argues that differential rent arises because 
extraction costs depend on differences in the quality of the resource and location. 
111. Quasi rent: The third type of rent represents the returns that accrue to firms from 
past investment and innovative practice or as a result of changes in the market. 
Such rents only occur in the short-run before they are competed away (Raja, 
1999). They are "earnings over and above that required to maintain a firm in 
business in the short run" (Kooten & Bulte, 2001, p.65). The existence of sunk 
costs, representing past expenditure, are a necessary but not sufficient condition 
to generate quasi rents. 
9 Adapted from Kooten & Bulte (2001), p.60 
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2.4.3. IMPLICATIONS 
The identification of the three types of rent is essential for any study addressing the issue 
of taxation since it has important implications for tax policy. 
Firstly, scarcity rent and differential rent generate the total resource rent, as shown in 
Figure 2.2. However, the classification between scarcity and differential rent is 
somewhat artificial, since any rent could be understood to be generated by either scarcity 
or differential effects alone (Banfi, Filippini & Mueller, 2003). 
Figure 2.2 Differential & Scarcity Rent 10 
p 
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Further, according to Raja (1999), in a normal competitive market when pure profits are 
earned new entrants are attracted into the industry. In the long run this reduces profits to 
10 Adapted from Kooten & Bu1te (2001). It should be noted that the quantity of oil that can be produced is 
restricted to the amount Q* by physical limits on the availability of oil. 
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normal levels. However, because oil is a scarce non-renewable resource, pure profits are 
not eliminated by competition. 
Secondly, the resource rent (i.e. scarcity rent and differential rent) is an appropriate tax 
base since taxation of this rent does not affect the behaviour of the firm. This is not the 
case with quasi rent. Although quasi rent is part of economic rent, it only occurs in the 
short run. The capture of quasi rent can alter the long run efficiency behaviour of firms, 
often causing them to reduce investment and therefore the social optimum level of 
output. According to Banfi, Filippini & Mueller (2003), the firm should keep the quasi 
rent generated by its more efficient behaviour in comparison to other firms. It will be 
competed away in the long run since competitors will learn from the firm generating 
quasi rent. 
Although such distinctions are not generally highlighted in previous studies, they do 
have two important implications. Firstly, in the case of an oil field with P > AC (fields A 
& B in Figure 2.1) there is resource rent, which consequently constitute a tax base. 
Secondly, quasi rent is not to be included in the tax base. 
2.5. TAX INSTRUMENTS 
Oil taxation can take several forms. Various tax instruments have been proposed in 
previous studies on energy taxation in order to capture the economic rent from oil 
activity. This section defines these instruments and analyses their main characteristics. 
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Four tax instruments are selected, namely Government Royalty, Brown Tax, Resource 
Rent Tax (RRT) and Income Tax. Royalty is an output-based tax because it is levied on 
the unit or the value of production, whereas the other three instruments are profit-based 
taxes or cash-flow taxes, because they are imposed on net profit or operating income 
after capital investment. A description of each of these instruments follows. 
1. Government Royalty: "A Royalty is a payment made for the right to use 
another's property for purposes of gain. It is a payment for the use of a wasting 
asset" (Stiegeler, 1985, p.376). Mommer (2001) argues that a country is entitled 
to earn a Royalty on the extraction of its natural resources. Raja (1999) compares 
this mechanism to a piece of land, being taken away hence compensation is 
necessary. The Royalty can be a per-unit tax, which is a uniform fixed charge 
levied on a specified level of output or an ad-valorem tax, which is a fixed 
charge levied on the value of the output. 
11. Brown Tax!!: This tax is levied as a fixed proportion of a project's net cash flow 
in each period. When the net cash flow is positive firms have to pay the tax but 
when the net cash flow is negative firms receive a rebate. In other words, the 
Brown Tax involves the payment of a proportional subsidy or tax credits on 
annual cash losses and an equivalent tax on annual cash profits. Consequently, it 
is a tax on net cash flow with full contribution by the Government. 
II After its proposer Brown (1948), as referred to in Watkins (2001) 
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111. Resource Rent Tax (RRT): The RRT was introduced by Garnaut & Ross (1975) 
and was developed primarily for application in less developed countries 
particularly those that rely on external sources of capital investment. It is a 
modified version of the Brown Tax but instead of paying tax credits in years with 
negative cash flows, the Government allows such negative amount to be carried 
forward and deducted from positive cash flows in later periods. However, the 
negative net cash flows are uplifted by a minimum rate of return requirement (the 
threshold rate) and added to the next year's net cash flow. The accumulation 
process is continued until a positive net cash flow is generated. No tax is payable 
until the firm has recovered its costs inclusive of a threshold rate of return which 
is compounded from year to year. As such, the RRT involves carrying forward 
losses, whereas the Brown Tax provides a rebate for losses (Garnaut & Ross, 
1975). 
IV. Income Tax: Unlike the previous two types of cash flow taxes, Income Tax 
applies to a company's profits. The tax is levied at a corporate rather than oil 
field level, as such it is generally known as Corporation Tax or company 
expenditure tax. Income Tax in most countries allows current expenses, interest 
expense and historic cost depreciation to be deducted. In fact, all forms of 
income tax allow relief for capital expenditure, but extra reliefs are sometimes 
given to provide incentives to develop high cost "marginal" projects and are 
called uplift allowances on capital expenditure. 
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In general, a country's oil taxation system can take the form of any of these tax 
instruments, possibly with some adjustments and often using a combination of two or 
more of these instruments 12. 
2.6. ANALYSIS 
This section analyses the principal concepts highlighted in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, taking 
into consideration the findings of previous studies. It is divided into four sub-sections. 
The first studies the concept of economic rent. The second analyses the practicability of 
the optimal tax criteria. The third relates to the tax instruments described in the previous 
section. These are evaluated with regard to the extent that they satisfy the criteria of an 
ideal tax. Finally, the fourth section analyses the interaction of the different tax 
instruments. 
2.6.1. ECONOMIC RENT 
It was stated in Section 2.3 that economIC rent can be an important source of 
Government revenue and its appropriation, in theory, can take place without destroying 
economic incentives. 
12 The UK petroleum fiscal regime is a typical example as it included a Royalty, Petroleum Revenue Tax 
(similar to RRT) and Corporation Tax (Income Tax), which are described in detail in Chapter 3. 
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Yet, many complications arise when estimating the quantum of economic rent and such 
difficulties have been highlighted in previous studies, as in those of Kemp & Stephens 
(1997) and Raja (1999). The complications include distinguishing between resource rent 
and quasi rent. This distinction is important because resource rent can be taxed away 
whereas attempts to capture quasi-rent usually result in inefficient behavior by the 
investing firms. However, in reality Governments find it difficult to distinguish between 
the two types of rent. 
A second complication is the difficulty Governments have in determining acceptable 
rates of return for all companies, especially oil companies, as they do not nonnally 
reveal directly their required rate of return on investment. 
Thirdly, measunng economIC rent requires knowledge of the differing costs of the 
individual factors of production as well as their opportunity costs. The difficulty in 
measuring each of these components is what makes the determination of economic rent 
and its capture difficult and controversial (Banfi, Filippini & Mueller, 2003). 
Further, as Kemp & Rose (1982) argue, because the size of a given discovery and its 
related exploitation costs can vary substantially, economic rent will vary from field to 
field. Although this problem can be partly overcome by a progressive tax system, it is 
difficult to make conventional fiscal systems sufficiently flexible and focused on 
resource rent. 
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Given the problems outlined above, it is difficult to estimate economic rent and this 
makes it complex to design and impose a tax that captures it exactly. Nevertheless, the 
impact of such problems can be reduced through the use of proper evaluation techniques 
to measure a project's profitability, incorporating both an appropriate level of risk and 
making use of actual revenues and cost data J3 • 
2.6.2. SATISFACTION OF TAX CRITERIA 
As in most areas of taxation there is often an inevitable compromise in satisfying the 
evaluation criteria. Some of these conflicts are analysed below. 
Neutrality and Simplicity: Several studies have questioned the suitability of 
neutrality as a major characteristic of tax systemsl4 • A major disadvantage with 
neutral taxes is their complicated administration, especially in the case of petroleum 
extraction, recognising the individual characteristics of oil fields (size, location, 
quality, etc). In this case, to maintain neutrality, the Government is required to 
calculate different levels of rent, discount rates and expected yields in order to value 
each individual field properly, subsequently imposing what would be called a fully 
differentiated tax. Such a task is impractical since it can be significantly complicated 
to administer. 
13 This is explained in more detail in Chapter 6 
14 Detailed study is done by Raja (1999), also refer to Smith (1999) and Bond, Devereux & Saunders 
(1987). 
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Neutrality and revenue generation: Heaps and Helliwell (1985) argue that there is a 
conflict between revenue collection and neutrality. A neutral tax system provides 
incentives for companies to exploit marginal fields. However, because marginal 
fields do not generate resource rent, they do not generate revenues for the 
Government. Further, as Mommer (1996) debate, under a neutral tax regime the 
company can exploit the resource without paying any tax. This is an important issue 
because, as was discussed in Section 2.4, although marginal fields do not generate 
differential rent they can benefit from scarcity rent. 
Equity, simplicity and efficiency: Governments often try to incorporate tax 
allowances and reliefs to reduce the tax burden on marginal fields as a means of 
ensuring equity. Such allocations, however, can impose additional administrative 
costs, thereby making the tax system complicated. Also, as Bittker (1980) argues, 
these allowances can generate misallocation of resources, thereby creating 
inefficiencies. 
Stability and fiscal risk: Although stability of the tax regime is often advocated, in 
reality it cannot be fully achieved. Boskin & Robinson (1985) refer to this difficulty 
in the sense that Governments face the problem of maintaining a consistent regime 
over time. "A stable regime is not one which is cast in stone" (Andrews-Speed, 1998, 
p.17). In fact, flexibility can be allowed to permit the regime to evolve as a result of 
major changes in the external environment. 
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Risk-sharing: The criteria of risk sharing can be argued in tenns of the extent to 
which the risk can be shared between the Government and investors. However, it is 
worthy of note that companies have a portfolio of activities and are able to diversify 
certain fonns of risk. 
It can be concluded that a compromise prevails between the vanous criteria of an 
optimal tax when trying to design and implement a practical tax system. Compromise is 
also inevitable because of the competing objectives of Government and the private 
investor. The Government usually seeks to achieve high revenues and receive a portion 
of the fiscal take relatively early in the life of a petroleum project, while at the same time 
accept an appropriate amount of project risk. The private investor tends to accept the 
need for a reasonable overall level of tax take especially in fiscal systems that adopt a 
risk sharing attitude and provide the capacity to recover project costs at an early stage 
(Kemp & Rose, 1982). 
Given all the compromise between criteria and trade off between objectives, it is not 
surprising to find that the principal tax instruments suggested in previous studies do not 
satisfy all the main criteria of optimal taxation. This is further analysed in the following 
section. 
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2.6.3. QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF PROPOSED INSTRUMENTS 
The previous two sections highlighted the difficulty in determining the appropriate tax 
base and meeting all the criteria of an optimal tax. This section assesses qualitatively the 
main tax instruments, addressing their advantages and limitations. The evaluation is 
derived from the arguments raised in previous studies. 
2.6.3.1. ASSESSMENT OF GOVERNMENT ROYALTY 
Royalty is a simple tax. Its computation is straightforward since it is imposed on the 
amount or the value of the output. It also ensures a share of revenue for the Government 
as soon as production commences. This is in contrast to profit-based taxes where the 
Government obtains its first tranche of revenues only when the net cash flow begins to 
tum positive. In this sense, Royalty ensures that some of value of the resource, 
concurrent with extraction, flows to the State. 
However, since Royalty is imposed on gross revenues (or the amount of output), it 
completely ignores costs and profits associated with the project. Royalty is not targeted 
on economic rent and because it is not neutral it is likely to affect investors' behavior and 
create distortions for several reasons. 
Firstly, Royalty has an up-front effect because it IS imposed concurrent with the 
commencement of production. 
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Secondly, because it is imposed irrespective of the size of the field, the marginal cost 
curve will rise as a field is being depleted. This may cause operating income to become 
negative even when gross revenues exceed extraction costs and consequently can lead to 
a premature abandonment of the field. 
Thirdly, just as with any tax, which is based on production, Royalty pushes more of the 
commercial risk onto the investor with little protection arising from cost increases or 
reduced oil prices. 
Previous studies have commented on the regressive aspect of Royalty, which can render 
profitable projects unattractive on a post-tax basis. Raja (1999) describes Royalty as "a 
classic example of a non-neutral tax" (p.3). Rotelling (1931) argues that the imposition 
of a revenue tax is equivalent to an increase in the resource extraction cost, affecting the 
depletion decision of the investor. Kemp & Rose (1982) made similar observations 
arguing that a high tax rate on production is more likely to cause distortions and 
disincentives to continuous production than a profits-tax at the same rate. 
To reduce the distortions caused by the imposition of Royalty, Mercier (1999) contends 
the application of a sliding scale Royalty. This Royalty is based on charging different 
rates of tax depending on the level of production or oil prices. In this case, the Royalty 
rate will be low when production or oil price is low and vice versa, thereby decreasing 
the possibility of negative cash flows when production or oil prices are low. 
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Such a tax incorporates the benefit of nonnal Royalty, which is the generation of early 
revenues and also combines a progressive aspect in contrast to the impact of a fixed rate. 
As such, the sliding scale Royalty can extend economic field life with both Government 
and the investor sharing the overall gains (Mercier, 1999). However, an additional 
burden is added, and which is the administrative complexity of the sliding scale tax 15. 
2.6.3.2. ASSESSMENT OF THE BROWN TAX 
The Brown Tax is a cash-flow tax and consequently incorporates the different costs an 
investor incurs in each period. It is based on economic rent and satisfies principally the 
criteria of neutrality and risk sharing. According to Rowland & Hann (1987), the Brown 
Tax is the oldest type of neutral tax imposed on extraction industries. Garnaut & Ross 
(1983) argue that this tax is financially equivalent to the Government having contributed 
equity in an oil field. 
Despite such advantages the Brown Tax is unlikely to be applied in reality, mainly 
because it imposes an unacceptable level of risk on the Government. Further, since 
companies are aware that in the case of unsuccessful exploration the Government will 
subsidize their investment, they have less incentive to reduce costs and increase 
efficiency. 
15 See Chapter 8, China Sliding Scale Royalty 
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2.6.3.3. ANALYSIS OF RESOURCE RENT TAX 
RRT is a modified form of the Brown Tax, designed to capture economic rent and 
therefore considered a neutral tax. Furthermore, it is a progressive tax that responds 
automatically to a variety of outcomes. It is based on actual profitability hence avoids 
the problems of cost and price forecasting. 
As with any tax based on profits, RR T tends to share risk with the Government; if costs 
rise or oil prices fall taxable profits change in sympathy, as does the tax burden. Further, 
as the company only pays tax when a profit is made the payback period of the 
investment will be shorter than if a Royalty is applied. Authors like Garnaut & Ross 
(1975), Devereux & Morris (1983) and Kemp & Stephens (1997) argue that RRT is an 
appropriate tax instrument to collect economic rent without distorting investment 
decisions. Consequently, it may be appropriate to apply RRT at significantly higher rates 
to capture a bigger share of rent given it has less distorting effects at the margin than 
alternative forms of taxation (Garnaut & Ross, 1979). Fraser & Kingwell (1997) 
maintain that if a Government switches from Royalty to RRT, its tax revenue can be 
increased without affecting the optimal level of investment. 
Notwithstanding, RRT has some weaknesses. It is thought to give rise on occasion to 
over-investment, hence affecting the rate of resource depletion. Since it is targeted on 
economic rent it is difficult to raise large amounts of revenue and preserve neutrality, 
especially in view of the difficulty of determining economic rent (Smith, 1999). 
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In fact, problems result from the determination of the threshold at which RR T should be 
levied. The threshold represents the rate of return that investors require to undertake a 
project. In other words it represents the level of normal profit. However, this raises the 
issue of whether companies are motivated by the prospect of normal profit, since 
businesses usually seek to maximize profits. Furthermore, since the threshold reflects the 
investor's required rate of return, this can vary from one project to another. 
As regards the generation of early revenues, if the Government applies RRT it is 
unlikely to receive revenues until several years after first production. This is principally 
because the threshold rate has to be achieved before RRT becomes payable. 
Consequently, authors like Palmer (1980) argue that RRT is politically unacceptable 
since it may delay tax payments and can only be imposed in conjunction with 
corporation tax. 
2.6.3.4. ANALYSIS OF INCOME TAX 
Since Income Tax is a profit-based tax, it is also assumed to be neutral. Raja (1999), for 
instance, argues that Income Tax is typical examples of a neutral tax because when 
profits are zero Income Tax revenues are zero. This is unlike Royalty where if profits are 
zeros the tax revenue will be positive. 
Samuelson (1986) argues that a proportional Income Tax left undistorted the choice 
among projects of different economic lives and time-line profiles. Similarly, Musgrave 
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(1982) maintains that, with full and immediate loss offsets, an Income Tax is neutral in 
its impact on different projects. Although, Dasgputa and Stiglitz (1971) argue that no 
differential taxes should be used, (otherwise they will affect the allocative efficiency of 
resources), the authors advise the use of differential taxes (e.g. special petroleum taxes) 
if economic rent exists. If differential taxes are not feasible, high rates of corporate taxes 
can be applied to the energy sector to tax rent indirectly (Boskin & Robinson, 1985). 
Garnaut & Ross (1975) recommended an adjusted version of Income Tax, known as The 
Higher Rates of Proportional Income Tax (HRIT), which is more targeted on economic 
rent than on profits and requires payment of normal corporate Income Tax but at a 
higher rate than would be applicable to non-resource income. 
In contradiction, Devereux & Morris (1983) and, more recently, Kemp, Stephens & 
Masson (1997) argue that Income Tax is neither directly targeted at economic rent, nor 
is it progressive. Consequently, it ~ can distort investment decisions. Further, if tax 
reliefs are very large, a gold-plating effect may be induced whereby the investment in 
capital equipment may result in tax relief exceeding the original investment. 
The main debate surrounding the Income Tax is more likely to be focused on the 
immediate deductibility of costs. In practice, Income Tax allows for deduction of capital 
costs but over a period of time using depreciation, which can apply over the life of the 
project. In contrast to the Brown Tax and RRT, with Income Tax, investors usually do 
not recover their costs immediately, and this can result in early payments of revenues to 
the Government. 
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To conclude this section, it can be argued that each tax has some benefits and some 
limitations, as summarized in Table 2.1. As such, it is not surprising that several oil 
producing countries have in practice adopted a combination of two or more tax 
instruments in an attempt to capture the economic rent and minimize distortions in the 
investment decision. 
Table 2.1. Tax Instruments Summary 
Tax Instruments Advantages Limitations 
Royalty - Simple - Regressive 
- Early source of revenue - Non neutral 
- Not targeted on economic rent 
- Less risk sharing 
Brown Tax - Neutral - High risk on Government 
- Risk sharing - Late source of revenue 
- Targeted on economic rent - Over-investment 
- Progressive - Complicated 
Resource Rent - Neutral - Complicated 
Tax - Progressive - Requires knowledge of 
- Risk sharing threshold rate 
- Targeted on economic rent - Late source of revenue 
- Over investment 
Income Tax - Simple - Late source of revenue 
- Neutral - Gold plating 
-
Progressive - Not project related 
-
Risk sharing at the corporate level - Often no immediate 100% 
-
Homogeneous treatment relief for Capital Expenditures 
among industries 
2.6.4 INTERACTION OF TAX INSTRUMENTS 
Although a tax instrument can create distortions, it cannot be ruled out solely for this 
reason. The most appropriate tax instrument is one which creates the least distortion, and 
the more a tax is targeted towards economic rent, the less the distortion created. Often, 
the combination of several taxes is advisable in fact it is usually applied in oil producing 
countries, such as the UK and Australia. 
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Boskin & Robinson (1985), for instance, argue that two taxes with opposite effects can 
be used to counterbalance each other. Kemp & Rose (1983) maintain that the 
Government has to choose a combination of fiscal arrangements, but it should be careful 
in determining the relative weights given to different elements in the structure of the 
system. Garnaut & Ross (1979) argue in favor of a combination ofRRT and Income Tax 
where the company pays in each period the higher of either RRT or Income Tax. In this 
situation, the company will pay the Income Tax even in early years, since with RRT the 
payments are delayed. At the same time, when RRT applies, both Government and 
companies will benefit from the advantages of this tax. More recently, Lund (2002) 
maintains that it is optimal to combine a tax on gross revenue, such as Royalty, with a 
tax on economic rent. 
Stauffer & Gault (1985) argue that an ideal tax substantially reduces perceived risk 
without any loss of revenue to the company. In this sense, the authors compared the 
ideal tax to the following four fiscal packages: a Corporate Income Tax with a 
deductible Royalty, a Production-Sharing Contractl6, a carried interest system 
superimposed on a Corporate Income Tax and Royalty, and a rent skimming surtax 
superimposed on a Corporate Income Tax. The authors argue that while Royalty and 
Income Tax package is the highest risk scheme, the rent skimming is the lowest (i.e. it 
allows a high risk sharing). Carried interest systems are second while the Production-
Sharing Contract is third. 
16 Explained in detail in Chapter 8 
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However, despite its superiority to other tax systems, the rent skimming system is far 
from ideal as it allows larger returns to the larger or more profitable discoveries 
(Stauffer & Gault, 1985). 
2.7. SUMMARY & CONCLUSION 
The first step towards achieving the objectives of this thesis is to analyze the theoretical 
background for petroleum taxation. This is accomplished in this chapter, which 
consequently sets out the basis for an in-depth analysis of the UK fiscal regime. 
The analysis carried out in this chapter highlights the main functions and effects of 
petroleum taxation. The principal criteria of an ideal tax against which all tax 
instruments relating to petroleum extraction activity are normally assessed are also 
developed. Six criteria are analyzed, namely efficiency, neutrality, equity, risk sharing, 
stability and simplicity - all of which are desirable when designing a tax system. A tax 
targeted on economic rent is often recommended, as it is believed to meet the optimum 
criteria. Subsequently, both the concept and type of economic rent are addressed since 
these have important implications for taxation policy. Additionally, an analysis of the 
main tax instruments proposed in previous studies is undertaken. 
In this regard, several complications are identified. In fact, designing an optimal tax 
system that meets different considerations, some of which are contradictory, vary 
between countries and evolve over time is a complicated task (Bhattacharyya, 1998). 
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This is particularly true in the case of petroleum taxation, which is a complex issue in its 
own right, both in terms of economic theory and political economy (Miller, 2000). 
Natural resources, such as petroleum, have special characteristics that complicate the 
design of an optimal tax system. Oil is an exhaustible resource, with an uncertain level 
of reserves before any investment takes place. It is both a raw material input as well as a 
final product with few substitutes. 
More importantly, as this chapter shows, the main source of complication lies in the 
difficulty of determining economic rent and the distinction between the various types of 
rents, namely resource rent and quasi rent. Another source of complication is the 
inevitable compromise between the various criteria of an optimal tax. Such difficulties 
make it complex to design and impose a tax that captures the resource rent exactly. 
None of the tax instruments proposed in previous studies represents an optimal tax. The 
main tax instruments often suggested are Royalty, Brown Tax, RRT and Income Tax. 
Each tax has both advantages and limitations. But, although a tax instrument can create 
distortions, it cannot be ruled out solely for this reason. The most appropriate tax 
instrument is one which creates the least distortion, and the more a tax is targeted 
towards economic rent, the less the distortion created. 
This leads the author to agree with the findings of Stauffer & Gault (1985), who 
maintain that the concept of an ideal tax is useful primarily as a paradigm against which 
to test actual or proposed fiscal systems. 
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Nevertheless, it can be argued that although compromise seems to be inevitable and an 
ideal tax not practical, the trade off can be improved and a balance can be reached in 
terms of generating a fair share of revenue for the Government while keeping the 
country attractive for investment. 
The examination of the vanous tax criteria as well as the major petroleum tax 
instruments leads the author to focus on the tax instruments used in the development of 
the UK fiscal regime that applies to oil activity in the North Sea. The analysis and 
qualitative evaluation of these instruments is the subject of the next two chapters. A 
quantitative assessment is then introduced and developed in Chapters 5-8. The 
evaluation is carried out in the light of the five chief criteria of an ideal tax, as discussed 
in this chapter17. 
17 In the remainder of this thesis, the efficiency criterion is combined with neutrality. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
EVOLUTION OF THE UK PETROLEUM FISCAL REGIME 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter established the background against which the taxation of oil on the 
Exploration and Production (E&P) activity in the UKCS can be studied and evaluated. 
In order to carry out the evaluation, the following step is to study the establishment of 
the regime in 1975 and its evolution from its beginnings through to the Budget changes 
introduced in 2002/03. This is the principal objective of this chapter, which analyses the 
basic structure of the UK petroleum fiscal regime and subsequent amendments thereto. 
The chapter also studies the reasons for such amendments and highlights the resulting 
controversies. Such a study is essential to providing the fundamental framework for 
understanding the drivers behind the current tax system. Further, from the analysis of the 
differing arguments used in the debate, and which has followed from the various 
changes, conclusions can be derived as to the nature and characteristics of the fiscal 
system. 
Oil is one of the UK's most important natural resources and the oil industry is of 
particular significance to the UK economy. The discovery of oil brought something new 
and rich to the British economy (Nelsen, 1991). As discussed in Chapter 1 (p.8), the oil 
industry is and has been a vital component of the UK economy, mainly in terms of 
significant investments, job creation and generation of revenue. 
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The role of the Government has been to set the framework within which the private 
sector can pursue the development of the UK's petroleum resources and to ensure that an 
appropriate share of the associated wealth is secured for the nation. The UKCS fiscal 
regime is one of the principal mechanisms used to capture the economic benefits of the 
UKCS for the nation. Since the commencement of production, more than £ 1 06bn in 
taxes has flowed to the UK Treasury (DTI, 2003). 
The structure of the current fiscal regime was first set out in a 1974 White Paper, and 
was formally legislated through the Oil Taxation Act (OTA) of 1975. The system 
consisted of three main instruments, namely Royalty, Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT) 
and Corporation Tax (CT). At the outset, the Government had two key objectives. These 
were to secure a fairer share of profits for the nation and to maximise the gain to the 
balance of payments while ensuring a suitable return for oil companies on their 
investment (Inland Revenue, 2003a). In fact, the 1960s were marked by minimal 
Government intervention in the offshore petroleum industry. However, the discovery of 
significant quantities of oil on the UKCS, the worldwide trend toward greater national 
control of petroleum resources and higher crude oil prices all contributed to a dramatic 
transformation of the petroleum policies established during the 1960s (Nelsen, 1991). 
Although the OTA of 1975 established the petroleum fiscal regime for the UKCS, it has 
been frequently reviewed and amended. This was caused by a combination of factors 
such as the volatility of oil prices, the international competitiveness of the UK as an oil 
producing province and latterly the maturity of the UKCS. 
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The UK Government enjoyed its greatest intake of revenue from oil companies during 
the early 1980s, but it was under oil companies pressure to ease the tax burden even at 
this point in time (Nelsen, 1991). This pressure continued until 2002, with the level of 
Government take gradually falling from approximately 87 per cent in the 1980s to just 
30 per cent in the mid 1990's. In April 2002, however, the Government increased its 
take for the first time since 1983 through the imposition of a 10 per cent Supplementary 
Charge on the Corporation Tax based income. 
The major changes highlighted above are analysed in detail in this chapter. Section 3.2 
studies the development of the fiscal regime between 1975 and 2002, including a brief 
description of the characteristics of the main tax instruments18 . Section 3.3 focuses on 
the debate arising from the principal amendments, it further analyses the advantages and 
disadvantages of each of the tax instruments, taking into consideration the arguments 
raised in previous studies undertaken in this area. Section 3.4 discusses the major 
findings arising from this analysis and conclusions are derived. Section 3.5 includes the 
final remarks. 
3.2. EVOLUTION OF THE UK NORTH SEA TAX SYSTEM 
This section charts the evolution of the UK oil taxation since 1975. It proceeds by 
describing the four main evolutionary phases, starting with the originating legislation 
enacted in 1975, and the following amendments undertaken in 1983, 1993 and 2002. 
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The section describes the principal tax instruments19 and highlights the main factors 
leading to the four major changes that affected the level of tax take and the structure of 
the system itself. 
3.2.1. FOUNDATION OF THE CURRENT REGIME 
In July 1974, the Government published a White Paper20, setting out two principal 
objectives with respect to the taxation ofE&P activities on the UKCS. These were firstly 
to secure a fairer share of profits for the nation and secondly to assert greater public 
control (Nelsen, 1991). In this White paper, the basic structure of the current oil taxation 
system was established. This was subsequently legislated for in the Oil Taxation Act in 
197521 . The system was based on three elements, namely Royalty, PRT and CT. 
3.2.1.1. ROYALTY 
In extractive industries, Royalty is a payment to a landowner, the Crown, for the right, 
granted under the license, to extract oil and gas22 (Inland Revenue, 2003b). 
18 A detailed numeric computation of the tax instruments is carried out in Chapter 5. 
19 A detailed computation is provided in Chapter 5. 
20 Entitled "United Kingdom Offshore Oil & Gas Policy" (Inland Revenue, 2003) 
21 Before 1975, there were two elements of the UK North Sea fiscal regime: Royalty charged at 12.5% and 
Corporation Tax charged at 50%. The Oil Taxation Act (1975) established the Petroleum Revenue Tax 
and the main regulations governing the administration of the tax (National Audit Office, 2000). 
22 Royalty is not charged on a field but on the license. In general, there is no difference between the field 
and the license but there are several cases where a license covers more than one field or where a field 
extends into the area covered by more than one license (Inland Revenue, 2003). For reasons of simplicity, 
it will be assumed that there is no difference between the field and the license. 
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In the UK, the Royalty rate was fixed at 12.5 per cent on the gross revenues of each field 
with a deduction for Conveying and Treating (C&T) costs. These costs represent the 
cost of bringing the petroleum ashore and its initial treatment. Royalty is based on a six-
month period and is administered by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) rather 
than the Inland Revenue who have responsibility for the other tax instruments. 
3.2.1.2. PETROLEUM REVENUE TAX 
PRT is a special petroleum profits tax. It is assessed on a field basis, hence a company 
with taxable losses in one field cannot offset them against profits in another field. This is 
because each field is treated separately under a "ring fence" arrangement. As a result, all 
fields are treated equally irrespective of ownership. PRT is charged on a half-yearly 
basis, initially at a rate of 45 per cent, on the value of oil and gas produced. This broadly 
equates to receipts less the expenditure incurred in developing and operating the field. 
PRT was introduced to capture economic rent from the more profitable fields. Less 
profitable projects are shielded from the tax as a result of various allowances and reliefs 
(Inland Revenue, 2003b). Three main reliefs are identified: 
1. Uplift, which is an additional allowance of 75 per cent to Capital Expenditures 
(CAPEX), so companies will not start paying PRT until they have at least 
recovered 175 per cent of their CAPEX. 
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11. Oil Allowance, which allows one million tonnes (Mt) of oil per annum to be 
exempt from PRT up to a cumulative maximum of ten Mt. As a result, PRT is 
unlikely to be payable on fields with reserves of less than 100 mmbbls. The Oil 
Allowance was introduced to help the development of marginal fields (Inland 
Revenue, 2003b). 
111. Safeguard, which limits the PRT liability in any chargeable period to 80 per cent 
of the amount by which gross profit exceeds 15 per cent of cumulative 
expenditure. Safeguard was introduced to ensure that, while it applies, PR T-
calculated after taking account of all other reliefs- does not reduce a participator's 
return on capital in any chargeable period to 15 per cent or less. As such, the 
Safeguard limits PRT liability for a part of the field's life and allows fields to 
achieve a certain level of return on investment before they incur any PR T 
liability (Inland Revenue, 2003b). 
PRT is similar to the Resource Rent Tax (analysed in Chapter 2). However, the two 
taxes differ in their respective treatment of expenditure carried forward for offset against 
future profits. RR T allows such expenditure to be carried forward in real terms, together 
with an interest mark up, while PRT compensates for the absence of this relief by 
allowing Uplift to apply to most development expenditures23 (Bond, Devereux & 
Saunders, 1987). 
23 This difference is explained in more detail in Chapter 8, where Australia PRRT is compared with the 
UKPRT. 
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3.2.1.3. CORPORATION TAX 
CT was initially set at 52 per cent on company gross profits. Exploration costs were 
deemed fully deductible, while development costs were made subject to various tax 
depreciation allowances. CT is the standard company tax on profits that applies to all 
companies operating in the UK. However, in normal CT applications a company can 
offset losses generated by one activity against income generated by its other activities. In 
the case ofUKCS E&P activity, there is a ring fence that prohibits the use of losses from 
other activities to reduce the profits originating from within the UKCS ring fence. 
Conversely, losses and capital allowances inside the ring fence may be set against 
income arising outside the ring fence. 
3.2.1.4. TIGHTENING OF THE SYSTEM (1978-1982) 
Following the increase in oil price in the mid 1970s, the Government implemented 
measures to increase the level of total tax take on UKCS activities. In 1978, it increased 
the PRT rate to 60 per cent, reduced the uplift allowance to 35 per cent and reduced the 
oil allowance from ~ Mi. to 500,000 M!. per year, with a maximum allowance of 5 
Mt. In 1980, the PRT rate was raised to 70 per cent, thereby increasing the combined 
marginal rate to some 87 per cent. Further, a new tax, Supplementary Petroleum Duty 
(SPD), was introduced. 
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Like Royalty, SPD was charged on a field by field basis by reference to 20 per cent of 
gross revenues less an oil allowance of one Mt. per annum. SPD was applied in the early 
producing life of field and was payable on monthly basis. 
3.2.2. ABOLITION OF ROYALTY (1983) 
In 198111982, the reduction in both oil prices and declining levels of development 
activity, combined with continuing industry pressure, led the Government to consider 
some adjustments to the fiscal regime. In 1983, for the first time relaxations in the 
system were introduced, chiefly to encourage exploration and appraisal activity and to 
encourage the development of new fields (Inland Revenue, 2003a). 
In 1983, SPD was abolished and replaced by Advance Petroleum Revenue Tax (APRT). 
Like SPD, APRT was imposed on gross revenues less an allowance of one Mt per year. 
The rate applied was 20 per cent and payments were to be made on monthly basis. 
However, unlike SPD, APRT was not a new tax but rather an instrument for accelerating 
the payment of PRT. It consisted of an advance payment of PRT that would be offset 
against the actual PRT payments due later in the life of a field. Additionally, the PRT 
rate was increased to 75 per cent. 
In the same year (1983), the Government further amended the regime by abolishing 
Royalty on fields receiving development consent after April 1982. 
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The Oil Allowance against PRT was restored to one Mt. per year for a maximum often 
years. In addition, a cross-field allowance was introduced with respect to PRT, 
permitting up to ten per cent of the development costs of a new field to be offset against 
the PRT liabilities of another field. By the end of 1986, APRT was abolished and CT 
reduced to 35 per cent. 
3.2.3. ABOLITION OF PETROLEUM REVENUE TAX (1993) 
In 1993, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced in his budget speech that "as the 
North Sea has developed, the PRT regime has begun to look increasingly 
anachronistic ... As profits in many existing fields attract a marginal tax rate of over 83 
per cent, there is little incentive for companies to keep costs under control or for 
additional investment in existing fields" COGJ, 1993c). Consequently, PRT was reduced 
to 50 per cent on existing fields receiving development approval before April 1993 and 
abolished on all fields receiving development consent after that date. 
3.2.4. IMPOSITION OF SUPPLEMENTARY CHARGE (2002) 
In 1998, following the increase in oil prices in 1996/7, the Government proposed two 
alternative fiscal reforms. One was the application of a supplementary corporation tax on 
upstream activity profits. The other was the re-introduction of PRT on fields receiving 
development consents after March 1993. 
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In the former case, a single tax would be applied for the majority of fields and the 
overall corporation tax would be 35-40 per cent, the highest since 1986. Under either 
option, the Government intended to abolish the 12.5 per cent Royalty on production 
(Rutledge & Wright, 2000). Following a sharp fall in oil prices in 1998, these proposals 
were dropped. However, after 1998 circumstances changed when oil prices exceeded 
$30 a barrel and North Sea production reached record levels. The discovery of the 
Buzzard oil field, which was the UK' s biggest new oil find in almost a decade (circa 300 
mmbbls), brought a positive outlook as regards the North Sea oil reserves (DT!, 2002). 
In 2002, the Government introduced new changes to oil taxation In the UKCS. The 
changes were very close to one of the reform packages proposed in 1998. A 10 per cent 
Supplementary Charge on profits subject to CT was applied in addition to the normal 30 
per cent rate, as a revenue raising measure (Hendersen, 2004). The charge is calculated 
on the same basis as normal CT, but there is no deduction for financing costs against the 
Supplementary Charge (DT!, 2003). Additionally, a 100 per cent capital investment 
allowance was introduced against both general Corporation Tax and the Supplementary 
Charge, instead of the 25 per cent allowance previously available. Furthermore, the 
Royalty was abolished on older fields that had received development consent before 
1983, in an attempt to encourage fuller exploitation of reserves from those fields24 . 
24 The 2002 changes are not the last changes applied to the UK petroleum fiscal regi me. Other 
amendments were made or proposed but they go beyond the scope of this study. In 2003, the Go ernment 
abolished PRT on tariffs receipts . In fact , a field which is liable to PRT and pro ides services in relation 
to another field , has to be pay PRT on the tari ffs recei ed from the new field . However, with the 2003 
changes, such payments are abolished on new business (Inland Revenue, 2003). Since a major as umption 
in this thesis is the use of one field (See Chapter 5, Section 5.3.1), such a change is not incorporated in the 
analysis. Further and very recentl y, the Government proposed to enhance tax relief on exp loration co ts 
for new entrants to the orth Sea (Petroleum Revie\ , 2004). 
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3.3. CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING UK OIL TAXATION 
Chapter 2 concludes that it is difficult to design an ideal tax system and that each tax 
instrument when applied to oil activity has both advantages and disadvantages. 
Consequently, it is not surprising to find considerable debate surrounding the principal 
amendments to UK oil taxation policy. The remainder of this section summarizes the 
controversies relating to the structure of the fiscal regime in the UK. It studies the 
arguments for and against the main tax instruments, as discussed in previous studies. 
3.3.1. ROYALTY AND THE 1983 CHANGES 
The abolition of Royalty on fields that received development consent after 1982 
generated two opposing views, although the majority welcomed the changes. 
Several authors like Moose (1982), Devereux & Morris (1983), Bond, Devereux & 
Saunders (1987), Kemp (1990), Nelsen (1991), Kemp & Stephens (1997) and Martin 
(1997) argue the inappropriateness of imposing Royalty and, in particular, its negative 
effect on the development of marginal fields. According to Moose (1982), the 1975 
fiscal system imposed such a high burden on marginal fields that if they were to be 
developed either crude oil prices would have to rise or the UK tax system would have to 
be modified to reduce the fiscal burden. 
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Devereux & Morris (1983) emphasize the inappropriate revenue base of Royalty, 
making it an unsuitable method for taxing mineral exploitation. This was implicitly 
recognized by the Government when new fields were exempted from Royalty in 1983 
(Bond, Devereux & Saunders, 1987). Kemp (1990) describes the 1975 fiscal package as 
regressive in relation to economic rent, mainly because Royalty is regressive as regards 
profits. However, the post 1983 package is described as wholly profit related and 
"constitutes a major structural improvement, which has improved the investment 
environment in the UK" (Kemp, 1990, p. 621). Nelsen (1991) further emphasizes the 
non-neutral aspect of Royalty. The author argues that the abolition of Royalty is an 
important step towards achieving neutrality of the regime. "The application of only PRT 
and CT represented an entirely new approach by Government to the taxation of oil 
profits. It signaled that taxation would be used to secure a full share for the Exchequer of 
the substantial economic rent expected from UKCS oil production (Nelsen, 1991, 
p.143). Kemp & Stephens (1997) maintain that Royalty generates a high fiscal risk since 
it is not fully profit-related and impacts more severely on less profitable fields, 
principally because costs are not allowed as deductions. Martin (1997) argues that the 
abolition of Royalty is the main reason that led to the peak in oil production in 
1984/1985. 
The abolition of Royalty was particularly welcomed by the oil industry. In 1991, 
Texaco's president argued that the changes would provide a substantial encouragement 
to Exploration and Development activities and create incentives for long-term 
investments (Bijur, 1991). 
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Despite such statements, the abolition of Royalty met with some criticisms. Rowland & 
Hann (1986) argue that the abolition of Royalty, while maintaining PRT and CT, does 
not alter the fundamental deficiencies of the UKCS tax system. Mabro (1994) compares 
not charging a Royalty on oil to a situation where the Government handed out buildings 
rent free to businesses and simply charged them corporate tax on their profits25 . In a 
more general discussion, Raja (1999) describes not imposing Royalty "as senseless" 
because "a resource being extracted from a country without a charge" (pS). 
Mommer (2001) argues that Royalty is the only instrument that can make the UK fiscal 
regime a more proprietorial regime26, providing more control for the Government over 
oil activity. Recently, Wright (2003) maintains that "sticking with upstream taxes which 
guarantee at least some income whatever the oil price, as Royalties do, is a sensible 
strategy. In this way, the tax may be transformed into an accepted cost of production 
which ensures that the resource owner is unambiguously compensated for the depletion 
of an exhaustible resource" (p.22). 
3.3.2. PETROLEUM REVENUE TAX AND THE 1993 CHANGES 
As with the abolition of Royalty, the abolition of PRT on fields that received 
development consent after 1992 generated controversy. However, the divergence in 
views was more pronounced. 
25 As referred to in Miller (2000) 
26 This point is further explained in chapter 6. 
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Many authors favoured PR T as an instrument to capture economic rent on oil related 
activity and strongly criticized its abolition, unlike others who emphasized the 
limitations ofPRT. 
Among the first group, Zhang (1995) emphasizes the neutrality ofPRT and argues that if 
the Government maintained its 1987 share of UKCS profits, revenues would have been 
almost three times their actual levels. Accordingly, the author concludes that the 
abolition of PRT in 1993 resulted from either a weakness in Government planning or 
because of unseen distortions. Kemp & Stephens (1997) maintain that PR T was almost 
neutral and efficient despite the high marginal rates of tax on oil revenues when all 
allowances were exhausted. The authors further argue that PR T was progressive in 
relation to variations in the oil price and development costs. Similarly, Kemp, Stephens 
& Masson (1997) argue that "PRT could collect a share of economic rents from fields 
without necessarily endangering the viability of a development project .. .it is progressive 
on its impact on profits" (p.117). 
In agreement with such a view, Mommer (1999) also argues that PRT is the main excess 
profit collecting device in the UK, and its several reliefs "ensure that PRT cannot, even 
accidentally, cut into the normal profits to which the companies are entitled" (p.15). 
More recently, Miller et al (2000) propose that the Government should re-impose PRT 
on the exempt oil fields at the 50 per cent rate. 
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From an industry perspective, UKOOA (1993) argues that the abolition of PRT reliefs 
can slow UKCS exploration and discourage investment. The association debates that 
such a change will, in particular, affect small compames as a consequence of the 
removal of cross-field allowance. According to UKOOA, this will also affect 
Government revenues, since in the long term, reserves will shrink and there will be 
fewer developments and less construction, hence the Government will be the big loser 
(OGJ, 1993b). 
Taylor (1993), of Esso UK PIc, argues that two opposing effects resulted from the 
changes in PRT. On one hand, the reduction in PRT to 50 per cent on fields that received 
development consent before 1993 has a positive impact. On the other hand, the reduction 
of exploration expenditures and the loss of cross-field allowance lead to a reduction in 
the development of new and small fields. Nevertheless, Taylor concludes that the overall 
impact is beneficial to the industry (OGJ, 1993a). 
Among the group that highlight the limitations of PRT, two views can be distinguished. 
The first emphasizes the problems of PRT but suggests an improvement, whereas the 
second advocates its complete removal. 
Authors such as Devereux & Morris (1983), Bond, Devereux & Saunders (1987), Kemp 
(1990) and Kemp & Stevens (1997) relate the main weakness of PRT to its imposition 
alongside Royalties and CT, both of which are distortionary instruments. Bond, 
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Devereux & Saunders (1987) describe this characteristic as a "serious deficiency" of 
PRT (p.49). 
A second major weakness is attributed to the complicated structure of PRT, although in 
its original state it was a fairly simple tax (Devereux & Morris, 1983). Rowland (1983) 
criticizes the way the progressive aspect is applied to PRT. The author argues that 
progressivity is attempted not by means of a suitable rate structure but by means of 
arbitrary allowances, which does not insolate the returns for those fields needing most 
protection. "The allowances do not protect the returns on the fields most needing 
protection and the North Sea tax structure burdened the less profitable finds while giving 
relatively favourable tax treatment to the richer oilfields" (Rowland, 1983, p.235). 
Rowland & Hann (1986) conclude that PRT has a regressive aspect in that its base does 
not grow in line with profits. The authors argue that progressivity should be automatic 
without changes being made especially structural changes to the allowances. Bond, 
Devereux & Morris (1987) maintain that the PRT allowances are intended to be of 
disproportionate assistance to relatively unprofitable fields but in practice this is not 
always the case. Robinson & Morgan (1978) and Robinson & Rowland (1978) conclude 
that PR T is in many ways a poor form of taxation. "It is a complicated device and could 
be abandoned" (Robinson & Morgan, 1978, p.20 1). Robinson & Morgan (1978) argue 
that PRT is a poor source of revenues, mainly as a result of the Safeguard27 . 
27 See definition on p0580 The computation ofthe Safeguard is explained in detail in Chapter 50 
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In fact, according to the Inland Revenue (2000), some oil companies gained an unfair 
tax advantage by delaying their claims for operating expenditure relief while benefiting 
from the Safeguard provision. By deferring expenditure claims to a subsequent period, 
when Safeguard no longer applied, the deferred claim had a direct effect in reducing the 
PR T payable. This is contrary to the intent of Safeguard relief (Inland Revenue, 2000). 
Rutledge & Wright (2000) argue that the three main PR T reliefs- Uplift, Oil Allowance 
and Safeguard are "equally important weaknesses" (p.5). The authors maintain that the 
Uplift postpones PRT payment and the Oil Allowance is based on the assumption that 
small oil fields are necessarily less profitable. The Safeguard is considered as the 
"strangest provision", since it is based on the presumption that the amount of tax paid 
should not exceed 80 per cent of the excess of gross profits over the 15 per cent return 
on capital (p.6). 
Also, the Government expressed its view regarding the abolition of PRT. According to 
the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, PRT is an expensive tax that cost the Exchequer 
an estimated £200M in 1991 and 1992. In addition, by allowing companies a larger 
share of the profits generated, the proposed reforms are intended to reduce the apparent 
disincentives to cost cutting and future investment in existing fields (Inland Revenue, 
2000). 
Kemp (1990) had previously raised the issue that the uplift provision encouraged more 
capital-intensive exploitation methods than would a neutral scheme. The author argues 
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that the interaction of this allowance with the Safeguard provision meant that gold-
plating incentives can occur. Martin (1997) maintains that the abolition of PRT is the 
main reason behind the 1995 peak in oil production of 2.49 mmbbl/d. This result 
underlines the non-neutral aspect of PRT. Finally, Watkins (2001) argues that the 
number of modifications to which PRT has been subjected are "a testimony to its 
clumsiness" (p.13). 
3.3.3. CORPORATION TAX, SUPPLEMENTARY TAX AND THE 2002 
AMENDMENTS 
CT has both advantages and disadvantages, as highlighted in Chapter 2, and 
consequently there is also a divergence of opinions concerning its imposition. This 
section studies the debate surrounding the application of both CT on oil activity in the 
UKCS and the imposition of the 10 per cent Supplementary Tax (ST) in April 2002, 
since the ST is computed on a similar base to CT. 
Among the authors who argue in favour of CT, Robinson & Morgan (1978) maintain 
that a tax applied on total company profits from UKCS activities is an appropriate 
instrument. The authors argue that companies can adjust their operations so as to 
improve the after-tax returns on high-cost projects, rather than dealing with single fields 
as is the case with PRT. Raja (1999) emphasizes the neutral aspect of CT and describes 
the UK regime based solely on CT as an example of a highly neutral tax regime. 
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Also, Beckman (1998) argues that CT is simple to administer, in fact it is the simplest 
way for the Government to raise revenues from E&P companies. 
From the Government perspective, imposing an Income Tax, such as CT combined with 
the ST, is intended to encourage long-term investment without providing better tax 
reliefs than those available to other industries and, as such, prevent unwelcome 
repercussion effects (Inland Revenue, 2003a). 
Opposing such arguments authors like Devereux & Morris (1983), Kemp (1990), Kemp 
& Stephens (1997), Rutledge & Wright (1998) argue that CT has an inappropriate tax 
base, which does not capture economic rent. Devereux & Morris (1983) contend that the 
severity of the tax burden for a field depends on which companies are involved because 
capital allowances from one field can be used to offset tax liabilities on another. Kemp 
(1990) argues that CT is not directly related to economic rent, as it does not allow a 
normal return on investment as a cost. Concurring with such a finding, Kemp & 
Stephens (1997) maintain that CT is non-neutral and can create distortions because it 
fails to distinguish between normal profit (i.e. the required return on capital invested) 
and pure profit or economic rent. Rowland & Hann (1986) underline the non-progressive 
aspect of CT. The authors argue that CT collects proportionately more from each field 
when prices are lower and that unprofitable fields receive a greater CT burden on unit 
profits than do their more profitable counterparts. However, it is important to stress that 
the authors assert that the regressive nature of CT is accentuated because PRT, a non-
progressive tax, is itself a deduction against CT. 
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Rutledge & Wright (1998) emphasize the inability of CT to capture economic rent. 
Consequently, the authors argue that imposing only CT on E&P activity does not 
generate a fair share of revenues for the Government and that it makes the UK fiscal 
regime the weakest in the world. Supporting such findings, Miller (2000) argues that oil 
companies are not paying their fair share of taxes. According to Miller (2000), before 
April 2002, Government revenues were far below the levels of the 1980s. In 1984/85, 
Government revenues reached a peak of £12.2bn. Tax receipts subsequently declined 
with the fall in oil prices to a low of £lbn. in 1991/92. Although the tax receipts 
recovered to £3.3bn. in 1997/98, they dropped again to £1.6bn. in 1998/99. Further, 
when companies' profits reached a peak of over £18bn. in the mid-1980s, the 
Government take was about £12bn. almost 60 per cent. When in 1996/97, companies' 
profits reached another peak of about £16bn. Government revenue was less than £4bn. 
with companies paying only quarter of their gross profits in tax (Miller, 2000). 
The industry response to the 2002 fiscal package was divided. Some companies, such as 
Talisman, welcomed the new changes and argued that the increase in the tax rate was 
more than offset by the current year decrease in taxable income, as a result of the 100 
per cent capital allowance write-down (PR Newswire, 2002). In contrast, other 
companies, such as BP and ExxonMobil, maintain that the changes to capital allowances 
and the abolition of Royalties are not expected to come close to offsetting the ST 
(Macalister, 2002). Leith (2002) argues that with hostile environments like that of the 
North Sea, the 2002 fiscal changes left companies feeling betrayed and raised concerns 
about when fiscal stability will be achieved. 
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Industry representatives, such as UKOOA, argue that there is no room for additional 
taxes. According to UKOOA (2002), prices of between $14 to $18 a barrel are needed in 
the UKCS to make a return. This is because the majority of the large oil fields are now 
discovered and only small fields remain, which are more expensive to develop on a unit 
cost basis hence less profitable. UKOOA (2002) maintains that the April 2002 changes 
can adversely affect smaller companies, jobs and investments, as well as generating an 
unstable environment in which companies must operate. 
3.4. THE UK CONTINENTAL SHELF FISCAL REGIME 
This section is divided into two parts. The first part analyses the principal findings 
derived from the arguments raised in previous studies, regarding the UK oil regime. The 
second part discusses the current mature state of the UKCS province, as it challenges the 
development of the fiscal policy. 
3.4.1. ANALYSIS 
The findings of this chapter are not different from those of Chapter 2, with respect to the 
individual components of the UK fiscal regime, namely Royalty, PRT and CT. In fact, in 
their original context, these taxes have the characteristics of a Royalty, Resource Rent 
Tax and an Income Tax, respectively. 
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Consequently, from the balance of arguments raised in preVIOUS studies and from 
Chapter 2 findings, the main conclusions regarding the individual taxes are presented as 
follows. 
Royalty is a simple instrument to administer and it generates early revenues for the 
Government. However, it is regressive, non-neutral and not targeted on economic 
rent. 
PRT is a special petroleum tax, targeted on economic rent. It allows a certain return 
before any tax is paid. The nature of its allowances and deductions ensure that it is 
progressive. Nevertheless, it is a complicated tax and tends to delay fiscal receipts. 
CT is simple and applies without exception to all industries in the UK. However, it is 
levied on a company basis and, similar to PRT, it tends to delay fiscal revenues. 
Conclusions can further be derived regarding the overall fiscal package that applies to 
the UKCS. As the previous section demonstrated, significant controversy surround the 
regime and its main changes. On balance, when the UK fiscal regime is assessed against 
the criteria of an ideal system as discussed in Chapter 2, the following arguments are 
applicable. 
Firstly, the UK fiscal regime lacks stability, as it has been subjected to frequent changes. 
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This criticism has often been made in previous studies, as no other sector in the UK 
economy has been subject to such instability (Rowland & Hann, 1987). Since 1975, 
"more changes have been recorded due to tax legislation than price changes" (UKOG, 
1984, p.1). Robinson & Rowland (1978) argue that the Government introduced several 
changes before the practical operation of the system can be observed. Such a weakness 
questions the effectiveness of the regime and its ability to cope effectively with different 
economic conditions, such as changing oil prices. Further, even though the regime was 
more risk sharing in its initial structure, its various amendments increased political risk 
and reduced investor confidence. 
According to Inland Revenue (2003a), the many adjustments made to the regIme 
reflected the changes that were taking place on the UKCS, such as a decreasing field 
size distribution and quite sharp changes in the price of oil. In fact, when oil prices 
began to increase from 1973 to 1981, PRT was increased from 45 per cent to 60 per 
cent, and later to 70 per cent in 1980. When the oil price reached a peak in 1981, SPD 
was introduced. A relaxation of the system came about after the decline in oil price 
starting in 1983. 
From the balance of arguments, it can be concluded that some degree of flexibility is 
appropriate to the regime so that it has the capability to adjust to changes in the external 
environment. 
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However, it is also argued that regime modifications should not be undertaken on a 
frequent basis, be of a major or structural nature nor undertaken without advanced 
warning. Oil prices are volatile and consequently it is almost impossible to track every 
change. This explains why several authors have criticized the UK Government for 
changing the regime in response to upward movements in crude oil prices. For instance, 
Rowland (1983) describes such measures as "an ill-conceived move based on a myopic 
view of how the oil industry operates, of the factors affecting the oil industry and of the 
burdens imposed by the cumbersome North Sea tax structure" (p.202). Noreng (1980) 
argues that the UKCS fiscal regime is not sensitive to changes in oil prices while Nelsen 
(1991) maintains that while it appears that both the UK and Norway imposed a tax 
system in response to oil price changes, it seems that this was true only for Norway. In 
the UK, however, the objective was often to increase the ,Treasury's take from the 
UKCS. 
The second important conclusion that can be derived from the analysis of previous 
studies' arguments is that the UK fiscal regime is complicated and several authors 
consider such complications unnecessary. This is particularly true for PRT and the 
complex nature of the differing reliefs and allowances available. 
Thirdly, the regIme is argued to lack neutrality, as it can affect decisions like the 
development of marginal fields, early abandonment or reduction in exploration activity. 
Royalty, in particular, is argued as being a typical non-neutral tax. 
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In fact, after its abolition in 1983, exploration and appraisal expenditures rose from 
£816M. in 1987 to £1,955M. in 1991, and between 1989 and 1993 the UK had the 
largest number of new field wildcat wells drilled (516) in the world (UKOOA, 2001). 
This increase in activity was accompanied by an increase in Government revenues, as 
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The abolition of PRT in 1993 also had a similar positive effect on both the levels of 
activity and tax revenues. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that PRT generates the 
largest share of revenues for the Government compared with Royalty and CT. It has 
produced almost £42bn. for the Exchequer since it was introduced in 1975, compared 
with £23.2bn. from CT and £20.2bn. from Royalty (NAO, 2000). 
The generation of revenues for the Government leads to the fourth conclusion, also 
derived from the arguments raised in previous studies. 
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It can be seen from Figure 3.1 that tax revenues reached a peak in 1985/6 at about 
£11.5bn. but are currently much lower. In the early 1990s Government receipts from 
UKCS activity fell to their lowest levels. Production on the other hand initially peaked in 
1985 at 127.6bnt, but by 1995 it had risen to 129.9bnt and finally, in 1999, it peaked at 
137bnt. 
This raises the issue of whether the Government is receiving an appropriate share of 
revenues. Miller et al. (2000) argue that even the pre-1983 regime was not generating a 
fair share of revenues, the reason being that companies do not pay for licenses to extract 
oil: these licenses were and still are "allocated free after a beauty contest" (p.l). 
From these findings, it is clear that the fiscal regime applying to the UKCS suffers from 
several limitations that go back to its beginnings in 1975. The original regime was 
weakened by the many changes introduced in a relatively short space of time, adding 
further to the administrative burden. 
The Select Committee on Energy (1982) highlights such limitations and argues that "the 
tax system, at its current level of complexity and frequency of change, has now passed 
the point at which its impact can be said to be broadly neutral and a substantial risk 
exists that development is being discouraged. ,,29 
28 Data Source: Inland Revenue (2003) & DTI (2003). 
29 As referred to in Rowland (1983), p.l. 
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3.4.1. A CHALLENGING SITUATION 
Since 1975, the UKCS has undergone major change, which has had important 
consequences mainly on the Government fiscal policy. One fact that clearly emerges is 
the maturity of the UKCS. "North Sea oil, the precious resource that has contributed 
hundreds of billions of pounds to the UK economy, is now slipping into history" 
(Reuters, 2004, p.1). 
Over the last few years, the UKCS· has experienced an increase in the number of 
producing fields, which have increased three-fold since 1985. In 2001, 21 new field 
development projects were approved by the DTI, more than double the number approved 
in 2000 (UKOOA, 2001). As might be expected, however, since oil was first discovered 
on the UKCS the average size of discoveries has fallen greatly. 
The larger fields (such as Forties, Brent and Ninian) , with an average size above 
200mmboe, were discovered in the early phases of exploration and were brought into 
production between 1975-1979. The fields found during subsequent periods have 
become progressively smaller, with an average discovery size of 25 to 30mmboe and an 
average commercial discovery size of 64mmboe. By 1996, well over half the fields in 
the UKCS were in the small category 30 (Sem & Ellerman, 1997). 
30 Appendix A illustrates the general trend reflecting the general decrease in the size of fields brought into 
production in the UKCS over the period 1975-2000. 
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The production from the 13 original large fields has fallen substantially, although they 
still contribute more than 15 per cent of total UKCS production. By comparison, the 69 
fields that were discovered between 1995-1999, produce in total less than half of the oil 
coming from the first fields (Zittel, 2001). UK oil production peaked in 1999 at 
2.8mmbbl/d and is forecast to decline by about 60 per cent over the next ten years. 
Today, around 47 per cent of the UK's 63bnbbloe combined oil and gas reserves have 
been produced (Ruairidh, 2003). From the UK's estimated total endowment of oil 
(20bnbbls), about two thirds has been already consumed and about one third (llbnbbl) 
remains for future production (Zittel, 2001). 
Another peculiarity of the UKCS that can act as a constraint to Government fiscal policy 
is the relative international competitiveness of the province. It currently ranks 19th 
globally in terms of the average commercial discovery size (Scottish Council for 
Development and Industry, 2002). According to the Scottish Council for Development 
and Industry (2002), since 1998, the scale of discoveries in other parts of the world, 
notably Kazakhstan, Angola, Brazil and Nigeria, have been an order of magnitude 
higher than the average discovery size in the UKCS. Additionally, the exploration and 
development costs in these regions are typically much lower than in the hostile and 
technically challenging UKCS environment. Morgan (2000) argues that with $10 a 
barrel operating costs in the UK North Sea compared with $5 in Angola and $6 in Gulf 
of Mexico, it is going to be harder to continue to attract investment in competition with 
the larger and more commercially attractive opportunities available elsewhere in the 
world. 
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3.S. SUMMARY & CONCLUSION 
In order to meet the objectives of this thesis and carry out the evaluation of the UK 
petroleum fiscal regime, the first step is to analyse the establishment of the regime in 
1975 and its evolution from its roots through to the Budget changes introduced in 2002. 
This chapter covers such analysis. It studies the basic structure of the fiscal regime, 
which was designed to secure an appropriate share of profits for the nation while 
offering stable, attractive and economically sound investment conditions to the oil 
industry (Inland Revenue, 2002). The 1975 package was based on Royalty, PRT and CT, 
which together generated a marginal tax rate of approximately 77 per cent. The regime 
has, however, changed over time with frequent alterations made to the level of 
Government take and to structure of the regime. Currently, marginal tax rates are 
between 70 per cent and 40 per cent depending on the age of the field in question. The 
various changes have generated considerable controversy, which have not been resolved. 
Divergence in the reaction to those changes has frequently been noted. 
From the analysis of the evolution of the regime and the subsequent controversies, the 
chapter derived certain conclusions regarding the UK fiscal regime. At this stage of 
analysis, it can be said that the regime suffered from several limitations, including the 
lack of neutrality, simplicity, stability, the high degree of uncertainty imposed on 
investors as a consequence of the regime instability, and the low generation of tax 
revenues. 
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An additional issue, the current maturity of the UKCS reserve base, is also addressed as 
it is of particular significance for taxation policy and is often referred to in previous 
studies. Given the size of the remaining fields, the decrease in the production from 
mature fields and the increasing range of alternative global investment opportunities for 
oil companies, taxation will be of much greater significance than in the past. 
Although times have changed, the UKCS can still provide opportunities of which the 
discovery of the Buzzard field is an example. Similarly, advances in technology can 
significantly help in reducing exploration and development costs. Finally, many of the 
new emerging regions competing with the attractiveness of the UKCS suffer from 
political instability. "Maturity brings with it all kinds of advantages- in particular the 
existing of infrastructure and great body of knowledge concerning the geological nature 
of the area" (Rutledge & Wright, 2000, p.9). The Government, through the design and 
implementation of an appropriate fiscal regime that improves the trade off between 
fiscal revenues and companies' interests (as discussed in Chapter 2), plays an important 
role in ensuring the longevity of the UKCS and sustaining a high level of investment. 
The findings of this chapter are essential in understanding firstly the reasons that led to 
the establishment of the current system and secondly the arguments used in the debate 
created by the different changes. This analysis leads to the empirical evaluation of the 
fiscal regime, which will be carried out both qualitatively and quantitatively. The next 
chapter discusses the qualitative aspect of the UKCS fiscal regime. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SURVEY OF OPINIONS RELATING TO THE UK NORTH SEA 
PETROLEUM FISCAL REGIME 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
The preVIOUS chapter analyzed the principal controversies surrounding the UK 
petroleum fiscal regime based on the findings of previous studies. In order to proceed 
with the assessment of the regime, a more rigorous and substantial evaluation is 
required. This chapter initiates the empirical analysis of this thesis and carries out a 
qualitative assessment of the regime. In particular, it describes and analyses the "Survey 
of Opinions" solicited from key players in the UK oil sector, with respect to the fiscal 
regime and the chief changes thereto over the last 27 years. The findings are then 
synthesized in an attempt to find ways in which the existing regime might be improved 
or how an alternative regime, which is more acceptable to Government and industry at 
present, might be created. 
The survey was conducted between March 2001 until August 2002. A questionnaire was 
designed to cover the key aspects of this thesis, chiefly the effects of the major changes 
in the UK oil tax structure. It also addresses the attractiveness of the UK North Sea 
province identifying in tum a set of alternatives, which may be preferable to existing 
policies. 
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The questionnaire was sent to tax specialists in selected oil companies operating in the 
UKCS, as well Government institutions, and leading consultancy companies. In 
addition, face-to-face interviews were carried out. 
A survey of this type has a major contribution to make to the body of research and is 
valuable for four main reasons. 
Firstly, it is a unique undertaking in this field of economic research. It analyses the 
issues from the perspective of the two main constituents namely; the Government and 
the petroleum industry/oil companies with respect to petroleum taxation. These two 
bodies generally have competing objectives and consequently their perspectives on 
petroleum taxation, as discussed in Chapter 2, can be quite different. These perspectives 
are clearly addressed in the survey, based upon a specific set of questions focused on 
soliciting the views of both sectors. 
Secondly, the survey incorporates the most recent views of tax specialists from within 
both the Government and the oil companies. As such, it provides significant information 
coming directly from those specialists and benefits from their expertise, especially of 
those dealing with taxation over a considerable period of time and under changing 
circumstances. More importantly, this kind of analysis is unlikely to be found in the 
literature associated with this important topic, nor to be fully captured in the quantitative 
assessment of the regime. 
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Thirdly, the survey allows a more detailed evaluation of the fiscal regime and an in 
depth understanding of the effects of the different amendments in the tax structure, 
particularly from both the Government and industry standpoints. Further, it more 
appropriately reflects the complex commercial and technical realities of the UKCS, 
which appear to be absent in several previous studies, which also tend to reflect a more 
partisan approach to the issues. 
In fact, since efficient petroleum taxation raises complex problems, as discussed in the 
previous two chapters, "it requires considerable insight into the oil industry" (Blinn et aI, 
1986, p.233). "If we could obtain from the companies their forecasts about how 
profitable they expected their operations to be under the current fiscal regime, compare 
their expectations about the profitability of one oil province with their expectations 
about the profitability of another province and to plot these changing expectations over 
time, then we would certainly be acquiring useful information that cannot be provided 
by an outside model" (Rutledge & Wright, 1998b, p.8). 
Finally, the survey provides significant guidance for the quantitative analysis in the 
following chapters, chiefly in that it identifies the most common methods and techniques 
adopted by the respondents when evaluating the effects of taxation. 
The design of the survey, its process and results are covered in this Chapter. Section 4.2 
describes the design of the survey and its methodology. Section 4.3 summarises the 
findings and Section 4.4 discusses those findings. Concluding remarks are provided in 
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Section 4.5. The cover letter, questionnaire, and respondents' replies are all presented in 
Appendix B. 
4.2. SURVEY DESIGN 
This section explains the manner in which the survey was designed and carried out. 
Firstly, it discusses the design of the questionnaire, then proceeds with the selection of 
the sample surveyed including the identification of any source of bias. This is followed 
by a description of the techniques used to carry out the survey and, finally, a review of 
the quality of responses. 
4.2.1. QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN 
The analysis performed in Chapters 2 and 3 led to the establishment of particular criteria 
and study of the principal issues that are essential to evaluating oil taxation policy in the 
UK. As such, that analysis provided guidance for setting the survey questions. In tum, 
these questions are designed to specifically capture the perceptions of different 
respondents on four key areas, namely: 
1. Evaluation of the main fiscal packages that were introduced for oil extraction 
activity in the UK, and in particular the basic 1975 package and the principal 
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amendments thereto in 1983, including the abolition of Royalty!, in 1993 the 
abolition ofPRT32 and in 2002 with the imposition of the Supplementary Charge. 
This work is fundamental to the research hence it is covered in most of the 
questions but is directly addressed in the first four questions. 
11. Risk-sharing and financial evaluation techniques. The issue of risk sharing was 
discussed in detail in Chapter 2, and is of particular importance to the research 
for two reasons. Firstly, it identifies the extent to which the fiscal regime shares 
risk with investors as well as its impact on investors' confidence. Secondly, it 
leads to identifying the techniques used to incorporate risk in the evaluation of a 
project's profitability. For consistency, the most popular techniques will be 
adopted in the quantitative analysis section of this thesis. This subject is 
addressed in Question 5. 
111. International competitiveness of the UK oil fiscal regime. This issue is essential 
for a complete analysis of the topic, especially given the global nature of the 
industry, with oil companies operating in many different countries with a variety 
of fiscal terms. Consequently, the fiscal terms offered by the various petroleum 
producing countries play an important role in attracting and encouraging oil 
exploration and production. 
31 On fields that received development consent after 1983. 
32 On fields that received development consent after 1993. 
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The question of the international competitiveness of the UK oil fiscal regime is 
addressed in the survey in the light of the criticism that it is the "weakest in the 
world", as described by Rutledge & Wright (1998a, p.801). It is covered in 
Question 6 and its three supplementary questions. 
IV. The future of the UK North Sea. As discussed in Chapter 3, the changing 
commercial environment of the UK North Sea province has a major impact on 
the Government fiscal policl3. Consequently, understanding the future of the 
province provides guidance as to the appropriateness of the regime in place. This 
is addressed in the final question of the questionnaire. This question further 
investigates how the different players view the future of UKCS and attempts to 
identify any divergence in the perception of the oil companies and the 
Government. 
In total, the questionnaire consists of seven questions designed to solicit information 
from the principal stakeholders in the UK North Sea on these four issues. However, 
because some questions include sub-sections the actual total number of questions 
amounts to 15. The questions are presented in open-ended manner so as to solicit a more 
detailed expression of opinion34• 
It is important to stress that two modifications were made to the original questionnaire in 
the course of undertaking the survey. This was done for two reasons. 
33 See Chapter 3, Section 3.4.2. 
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The first reason is to incorporate the tax changes in April 2002. This alteration, however, 
does not generate a dramatic difference because in the original version Question 4 
addresses the 1998 tax proposals35 , which incorporated the possibility of imposing an 
additional charge. This option was implemented in the 2002 changes. The second reason 
is to adapt some questions to the role of the respondent and the institutions represented. 
As such, questions addressed to Government institutions are formulated differently than 
those addressed to the oil companies. Nevertheless, consistency of meaning is 
maintained throughout. A detailed explanation of the modifications introduced is given 
in Appendix B. 
4.2.2. SAMPLE SELECTION 
In this survey, the sample is not a simple random one. It is rather purposive, as is the 
norm in qualitative research of this type. A purposive sample involves selecting "small 
numbers of people with specific characteristics, behaviour or experience ... to facilitate 
broad comparisons between certain groups that the researcher thinks likely to be 
important" (Walker, 1988, p.30). Consequently, in this survey, the size of the sample is 
not as critical as the expertise and knowledge of the respondents both with respect to UK 
oil taxation, as well as familiarity with the subsequent amendments to the regime and the 
computational complexities involved. 
34 The questionnaire is presented in Appendix B. 
35 See Chapter 3, Section 3.2.4 
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As such, the target population in this survey is the tax experts, mainly at the head of tax 
level, working either within Government or the oil companies. Tax experts working with 
major consultancy companies are also included within the target population, because of 
their experience in working with oil companies. 
The first step in the selection process is to establish a list of the different Government 
institutions, oil companies and consultancies, from which the sample is to be selected. 
The selection of Government institutions is a straightforward task, since there are only a 
limited number of relevant institutions. The task is somewhat more complicated with 
respect to the selection of oil companies, given the number of companies of varying 
sizes operating in the UK North Sea. 
A complete list of oil companies is obtained from the Institute of Petroleum directory, 
which also includes their addresses. Details of each company are checked by visiting 
their respective websites and an indication of the relative size of their operations is 
provided by reference to the General Economic Model (GEM) from WoodMackenzie36. 
Companies are then divided into two groups: small and large companies referred to 
respectively as "independents" and "majors". The majors constitute the main target 
population in this survey because of their long-term involvement in the UK North Sea, 
effectively since oil exploration activity began in the late 1960s and early 1970's. 
36 This model provides the database on both oil companies and oil and gas fields in the UK North Sea. It is 
explained in detail in Chapter 6. 
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Furthermore, such companies hold a portfolio of fields including many mature fields 
subject to Royalty, PRT and CT. As such, the tax experts in these companies can 
provide detailed information regarding the development of oil taxation since 1975, and 
the effects of the past amendments on the company's activity. 
However, the majority of independents started operating relatively recently- some in 
early 1990's but many others in the late 1990's. Further, the activities of these 
companies are mainly focused on the smaller oil fields. As such, tax experts in these 
smaller companies may not always be able to provide substantial background 
perspective on development of the fiscal regime over the last 27 years as it effects these 
smaller companies. Nevertheless, their contribution is valuable especially with respect to 
the impact of the current regime, and the fact that the smaller sized companies are 
currently the new wave of operators on the UKCS. 
Finally, a list of the major consultancy companies based in the UK is prepared. Such 
companies are well established in the UK and provide advisory services on a variety of 
problems for various types of businesses, including oil companies. They also publish 
special reports, chiefly on oil activity in the UK. Consequently, tax experts working for 
such companies can provide considerable information regarding the impact of taxation 
from a range of perspectives. 
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As soon as the lists are prepared, the next step is to select the sample of the tax 
specialists. The heads of tax involved directly with taxation in the UKCS from 
Government institutions are selected and contacted. Their contact details are provided on 
the institutions' website. A group of 7 consultancies and 10 oil companies is randomly 
selected, including 6 majors and 4 independents. Details of some of the tax specialists 
are available online, whilst contact with others has come as a result of the 25 th IAEE 
Annual Conference, 2001, in Aberdeen. For the remaining respondents, the companies 
are directly contacted and details of their head of taxes are requested. In total, the panel 
of respondents consists of 19 tax specialists. 
4.2.3. SOURCE OF BIAS 
It is important to take in consideration certain potential sources of bias, mainly resulting 
from the selection of respondents as well as the lack of randomness. In order to carry out 
the survey, tax specialists in Government and companies are selected, however, these 
specialists can have interest in more complex tax regimes. The lack of randomness can 
be reflected firstly in the high proportion of experts from oil companies and consultancy 
companies, compared with representatives from the Government. Secondly, it is 
replicated in the higher proportion of respondents from large oil companies relative to 
the proportion of respondents from small companies. 
Nevertheless, these possible sources of bias do not weaken the validity of the survey, for 
the following reasons. 
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Firstly, given the complicated aspect of the UK petroleum fiscal regime resulting mainly 
from the interaction of the various taxes and their reliefs, tax specialists are considered 
to be the most suitable source of information particularly with respect to the details of 
the regime. 
Secondly, the sample selected can be described as a stratified sample, because it 
involves "taking random samples but within subsets of the population so determined that 
the sample will definitely be representative of the population" (Sapsford, 2001, p.8). In 
fact, adopting complete randomness in the selection process is unlikely to produce either 
a representative sample or valid results. In this case for instance, there are only two 
major Government institutions, involved with UKCS oil taxation. Consequently, if the 
sample is randomly selected, it is unlikely that the Government institutions are included. 
Thirdly, because there is a wider panel of oil and consultancy companies compared with 
Government institutions, it is not surprising to find such a high representation of the 
industry within the sample. In essence, the sampling process is aiming to produce as 
good a representation as possible of the population. 
Finally, because the survey investigates the effects of the main amendments of the 
regime since 1975 on companies' performance so as to ensure validity, the sample by 
definition needs to include companies with significant experience within the UKCS. 
These are likely to be the large companies that hold a large portfolio of assets in the 
UKCS in contrast to the smaller companies. 
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This chiefly justifies the higher proportion of larger companies relatively to smaller 
ones. Nevertheless, the inclusion of consultancy companies partially overcomes this 
weakness, because these companies deal with different companies, regardless their size 
or experience in the UKCS. 
4.2.4. SURVEY TECHNIQUE 
The principal survey technique is an interview based on the seven key questions 
presented in Appendix B. This data collection method is the most commonly used 
survey technique, in particular for qualitative data collection (Fink & Kosecoff, 1985). 
The benefit of applying the interview technique consists mainly in the personal contact 
between the interviewer and the interviewee. This allows questions to be expanded to 
allow for wider discussions that generate in depth information and provide the 
opportunity to ask follow-up questions. 
The selected specialists were contacted bye-mail orland phone and were invited to 
participate in the survey. In order to encourage participation, respondents were promised 
confidentiality. The author requested a meeting at which to conduct an interview. Ahead 
of the meeting the author sent a copy of the questionnaire, so that the respondent could 
become familiar with the questions prior to the interview taking place. The interviews 
were performed at the interviewee's place of work and lasted about one hour, on 
average. During the interview, data was recorded by note taking. 
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In five cases, it was difficult to arrange a meeting for interview because of time and 
distance involved. In these cases, some were sent the questionnaire and they replied by 
e-mail. 
4.2.5. QUALITY OF RESPONSE 
In total 19 questionnaires were sent, 10 interviews were carried out and 5 questionnaires 
were replied bye-mail and 4 were not returned. Consequently, the response rate was 
approximately 80 per cent. 
Among the non-returned questionnaires, three are from oil companies and one from a 
consultancy company. Two respondents apologized for not being able to provide the 
necessary information. Of these the first, an oil company, argued that the information 
required was confidential, whereas, the other respondent, a consultancy company, 
mentioned that the questions required detailed information that only an oil company, not 
a consultancy company, could provide. The third respondent sent an e-mail to the author 
to clarify one question and promised to reply soon. However, the author did not hear 
from the respondent again, although the author tried to re-contact the respondent. The 




This section summarizes the main findings of the survey37. These findings are organised 
in four sub-sections, each sub section illustrating one of the four main topics of this 
survey. As respondents were promised confidentiality, different notations are used. 
These are presented in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1. Respondents Notation 
Notation Institution Total Respondents 
Respondent Gn Government 2 (Respondents G 1 and G2) 
Respondent On Oil Company 7 (Respondents 01,02,03,04, 
OS, 06 and 07) 
Respondent Cn Consultancy company 6 (Respondents Cl, C2, C3, C4, 
C5 and C6) 
4.3.1. ASSESSMENT OF THE PRINCIPAL FISCAL PACKAGES 
Questions 1 to 4 address the impact of the principal fiscal packages that have been 
imposed on oil activity in the UK namely the 1975 package, the abolition of Royalty in 
1983, the abolition of PRT in 1993 and the imposition of the Supplementary Charge in 
2002. 
37 The detailed answers are provided in Appendix B. 
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4.3.1.1. 1975 FISCAL PACKAGE 
From a Government perspective (Respondents Gland G2), the 1975 fiscal package is 
justified as follows. The Royalty element gives oil companies the right to exploit the oil 
resource, which is owned by the Government. As such, the Government receives a 
specified part of the production as a compensation for the depletion of its assets. The 
PRT element applies as a super-profits tax, aimed at capturing "a share of the economic 
rent from oil activity" in the UKCS (Respondent G 1). The CT element is imposed 
because all companies in the UK pay this income tax and oil companies are no 
exception. 
Respondents C 1 and C2 made additional comments. Respondent C 1 argues that since oil 
was a new experience for the UK, the country had broadly to follow what other 
countries were doing relative to their oil extraction activity. Royalty was a common 
instrument applied in other countries to oil production, albeit mainly to onshore fields. 
However, Royalty allowed only partial deductions of individual field's costs although 
their location differed one from another. PRT "unlike Royalty, provided for the 
deduction of all direct costs ... Had Royalty applied to a more homogeneous cost base, 
the Government wouldn't have needed the PRT" (Respondent Cl). 
Respondent C2 argues that the reason for imposing PRT was that in the wake of the high 
oil prices in the 1970s a windfall tax was required on top of Royalty and CT. However, 
the respondent adds that the regime was not sensitive enough to changes in oil prices. 
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All respondents from the oil industrJ8 agree that the 1975 package was unsatisfactory, 
mainly as the result of the imposition of Royalty and the high marginal tax take. 
"Investments within an existing PRTfield ringfence are adversely impacted by the 69 per cent 
RoyaltylPRTICTregime" (Respondent 01). 
"The regime acts as a disincentive to investment ... Activities had dried up due to the very high 
marginal tax rates then in place" (Respondent 03). 
Respondent Cl adds that the main limitation of the 1975 package is its complication, 
which imposed an additional administrative burden. 
4.3.1.2. ABOLITION OF ROYALTY 
From a Government perspective, Respondent G2 argues that as Royalty does not allow 
the deduction of all costs, it can distort the investment decision particularly with respect 
to marginal activities. The respondent further adds that the abolition of Royalty in 1983 
did not generate a loss in revenue for the Government. 
"Had the tax still applied "the development of many fields would have been stopped and the 
Government wouldn't have generated more revenues" (Respondent G2). 
38 Except two respondents, since the companies they work for were not involved in the UKCS before 
1993. 
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Agreeing with such a statement, Respondent C2 maintains that Royalty was abolished 
because it was not a significant source of revenue for the Government. 
All respondents from oil companies that were subject to Royalty payments (01, 02, 03, 
05 and 07) and respondents from consultancy companies (C1-C6) comment on the 
negative aspect of Royalty, in that it is imposed on gross revenues rather than profits. 
For instance, Respondent C3 describes Royalty as a tax that "hits in a more aggressive 
way". 
However, in terms of the effects of Royalty on early abandonment and marginal fields a 
divergence in views is noted. 
Firstly, 31 per cent of respondents agree that Royalty leads to early abandonment. 
"The point of abandonment is where marginal cost equates to marginal revenue. This means 
that Royalty is a more important determinant of abandonment than either PRT or CT since it is a 
fixed cost of production" (Respondent C5). 
Opposing such views, both Respondents Gland G2 from Government institutions argue 
that Royalty does not have a significant impact on early abandonment given the 
possibility of Royalty remission. 
99 
"If Royalty results in the shortening of the field life, then companies can apply for Royalty 
remission" (Respondent G 1). 
"There is a discretionary provision to repay Royalty to oil producers if they consider that it will 
maintain the development of petroleum resources of the UK. This mechanism would encourage 
incremental production from older, Royalty-paying fields" (Respondent G 2). 
Secondly, concerning the effects of the abolition of Royalty on decision making on the 
development of marginal fields particularly, a divergence within the industry opinions is 
noted. Among 11 respondents, seven argue that the abolition of Royalty encouraged the 
development of marginal fields. 
"The improvements in the fiscal regime made in 1983 led to a material increase in development 
activity that lasted through the 1980's despite the rapid real decline in the oil price" 
(Respondent 03). 
''At the time it was particularly important for some new developments to proceed" 
(Respondent C6). 
Among the other respondents, three respondents maintain that the abolition of Royalty, 
if it had any impact, it was "minor". 
"The abolition of Royalty had a modest impact but nonetheless positive because it is an 
allowable deduction for PRT and CT. But the net impact is relatively small" 
(Respondent C4). 
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"The abolition of Royalty is not a material factor in determining investment decisions. It only 
affects the end of field life and any incremental expenditure to extend the field life" 
(Respondent C5). 
"Fiscal terms alone will not influence marginal developments or the timing of abandonment" 
(Respondent 02). 
Respondent 03, however, agues that it was the reduction in the overall tax burden, as a 
consequence of abolishing Royalty, which led to an increase in activity. 
"Prior to the fiscal changes in 1983 development activities had dried up due to the very high 
marginal tax rates then in place" (Respondent 03). 
Finally, Respondent C2 highlights a different limitation of the 1983 fiscal changes, 
which, because they came as a surprise, helped to create an impression of instability. 
4.3.1.3. ABOLITION OF PETROLEUM REVENUE TAX 
Both Respondents G 1 and G2 argue that PRT was the main source of revenue in early 
years of its imposition. However, by the early 1990s PRT was not generating sufficient 
revenues and that is why it was abandoned. 
"P R T was expensive to the Government. There was a lot of exploration but the fields discovered 
did not yield sufficient revenue for the Government, given the different reliefs" (Respondent G2). 
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Among those reliefs, Respondent G 1 argues that the oil allowance was the most 
expensive to the Government. The respondent further maintains that after abolishing 
PRT on new fields in 1993, more revenues were generated, mainly as a result of 
abolishing offsetting exploration costs. 
21 per cent of respondents from the industry argues that the abolition of PRT was 
beneficial for the industry. 
"This directly encouraged the development of Andrew, ETAP and the first production West of 
Shetland. The Schiehallionfield is now the largest producing oilfield in the UKCS" 
(Respondent 03). 
The respondents further referred to the inefficiency and complexity ofPRT. 
"The pre-1993 fiscal regime subsidized exploration activity, which led to an inefficient 
allocation of capital" (Respondent 03). 
"The structure of PRT could lead to counter investment decisions or gold-plating" 
(Respondent C2). 
However, 57 per cent of respondents argue that the abolition of PRT was beneficial but 
it also led to the loss of the different "generous" reliefs, particularly the oil allowance 
that protected marginal fields from paying the tax. 
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"The retention of oil allowance is considered to be of prime importance to the more marginal 
fields" (Respondent 02). 
"The oil allowance is must be the most valuable relief' (Respondent C6). 
On the other hand, 22 per cent of respondents maintain that the abolition of PRT was 
damaging. Two respondents (C6 and 01) relate this effect to the loss ofPRT reliefs. 
"There has been a marked decline in exploration activity since Exploration and Appraisal Relief 
(E&A) was abolished and PRTfor new fields ... the oil allowance must be the most valuable 
relief' (Respondent C6). 
"Prior to 1993 all PRT allowances had a significant beneficial impact in encouraging activity" 
(Respondent 01). 
Respondent C2 relates the detrimental effect to the resulting instability. 
"The Government abolishment ofPRTwas unexpected. This created a lot of uncertainties" 
(Respondent C2). 
4.3.1.4. THE SUPPLEMENTARY CHARGE AND THE 2002 CHANGES 
Five respondents (G 1, 02, C4, C5 and C6) were interviewed after the 2002 changes. 
Respondent C6 argues that the abolition of Royalty and the Writing Down Allowance as 
the main benefit of the changes. 
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''Abolition of Royalty is ... important not least in terms of allowing the Government to retain its 
creditability ... The First Year Allowance is the only thing that compensates for the new 10 per 
cent SCT " (Respondent C6). 
Opposing such a view, Respondent C4 maintains that commented "increasing the CT is 
not appropriate currently". Similarly, Respondent C5 argues that "although the 
Government has changed the headline rate of CT, it made fundamental changes to CT: 
the Supplementary 10 per cent does not allow the deduction of interests. This can affect 
companies' decisions in the manner in which they finance their investments. As a 
consequence small companies will use more imaginative and more risky routes to raise 
capital". 
As for the destabilizing effects, Respondent G 1 argues that dropping the proposed 
changes after a decline in oil prices (in 1998) did not mean that it would never be 
considered. In agreement with such statement, Respondent 02 maintains that "the latest 
changes, although unacceptable to the industry, primarily because of their destabilizing 
affect, were in fact not totally unexpected". 
The other respondents addressed the 1998 proposals, which compare an application of a 
Supplementary Charge with a re-introduction of PRT. The industry does not normally 
favor any increase in tax, however when faced with either an increase in the CT rate or 
an application ofPRT, 93 per cent of respondents prefer the former option. 
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"The Government could equalize the tax effect on fields by abolishing all upstream taxes and 
replacing this with a supplementary rate of CT, which delivers the same overall yield. This 
would remove the unnecessary complexity of the current system and remove disincentives to 
invest in mature fields" (Respondent 05). 
"!t is essential that any tax regime is focused on profit and not revenue. The CT Writing 
Down Allowance (WDA) ensures this condition is met. The relative fast depreciation 
provided by the WDA ensures that the after tax return is not significantly less than the 
before tax return, and consequently the CTregime does not inhibit activity" 
(Respondent 01). 
"This best suits the nature of geological risk in the UK" (Respondent 04). 
On the other hand, Respondent 04 rejects both alternatives, while Respondent 07 agrees 
that the abolition of Royalty can be a beneficial step but, 
"If this has to be paidfor by robbing Peter, then the status quo is better overall" 
(Respondent 07) 
4.3.1.5. ALTERNATIVE REGIME 
All respondents from the industry argue that the Government needs to maintain the 
stability of the regime. 
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"Companies require a stable fiscal regime if they are to invest in long timeframe high-risk 
projects" (Respondent 01). 
"The recent change has made the UK again an unstable tax regime and there will be companies 
who will not invest in marginal projects with a long payback period for fear they will get hit 
again later" (Respondent C6). 
Furthermore, 93 per cent of respondents are against the application of any special tax, 
whether PRT or Royalty. 
"The least worst option is to change CT rather than applying PRT. CT is a corporate tax thus it 
takes into account the company's overall portfolio, not simply a single project" 
(Respondent C5). 
"The most appropriate fiscal system is ... namely CT only. This ensures that the upstream industry 
is treated in the same way as any other industry in the UK. Since the returns in the oil sector in 
recent years have been below those that can be earned elsewhere in the economy, the 
intellectual case for additional taxation on oil and gas activities is not sustainable" 
(Respondent 03). 
Respondent C4 argues that PRT should not be applied because "it is a complicated tax as 
it stands, plus it is likely to create greater uncertainty, thus affecting investment 
decisions ... Changing CT is simpler, more direct and unlikely to cause significant 
distortions and create greater uncertainty". 
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Respondents C2 and C3 are against the re-application of PRT because it does not suit the 
current reality of the UK oil industry. 
"The oil industry is a competitive industry, thus over the long-term there are no super profits" 
(Respondent C2). 
"PRT is a super profit tax, so to charge a super profit tax, companies should be making super 
profits in each field ... this is not the case anymore" (Respondent C3). 
Two respondents (G2 and C6), however, pointed out their preference to PRT. 
Respondent G2 argues that "technically, nothing is wrong with the PRT". Respondent 
C6 argues that "the original PR Twas ... a fair system which guaranteed to the company a 
full return of costs and an annual return on investment before any special levy applied". 
But the respondent further debates that re-introducing PRT "after nearly ten years would 
be very difficult". Additional alternatives are suggested namely; 
"Link CT changes to the behavior of oil prices" (Respondent C4), 
"The recent changes need to be supplemented by additional incentives to explore (say, a 25 per 
cent supplement on Exploration costs)" (Respondent C6), 
''Apply RRT similar to Australia" (Respondent G2), 
and, 
''Apply aflat CT, butfields, such as Don, need subsidy" (Respondent C4). 
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4.3.2. RISK-SHARING AND EVALUATION TECHNIQUES 
The second subject in this survey is the extent to which the UK oil fiscal regime is risk 
sharing and/or imposes a fiscal risk, and additionally the evaluation techniques that 
companies adopt so as to incorporate risk in their investment decision analysis. On the 
first issue there was a wide variety of opinions. 
Four respondents (Cl, C2, C4 and C5) argue that the system in its early stages was more 
risk absorbing, since according to these respondents, a high tax take was needed to 
compensate for the risk the Government was willing to share the oil industry. 
"High tax rates work perfectly as risk sharing" (Respondent CJ). 
Three respondents (G 1, 01, and C 1) argue that since PR T is a cash flow tax it is more 
risk absorbing then Royalty, as the latter is paid as soon as production commences. 
"A cash flow tax is when the Government takes an equity share, which equals a percentage tax 
take from the cash flow (CF). In this case, the Government is facing a risk-sharing situation. 
Both the Government and companies will have the same CF (e.g. negative tax at the early stage 
of investment) ... PRTworks well as a CF" (Respondent GJ). 
"To the extent fiscal regime is profit based, an equitable sharing of risk between Government 
and industry occurs. Royalty does not result in an equitable risk sharing since it is not profit 
based" (Respondent OJ). 
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Four respondents (04, 05, C3 and C6) refer to the instability of the tax regime in 
creating an uncertain fiscal environment for investors who "dislike uncertainty". When 
evaluating a project, investors base their evaluation on an average life of over 20 years 
and as such include in their analysis a stable fiscal outlook. Consequently, these 
respondents argue that the stability of the fiscal regime is crucial for creating a healthy 
investment environment and maintaining the competitiveness of the country. 
"The company would be unlikely to consider investments in countries where the fiscal system is 
not properly defined or is known to be unstable" (Respondent 04). 
"The real threat of an adverse tax change as proposed in March 1998 caused investment 
decisions to be deferred until the fiscal uncertainty was resolved. Maintainingfiscal stability is a 
key element of delivering investor confidence and UKCS competitiveness" 
(Respondent 05) 
Two respondents (03 and C2) comment on the partnership between the Government and 
the industry as reducing investors' risk. 
"The fiscal risk will never go away but with meaningful discussions between the industry and 
Government at such forums as PILOT we believe that the Government is committed to ensuring 
that the UKCS remains competitive" (Respondent 03). 
On the other hand, three respondents from oil companies (02, 03 and 04) argue that oil 
companies developed their own strategies to find ways to adapt and learn to live with 
risk. 
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"Since 1984, the company policy has been to expand overseas and diversify away from the UK 
tax changes" (Respondent 04). 
"Fiscal changes do not especially alarm us because risk and uncertainty are inherent in the 
business and the UK is no more risky than anywhere else" (Respondent 02). 
"The company has been a key player in the development of the UKCS for over 30 years and has 
learnt to live with the fiscal risk" (Respondent 03). 
Such comments agree with the Mitchell (1982) concept of risk diversification, referred 
to in Chapter 239. 
Concerning the evaluation techniques that companies use to evaluate their projects and 
incorporate risk, the survey results indicate that several methods are used. The most 
common evaluation method indicated by 87 per cent of respondents is identified as the 
Net Present Value (NPV) method. Risk, namely oil price and geological risk, is 
incorporated mainly through sensitivity analysis (03, OS, 06, 07, G2, and Cl) and the 
use of higher discount rates (04, OS, C4, and C5). 
However, Respondent 06 argues that "no one will invest with just a positive NPV for 10 
per cent discount rate", while Respondent G2 refers to the importance of understanding 
the companies' decision making criteria so as to gain an understanding as to whether a 
project is acceptable or not. However, this is a time consuming process. 
39 See Section 2.3 on Risk Sharing 
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Other techniques are also identified but at a lesser extent, namely separate cash flow 
discounting (Respondent C5) and Modem Asset Pricing Model (Respondent C4). Two 
respondents (07 and C2) refer to the Real Options Theory. However, Respondent 07 
argues that "the theory is currently on-fashion but it is too complicated to be applied in 
the daily operations of the company" and Respondent C2 adds that the theory is "less 
likely to work in the long term". 
On the other hand, Respondent 04 argues that "the uncertainties of the regime are not 
generally factored into risk analysis". 
4.3.3. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS 
As it might be expected, all respondents rejected Rutledge & Wright (1998) argument 
that the regime is the "weakest in the world" (p.80I). In fact, all respondents agree that 
there are several factors, such as costs, geology, and exploration risk that are essential to 
include when looking at the international competitiveness of a fiscal regime. 
"The fiscal regime cannot be seen in isolation from the prospectivity. Whilst in headline terms 
the fiscal regime for new developments in the UKCS is more attractive than, for instance, 
Norway, the fields size are smaller and unit costs higher in the UKCS than for typical new fields 
in Norway. At the Exploration level Norway offers the potential for large discoveries while the 
UKCS does not" (Respondent 02). 
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Consequently, four respondents (07, Cl, C2 and C3) argue the difficulty in comparing 
the UK oil fiscal regime to other regimes. 
"The question is impossible to answer, as each country is appropriate to its own geological facts 
and circumstances" (Respondent 07). 
"The weaknesses or the strengths of the system cannot be measured by the marginal tax rate on 
fields" (Respondent C2). 
The dominant opinion is that the current fiscal regime is "fit-to-purpose" (Respondent 
G2) and" well-attuned to the economic realities of the UK North Sea" (Respondent 01), 
where newly discovered fields cannot stand a "harsher" system. 
"The current UKfiscal regime largely reflects the maturity of the UKCS and the marginality of 
likely future developments" (Respondent 03). 
"The regime is also geared to maximise UKCS resources" (Respondent C4). 
Other respondents (05 and 06) argue that the regIme is required to maintain the 
competitiveness of the mature oil province. Respondent G 1 further maintains that other 
countries are "more generous, more favourable to oil companies". 
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4.3.4. THE FUTURE OF THE UK NORTH SEA 
All respondents agree that the future level of activity in the UK North Sea is towards a 
decline. As Respondent C6 points out, "most companies are pessimistic!" 
"Recent discoveries are quite small and unlikely to offset the decline from the older fields" 
(Respondent 05). 
"There is a serious decline in the size of new discoveries in the mature shallow water area of the 
UK North Sea" (Respondent 03). 
"There will be little real prospectivity to encourage further investment in the UKCS and activity 
level will inevitably fall" (Respondent 02). 
Two respondents argue that the UK North Sea IS unattractive particularly for large 
compames. 
"On an international level, the competition over capital will be more significant over the next 
few months, many opportunities elsewhere for the big companies, and the UK is not on the list" 
(Respondent C5). 
"The remaining UKCS opportunities are of insufficient scale to attract further investment ... 
Major operators are now attracted to deepwater areas where major fields are still to be found" 
(Respondent 03). 
One respondent (C2) further added that the Government should now worry about the 
"security of supply rather than ... revenues" . 
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Nevertheless, 40 per cent of respondents agree that despite such expectations this does 
not mean that the UK North Sea era has ended. These respondents argue that it is the 
Exploration activity, which is in decline not necessarily development and production. 
"A lot of discoveries are waiting to be developed" (Respondent GJ). 
"The North Sea has a brilliant future" (Respondent C5). 
Five respondents (01, 02, 06, and C3) maintain that the oil price is a significant factor 
in determining both the levels of activity and profitability in the UK oil province. 
"The level of activity has probably only been sustained by the recent and continued high oil 
price" (Respondent 02). 
"The behavior of oil and gas prices is a major determinant of the profitability of the region. 
Activity level will be determined by the development of newly discovered fields" 
(Respondent C3) 
Other respondents (05, 06, 07, Cl, C3, C4 and C5) argue that technology, industry 
structure, infrastructure, and taxation, are principal determinants of future levels of 
activity and profitability. 
" Very few companies are spending money on Exploration; they are more likely to be spending 
money on development of existing fields, such as new drilling techniques, new seismic, etc ... to 
recover more oilfrom these fields " (Respondent CJ). 
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"The small Independents will playa role in the UKCS to develop the remaining resource base" 
(Respondent C3) 
"There is also a need to ensure that old fields are not abandoned prematurely since there will 
then be no infrastructure in place from which to produce/transport the new finds" 
(Respondent C6). 
"The Government ... by adoptingfavourablefiscal policies ... can play an important role in 
extending the life of the UK North Sea province" (Respondent 05). 
4.4. ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS 
In this section, the findings of the survey are synthesised in an attempt to ascertain and 
discuss the distinctive views of the respondents. From these views, conclusions are 
derived with respect to the characteristics of UK oil taxation relative to the major criteria 
of an ideal tax, as defined in Chapter 2, and to the arguments of previous studies, as 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
4.4.1. NEUTRALITY 
From the different opinions provided on the effects of the major fiscal changes in oil 
taxation in the UKCS, the UK oil fiscal regime is unlikely to be described as neutral, 
particularly the 1975 fiscal package and especially Royalty. For instance, Respondent 
03 argues "that the key fiscal changes of 1983 and 1993 both led to significant increases 
in investment activity by the company", as Martin (1997) and Johnston (2003) maintain. 
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Not surprisingly, all respondents agree that the abolition of Royalty encouraged activity, 
with 64 per cent referring to the detrimental impact of Royalty on the development of 
marginal fields. Consequently, it can be concluded that Royalty inhibited oil activity 
hence it is not a neutral fiscal component. 
However, a certain divergence in opinions exists as regards the effect of Royalty on 
early abandonment, particularly between respondents from the Government and those 
from the industry. The former argue that Royalty remission overcomes such a problem 
and only 31 per cent of respondents from the industry argue that Royalty can lead to 
early abandonment. Consequently, the effect of Royalty on mature fields does not seem 
to be dramatic hence its abolition in 2002 raises several questions. 
Firstly, it seems that by 2002, the Government was convinced that it should abolish 
Royalty if the production from mature fields was to be extended. However, as 
Respondent G2 argues, the effect of Royalty as a distortionary tax is difficult to prove in 
practice because of the volatility of oil prices. Such an opinion is further emphasized 
with the fact that by 2001 only two cases were presented to the Government for Royalty 
remission. Secondly, as both respondents from Government institutions argue, Royalty 
provides the ownership right to oil for private companies. In this case, with the abolition 
of Royalty, companies are using a nationally owned resource without paying for it. This 
agrees with the arguments of Mabro (1998), Miller et al (1999), Mommer (2001), and 
Wright (2001), as highlighted in Chapter 3. 
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As such, the principal reason for the abolition of Royalty seems to be that this 
instrument is no longer a major source of income for the Government, as the production 
of oil in mature fields is in decline. This suggests that Royalty was originally applied to 
guarantee early revenues for the Government, especially that its abolition came at the 
time when the Government introduced an increase in the Income Tax, which appears to 
be a better source of revenue. 
As for PRT, a divergence in opinions is noted with respect to the effects on oil activity, 
and consequently it is difficult to conclude on its neutrality. In fact, only 21 per cent 
argue that the abolition of PRT enhanced oil activity. This can be particularly true in the 
case of large fields. However, in the case of marginal fields, PRT does not have any 
effect according to approximately 79 per cent of respondents, given the different reliefs, 
especially the oil allowance. As such, PRT can be described as neutral in its impact on 
marginal fields. A profit related tax, such as PRT, is likely to offer tax reliefs and 
allowances, so as to take into account the special risks that the oil industry face and to 
capture only a share of economic rent. As Respondent G 1 argues, PRT captures only a 
share of the excess profit and not all of it, otherwise it can make the activity unattractive 
to investors. 
Nevertheless, as has been discussed in Chapter 2, the neutrality concept is often 
combined with the efficiency concept. In this survey, 21 per cent of respondents refer to 
inefficiency in capital expenditures allocations, as a result of the PR T reliefs. 
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For instance, Respondent G2 argues that "PRT does not cause you to think about 
incurring certain expenditure because such expenditure is deducted". Similarly, 
Respondent 03 debates that the "the pre-1993 fiscal regime subsidized exploration 
activity, which led to an inefficient allocation of capital". Consequently, the neutrality 
and efficiency of PR T are put in question. 
No comments are made on the CT and the ST as obstructing the development of oil 
fields. In contrast, Respondent 01 for instance argues that "CT regime does not inhibit 
activity". Similarly Respondent 05 points out that "CT removes disincentives to invest 
in mature fields". From such opinions, it can be derived that CT is considered neutral 
from the industry perspective. 
Additionally, the CT allowances seem to largely contribute to the neutrality of the tax. 
For example, Respondent C3 argues that "CT allowances are the most important and 
broadly neutral". In fact, the accelerated depreciation lowers significantly the taxable 
income during the payback period, which is of particular importance in the capital-
intensive oil industry. 
Moreover, 87 per cent of respondents from the industry prefer Income Tax relatively to 
any other special petroleum taxes. This further emphasizes the neutrality of the tax. 
Nevertheless, it is worthy of note to refer to a distinctive view expressed by Respondent 
C2, who argues that the CT is neutral "and has almost no effect because of its low rate". 
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To conclude, there is a general agreement that taxation can playa principal role in 
affecting the investment environment and the international competitiveness of a 
prOVInce. However, two respondents emphasized that taxation alone is not the only 
factor affecting decision-making. Respondent 02 argues that "fiscal terms alone will not 
influence marginal developments or the timing of abandonment". Consequently, there 
are other factors that should be taken in consideration, namely oil price and 
prospectivity. 
4.4.2. EQUITY 
The survey put forward the idea that by imposing CT only the oil industry is treated 
similarly to other industries. This proposes that taxation based on CT is an equitable 
system because, according to 47 per cent of respondents, the tax applies to all industries 
in the UK and the oil industry, particularly, is achieving similar profitability as other 
industries. Respondent 03 indeed argues that other industries are even more profitable. 
As such, special petroleum taxes, like PRT, that treat the oil industry differently from 
other industries in the UK are not desirable. In fact, despite its "generous" reliefs, PRT is 
rejected by 87 per cent of respondents when compared with the imposition of the 
Corporation Tax. This again raises the question of the efficiency of such reliefs, which 
were originally introduced to allow progressivity in the PRT system. 
On the other hand, some respondents argue that the profitability of the oil industry 
largely depends on oil prices. Respondent C5, for instance, points out that "companies 
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will make normal profits at modest production and modest prices but no super profits". 
This raises the issue of the effects of an increase in oil price, which, in this case, allow 
companies to achieve abnormal profits unlike other industries. As such, a super-profits 
tax, like PRT, may be required. 
Three additional points are worthy of note as regards achieving equity. Firstly, 
profitability is required to develop new technology and sustain the activity in older 
fields, as well as developing marginal fields in order to extend the life of the UK North 
Sea province. 
Secondly, the Government needs to take into consideration the impact of taxation on 
small independent companies, who are the new players in the North Sea. Such 
companies do not have a large international portfolio of investments like the majors. 
Respondent Cl refers to the damaging effects that PRT have on small players because 
unlike CT, it does not offer any interest reliefs. Nevertheless, there are no interest reliefs 
on the 10 Supplementary Charge neither and this is a criticism that Respondent C2 
makes as regards the 2002 fiscal changes. 
Finally, as Respondent G 1 argues, the changes to taxation in the UK were made because 
"companies should pay a fair share of their profit in tax". Consequently, it can be 
concluded that neither Royalty nor PRT were generating a fair share of revenue for the 
Government, and as a consequence they were abolished. 
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4.4.3. RISK SHARING 
The findings of the survey reveal that, according to 27 per cent of respondents, high tax 
takes can compensate for the high risk sharing. That is why these respondents argue that 
the UK tax system was more risk absorbing in its early stages. However, taxes based on 
profits, or cash flow, such as PRT, are risk sharing unlike Royalty, which is revenue 
based. In fact, PRT is indirectly described as the most risk-absorbing component of the 
1975 fiscal package given the Exploration reliefs that it provides. 
Furthermore, risk sharing is not necessarily reflected in the fiscal terms. Some 20 per 
cent of respondents refer to the importance of partnership between the Government and 
the industry to reduce risk as perceived by the industry, namely geological and fiscal 
risk. Such a partnership between the UK Government and the industry has been 
achieved (and is still in existence) as a consequence of initiatives like the PILOT 
program. 
4.4.4. STABILITY 
20 per cent of respondents argue that the stability of the regime is the most significant 
factor in affecting investment climate. These respondents debate that any attempt to 
destabilize the regime can largely affects investors' confidence and reduces the 
international competitiveness of the country. 
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On this matter, Respondent C5 makes expresses a distinctive opinion, as the respondent 
argues that although the abolition of Royalty enhances activity, such a change will create 
instability and negatively affect the province prospects. Opposing such views, one 
respondent acknowledged the difficulty of achieving stability in the regime, given the 
volatility of oil price; "it is difficult for one size to fit all circumstances" (Respondent 
C4). 
It is also important to note that although the 2002 changes were proposed in 1998, they 
came as a surprise despite the disapproval of Respondents Gland 02. In fact, during the 
interview one month prior to the April 2002 changes, Respondent G2 denied any 
possible changes to the tax regime in the near future. 
Two respondents argue that oil companies have developed their own strategies to cope 
with risk and that is why the changes to the regime did not affect their decision-making. 
In fact, Respondent 04 points out that "the uncertainties of a fiscal regime are not 
generally factored into risk analysis". 
It can be concluded that, rather than establishing a regime that is risk absorbing, the 
Government might prefer to compensate for this by maintaining and improving its 
partnership with industry and also sustaining the stability of the regime. Both partnership 




The findings of the survey with respect to the simplicity criterion are not different from 
the findings of the two previous chapters. All respondents who referred to the simplicity 
of the regime argue that PRT is a complicated tax, unlike CT. For example, Respondent 
02 argues that the 2002 changes "represented the simplest method for the Government 
to achieve the revenue that they required". Additionally, Respondent C 1 refers to the 
interaction of the three instruments in the 1975 fiscal package that generated 
complications and imposed an additional administrative burden. 
4.4.6. PROPOSED ADJUSTMENTS 
The main objective of the survey is to identify the principal weaknesses in the regime 
and to find ways to ameliorate it or an alternative system that might be acceptable to 
Government and industry alike. From the discussion in the previous sections and the 
arguments made in the survey, several suggestions are highlighted as possible attempts 
to improve the fiscal regime, which is in place currently. 
Nevertheless, before proceeding, it is important to stress on the contradiction in 
perspectives between industry and the Government regarding taxation, given their 
competing objectives. Mommer (2001) argues that "whatever the levy, a case is 
constructed where the existing levy is actually a disincentive, deters a potential 
investment or even worse, creates perverse incentives" (p.2). 
123 
Such an argument seems to indirectly agree with that of Rutledge & Wright's (1998) 
view that the UK has the "weakest regime in the world" (p.80I). In fact, although in this 
survey all respondents reject the Rutledge & Wright criticism, none of the respondents 
suggest a further decrease in the tax rates. This suggests that the industry is convinced 
that in the UK the tax rate is very competitive. Respondent 05 argues indeed that "a 
regime based upon a CT rate greater than 30 per cent might be appropriate in the event 
of the abolition of Royalties". As such, it can be derived that no reduction in the tax rates 
is advisable. 
As discussed in both Chapters 2 and 3, a tax targeted on economic rent is likely to meet 
the criteria of an ideal tax. However, no respondent in this survey suggests applying a 
tax that captures economic rent. Although three respondents (G I, G 2 and C3) argue that 
PR T was intended to capture such rent, the tax is described as having several 
deficiencies. The explanation can be partly the inability of failing to clearly define 
economic rent. In fact, according to Respondent G I, the Government does not have a 
clear definition of economic rent. This raises the issue on the Government's ability in 
practice to impose a tax that targets economic rent. 
However, other possible adjustments suggested in the survey can be considered. These 
are discussed as follows. 
Firstly, the current system, based solely on Income Tax is described as neutral and 
simple. 
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Nevertheless, compared with PRT, CT and ST are argued to lack incentives to explore, 
although they are preferred to PRT. The abolition of PRT is met with criticism on one 
specific point, the abolition of the Exploration reliefs, which are described as essential 
by the industry. This raises the possibility of introducing some Exploration reliefs to the 
current system. Respondent C6, for instance, argues that "the recent changes need to be 
supplemented by additional incentives to explore (say, a 25 per cent supplement on 
Exploration costs)". However, according to Respondent GI, such a measure is difficult 
to implement. "The Government is not currently giving too many reliefs because it 
realized that the past era will not be alive again" (Respondent G I). In fact, the general 
perspective of the industry is that the Exploration activity has been and will continue to 
be in decline but it is the development of existing fields, which will determine the future 
of the UK oil province. 
Secondly, another possibility can be to subsidize certain fields, like Don, where "there is 
lot of oil still to come but given a technology barrier, it has been abandoned" 
(Respondent C2). However, subsidizing activity makes the tax more like a Brown Tax 
hence imposes high risk on the Government40 • Further, subsidies can lead to inefficient 
use of capital. For instance, Respondent 03 argues that "the pre-I993 fiscal regime 
subsidized Exploration activity, which led to an inefficient allocation of capital". 
40 Discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.6.3.2 
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A third possible adjustment is to allow the deduction of financial costs against the 10 per 
cent Supplementary Charge, similarly to CT, as Respondent C5 argues. Such an 
alternative can be simple to implement. 
These propositions involve altering the existing tax structure. However, a fourth 
possibility suggests a complete change in the fiscal regime. Instead of PR T, the UK 
Government can impose a Resource Rent Tax similar to that used in Australia. The 
comparison between UK PRT and Australia RRT is studied in detail in Chapter 8. 
4.5. SUMMARY & CONCLUSION 
This chapter conducts a qualitative evaluation of the UK oil fiscal regime. It describes 
the different stages of the survey carried out among the main players in the UK North 
Sea. The chapter further summarizes and analyses the survey findings to evaluate the 
UK fiscal regime since its establishment in 1975, and to find ways in which the existing 
regime might be improved from both the Government and industry standpoint. In the 
light of the competing objectives of these two players, and of the controversy 
surrounding the UK petroleum fiscal regime, the analysis done in this chapter is of 
particular contribution to the progress of this thesis as well as the body of research. 
The survey solicits opinions on four main issues, which are firstly, the impact of the 
chief tax instruments and the consequences of the principal amendments on both the 
Government and the industry. 
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Secondly, the risk sharing attribute of the fiscal regime and the evaluation techniques 
that companies adopt to evaluate their projects and incorporate risk. Thirdly, the rating 
of the UK oil province on an international scaling and finally, the future of the UK North 
Sea, but more importantly the role of taxation in determining those two concerns. 
With a response rate of approximately 80 per cent, the main findings of the survey are 
summarized as follows. Taxation in the UK is argued as a major determinant of activity 
levels and trends. Tax instruments like Royalty and PRT are considered as non-neutral, 
as their abolition in 1983 and 1993 respectively, affected to a certain extent the activity 
in the UK North Sea. Royalty is outlined as a regressive tax and the least desirable, 
hence its abolition is considered as essential. 
Nevertheless, the abolition of PRT raises different opinions. On one hand, the several 
PRT reliefs are considered as expensive to the Government and can lead an inefficient 
allocation of Expenditures. Further, the abolition of PRT seems to favor the large fields, 
as small fields are protected from the payment of the tax given the different reliefs. 
Further, compared with CT, PRT is less preferred, as there is a general argument that the 
oil industry should not be treated differently from other industries. But, on the other 
hand, the abolition of PRT led to the abolition of the Exploration and Appraisal reliefs, 
as well as a reduction in the perceived level of risk sharing with Government, and which 
was a previous and important attribute of the regime. 
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The "least worst option" as an alternative regtme or actually what can be an 
improvement in the regime is to combine an increased in the Corporation Tax with the 
abolition of all upstream taxes. Yet, the stability of the regime is argued as of particular 
significance in maintaining investors' confidence. Maintaining and improving 
Government partnership with industry is also considered equally important. 
Another general agreement is with respect to the description of the UK regime as the 
weakest in the world. Not surprisingly, all respondents reject this statement, which is 
rather described as extreme because the regime is "well attuned" to the economic 
realities of a mature oil province. In fact, all respondents argue that the level of activity 
in the UK North Sea, particularly Exploration, is declining but both oil price and 
taxation can play an important role in determining both activity and profitability of the 
industry. 
The survey attempts to identify alternatives to the existing regIme that might be 
acceptable to both the Government and industry alike. Five main propositions are made, 
namely the imposition of an income tax with the abolition of all special petroleum taxes, 
as suggested by majority of respondents, the application of RRT, the introduction of 
Exploration reliefs as well as subsidies, and finally the deduction of finance costs from 
ST. The first two propositions are quantitatively assessed in the following chapters. 
However, since the research is undertaken at the development stage of a field life cycle, 
Exploration reliefs are not going to be evaluated41 . 
41 See Section 5.2.1 in Chapter 5, p.l33 and Section 9.4 in Chapter 9, p.306 
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Furthermore, introducing such a relief depends on Government and industry future 
outlook for activity in the North Sea, which seems to be pessimistic. The main concern 
is to encourage the development of discovered fields and extends the life of existing 
fields. With regards to subsidies, such an alternative seems very difficult to apply as it 
transfers too much of the risk onto the Government. Additionally, the thesis does not 
take into consideration finance costs, as such the deduction of these costs is not assessed 
any further. 
The findings of the research done in this chapter provide material insights into the 
effects of the past changes as well as the desirability and feasibility of changes to the 
current tax regime. The next chapter commences with a more detailed quantitative 
analysis of the impact of such changes on the economics of North Sea operations. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE UK NORTH SEA TAX MODEL, METHODOLOGY AND 
ASSUMPTIONS 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 3 analyzed the tax instruments that have applied to oil E&P activity on the 
UKCS since 1975, while Chapter 4 surveyed the principal views of key decision makers 
regarding the influence of taxation on oil field profitability and, consequently, its effects 
on decision making. However, the principal findings and opinions expressed need to be 
quantitatively tested for a more complete evaluation of the UK petroleum fiscal regime 
and ascertaining a regime that can be acceptable to both Government and industry alike. 
Such an evaluation requires a comprehensive understanding of the rules of taxation. 
Consequently, at this stage, a model of the UKCS oil fiscal regime needs to be derived 
in order to understand how the principal tax instruments and their different reliefs work, 
interact and impact on both oil field profitability and Government revenues. 
The objective of this chapter is to establish the analytical framework for the quantitative 
evaluation of the fiscal regime. From the principles of petroleum taxation as applied in 
the UK, the chapter derives a cash flow model that clearly shows how the tax take is 
calculated and impacting on both profitability and revenues. Further, the chapter 
highlights the principal assumptions and methodology adopted in the quantitative 
evaluation performed in subsequent chapters. 
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As the previous two chapters demonstrated, the K oil fi cal regi me i ba ed on very 
complex rules. "Tax systems are rarely simple but the legislation coverin g the taxati n 
of UK North Sea oil (the Oil Taxation Act, 1975) is quite ex traordinaril compl ex" 
(Robinson & Morgan, 1978, p .93). In the absence of complexity, the calculation of fi scal 
take is a more straightforward task. Firstly revenues less costs are calculated 0 a to 
produce the pre-tax cash flow. Secondly, a tax rate is applied to detemline the total tax 
take, which is then deducted from the pre-tax cash fl ow in order to arrive at the po t tax 
profitability in a given period. This chapter demonstrates that in the ca e of the K 
the analysis is less straightforward and require an in-depth under tanding of the 
different tax rules. 
The complexity of the regime is probabl y the reason why limited attempts have been 
made to fully establish a tax model of the UKCS, which clearl y demonstrates the effect 
of taxation on profitability. Among these few attempts, the early work of De ereux & 
Morris (1983) is distinguished. Other authors such as Favero (1992) and Zhang (1997) 
have used small-scale economic models and in other cases, such as Kemp & Rose 
(1983) and Kemp & Stephens (1997), the model s are not full y described. As such, the 
treatment of UK oil taxation in the academic literature remains very limited. Yet , 
establishing a comprehensive tax model is essential to providing appropriate guidance in 
understanding the workings of the UK regime, \ here "there are rule not simpl e 
formulas to calculate the tax li abi lity,,4~ . 
4 ~ arp (Head. or1h ea Tax Polic y. DTI ) in a per onal e- mail to the au thor (2002) . 
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For instance, it is difficult and probably inaccurate to comment on the effect of a 
particular tax relief if no clear computation is established. As will be shown later, this is 
especially the case when loss carry forwards are involved at the early stages of an oil 
field's life. 
In this chapter the principles of oil taxation are taken from the principal sources of such 
information which are the Inland Revenue (2003a,b) and the DTI (2003). A fully 
transparent cash flow model for the UKCS is then derived, for the purpose of this thesis. 
Since the principal objective of the thesis is to evaluate the impact of taxation on 
profitability and Government revenue, the availability of this model is a prerequisite for 
the quantitative analysis. Such a model produces an appropriate framework where the 
various interdependencies of tax instruments become more manageable and transparent 
(Creedy, 1999). 
The chapter is divided into four main sections. Section 5.2 incorporates the derivation of 
the cash flow model. The section is further divided into four subsections mainly 
concerned with the computation of the three principal components of fiscal take. To 
assist understanding of the tax computation, a detailed example of a selected oil field is 
presented in Appendix C. Section 5.3 sets out the principal assumptions underlying the 
quantitative analysis. It also incorporates a brief review of the WoodMackenzie Global 
Economic Model as well as the sample of fields selected. Section 5.4 covers the 
concluding remarks. 
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5.2. THE DERIVATION OF THE CASH FLOW MODEL 
This section studies the computational sequence of the three main tax instruments that 
have applied to E&P activity on the UKCS namely, Royalty, PRT and CT. However, it 
is important to stress that these taxes have several reliefs and were the subject of many 
changes that have almost prohibited their capture in the model. Notwithstanding, the 
principal reliefs and changes are fully evaluated. 
The section commences with a brief description of the different stages of an oil field's 
life cycle, because "a full understanding of the taxation problems of oil and gas cannot 
be achieved without at least a basic appreciation of the physical nature of oil operations" 
(Hayllar & Pleasance, 1977, p.5). The section then proceeds with listing the variables 
used in the development of the model. This is followed by a separate computation of 
each fiscal component so as to derive a complete model of the UK oil fiscal regime. 
5.2.1. FIELD LIFE CYCLE 
There are six phases in the life of an offshore oil field. These are presented as follows: 
1. The acquisition of a license or concession: The search for oil begins when the 
Government announces its intention to offer oil companies the right to prospect 
in a part of its territorial waters (UKOOA, 2003). 
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11. Exploration: This phase starts with the decision to drill a well. Seismic surveys 
are undertaken to identify the prospect. Once technical data is obtained and 
analyzed, the decision is taken whether to proceed further. If the conditions are 
right to continue with the project, the next stage is to drill an exploration well. If 
the well proves dry the exploration costs of the dry hole are written-off, whereas 
if oil is found the company proceeds to the testing phase. In the UKCS, the 
success rate of exploration wells is estimated to be approximately 21 per cent 
(UKOOA, 2001). 
111. Appraisal: Following a discovery, it is necessary to appraise the reservoir and 
ascertain its characteristics (size, structure and quality), thereby reducing 
technical uncertainty. Once data has been obtained and interpreted, the decision 
to develop the discovery must be taken. This decision depends on numerous 
factors, including an estimate of the future oil price at the time the project would 
be expected to come on stream (UKOOA, 2003). 
IV. Development: If the field is commercially viable, the next stage is the 
development phase. A decision is taken as regards the development technology 
to be employed in exploiting the reserves of the field. A detailed development 
plan has to be submitted to the DTI for approval before construction proceeds. 
According to Inland Revenue (2003b), the aforementioned stages are incorporated into 
one single stage, the Exploration Stage, which "covers broadly the period from the 
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obtaining of the license to the time when a decision is made to develop, or not to 
develop a field,,43. 
v. Production: Once the first production wells are drilled the production phase 
begins and the project comes 'on stream'. A number of production wells are 
drilled to access as high a proportion of the field reserves as possible. The natural 
pressure within the reservoirs forces the oil up the wellbore, allowing it to be 
delivered to an offshore production facility on the sea surface or to a production 
facility onshore. It is only when production starts that both operating revenues 
and operating costs occur. The costs occurring before the production stage are 
generally regarded as capital expenditures. 
VI. Abandonment phase: This is the final stage in the cycle, where the field is no 
longer profitable and is decommissioned. 
In the UK, an oil field life cycle tends to be longer than in most other areas of the world 
both because of the nature of the environment and the scale of the risks and costs 
involved. The Exploration and Appraisal stages, in particular, can last many years. 
Exploration and development activities have often taken ten years or more and even then 
it may take another twenty or thirty years to produce all recoverable reserves (Inland 
Revenue, 2003). Accordingly, there may be substantial delays before oil compames 
begin to obtain a return from their investments (UKOOA, 2003). 
43 Inland Revenue (2003) Oil Taxation Manual- Overview of the main types of costs incurred in oil 
exploration and production. 
135 
5.2.2. LIST OF VARIABLES 























Net Cash Flow in period t 
Oil Revenue in period t 
Total Cost in period t 
Total Tax Take in period t 
Capital Expenditures (CAPEX) in period t 
Operating Costs (OPEX) in period t 
Oil production in period t 
Oil price in period t 
Royalty in period t 
Royalty rate 
Uplift rate on capital expenditure in period t 
Payback Period 
Loss carried forward from Period t-l, for PR T purpose 
Oil Allowance in period t 
Number of years over which profitability is calculated 
Adjusted profit 
PRT assessable profit 
Mainstream Petroleum Revenue Tax in period t 
PRTrate 
Safeguard period 
CT assessable profit 
Corporation tax in period t 
Corporation tax rate 
Writing Down Allowance in period t 
First Year Allowance in period t 
Loss Carried forward from period t-l, for CT purpose 
Supplementary Charge in period t 
Supplementary Charge rate in period t 
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5.2.3. NET CASH FLOW OF AN OIL FIELD 
At a given period t, the profitability of an oil field is given by its Net Cash Flow, as in 
the following: 
(5.1) 
Where the total cost, Ct , incorporates two principal costs namely; the Capital 
Expenditures, CAPEX, and the Operating Expenditures, OPEX. The tax comprises 
three main elements: Royalty, PRT and CT. These are described separately in the 
following sections. 
5.2.3.1. ROYALTY 
In April 2002, the Government decided to abolish Royalty on all fields (see Budget 
Release, 2002). This decision was made effective in December 2002. Prior to that year, 
Royalty applied on fields that received development approval before April 1982, at a 
rate of 12.5 per cent and charged on half yearly periods. The rate is imposed on the 
gross revenue with deductions for Conveying and Treating costs (C&T). These costs 
include the cost of getting the oil from the wellhead to the point of sale but exclude the 
exploration and drilling costs. 
According to WoodMackenzie (2000), the C&T costs comprise: 
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70 per cent of the capital costs of the platfonn depreciated (on a straight-line basis) 
over eight years (or 16 chargeable periods) or the life of the field, whichever is the 
shorter. 
Approximately 60 per cent of total platfonn operating costs. 
100 per cent of the costs of transportation. 
Given the C&T costs, the effective Royalty rate is likely to be between 9 and 12 per 




The post-Royalty revenue becomes: 
(5.4) 
Royalty is an allowable cost for both PR T and CT in the case of a field paying all three. 
44Devereux & Morris (1983) assume that the C&T costs represent 37.6% of Capital Expenditure 
depreciated over 8 years (i.e. 4.7% of CAPEX per year) and 4.5% of Operating Costs. As such, the 
authors represent the Royalty take in a given period t as in the following: 
RO~ = (Rt - (0.047 * L CEJ- (0.045 * OE,))* 0.125 
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5.2.3.2. PETROLEUM REVENUE TAX- PRT 
PRT is assessed on a six-month period at a rate of 50 per cent on 'assessable profit' for 
fields that gained development approval before 16 March 1993. This rate has changed 
five times since 1975, as Table 5.1 shows: 






1993 Onwards 50% 
Under the PR T rules, a nng fence exists around the field where only expenditure 
incurred on the oil field can be set against the income from the field and not against the 
profits from another field45. The assessable or taxable profit is the gross revenue less a 
series of deductions principally Royalty, Opex and Capex, Uplift, Losses Brought 
Forward and Oil Allowance. Although Safeguard relief applies, it is not given as a 
deduction but is calculated separately. 
Opex and Capex are fully deductible in the year in which the expenditure is incurred. 
Certain types of costs, principally financial costs, are excluded. 
45 However the introduction of the Cross Field Allowance (CFA) in 1987, enabling 10 per cent of the , 
development costs on a new field to be offset against PRT liabilities on another field operated by the 
same company, was one of the exceptions to the general principle that PRT is a field-based tax (Inland 
Revenue, 2003). 
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Capex benefits from an additional relief known as Uplift or Supplement, at a rate of 35 
per cent46 . As such, 135 per cent of Capex is deductible from gross revenue, reducing 
the assessable profit by the following amount: 
(5.5) 
No PRT is paid until the accumulated Capex and Uplift has been written off. However, 
Uplift on Capex is granted only up to payback period, K, which is defined as the first 
period in which cumulative cash flow becomes positive. In other words, the payback 
period is "the point where the cumulative incomings exceed cumulative outgoings, 
(outgoings being defined as including not only Capital Expenditure but also the uplift)" 
(WoodMackenzie, 2000, p.74). As such, the payback period, K, can be found as the 
minimum value of K for which the following relationship is satisfied: 
K K 
I(Rt -ROY, -OEt) > ICEt(l+uPt) (5.6) 
t=1 1=1 
After the Payback period, no Uplift is granted and Capex in subsequent periods 
although not qualifying for Uplift continues to be allowed as a deduction. 
Losses are carried forward and set against profits in future chargeable periods. 
However, when the production has ceased, losses (such as abandonment costs) can be 
carried back against earlier period's profits, working backward until the loss is 
exhausted (Inland Revenue, 2003). 
46 The rate was initially 75 per cent but it was reduced to 35 per cent in 1979. 
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Where there is still a profit, after the deduction of expenditures and losses, Oil 
allowance is given. This relief exempts a fixed amount of production from each field 
from PR T until such time as the total Oil Allowance for the field is fully utilized. 
Oil Allowance is a deduction from profits equal to the value of 250,000 tonnes of oil for 
each six-month period up to a cumulative maximum of 5 Mt47, multiplied by the 
relevant price of each period. If production does not reach 250,000 tonnes in a 
chargeable period, that part of the Oil Allowance is not lost but is available in later 
chargeable periods but always with the limitation of 250,000 tonnes per chargeable 
period and 5 Mt overall (Hayllar & Pleasance, 1977). 
Any profit remaining for the period after the deduction of expenditures, losses and Oil 
Allowance is liable to PRT. Consequently, the assessable profit for PRT, to which the 
PRT rate will apply, is given by: 
(5.7) 
As such, the mainstream PRT take is defined as: 
PRT =t Jr =t {R -ROYt -OEt -CEt(l+uPt)-Losst_1 -OAt} (5.8) t P pt P t 
At this stage, the Safeguard relief rules are applied. 
47 Before 1979, 500,000 tonnes of oil were allowed for each period with a maximum cumulative 
allowance of 10 million tonnes. 
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This is a form of tapering relief, i.e. an upper limit, under which an oil field will never 
pay more than the Safeguard liability. As such, in certain cases, Safeguard can further 
reduce the amount of PRT chargeable, thereby allowing a field to achieve a minimum 
level of return on investment before it incurs any PR T liability. The Safeguard applies 
as follows. 
Firstly, an "adjusted profit", Ira is calculated and which is the gross revenue less Royalty 
and operating costs. 
(5.9) 
Secondly, this profit is compared to the accumulated CAPEX (without the Uplift), 




If Ira < 15% of L CE ,no PRT is paid. 
n=l 
t 
If Ira ~ 15% of L CE ,PRT is compared to the Safeguard limit, which is 80% of 
n=l 
t 
(Ira -150/0 ofL CE), and the company pays whichever is the smaller amount. As 
n=l 
such, when the Safeguard limit is lower than the PRT liability, the Safeguard 
reduces the amount of PR T chargeable. 
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Safeguard applies over only a limited period of time, which is the number of chargeable 
periods up until the field has reached payback plus half of that number of periods. 
Therefore, S , the period in which the Safeguard provision ends, is given by: 
S = l.5K (5.10) 
5.2.3.2. CORPORATION TAX 
Unlike PRT, CT applies on a company rather than a field basis. An oil company is 
subject to the standard CT rules that apply to all companies operating in the UK but, in 
addition, is subject to the ring fence rules. UK E&P activities are treated as distinct from 
all other activities carried out by the company and profits from these activities are 
referred to as 'ring fence' profits. In order to prevent tax leakage, only losses incurred 
within the ring fence are allowed as a deduction from ring fence profits. The main CT 
rate is currently 30 per cent, "one of the lowest company tax rates in the world" (DTI, 
2001, p.1)48. This rate has changed several times, since 1975 as Table 5.2 shows. 
Table 5.2. Evolution of CT Rate 
Period CTRate 








1999- Onwards 30% 
48 See Appendix D comparing the fiscal take in a sample of countries 
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The assessable profit for CT is calculated after deduction of Royalty, Opex, Capital 
Allowances (depreciation), together with any losses brought forward from previous 
. 49 years, Interest costs ,as well as any PRT payable. 
The principal capital allowances are the First Year Allowance (FY A) and the Writing 
Down Allowance (WDA) which cannot both be claimed in the same year. The FYA 
represents an immediate relief, its rate has varied over time: 
Prior to 14 March 1984, FYA rate 100 per cent 
14 March 1984-31 March 1985, FYA rate 75 per cent 
1 April 1985-31 March 1986, FYA rate 50 per cent 
After that date, FYA ceased to apply. 
If FY A is claimed, the expenditure remaining, the Residual Balance, will qualify for a 
WDA in the following period. If a 100 per cent FY A is due, the residual value is zero. 
Prior to April 2002, WDA applied at a rate of 25 per cent on the undepreciated pool of 
expenditure brought forward from the previous years. However, after April 2002, a 100 
per cent Capital Allowance was applied instead of the 25 per cent rate, and is also 
adopted in the quantitative analysis in the following chapters. 
Any losses, which are inevitable in an activity involving a long lead-time between 
development and the generation of positive cashflows are carried forward and set 
against future profits in other chargeable periods. 
49 Finance costs have not been incorporated in the calculation of CT in this thesis. As such it is assumed 
that the company is self-financed. 
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When the production has ceased, a claim is made to carry back the loss (Abandonment 
costs) against earlier profits, working backward until it is exhausted. 
The assessable profit for CT is defined as: 
(5.11) 
And the CT take will be: 
(5.12) 
In the 2002 Budget, the Government imposed the Supplementary Tax at a rate of 10 per 
cent. This tax is applied to the same tax base as CT, the only difference being that there 
was no deduction for financing costs50. Nevertheless, since finance costs are not 
incorporated in the calculation of CT in this thesis, the ST and CT will be calculated on 
the same tax base. As such, it can be assumed that given a ST rate of 10 per cent the 
applicable CT rate will be 40 per cent. 
The assessable profit for ST is as follows: 
(5.13) 
50 "This was aimed at preventing companies manipulating their levels of borrowing between ring fence 
and non-ring fence activities to minimize the impact of the supplementary charge" (Inland Revenue, 
2003). 
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And the ST take is: 
(5.14) 
5.2.4. CASH FLOW MODEL 
The previous sections studied in detail the computation of the tax base for Royalty, PR T 
and CT. Consequently, the post-tax profitability of an oil field, where Royalty, PRT and 
CT apply in a particular period, t, can be expressed as follows: 
(5.15) 
Where: 
The post-Royalty revenue is given by: 
(5.16) 
The post-PRT profit is given by: 
The post-CT profit (including the ST) or the net post-tax cash flow is given by: 
(l-t )R -DE -CE -t {Rt -ROYt -OEt -CEt(l+uPt)-LossH -OAt} 
r t t t P (5.18) 
-( {R -ROY -DE -PRTt -CAt -Losset_l } c t t t 
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The above Net Cash Flow model raises an important point of interest. 
As the NCF equation shows, the oil price, size of the field, Opex and Capex as well as 
taxation and related reliefs are the key variables directly affecting profitability and, as 
such, the investment decisions and the international competitiveness of the UK's 
petroleum fiscal regime. The size and costs of the field are related to geological, 
geographic and environmental circumstances. 
In a survey undertaken by Mohiuddin & Ash-Kuri (1998)51 on 30 companies, 83 per 
cent of these argue that prospectivity is the most important factor while fiscal terms 
come second with 80 per cent of respondents and political stability third. Since 
exploration activity is high risk and expensive to undertake, firms are anxious to ensure, 
that wherever they drill or explore, there will be a reasonable probability of success 
(Ritchie, 1992). 
This can explain why countries with very tough fiscal regimes still attract substantial 
investments. For example, although the UK is believed to have one of the most 
attractive fiscal regimes in the world while Indonesia has relatively tough fiscal terms, 
Indonesia comes second to the UK in terms of the number of wells drilled. This 
indicates the favorable prospectivity in the region. As long as companies are confident 
of finding a resource, they are able to deal with all the other factors in such a way as to 
earn an acceptable rate of return (Raja, 1999). 
51 As referred to by Raja (1999) 
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Nevertheless, Chapter 4 demonstrates that in mature areas such as the UK North Sea, 
taxation now plays one the most significant role in determining the future of the 
prOVInce. 
Martin, in 1997, argues that the changes made to the UK petroleum fiscal regime are the 
most important factor that led to the 1985 and 1995 peaks in oil production. 
Technological progress, leading to cost reduction, is the second most important factor. 
Nevertheless, according to Martin (1997), technological progress is significant only 
when combined with high oil price. The author further argues that the oil price, 
although it is the third most important factor that leads to production peaks if, 
considered alone, is not a sufficient variable to explain the change in production. 
Deriving the cash flow model allowed a better understanding of the functioning and 
interaction of the different tax instruments of the UK petroleum fiscal regime. As such, 
a clearer picture is provided to assist in understanding the debate surrounding the 
different tax instruments and their reliefs as applied in the UKCS. 
5.3. ASSUMPTIONS 
The cash flow model derived in the prevIOUS section sets out the basis for the 
quantitative analysis. This section highlights the major assumptions underlying the 
analysis. 
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5.3.1. COMPANIES & FIELDS 
In order to avoid unnecessary complications, this thesis takes as its basic operating 
premise a single company which operates and owns a single oil field. If there are 
several companies investing in an oil field, each will own a percentage and the tax base 
will apply on the individual company's, not the overall profitability of the field. This 
particularly applies in the case of CT. 
Following Devereux & Morris (1983), it is assumed that a company's profit in a 
particular field is equal to its interest in that field multiplied by the profit generated 
(after deductions of both Royalty and PRT). A company's assessable profit for CT is the 
sum of different profits from each of the fields it holds an interest. 
The analysis carried out in this thesis concentrates on the effects of taxation on 
individual oil fields. In fact, "the outside observer cannot know in detail the tax position 
of the companies" (Robinson & Morgan, 1978, p.113). This partly explains the reason 
why several of the studies52 done in the field of UK petroleum taxation assume no 
difference between the effects of tax on individual oil fields and on the company. 
Although such assumptions may not reflect the exact impact of tax, particularly CT, 
they are unlikely to generate any contradictory findings. The profitability of an oil field, 
which is greatly influenced by taxation, is a key determinant of the attractiveness of an 
oil province. 
52 Among others Robinson & Morgan (1978), Kemp & Rose (1983), Rowland (1983), Kemp, Stephens & 
Masson (1997), Kemp & Stephens (1997), Laughton (1998). 
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5.3.2. TAX SCENARIOS 
Chapter 3 critically analyzed the evolution of the petroleum fiscal regime in the UK and 
the various amendments made as a consequence of changes in field size, infrastructure, 
oil prices and international competitiveness. 
Using the Cash Flow Model, different tax scenarios are introduced in order to assess 
and compare the outcome of the principal changes made to the regime between 1975 
and 2002, both as regards field profitability and Government revenues. 
Consequently, in this thesis nine tax scenarios are adopted which, except for Scenario 1-
the Base Case Scenario- calculate profitability and Government revenue under the 
differing combinations of tax instruments and tax rates that generated the major 
controversies when they were implemented. 
Scenarios 2 to 5 evaluate the effects of the historic tax rates, while Scenarios 6 evaluates 
the 2002 regime, and also assessing one of the proposed adjustments as identified in 
Chapter 4. 
Since the main PR T reliefs have generated significant controversies, Scenario 7 isolates 
and evaluates the effects of those reliefs on both field profitability and Government 
revenue under the current regime through three sub-scenarios. 
All the scenarios are summarized in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3. Tax Scenarios53 
• Scenario 1 (Base) Under this scenario, no tax applies. 
• Scenario 2 This scenario evaluates the pre-1983 structure with 12.5% Royalty, 
70% PRT and 52% CT. 
• Scenario 3 This scenario assesses the post-1983 but pre-1993 structure, where 
fields are subject to 75% PRT and 33% CT. 
• Scenario 4 This scenario computes the post-tax profitability of fields that received 
development consent after 1983 but before 1993, but following the 
changes in 1993, the PRT rate was reduced to 50% and CT applies at 
30%. 
• Scenario 5 This scenario evaluates the tax structure that applies to fields that 
received development consent after 1993 but before the 2002 changes. 
In this case, fields are subject to 30% CT. 
• Scenario 6 This scenano assesses the 2002 changes, where the 10% 
Supplementary charge was introduced on fields that are subject only to 
CT. 
• Scenario 7 This scenario also evaluates the 2002 changes, but applies ST on fields 
that are in a 50% PRT and 30% CT-paying position. 
- Scenario 7.a No Uplift applies 
- Scenario 7. b No Oil Allowance applies 
- Scenario 7.c. No Safeguard applies 
5.3.3. GLOBAL ECONOMIC MODEL 
The Global Economic Model (GEM) (2002 version) is an Excel spreadsheet economic 
evaluation tool developed by WoodMackenzie, a well-established consultancy company 
in the E&P sector of the petroleum industry, who kindly agreed to supply a copy of their 
model to assist the author in the research. 
53 Where PRT applies, it is assumed that the Uplift rate is 35 per cent and the Oil Allowance is a 
maximum of 5 Mt. 
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In general, the model serves two mam purposes. Firstly, it provides a cost and 
production database covering all oil and gas fields in the UK, including past and 
prospective information. Secondly, it is an economic modeling tool that can be used to 
evaluate individual field or company developments in the UK (WoodMackenzie, 2000). 
A field's profitability is calculated under a specific set of assumptions principally oil 
price, inflation and tax, which can be varied. 
However, for the purpose of this thesis, GEM is mainly used as the basic source of 
production, historic oil price and cost data. In fact, because GEM is based on 
spreadsheet formulas that calculate a field's profitability under specific tax scenarios 
that cannot be amended and only use the Discounted Cash Flow evaluation method, 
additional spreadsheet based models are developed to overcome these limitations. These 
spreadsheets utilize the tax formulas set out in this chapter to calculate field profitability 
and Government revenue under the different tax scenarios detailed in the previous 
section54. 
Additionally, in those spreadsheets, field profitability is calculated USIng different 
financial evaluation techniques, namely Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) and Modem 
Asset Pricing (MAP), which are described in detail in the following chapter. 
Furthermore, GEM calculates profitability under fiscal terms that are specific to the UK. 
In order to complete the international comparison (see Chapter 8), additional 
spreadsheets are developed to include the fiscal terms of five other oil producing 
countries. 
S4 See Appendix C, for an example 
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5.3.4. SAMPLE OF FIELDS 
Different sizes of fields generate different levels of profitability. In relative tenns small 
and medium fields do not generate same levels of economic rent as large fields. 
Consequently, different tax instruments have a varying impact on field profitability in 
so far as "one size does not fit all". 
To illustrate this variable impact, a sample of oil fields is selected and classified 
according to the size of their recoverable reserves55 into very small, small, medium, 
large and very large categories, as in the following: 
A very small field IS deemed to have less than 100 mmbbl of recoverable 
reserves. 
A small field has less than 200 mmbbl of recoverable reserves. 
A medium field has recoverable reserves between 200 and 400 mmbbl. 
A large field has recoverable reserves of more than 400-500 mmbbl. 
Any field with recoverable reserves of more than 500 mmbbl is described as 
very large. Nevertheless, no very large fields are incorporated in the analysis 
because there has not been any UK discovery of this size for the last 20 years. 
Further, the very large fields that are in production are currently in their final 
stages of decline. 
55 Recoverable reserves are "that proportion of the oil and gas in the reservoir that can be removed using 
currently available techniques" (DTI, Oil & Gas Glossary, 2003) 
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This classification is the result of a comparison of size division from major sources: 
Table 5.4. Division of Fields by Size 
Study By Very Small Small Medium Large 
Robinson & Morgan (1978) 100-250 250-350 >350 
Kemp & Macdonald (1995) <100 100-250 250-500 >500 
Sem & Ellennan (1998) <100 100-400 >400 
Simmons & Co (2003) <100 100-200 200-400 >400 
The Brown Book (DTI, 2001) provides information on 143 oil fields operating in the 
UK North Sea and GEM provides data on their production and costs. The distribution of 
these fields relative to the four size groups provided the following proportions of the 
total number of fields: 
Table 5.5. Distribution of Fields 
Field Size Proportion of total 
field base 




A sample of 25 oil fields is randomly selected for investigation on the basis of their 
providing a representative coverage of post 1993 (pre 2002) operating oil fields in the 
North Sea. As such, with respect to the distribution of UK oil fields, the data set 
selected includes 10 very small, 9 small, 4 medium and 2 large field56• Production and 
cost data for these fields is provided in Appendix E57. 
56 A minor alteration is made to the proportion of fields selected to allow a better comparison, as such 10 
very small fields are selected instead of 14,9 small instead of7, and 4 medium instead of3. 
57 For reasons of consistency, the cash flows of the various fields selected are assumed to start in 2002. 
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The use of real data affords the study a more authoritative status especially when 
individual characteristics such as water depth, size, costs and life, which are specific to 
each field, are incorporated into the models. Smith & Mccardle (1998) argue that the 
use of a model field greatly oversimplify the problems analysed, because in reality there 
are many complications such as uncertain production rates, development costs and 
construction lags. 
5.3.5. ADDITIONAL ASSUMPTIONS 
In addition to the principal assumptions highlighted In the preVIOUS sections, the 
following assumptions are made: 
A base Brent oil price of $19.50Ibbl in 2002 is used for evaluation purposes. This 
rate remains constant in real terms, with 2002 as base year. 
All figures are expressed in real terms and in £M. 
The analysis is done on nominal terms then deflated. kl is the inflation factor, where 
k = k exp(k) with k = 1 and k the constant annual inflation rate of 2.5 per cent 
I 1-1 ' 0 
from 2002, as assumed in GEM 
A constant exchange rate ofUS$1.50 = £1 STG, as assumed in GEM. 
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5.4. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has derived a tax model that applies to oil activity in the UK North Sea, 
from the legal terms of oil taxation, as provided by the Inland Revenue and the DTI. 
The transparent cash flow model derived allows a clear understanding and quantitative 
evaluation of the effects of different tax instruments and their reliefs on oil field 
profitability and Government revenue. 
The chapter then proceeds with the review of the principal assumptions that are adopted 
in the cash flow model in the following chapters, particularly the assumptions regarding 
the tax scenarios and sample of fields. Seven tax scenarios are assumed in order to 
evaluate and compare the outcome of the principal changes made to the regime between 
1975 and 2002, both as regards field profitability and Government revenues. 
Furthermore, 25 oil fields, currently operating in the UK oil province, are selected to 
carry out the research. 
The analysis undertaken in this chapter demonstrates the significant complexity of the 
UK fiscal regime and is reflected in the underlined tax equations. "In anyone year or in 
anyone field the amount that the Government will take in the forms of taxes cannot be 
simply evaluated or anticipated without an appropriate computer model; there is no such 
thing as an adequate "back of the envelope" calculation in the North Sea" (United 
Kingdom Oil & Gas Taxation and Accounting, 1984, p.14). The level and combination 
of taxes vary with the date a particular field received development consent. 
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Where more than one tax applies, the tax instruments interact with each other. Royalty 
is allowable as a deduction against PRT and CT, while PRT is only allowed as a 
deduction in calculating CT. Additionally, the different items of expenditure have 
different degrees of allow ability for each type of tax. PR T in particular was described as 
a complicated device in the previous two chapters. 
This chapter sets the analytical framework for the quantitative evaluation of the UK oil 
fiscal regime. Up to this stage, the profitability of an oil field is modelled for a single 
specific period. Nevertheless, in computing the profitability of a project based on 
expected future cash flows, both time and risk need to be taken in consideration in the 
calculation. This is often incorporated through the use of an appropriate discount rate 
although it can be done using other techniques. These are explained in detail in the 
following chapters, which cover the quantitative evaluation of the UK oil fiscal regime. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
IMPACT OF DIFFERENT TAX SCENARIOS ON OIL FIELD 
PROFITABILITY AND GOVERNMENTREVENUE 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter derived the tax model and outlined the main assumptions that are 
adopted in the quantitative evaluation of the UK petroleum fiscal regime. This chapter 
proceeds with the assessment of the regime taking into consideration both the industry 
and Government interests, hence evaluating the effect of taxation on oil field 
profitability and Government revenue from the UKCS. An important aspect of the study 
is the appraisal technique used to calculate the after tax profitability and, consequently, 
capture more appropriately the effect of taxation. 
The choice of the financial evaluation technique is of particular significance for both 
companies and Government. To assess the taxation impact, an appropriate evaluation 
technique must be adopted. An inappropriate technique can result in a misleading figure 
both as regards profitability and taxable capacity. 
In Chapter 5, an after tax Net Cash Flow (NCF) equation was derived. This NCF is 
calculated for a given period of time. However, to value their projects, oil companies 
estimate the after tax present value of their total expected net cash flows discounted for 
both time and risk. 
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Bjerkedal (2000) argues that under some evaluation teclmiques, "a tax system can 
appear less attractive, even though it is not. .. in this case very severe conclusi ons can be 
drawn and companies can make wrong statements, based on incorrect computation 
methods in evaluating project economics" (pA). Emhjellen & Al aouze (2001 ) maintain 
that changing the valuation method may affect an oil company's investment decision on 
new projects because the ranking of projects will vary under different valuation 
methods. In an attempt to explain the reason that led to the decline in the value of oil 
companies over the last 15 years, Siew (2001) argues that oil companies have made 
incorrect investment decisions based on faulty project appraisal methods. 
For several decades in the energy industry, the most common form of project evaluation 
has been the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) technique (Laughton, Sagi & Samis, 2000) . 
However, over the last few years, there has been an increasing interest in the use of 
more useful and more moden1 evaluation techniques, such as the Modem Asset Pricing 
model (MAP) developed by Jacoby & Laughton (1991) and Real Options Theory 
(ROT)58. These teclmiques were developed to overcome some of the weaknesses of 
DCF, and can be considered as evolved versions of the traditional technique. They can 
allow a more efficient valuation of risk, hence an improved investment decision making 
by oil companies compared with the commonly applied DCF59. 
58 Thi chapter focu es on M P, while the fo llowing chapter incorporate ROT becau e an additiona l 
a umption in dec ision-making is taken in con ide ration, and which i fl exibility. 
'i9 The 0 F technique ca n be more ophisti ca ted. but in thi thcs ls a more impli tic ver, ion of the 
tcchnique i followcd, a adopted in majori ty of pre\'iou tudles. among other Kemp c ' Ro, e ( 19L 3) and 
Kemp & , tcphcns ( 1997) . 
159 
The DCF method is currently used by oil companies (Emhj ellen & Alaouze, 2001) and 
a recent study done by Siew (2001) found that 99 per cent of oil companies use this 
technique. Furthermore, the majority of previous studies60 utilized this traditional 
technique to evaluate the profitability of an oil field. The number of applications of the 
newer methods in the evaluation of the UK oil fiscal regime is however substantially 
less. Jacoby & Laughton61 (1991) were pioneers in the application of the MAP 
technique to evaluate the oil fiscal regime in the UKCS. However, they limited their 
analysis to the 1975 fiscal structure. 
Evaluating after tax profitability of an oil field under both the traditional and modem 
techniques can therefore be beneficial. It is useful to see if the more modem techniques 
give significant difference from the traditional method and whether they should be 
recommended as a replacement to the traditional technique. Furthermore, comparing 
two competing techniques not only gives new insights regarding the efficiency of these 
methods, but also increases the reliability of the conclusions of this thesis. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 analyses and 
compares the concepts of the traditional DCF and MAP, the more modem technique. 
Section 6.3 expands the comparison of the two methods in terms of discounting 
expected future cash flows. The results are presented and discussed in Section 6.4. 
Section 6.5 summarizes and concludes the chapter. 
60Among others, Robinson & Morgan (1978), Rowland (1983), Rowland & Hann (1987), Kemp & Rose 
(1982), Kemp & Stephens (1997), and Martin (1997). . . . 
61 Because of the limited published work in the field of MAP, the author benefited from diSCUSSIOn WIth 
Dr. Laughton. 
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6.2. OCF VERSUS MAP: CONCEPTS & COMPUTATIONAL STEPS 
This section compares the concepts and computational steps of DCF and MAP. It 
addresses the limitations of DCF and the manner in which MAP overcomes these 
limitations. 
6.2.1. DCF COMPUTATIONAL STEPS & LIMITATIONS 
The Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) technique has been (and still is) the most commonly 
used method in evaluating expected future cash flow. Under this technique, the project62 
evaluation is usually done in three steps: 
Firstly, the analyst estimates the project net cash flows that will occur at each time 
period in a particular scenario. 
Secondly, the project cash flows are discounted usmg a certain discount rate, 
incorporating a risk premium 63. 
Finally, the discounted cash flows are added to form the project value, also called the 
Net Present Value (NPV)64. 
62 The term "project" in this thesis refers to an oil field 
63 See Section 6.3 for further explanation of OCF discounting . 
.. In some cases, a probability distribution for different scenarios is constructed In this case, the Expected 
Net Present Value, ENPV, is used as a measure of the overall profitability of the project. 
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Siew (2001) argues that there are two main advantages to using DCF method65 . Firstly, 
it is a cash flow based technique, which takes into account the time value of mone/6. 
Secondly, it is quick and relatively easy to understand and calculate. 
However, according to Jacoby & Laughton (1992), there are several problems III 
following the DCF method, mainly: 
1. The use of uniform discounting in the DCF method is based on the "false" 
premises that the risks inherent within different components of the project cash 
flow are of the same magnitude. This is of particular significance when using the 
assumption that the only uncertainty results from oil price, as is the case in this 
thesis. As such, "the discounting in the DCF is only vaguely related to the 
uncertainty in the cash flows" (Jacoby & Laughton, 1992, p.9). 
11. Under DCF, the discount rate is constant and therefore it does not take into 
consideration the resolution of uncertainty over time. As such, under DCF, the 
future cash flows are discounted excessively and this can lead to a tendency to 
throw capital at any proj ect alternative that will accelerate the receipt of revenues. 
Consequently, DCF introduces bias against long-term decision-making. 
Ill. DCF analysis depends critically on the choice of a project discount rate. However, 
many organizations do not understand the very complex issues that lie behind the 
65 NPV is one of the applications of DCF technique. Other profitability indicators can be the Internal Rate 
of Return (IRR) and finding the required price for given rate of return. However, authors like Bierman & 
Smidt (1988) argue that NPV method is simpler, easier and more direct. 
66 This point is further discussed in Section 6.2.2. 
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chosen rate. DCF method treats risk in an ad hoc matter through some combination 
of subjective choices of discount rates. 
IV. The focus of the DCF analysis is on a "now or never" investment decision. It does 
not allow future management flexibility, which can add value to an investment. 
Consequently, DCF can undervalue projects (Watkins, 2002)67. 
6.2.2. MAP CONCEPT 
In 1991, Jacoby & Laughton introduced an alternative to DCF for the evaluation of 
petroleum projects. They called the new technique Modem Asset Pricing (MAP), which 
is based on the Derivative Asset Pricing theory (explained in Section 6.3.2). The 
Derivative Asset Pricing theory has been developed over the last three decades and as 
such it is not a new approach. However the theory is applied in the pricing of complex 
financial instruments, whereas MAP expands the model for the evaluation of petroleum 
projects, where the technique is still in its "infancy" (Laughton, 1998c). 
MAP is based on the following two major ideas: 
1. Firstly, a project can be valued by considering the cash that it consumes and 
generates. Cash flow is a commodity and can be valued according to the two 
characteristics that are important to people who trade in it. These characteristics are 
time and risk. 
67 The concept of flexibility is discussed in detail in Chapter 7. 
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The DCF method recognizes this idea in the use of discount rates that combine a risk 
free rate (valuation for time) and a risk premium (valuation of risk) (Laughton, 
1998a). 
People prefer to receive cash sooner rather than later. "A dollar received now is 
more valuable than a dollar received five years from now because of the investment 
possibilities that are available for today's dollar" (Bierman & Smidt, 1984, pA 7). 
Therefore, there is a time discount in the valuation of the claim to a cash flow. The 
longer the time to the receipt of the cash that an asset provides, the lower the value 
of the asset (Salahor, 1998). 
For a risk free cash flow there is no discount for risk since there is no risk involved. 
As such there is only discounting for time. The time discount rate is derived from 
the risk free cash value, which in turn can be expressed in terms of the risk-free 
interest rate. However, when cash flows are uncertain there needs to be a discount 
for risk in addition to discount for time. "Most people have an aversion to 
uncertainty in their level of welfare. Therefore, if they have a choice, most people 
would prefer to reduce uncertainty in their lives by investing their current wealth in 
assets that would provide extra cash in future situations where they would otherwise 
be poor rather in situations where they would otherwise be rich" (Salahor, 1998, 
p.IS). In the former case, assets will be more valued than those in the latter, as there 
will be a markup for risk of the expected payoff. 
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When the existence of uncertainty directly influences financial market prices it is 
called "priced risk,,68 and requires non-zero risk discounting but when it does not 
have any direct influence it is called "unpriced risk,,69, which does not require risk 
discounting. An oil proj ect faces uncertainty as regards the price of oil, which is 
normally a priced risk, as well as project-specific technical and geological 
determinants as regards the volume of oil to be produced, which is normally a non-
priced risk (Salahor, 1998). 
11. The second idea is the "principle of value consistency" or the "no-arbitrage 
principle", which states that if two assets have the same cash flow consequences 
they have the same price (Coelen, 2002). The special form of this principle is the 
"principle of value additivity", which allows to break the cash flows of a project into 
parts with different risk characteristics for evaluation and then add the value of the 
parts to get the value of the whole project (Salahor, 1998). 
Under the MAP technique, the analyst performs the equivalent of the first two steps in 
the DCF evaluation process (Section 6.2.1) but in the reverse order, as described below: 
Firstly, the analyst discounts the uncertain project cash flow determinants USIng 
appropriate discounting structures for each determinant. 
68 Also called "non-diverisfiable", "systemic", "market" or "macroeoconomic" risks, because it is 
correlated with the overall economy and cannot be completely removed by diversification strategy. 
69 Also called "diversifiable", "non-systemic", "local", "private" or "project-specific" risks, because it is 
not correlated with the overall economy and can be removed almost completely by diversification 
strategy. 
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Secondly, the input valuations are filtered through the project structure to find the cash 
flow values. 
Finally, these values are added to form the total project value. 
6.2.3. MAP: OVERCOMING DCF LIMITATIONS 
MAP overcomes the limitations ofDCF outlined in Section 6.2.1 in the following ways: 
1. The DCF technique recognizes the first idea behind MAP regarding the use of a 
discount rate that combines both a risk-free rate (valuation of time) and a risk 
premium (valuation of risk). However, with DCF, the effect of uncertainty is 
determined by the risk premium in the discount rate and which is the same for the 
different components of the cash flow. With MAP, however, the risk adjustment 
only applies on the risky components of the cash flow. So, instead of applying a 
uniform proj ect discount rate, under MAP, discounting is done at the level of the 
cash flow components. As such, MAP provides a company with a "framework for 
determining the differentiated effects on asset values of the diverse combinations 
of uncertainties to which its different assets are exposed" (Laughton, 2002, p.12). 
According to Laughton (1998a), discounting individual projects determinants, as 
MAP does, involves fewer considerations than directly discounting proj ect cash 
flow. Discounting the price of a barrel of oil to be received 10 years from now is 
much simpler than discounting the set of cash flows for a producing field. 
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In principle, MAP can give a more appropriate value estimates than DCF because 
it discounts revenues and costs using discount rate that reflects the riskiness of 
each of the cash flow components (Emhjellen & Alaouze, 2001). The following 
simple example demonstrates the difference in profitability between using DCF 
and MAP to evaluate a project. 
Table 6.1. DCF versus MAP- Example 
Project Expected CF DCF MAP 
Yearl NCF discounted @1O% 
Cost -100 Discounted @ 6% A -£94.34 
Revenue 400 Discounted @ 12% B £357.14 
NCF 300 
Profitability £272.73 Total (A+B) £262.80 
Although the difference in the profitability of the project under the two methods is 
small, for oil companies, however, with billion dollar mutli-period projects, the 
possible valuation and decision errors may be substantial (Emhjellen, 1999). 
11. The discounting of value for risk is determined by how uncertainty is resolved 
over time. Unlike DCF where discounting is done at a constant rate, under MAP 
uncertainty is resolved as new information arrives over the course of time. 
Furthermore, the use of a constant discount rate throughout the life of a project is 
based on the assumption that oil price grows at a constant rate over time (Siew, 
2001). MAP, however, can more readily exploit a sophisticated dynamic model of 
oil prices as compared with the DCF technique70 (Baker, Mayfield & Parsons, 
1998). 
70 See Section 6.3.2.3. 
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111. Choosing an appropriate discount rate is very complex under DCF. With MAP, the 
discount rate is not given as a direct input into the evaluation as is the case with 
DCF, but is allowed to arise jointly from the discounting of the project's 
determinants and from the proj ect structure. 
IV. MAP incorporates flexibility in decision making, allowing the company to change 
the timing of its investment. However, when flexibility is taken into consideration, 
MAP is referred to as Real Options Theory (ROT). This concept is discussed in 
detail in the following chapter. 
6.3. DCF VERSUC MAP: DISCOUNTING 
In this section, the discounting techniques and the determination of the discounting 
factors are examined under DCF and MAP 
6.3.1. DCF DISCOUNTING 
DCF estimates the profitability of a project by calculating the Net Present Value, NP V7J , 
which is expressed in the following: 
71 The NPV is adopted to measure profitability at the Development and Production phases of a field's life 
cycle. However, this measure is modified when applied at the Exploration and Appraisal phases, which 
go beyond the scope of this thesis. In this case, profitability is measured by the Expected Monetary Value 
(EMV), which is expressed as in the following (Kemp, Stephens & Mason, 1997): 
Where: 
EMV=PsNPV-EC 
Psis the probability of success. According to UKOOA (2001), the chance of discovery is 
currently approximately 21 per cent in the UKCS. 
EC the exploration costs. 
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n 
NPV = LNCFt x DF (6.1) 
t=! 
The discrete discount factor, DF, is given by the following expression: 
DF= 1 
(l+r)t (6.2) 
While continuous discounting is given by the following: 
DF = lim 1 = e -rt 
Ha) (l+rf (6.3) 
Where r is the discount rate: 
If there is no uncertainty, cash flows are discounted for time only, and the discount 
rate would be the risk-free interest rate. 
If there is uncertainty, cash flows are discounted for both time and risk, and the 
discount rate is the interest rate plus a risk premium. 
There is likely to be a range of discount rates employed by investors in the North Sea 
depending on the overall cost of capital and the risk premium relating to specific 
projects (Kemp, Stephens & Mason, 1997). 
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6.3.2. MAP DISCOUNTING 
This section analyses the concepts on which MAP is based. It further demonstrates how 
its discounting is derived and the extent to which it differs from DCF discounting. 
6.3.2.1. DERIVATIVE ASSET PRICING 
MAP is based on the Derivative Asset Pricing theory that is at the core of most financial 
analysis in the options, futures and securities markets. "Derivatives are financial 
instruments that derive their values from the prices of other assets ... Their principal 
function is to serve as tools for managing exposure to the risks associated with the 
underlying asset" (Bodie & Merton, 2000, p.36). When the magnitude of the cash flow 
associated with an asset (the derivative asset) is determined by the value of other assets, 
called the underlying asset, then the value of the derivative asset can be calculated from 
the values of the underlying assets. This is accomplished by creating a trading strategy 
in portfolios of the underlying assets designed to replicate the cash flows hence the 
value of the derivative asset (Jacoby & Laughton, 1992). 
The no-arbitrage principle makes such a valuation possible as different assets with the 
same cash flow consequences have the same price. If the relationship between the future 
traded price of a risky asset and the future cash flow from a risky project is known, then 
a portfolio with the same expected payoff as the project can be created by investing in 
the traded risky asset and in the risk free asset (Emhjellen, 1999). 
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6.3.2.2. VALUATION OF RISKY ASSETS 
A project can be thought of as a portfolio of claims to individual cash flows. In this 
case, one can focus first on the single cash flows and value each individually. Then, 
once each individual cash flow is valued, the project can be valued by summing the 
individual cash flow values (Jacoby & Laughton, 1992). 
Jacoby & Laughton (1992) provide a practical method for the evaluation of oil projects 
based on derivative asset pricing. The authors assume that oil price is the only uncertain 
variable, hence uncertainty of the project cash flow is determined only by reference to 
the uncertainty of the price of a barrel of oil. Therefore, the only uncertainty in value 
may be modelled through modelling uncertain future oil prices. 
Oil price can be modelled through the use of forward contracts, which are one of the 
most common types of derivatives. A forward contract "obliges one party in the contract 
to buy, and the other party to sell, some asset at a specified price on some specified date 
(maturity date). It permits buyers and sellers of the asset to eliminate the uncertainty 
about the future price at which the asset will be exchanged" (Bodie & Merton, 2000, 
p.36). The fixed amount that is paid to obtain the forward contract is called the Forward 
Price or the Certainty Equivalent of the uncertain amount (Laughton, 2002). 
Each future oil price, ~, can be formulated as the terminal value of the forward 
contract. In other words, each oil forward contract is a claim to a single cash flow at 
maturity, where the cash flow amount is ~. 
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Hence, to get the certain ~, investors pay today the forward price, which reflects both 
time and risk preferences. As such, the underlying value of the derivative asset 
valuation depends on the current expectation of the output price claims, here oil price 
(Emhjellen, 1999). 
Let Vo (~) be the current value of the claim to be received at time t and Eo (~) the 
current expectation of the oil price evaluated at time zero. Vo (~) is then given by: 
(6.4) 
The future expected rate of return, J.1, on the underlying risky asset is the sum of two 
terms, the risk free rate and a risk premium. The risk free rate is the return for time and 
it is assumed to be constant. The risk premium is taken to be proportional to the amount 
of volatility of the oil price expectations at time t. This proportionality constant also 
termed the price of risk is assumed positive and constant overtime so that there is risk 
discounting in the valuation of the output price claim. Jacoby & Laughton (1992) 
identify the price of risk as the risk due to oil market uncertainty. The future expected 
rate of return is then expressed as in the following: 
J.1 = 1 + ¢O' (6.5) 
Where: 
¢ is the price of risk. 
0' is the volatility of oil price expectations. 
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The current value of the claim becomes: 
(6.6) 
The first discount factor e-t/Jcrt is the discount factor for risk72. It is referred to in the 
remainder of the analysis as the Risk Discount Factor, RDF. This risk adjustment 
converts the forward price of oil into a certainty equivalent price of oil (Emhjellen, 
1999). The second factor e -it is the discount factor for time and it is referred to hereafter 
as the Time Discount Factor, TDF, where i is the nominal risk-free rate. 
6.3.2.3. MODELING OIL PRICE VOLATILITY 
Determining oil price volatility is an important aspect of MAP since it has a significant 
impact on computing the RDF. Further, it constitutes a major difference between MAP 
and DCF, with respect to the assumption regarding the evolution of future oil price. The 
constant discounting in DCF is based on the assumption that oil price uncertainty grows 
at a constant rate over time, whereas with MAP, uncertainty is assumed to be resolved 
over time (Siew, 2001). MAP uses a stochastic process, more precisely a Mean 
Reversion Model, to illustrate the behaviour of future oil price. 
A stochastic process is defined as "a variable that evolves over time in a way that is at 
least in part random" (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994, p.60). So, a stochastic process involves 
time and randomness (Dias, 2001). 
72 See Section 6.3.2.3 for further discussion 
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The most common stochastic processes used in modelling uncertainty related to oil 
projects are the Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) with drift and the Mean Reverting 
Processes (MRM)73 (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). 
1. Geometric Brownian Motion with Drift (GBM): This popular and simple model 
is the most often used stochastic process in financial economics theory. It is also 
known as the random walk model (Baker, Mayfield & Parsons, 1998). The 
GBM presumes that the forecasted uncertainty is constant therefore shocks to 
the market have permanent effects. That is why the model is also called the 
permanent shock price model (Bradley, 1998). 
For an oil price that follows a GBM, the stochastic equation for its variation with 
the time t is given by: 
d~ =~dt + (J~dz (6.7) 
Or: 
dP 
_t = adt + (Jdz (6.8) 
~ 
Where: 
dz is the increment of Wiener process; E[ dz] = O. Var [dz] = dt 
a is the constant drift variable or the expected growth. 
73 For further detail see Appendix F. 
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cr is the annual standard deviation of ~ . It illustrates the volatility of price, 
t 
the random variation term or the deviation from the expected rate, hence the 
term of uncertainty. 
ii. Mean Reversion Model (MRM): This model presumes that the forecasted 
uncertainty declines over time so that the effects of shocks decay because of 
long term equilibrating forces. Prices in this model tend to revert to a prior trend 
after being shocked (Bradley, 1998). As applied to the petroleum industry the 
idea is that if the price is too far (above or below) a certain long-run equilibrium 
level pi market forces will act to reduce (if P > > Pi) or increase (if P «pi) the 
oil production or exploration activity. This creates a reverting force that is 
similar to a spring, as strong as P is far from the equilibrium level pi (Dias, 
2001). 
If oil pnces follow a mean reverSIOn process, they have the following 
characteristics: 
dP / P = A(PI-P)dt + (Jdz (6.9) 
Where: 
Iv is the speed of reversion or the mean reverSIOn factor of oil pnces, 
associated with a half life, HL. It is given by: 
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A = log2 
HL 
(6.10) 
When A tends to zero, Pt becomes a simple Brownian motion and variance 
tends to a 2 t (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994, p.75). 
P' is the normal level or long run equilibrium level of P. Hence, P' is the 
long-run mean price to which the price will tend to revert 
For the GBM model, every change in the oil price is a permanent change in the long-run 
price drift. As such, the amount of uncertainty and its associated risk discounting 
continues to grow at a constant rate with respect to time. In contrast, mean-reversion 
assumes the opposite. Every price oscillation is simply a temporary deviation from the 
predictable long-run equilibrium level. Consequently, the reversion force effect does not 
permit, even in the distant future, extreme values for P. Hence, in the reverting model, 
there is uncertainty only in the very short term and the forecasted uncertainty is halved 
for each year that is added to the term of the forecast and the total amount of oil price 
uncertainty "saturates" in the long term. Salahor (1998) argues that under conditions of 
oil price mean reversion, as forecast uncertainty reduces over time, the systematic risk 
discount should also decrease to reflect this. 
Baker, Mayfield & Parsons (1998) present evidence of mean reversion. Pindyck (2001) 
argued that the mean-reversion model was better for oil prices after studying the long 
run evolution of the oil prices using 127 years of data. According to Dias (2001), the 
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mean-reversion model is more consistent with the futures market, with econometric 
tests and even microeconomic theory. 
As one of the concepts behind MAP is that uncertainty is resolved over time, MAP is 
based on the assumption that oil prices follow a mean reversion process (Emhjellen, 
1999). In fact, Siew (2001) argues that one of the main advantages of MAP over DCF is 
the fact that MAP considers the effects of mean reversion in oil prices. 
6.3.2.4. MAP NET PRESENT VALUE 
The net present value calculated under MAP is called Certainty Equivalent to 
distinguish it from the NPV calculated under DCF. The after-tax project Certainty 
Equivalent, NPVe , is given by: 
(6.11) 
Where I Ret is the sum of the present values of the expected revenue cashflow, 
Ie et is the sum of the present values of the expected cost cashflow and I T et is the 
sum of the present values of the expected tax cashflow. 
R is the present value of the expected revenue cash flows at time t, hence the Revenue 
et 
Certainty Equivalent. It is given by: 
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(6.12) 
Replacing Vo (~) by its value derived from equation 24, Revenue Certainty Equivalent 
becomes: 
Re = Qt xE(~)xRDFt xTDFt (6.13) 
Where: 
TDFt = exp( -it) (6.14) 
and, 
RDFt = exp( -qxr(1 - exp( -At))/A) 74 (6.15) 
C et is the Certainty Equivalent of the expected total costs cashflow at time t, and it is 
given by: 
Ce = Ct xTDFt 
74 Under the assumption of Mean Reversion Model for oil prices, the variance is given by: 
2 v(~ - PI) = ~A (1- e-Ht) 
(6.16) 
(6.17) 
In a spreadsheet model developed by Laughton at the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate Workshop on 
Modem Asset Pricing and Project Evaluation (Stavanger, Norway, May 1997), to calculate project 
values, Laughton considered a simple version of variance and deducted the RDF formula. Laughton RDF 
formula is applied in this thesis. The spreadsheet model was kindly supplied by Emhjellen and adapted to 
UK conditions by the author. 
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(Ret - eet) is the value of the pre-tax cashflow at time t. 
Te is the present value of the total tax cashflow at time t. It is derived from the 
application of the tax model provided in Chapter 5, but taking into consideration both 
the Revenue Certainty Equivalent and the Cost Certainty Equivalent. 
6.4. RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
This section highlights the assumptions used to complete the analysis presented in this 
chapter, in addition to those set out in Chapter 5. It further summarizes the main results 
of the analysis. The discussion focuses firstly on comparing the net present values of the 
oil fields obtained using the DCF and MAP techniques under the Base Scenario. 
Secondly, it examines the impact of the different tax scenarios on different field sizes. 
6.4.1. ADDITIONAL ASSUMPTIONS 
Using the cash flow model derived in Chapter 5, this section assesses and compares the 
outcome of the principal changes made to the UK petroleum regime between 1975 and 
2002, both as regards field profitability and Government revenue. This evaluation is 
undertaken using the nine tax scenarios developed in Chapter 5, which, except for 
Scenario I (Base case Scenario), calculate profitability and Government revenue under 
the differing combination of tax instruments and tax rates, which were subsequently to 
prove controversial when implemented. 
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The analysis is carried out using the major assumptions highlighted in Chapter 5. The 
25 oil fields used for evaluation purposes are analysed under the nine tax scenarios. The 
profitability of the fields is calculated firstly under the DCF method and then using the 
MAP technique. Due to the individual characteristics of each oil field, an Excel 
spreadsheet particular to each oil field was developed so as to proceed with the analysis. 
The study is done in nominal terms and the results are subsequently deflated. By way of 
example, a detailed analysis of Alba field is provided in Appendix G. 
Additional assumptions used include: 
i, the nominal risk-free rate, is assumed to be 4.5 per cent, as this approximates 
the average nominal risk free rate in 2002 as given by the UK Debt Management 
Office (2003). 
r, the discount rate, is assumed to be 10 per cent in real terms, as was applied in 
the majority of published studies75, to mirror the industry'S discount rate. 
cr , the annual volatility of oil price was reported in the literature as typically in 
the range of 15 and 25 per cent per annum76• In this Chapter, it is assumed equal 
to 20 per cent. 
A, the speed of reversion of oil prices, is associated with a half life, HL, of 5 
years (hence A = 0.139). A half-life of five yeas for the mean reversion of oil 
75 See Kemp & Rose (1983), Rowland (1983), Kemp & Stephens (1997), Martin (1997) and Bradley 
( 1998). 
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prices was assumed by Laughton & Jacoby (1992) and Emhjellen & Alaouze 
(2001) and is the value estimated by Pindyck (1997, p.7). 
~, the price of risk, is considered 0.3503 in annual terms as assumed by Jacoby 
& Laughton (1992), Laughton (1997) and Emhjellen (1999). 
6.4.2. FINDINGS 
The results of the analysis are displayed in Tables 6.2-6.11, with all figures presented in 
£M. Oil fields are grouped by size because the main factor determining the variable 
effects of the differing tax packages is oil field size (Kemp & Crichton, 1979). This 
partly explains why the Government reduced its take from approximately 87 per cent in 
the early 1980s to 40 per cent in 2002, as the number of small fields increased relative 
to the larger accumulations 77. However, other factors come into play namely oil field 
profitability and productive life expectancy. 
6.4.2.1. DCF VERSUS MAP: COMPARISON OF RESULTS 
The profitability of oil fields under DCF and MAP techniques is compared with a Base 
zero tax scenario in order to evaluate the performance of the two methods. Results from 
the techniques are then used to investigate whether a clear preference exists as to 
differing tax regimes. 
76 See Paddock et al (1988), Pindyck (1988), Dixit & Pindyck (1994) and Lund (2001). 
77 See Chapter 3, Section 3.4.1 
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Table 6.2 displays the profitability of the 25 selected oil fields under the Base scenario 
using both techniques. The main finding is that the two discounting methods produce 
different project NPVs. 
The difference is particularly significant for larger, long-term projects, like Tern, Alba 
and Schiehallion. In fact, as the fields become larger, with relatively longer productive 
life duration, the difference between the two methods becomes more pronounced. Under 
DCF, because the discounting is constant, long term projects are under-valued 
compared with MAP, where given the Mean Reversion Model, the risk discount rate 
declines from a short-term rate toward zero in the long term. As such, revenues are 
highly discounted in the long term with DCF compared with MAP resulting in lower 
values. 
Therefore, the quantitative differences in the two methods are mainly due to the decline 
in revenue discounting over the project duration under MAP. This reverse decline 
supports the criticism that Jacoby & Laughton (1992) make of the DCF method, 
highlighting in particular the inherent bias of the method against long term projects78 . 
The length of the field's productive life is not, however, the only factor affecting the 
difference in results between DCF and MAP. Both the distribution of revenues and 
costs play an important role. For instance, in the case of Montrose a small field, but with 
a 40 years life, the difference between MAP and DCF is only £15.2MM (or 5.9 per 
cent). This is a consequence of the fact that annual revenues from this field are very 
modest unlike Auk field where the difference is larger (36.3 per cent). , 
78 See Section 6.2.1. 
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Table 6.2. Oil Field Profitability- Base Scenario 
Base Scenario DCF (£M) MAP (£M) Difference (£M) Difference Life (from 
Fields (1) (2) (2-1 ) % production start-up) 
Very Small 
Argyll 292.3 318.1 25.9 8.1% 17 
Arkwright 81.4 92.2 10.8 11.7% 18 
Birch 57.5 55.8 -1.7 3.0% 19 
Blake 276.0 280.1 4.1 1.4% l2 
Kappa 171.4 137.6 -33.8 24.5% 10 
Highlander 350.2 370.9 20.8 5.6% 27 
Janice 182.4 170.6 -11.8 6.9% 11 
Tiffani -208.1 -301.0 
-93.0 30.8% 16 
Thelma 224.1 252.8 28.8 11.3% 11 
Toni 182.6 234.1 51.5 22.0% 16 
Small 
Arbroath 503.1 651.3 148.2 22.7% 24 
Auk 385.4 604.4 219.1 36.2% 36 
Balmoral 161.4 199.9 38.5 19.2% 21 
Beatrice 165.4 143.8 -21.6 15.0% 24 
Heather 170.9 208.1 37.2 17.8% 32 
Leadon 571.4 677.2 105.9 15.6% 14 
Montrose 257.1 272.2 15.2 5.5% 40 
Osprey 277.8 329.2 51.4 15.6% 19 
Scapa 399.2 511.5 112.4 21.9% 35 
Medium 
Captain 541.4 643.8 102.5 15.9% 33 
Clair 418.3 758.7 340.5 44.8% 28 
Maureen 495.2 455.0 -40.2 8.8% 16 
Tern 719.5 1097.1 377.7 34.4% 25 
Large 
Alba 1040.1 1501.3 461.2 30.7% 24 
Schiehallion 1481.2 2092.8 611.7 29.2% 25 
In terms of the impact of the distribution of costs, with MAP, costs are discounted at a 
lower rate than DCF. Therefore, in the case of high cost fields, particularly those with 
substantial CAPEX, NPV s calculated using MAP are likely to be lower compared with 
those using the DCF method. Furthermore, the longer the period in which CAPEX 
occurs the lower the MAP NPV is likely to be. This is the case of the Beatrice oilfield 
where CAPEX are relatively significant and extend over 10 years of the field's life. As 
such, Beatrice NPV under MAP is lower than its equivalent under DCF. However, in 
the case of most oil projects, a large part of the CAPEX typically occurs at the early 
stage of the project. 
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Consequently, it can be said that the shorter (longer) the life of a field, and the smaller 
(lager) the field is, the narrower (the wider) the NPVs calculated under the DCF method 
versus those derived under MAP. This partly explains the relatively smaller difference 
in the findings of Emhjellen & Alouze (1999, 2001) and Laughton (1997) when 
comparing the two techniques, since the authors considered shorter fields' life, where 
the longest duration being 20 years. However, it is difficult to generalize, as other 
factors such as the distribution of both revenues and costs over time need to be 
considered. 
6.4.2.2. IMPACT OF DIFFERENT TAX SCENARIOS79 
The following section presents the results of oil fields profitability and Government 
revenue under different tax scenarios. The principal emphasis of the discussion is on 
comparing the effects of different tax packages on different field sizes, while continuing 
the comparison between DCF and MAP techniques. 
Table 6.3 displays the results of the profitability of 25 oil fields profitability under both 
Scenarios 2 and 3. Under Scenario 2, Royalty applies alongside PRT and CT, whereas 
in Scenario 3, only PRT and CT apply. Under Scenario 2, there is a significant 
reduction in profitability for all fields, particularly very small and small fields (see 
Kappa for instance). Such a low level of profitability can discourage field development 
and may lead to early abandonment, as some Respondents argued in Chapter 4 in the 
context of Government Royalty. 
79 For various Scenarios, see Table 5.3, p.150. 
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Two fields Janice, a very small field, and Beatrice, a small field, have a negative 
profitability. However, these fields have higher profitability under Scenario 3, despite 
the higher rate ofPRT. This difference in profitability is principally due to the impact of 
Royalty, as very small and small fields do not pay PRT as a result of the availability of 
oil allowance. This is consistent with the view of Respondent G2 in Chapter 4, who 
argued that the effect of the abolition of Royalty depends on whether oil field profits are 
subj ect to PR T and CT. 
Table 6.3. Oil Field Profitability- Scenarios 2 & 3. 
Scenario2 12.5% Royalty, 70% PRT, 52%CT Scenario3 175% PRT, 50%CT 
Fields DCF MAP Difference Fields DCF MAP Difference 
(£M) (£M) % (£M) (£M) % 
Ivery Small Ivery Small 
[Argyll 108.1 116.7 7.4% IArgyll 162.7 195.5 16.8% 
IArkwright 27.7 31.4 11.8% [Arkwright 51.9 59.3 12.5% 
/Birch 13.7 12.8 7.0% /Birch 31.9 33.6 5.1% 
Blake 85.2 92.3 7.7% /Blake 144.2 151.9 5.1% 
Kappa -0.7 -58.5 98.8% lKappa 71.0 32.6 117.8% 
Highlander 97.5 104.8 7.0% Highlander l73.3 194.1 10.7% 
amce -171.8 -231.7 25.9% Janice -26.9 -66.2 59.4% 
Tiffani -237.8 -321.9 26.1% ITiffani -218.4 -301.0 27.4% 
Thelma 68.5 80.4 14.8% Thelma 120.1 147.1 18.4% 
Ironi 47.3 64.5 26.7% Ironi 89.5 132.8 32.6% 
Small Small 
!Arbroath 132.9 178.0 25.3% [Arbroath 186.5 305.8 39.0% 
!AUk lO5.9 143.9 26.4% !AUk 160.6 225.1 28.7% 
!Balmoral -4.3 -25.9 83.4% /Balmoral 58.6 79.4 26.2% 
!Beatrice -11.1 -18.9 41.3% /Beatrice 53.7 65.0 17.4% 
~eather 25.2 45.1 44.1% /Heather 78.2 124.9 37.4% 
lLeadon 113.9 181.4 37.2% JLeadon 215.1 355.7 39.5% 
iMontrose 77.5 85.5 9.4% lMontrose 129.4 154.4 16.2% 
Osprey 74.7 114.6 34.8% !osprey 131.1 197.5 33.6% 
Scapa 130.6 177.1 26.3% Scapa 202.9 265.2 23.5% 
iMedium iMedium 
!captain 77.8 161.9 51.9% Captain 164.4 346.9 52.6% 
!clair 59.8 218.1 72.6% Clair 115.7 342.4 66.2% 
iMaureen 57.2 34.3 66.8% Maureen 133.7 216.3 38.2% 
Irem 92.4 227.8 59.4% Tern 148.7 355.7 58.2% 
Large :Large 
!Alba 116.4 285.0 59.2% Alba 228.1 505.3 54.9% 
~chiehallion 223.7 563.0 60.3% Schiehallion 436.9 699.7 37.6% 
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For the medium to large fields (and some of the small fields that are in a PRT-paying 
position), both Scenarios 2 and 3 lead to a significant reduction in profitability. 
Furthermore, the abolition of Royalty increased the PRT take because Royalty is 
allowed for deduction from the PR T taxable income. 
As to the difference in profitability as measured by the DCF and MAP techniques, in 
principal the results are consistent with the findings of the Base Scenario. However, the 
tax take is lower with MAP evaluation because taxation applies on the discounted 
revenues and costs. This further affects the timing of some reliefs, such as the oil 
allowance, since its value depends on annual production and revenue. In fact, with MAP 
evaluation, the impact of taxation is less severe as compared with those under DCF 
technique. This concurs with the findings ofBjerkedal (2000), who argues that the taxes 
can be overestimated in any project where a discounting rate above the risk free rate is 
used. 
However, in the case of fields rendered loss making particularly under Scenario 2 (e.g. 
Kappa and Balmoral), MAP indicates an even lower value than DCF. This is mainly 
due to the effect of Royalty imposed on Gross Revenues, which are discounted at a 
higher rate than costs. 
The effective tax rate derived from each field under Scenarios 2 and 3 respectively are 
shown in Tables 6.4 and 6.5, together with the total tax take from each field as well as 
the Government revenues generated from each of the tax instruments. 
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Table 6.4. Government Take- Scenario2 
Scenario2 Effective rate(%) Total (£M) Roy (£M) PRT (£M) CT (£M) 
Argyll 60.9 475.0 109.1 32.1 333.8 
Arkwright 59.0 156.0 38.2 0 117.1 
Birch 59.3 164.0 38.1 0 125.9 
Blake 63.9 376.2 93.2 52.5 230.6 
Kappa 80.4 320.7 61.4 0 258.6 
Highlander 65.4 534.0 118.0 68.3 347.7 
Janice 119.2 555.4 85.2 0 487.2 
Tiffani 103.3 65.0 40.9 0 24.2 
Thelma 62.3 343.6 85.2 33.2 225.1 
Toni 61.8 386.3 87.9 34.1 261.9 
Very Small Total 3376.2 
Arbroath 67.0 1394.0 262.9 397.8 733.3 
Auk 79.6 2139.8 329.6 1196.3 613.8 
Balmoral 58.4 515.4 112.2 0 403.2 
Beatrice 60.0 780.6 174.3 0 606.3 
Heather 66.1 886.6 191.3 191.0 504.3 
l.eadon 68.1 973.6 209.3 266.5 497.8 
Montrose 66.5 710.2 145.9 151.6 412.7 
Osprey 62.4 635.7 147.4 80.4 413.9 
Scapa 64.2 938.4 190.1 181.8 566.6 
Small Total 8974.3 
Captain 75.4 2303.3 446.7 1004.4 852.2 
Clair 77.4 2638.4 488.1 1290.9 859.4 
Maureen 64.4 1455.0 313.3 258.1 883.6 
Tern 77.7 2990.1 513.3 1525.1 951.8 
Medium Total 9386.8 
Alba 80.7 4209.7 693.4 2422.2 1094.1 
Schiehallion 78.3 4622.8 821.1 2469.1 1358.7 
Large Total 8832.5 
As noted from the results under Scenario 2, the effective tax take resulting from the 
combinations of 12.5 per cent Royalty, 70 per cent PRT and 52 per cent CT does not 
exceed 81 per cent on the selected fields given the application of the different reliefs. 
The only exceptions are Janice and Tiffani, which have been rendered loss making 
through the combined effects of Royalty and CT. 
It is also important to stress that some of the very small and small fields do not pay 
PR T. Royalty impacts as soon as production commences and as such is due earlier than 
the other taxes. 
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For instance, in the case of Scapa, Royalty occurs 3 years before CT and 6 years before 
PR T while in the case of Heather Royalty is due 2 years before CT but 8 years before 
PRT. 
Table 6.5. Government Take- Scenario3 
Scenario3 Effective rate(%) Total (£M) Roy (£M) PRT (£M) CT (£M) 
Argyll 43.8 341.6 0 124.0 217.5 
Arkwright 33.0 86.9 0 0 86.9 
Birch 33.9 93.7 0 2.7 91.0 
Blake 43.1 253.7 0 88.5 165.2 
Kappa 46.3 184.3 0 3.8 180.4 
Highlander 44.6 364.1 0 132.8 231.4 
Janice 69.6 324.8 0 0.4 324.4 
Tiffani 34.6 21.8 0 0 21.8 
Thelma 41.1 226.9 0 67.5 160.2 
Toni 41.0 256.1 0 74.2 181.9 
Very Small Total 2153.9 
Arbroath 65.0 1353.5 0 999.1 354.3 
Auk 71.5 1922.2 0 1537.2 385.0 
Balmoral 35.8 315.9 0 34.3 281.6 
Beatrice 41.9 544.6 0 149.9 394.7 
Heather 50.9 683.5 0 354.8 328.7 
Leadon 53.7 767.6 0 439.9 327.8 
Montrose 51.9 556.1 0 295.0 261.1 
Osprey 47.7 486.4 0 224.1 260.8 
Scapa 48.1 703.8 0 329.6 374.2 
Small Total 7333.6 
Captain 63.9 1951.4 0 1394.8 556.5 
Clair 67.6 2302.7 0 1746.6 556.1 
Maureen 55.8 1261.5 0 764.5 497.1 
Tern 72.0 2770.4 0 2229.0 541.4 
Medium Total 8286.0 
Alba 73.6 3837.6 0 3157.9 679.7 
Schiehallion 69.1 4079.4 0 3181.1 898.3 
Large Total 7917.0 
Under Scenario 3, with 75 per cent PRT and 33 per cent CT, Arkwright, Tiffani and 
Janice are still protected against the impact of PRT. Birch, Beatrice and Balmoral 
however start paying, because their taxable income subject to PRT is now higher as 
Royalty is no longer deductible. 
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Also, it is important to stress that there is no significant difference in Government take 
from the large fields, as the major source of income is from PRT, unlike the very small 
fields, where the major source is CT. 
Table 6.6 displays the results of profitability under both Scenarios 4 and 5. 
Table 6.6. Oil Field Profitability- Scenarios 4 & 5 
Scenario4 50% PRT, 30% CT Scenario5 30%CT 
Fields DCF MAP Difference Fields DCF MAP Difference 
(£M) (£M) % (£M) (£M) % 
Very Small Very Small 
Argyll 187.7 208.9 10.1% Argyll 203.4 221.6 8.2% 
Arkwright 54.6 62.3 12.4% Arkwright 54.6 62.3 12.4% 
Birch 34.6 35.6 2.8% Birch 35.8 35.6 0.6% 
Blake 163.9 172.5 5.0% Blake 189.1 193.1 2.1% 
Kappa 80.3 41.4 94.0% Kappa 82.5 36.3 127.3% 
Highlander 201.4 220.4 8.6% Highlander 257.2 254.3 1.1% 
Janice -8.5 -44.6 80.9% Janice -3.4 -44.6 92.4% 
Tiffani -217.4 -301.0 27.8% Tiffani -217.4 -301.0 27.8% 
Thelma 134.7 159.8 15.7% Thelma 151.3 174.1 13.1% 
Toni 102.7 149.1 31.1% Toni 118.2 156.9 24.7% 
Small Small 
Arbroath 263.0 353.0 25.5% Arbroath 345.0 447.9 23.0% 
Auk 201.1 296.1 32.1% Auk 266.9 415.8 35.8% 
Balmoral 70.2 90.4 22.3% Balmoral 77.6 90.4 14.2% 
Beatrice 67.2 42.0 60.0% Beatrice 79.3 72.2 9.8% 
Heather 89.1 206.8 56.9% Heather 99.9 133.3 25.1% 
Leadon 259.7 370.1 29.8% Leadon 373.6 462.8 19.3% 
Montrose 148.8 169.0 12.0% Montrose 174.1 181.7 4.2% 
Osprey 153.7 213.4 28.0% Osprey 184.3 224.7 18.0% 
Scapa 233.7 303.1 22.9% Scapa 276.2 355.9 22.4% 
Medium Medium 
Captain 215.7 384.3 43.9% Captain 350.9 422.1 16.9% 
Clair 162.0 400.8 59.6% Clair 275.6 515.1 46.5% 
Maureen 180.7 258.5 30.1% Maureen 296.7 279.4 6.2% 
Tern 252.2 471.2 46.5% Tern 467.9 747.3 37.4% 
Large Large 
Alba 377.1 683.2 44.8% Alba 683.7 1007.1 32.1% 
Schiehallion 610.2 921.9 33.8% Schiehallion 994.9 1443.2 31.1% 
189 
The abolition of PRT did not generate a significant difference on the very small and 
even small fields, unlike the larger fields. The difference is reduced between DCF and 
MAP in Scenario 5 relatively to Scenarios 2-4, as PRT reliefs do not apply anymore and 
their timing does not affect the distribution of the fiscal take. 
Government revenues are displayed in Table 6.7 for both Scenarios 4 and 5. 
Table 6.7. Government Take- Scenarios 4 & 5 
Scenari04 Effective Total PRT CT Scenario5 Effective Total PRT CT 
rate(%) (£M) (£M) (£M) rate(%) (£M) (£M) (£M) 
Argyll 36.3 283.4 69.2 214.2 Argyll 30.0 235.0 0 235.0 
Arkwright 30.0 79.0 0 79.0 Arkwright 30.0 79.0 0 79.0 
Birch 30.7 84.8 1.8 83.0 Birch 30.0 83.6 0 84.0 
Blake 37.0 218.0 59.0 159.0 Blake 30.0 176.7 0 177.0 
Kappa 42.3 168.7 5.1 163.7 Kappa 41.0 165.2 0 165.0 
Highlander 38.3 313.0 88.5 224.5 Highlander 27.0 217.6 0 218.0 
Janice 64.0 297.9 4.7 293.2 Janice 63.0 294.6 0 295.0 
Tiffani 31.4 19.8 0 19.8 Tiffani 31.0 19.8 0 19.8 
Thelma 35.7 196.7 45.0 152.4 Thelma 30.0 165.4 0 165.0 
Toni 35.5 223.2 49.5 172.8 Toni 30.0 187.7 0 188.0 
Very Small Total 1884.5 Very Small Total 1624.6 
Arbroath 43.3 901.4 403.6 497.8 Arbroath 30.0 613.0 0 613.0 
Auk 56.9 1528.5 1024.8 503.7 Auk 30.0 811.0 0 811.1 
Balmoral 32.0 282.3 22.9 259.4 Balmoral 30.0 266.0 0 266.3 
Beatrice 36.9 480.4 109.4 371.0 Beatrice 31.0 404.0 0 403.8 
Heather 41.0 570.8 238.9 331.9 Heather 30.0 400.0 0 400.2 
Leadon 46.5 664.7 335.3 329.3 Leadon 30.0 430.0 0 429.9 
Montrose 40.3 410.4 149.6 260.8 Montrose 30.0 305.7 0 305.7 
Osprey 36.4 371.2 93.6 277.6 Osprey 30.0 306.0 0 305.7 
Scapa 40.6 592.9 133.2 459.7 Scapa 30.0 439.0 0 438.9 
Small Total 5802.6 Small Total 3974.7 
Captain 53.7 1639.8 1022.0 617.8 Captain 30 924.0 0 924.0 
Clair 55.9 1903.2 1248.2 655.0 Clair 30 1029.0 0 1029.0 
Maureen 48.0 1084.3 575.9 508.4 Maureen 30 681.0 0 681.0 
Tern 58.0 2229.9 1527.1 702.7 Tern 30 1161.0 0 1161.0 
Medium Total 6857.2 Medium Total 3795.0 
Alba 58.6 3057.4 2155.1 508.4 Alba 30 1565.3 0 1565.0 
Schiehallion 56.3 3325.0 2220.1 1104.9 Schiehallion 30 1770.9 0 1770.9 
Large Total 6382.4 Large Total 3336.2 
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In Scenario 5, it is important to stress that the abolition of PRT did not generate 
significant reduction in Government revenues in the case of very small fields, 
particularly. However, in the case of medium and large fields, the revenues are almost 
halved. 
Table 6.8 shows the profitability of oil fields under Scenarios 6 and 7a. 
Table 6.8. Oil Fields Profitability- Scenarios 6 & 7a 
Scenario6 30% CT, 10% ST Scenario7a 50% PRT (no Uplift), IO%ST,30%CT 
Fields DCF MAP Difference Fields DCF MAP Difference 
(£M) (£M) % (£M) (£M) % 
Very Small Very Small 
Argyll 192;] 202.5 5.1% Argyll 153.4 175.8 12.7% 
Arkwright 45.6 52.3 12.8% Arkwright 45.6 53.7 15.1% 
Birch 28.6 28.9 1.0% Birch 26.2 19.2 36.5% 
Blake 160.1 164.1 2.4% Blake 129.0 138.6 6.9% 
Kappa 52.8 11.4 363.2% Kappa 50.3 10.1 398.0% 
Highlander 226.2 215.4 5.0% Highlander 164.8 182.8 9.8% 
Janice -65.4 -116.4 43.8% Janice -79.1 -105.6 25.1% 
Tiffani -220.5 -301.0 26.7% Tiffani -220.5 -301.0 26.7% 
Thelma 127.1 147.9 14.1% Thelma 132.2 138.7 4.7% 
Toni 96.8 131.2 26.2% Toni 80.0 115.1 30.5% 
Small Small 
Arbroath 292.4 380.1 23.1% Arbroath 214.2 286.3 25.2% 
Auk 227.3 352.9 35.6% Auk 166.9 246.0 32.2% 
Balmoral 49.7 53.9 7.8% Balmoral 38.4 48.1 20.2% 
Beatrice 50.6 48.3 4.8% Beatrice 23.5 48.3 51.3% 
Heather 76.2 108.3 29.6% Heather 54.1 104.4 48.2% 
Leadon 307.7 391.3 21.4% Leadon 184.1 314.4 41.4% 
Montrose 146.5 151.5 3.3% Montrose 121.3 136.6 11.2% 
Osprey 153.2 189.9 19.3% Osprey 116.8 169.0 30.9% 
Scapa 235.2 304.0 22.6% Scapa 183.8 253.7 27.6% 
Medium Medium 
Captain 287.3 348.2 17.5% Captain 142.1 282.1 49.6% 
Clair 228.1 433.9 47.4% Clair 118.3 289.2 59.1% 
Maureen 230.5 220.9 4.3% Maureen 95.5 161.7 40.9% 
Tern 384.1 630.7 39.1% Tern 181.1 362.2 50.0% 
Large Large 
Alba 564.9 842.4 32.9% Alba 264.4 461.3 42.7% 
Schiehallion 832.8 1226.7 32.1% Schiehallion 463.8 736.6 37.0% 
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Scenario 6 illustrates the effect of the imposition of the extra 10 per cent charge on 
fields that previously were only paying CT. Scenario 7a represents the effects of the 
imposition of PRT along with 30 per cent CT and 10 per cent ST, but where no Uplift 
applies. To better estimate the significance of PRT reliefs, it is helpful to compare the 
results under Scenario 7a with those under Scenarios 7b and 7c. This is the situation 
where no oil allowance or Safeguard applies. 
Government take under both Scenarios 6 and 7a is summarized in Table 6.9. 
Table 6.9. Government Take- Scenarios 6 & 7a 
Scenario6 Effective Total CT+ST Scenario7a Effective Total PRT CT+ST 
rate(%) (£M) (£M) rate(%) (£M) (£M) (£M) 
Argyll 36.5 284.4 284.4 Argyll 47.1 367.4 90.2 277.2 
Arkwright 40.0 105.3 105.3 Arkwright 40.0 105.3 0 105.3 
Birch 40.3 111.4 111.4 Birch 42.2 116.6 8.6 108.0 
Blake 40.0 235.6 235.6 Blake 48.4 284.9 82.0 202.8 
Kappa 55.3 220.3 220.3 Kappa 56.0 223.3 5.0 218.3 
Highlander 35.5 290.1 290.1 Highlander 48.7 398.1 105.5 292.6 
Janice 84.3 392.8 392.8 Janice 79.7 371.1 5.1 366.0 
Tiffani 41.9 26.4 26.4 Tiffani 41.9 26.4 0 26.4 
Thelma 40.0 220.6 220.6 Thelma 37.2 205.1 31.1 174.6 
Toni 40.0 250.2 250.2 Toni 45.9 286.8 61.1 225.6 
Very Small Total 2137.0 Very Small Total 2384.9 
Arbroath 39.2 817.3 817.3 Arbroath 52.5 1086.6 435.7 650.9 
Auk 40.3 1081.5 1081.5 Auk 63.4 1703.2 1036.2 667.1 
Balmoral 40.2 355.0 355.0 Balmoral 42.8 377.9 38.1 339.8 
Beatrice 41.4 538.4 538.4 Beatrice 52.4 680.8 237.3 443.5 
Heather 39.8 533.6 533.6 Heather 55.1 738.8 334.5 404.3 
Leadon 40.0 573.2 573.2 Leadon 57.6 822.9 416.0 406.8 
Montrose 40.0 434.5 434.5 Montrose 53.2 569.5 225.1 344.4 
Osprey 40.0 407.6 407.6 Osprey 51.5 525.2 196.1 329.1 
Scapa 40.1 585.2 585.2 Scapa 56.1 819.9 390.7 429.2 
Small Total 5326.3 Small Total 7278.0 
Captain 40.4 1232.5 1232.5 Captain 64.1 1956.9 1207.4 749.5 
Clair 40.0 1372.7 1372.7 Clair 64.1 2185.6 1354.9 830.7 
Maureen 40.0 908.3 908.3 Maureen 60.1 1357.7 749.0 608.7 
Tern 40.0 1547.8 1547.8 Tern 65.3 2512.6 1607.9 904.7 
Medium Total 5061.3 Medium Total 8012.8 
Alba 40.0 2087.0 2087.0 Alba 66.4 3464.6 2296.0 1168.7 
Schiehallion 40.0 2361.3 2361.3 Schiehallion 64.2 3789.3 2380.0 1409.3 
Large Total 4458.6 Large Total 7271.1 
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The effect of the abolition of the oil allowance and Safeguard on oil field profitability 
and Government revenue are displayed in Tables 6.10 and 6.11 respectively. 
Table 6.10. Oil Field Profitability- Scenarios 7b & 7c 
Scenario7b No oil allowance Scenario7c No Safeguard 
Fields DCF MAP Difference Fields DCF MAP Difference 
(£M) (£M) % (£M) (£M) % 
Very Small Very Small 
Argyll 87.6 96.1 8.8% Argyll 154.8 178.5 13.3% 
Arkwright 27.5 35.7 23.0% Arkwright 45.6 52.3 12.8% 
Birch 13.1 9.9 32.3% Birch 27.3 28.9 5.5% 
Blake 84.0 100.1 16.1% Blake 138.5 138.4 O.l% 
Kappa 4.1 -37.1 111.1% Kappa 50.8 10.1 403.0% 
Highlander 102.7 108.7 5.5% Highlander 147.7 161.2 8.4% 
Janice -86.9 -125.9 31.0% Janice -75.4 -121.1 37.7% 
Tiffani -224.3 -301.0 25.5% Tiffani -224.3 -301.0 25.5% 
Thelma 67.6 95.2 29.0% Thelma 107.1 130.7 18.1% 
Toni 44.7 81.8 45.4% Toni 83.5 120.9 30.9% 
Small Small 
Arbroath 147.5 199.8 26.2% Arbroath 207.1 296.8 30.2% 
Auk 119.4 172.5 30.8% Auk 170.6 249.9 31.7% 
Balmoral 14.2 16.5 13.9% Balmoral 49.7 53.9 7.8% 
Beatrice 16.8 41.7 59.7% Beatrice 25.0 48.3 48.2% 
Heather 37.4 82.1 54.4% Heather 61.3 108.3 43.4% 
Leadon 160.5 265.6 39.6% Leadon 208.1 301.0 30.9% 
Montrose 76.6 72.5 5.7% Montrose 124.7 140.6 11.3% 
Osprey 80.9 123.9 34.7% Osprey 126.9 173.7 26.9% 
Scapa 130.4 174.9 25.4% Scapa 198.8 258.8 23.2% 
Medium Medium 
Captain 148.8 281.6 47.2% Captain 164.0 246.4 33.4% 
Clair 105.8 291.9 63.8% Clair 130.l 290.0 55.1% 
Maureen 97.7 170.1 42.6% Maureen 111.2 144.2 22.9% 
Tern 152.8 338.1 54.8% Tern 199.2 391.1 49.l% 
Large Large 
Alba 253.9 524.3 51.6% Alba 301.6 587.4 48.7% 
Schiehallion 463.3 714.9 35.2% Schiehallion 445.0 721.1 38.3% 
The oil allowance is found to be the most important PR T relief for the very small and 
small fields. In fact, the abolition of the oil allowance has had the most significant 
impact on those fields. While the abolition of the Uplift and Safeguard had relatively 
minor effects on the profitability, the effects were reversed with the abolition of the oil 
allowance. 
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Highlander field, for instance, paid an effective tax rate of 70.4 per cent under Scenario 
7b where the oil allowance was abolished compared with 48.7 and 49.4 per cent under 
respectively the Scenarios 7a with no Uplift, and 7c with no Safeguard. Also, the 
Arkwright field was protected against the payment of PRT in all scenarios except 
Scenario 7b, although it utilised only 12mmbbl instead of 37.5mmbbl of the total oil 
allowance available80. In fact, many of the very small and small fields do not claim all 
the allowance available, due to their very low annual production. Furthermore, as oil 
allowance applies only when the Uplift has been fully utilised, the abolition of Uplift 
resulted in fields being able to claim a larger share of the allowance. As such, the 
abolition of the Uplift has been attenuated by the acceleration in the use of the oil 
allowance. 
As for the other PRT reliefs, namely the Uplift and Safeguard, the effects were more 
pronounced in the case of medium and large fields. In fact, the effects of these two 
reliefs depend mainly on the value of the CAPEX as well as the payback period8l . As 
the larger fields tend to have a longer payback period and larger CAPEX spend than the 
smaller ones, the Uplift and Safeguard relied are of greater significance. Nevertheless, 
the oil allowance is also important for the larger fields, which have the capacity to 
maximise all of the available allowance because of their high levels production. The 
equal importance of the three PR T reliefs to the medium and large fields can be seen 
from the close similarities between the effective tax rates under Scenarios 7a, 7b and 7c. 
In the case of Schiehallion field, for example, the effective tax rates are 64, 65.2 and 
65.2 per cent for Scenarios 7a, 7b and 7c respectively. 
80 37.5mmbbl is equivalent to the 5 Mt of total oil allowance allowed per field. 
81 See Chapter 5. 
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These findings are consistent under both DCF and MAP techniques. 
Table 6.11. Government Take- Scenarios 7b & 7c 
Scenario7b Effective Total PRT CT+ST Scenario7c Effective Total PRT CHST 
rate(%) (£M) (£M) (£M) rate(%) (£M) (£M) (£M) 
Argyll 69.8 544.5 385.4 159.1 Argyll 46.6 363.1 83.0 280.1 
Arkwright 64.2 169.2 106.4 62.8 Arkwright 40.0 105.3 0 105.3 
Birch 63.7 176.1 107.9 68.2 Birch 41.8 115.5 6.8 108.7 
Blake 67.3 396.5 268.1 128.4 Blake 46.0 271.0 59.0 212.0 
Kappa 83.2 331.9 186.0 145.9 Kappa 56.1 223.5 5.2 218.3 
Highlander 70.4 575.1 400.5 174.6 Highlander 49.4 404.0 115.4 288.6 
Janice 95.8 446.3 89.0 357.2 Janice 87.5 407.7 24.7 383.0 
Tiffani 54.5 34.3 0 34.3 Tiffani 54.5 34.3 0 34.3 
Thelma 65.8 363.0 238.2 125.9 Thelma 46.8 258.1 63.0 196.0 
Toni 65.9 412.4 270.3 142.1 Toni 44.8 279.9 49.5 230.4 
Very Small Total 3449.3 Very Small Total 2462.3 
Arbroath 68.4 1424.7 999.1 425.6 Arbroath 58.8 1224.8 666.1 558.8 
Auk 69.8 1875.2 1322.9 552.4 Auk 63.2 1697.0 1025.8 671.2 
Balmoral 57.4 507.1 253.4 253.6 Balmoral 40.2 355.0 0 355.0 
Beatrice 59.0 767.7 382.2 385.5 Beatrice 50.7 659.4 201.6 457.7 
Heather 63.2 847.8 516.3 331.6 Heather 52.3 701.3 272.0 429.3 
Leadon 64.7 925.0 586.2 338.8 Leadon 54.3 776.5 338.8 437.7 
Montrose 68.8 735.7 502.0 233.6 Montrose 51.6 552.4 196.6 355.8 
Osprey 65.8 670.9 438.9 232.0 Osprey 48.8 497.4 149.6 347.7 
Scapa 68.1 995.2 682.9 312.3 Scapa 49.1 717.3 219.7 497.6 
Small Total 8753.1 Small Total 7115.6 
Captain 65.3 1992.8 1267.1 725.7 Captain 61.3 1872.9 143.5 1729.4 
Clair 68.1 2318.7 1576.8 742.0 Clair 62.3 2121.8 1248.6 873.2 
Maureen 62.6 1415.9 846.0 569.9 Maureen 58.0 1311.5 672.0 639.5 
Tern 69.1 2659.8 1853.3 806.5 Tern 64.0 2464.1 1527.1 937.0 
Medium Total 8387.2 Medium Total 7770.3 
Alba 68.1 3556.0 2448.2 1107.8 Alba 65.0 3373.8 2144.6 1229.6 
Schiehallion 65.2 3849.5 2480.0 1368.0 Schiehallio 65.2 3850.5 2493.0 1374.4 
n 
Large Total 7423.5 Large Total 7241.2 
Figure 6.1 compares the total Government take from all fields under the different tax 
scenarios. It indicates that Scenario 2, which reflects the pre-1983 fiscal package in the 
UK, generates the highest revenues. This is followed by Scenario 7b, where PR T 
applies at 50 per cent but without the oil allowance, alongside 30 per cent CT and 10 
per cent ST. 
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Scenario 3 (75 per cent PRT and 33 per cent CT) generates the third highest take, 
followed by Scenario 7c (no Safeguard), which generates a very similar amount of 
Government revenues as Scenario 3. 
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Scenario 4 (50 per cent PRT and 30 per cent CT) generates the fifth highest amount of 
revenue followed by a close figure from Scenario 7a (no Uplift). The least amount of 
fiscal take derived from the nine scenarios is Scenario 5 with only 30 per cent CT. The 
April 2002 changes that are supposed to generate a higher share of revenues as 
compared with the application of CT only appear to have achieved its objectives. 
However, the combination of CT and ST gives less revenue compared with the pre-
1993 tax structure where both PRT and CT applied, despite the fact that PRT is not paid 
by all fields and provides several reliefs. Consequently, one could question the 
effectiveness of the abolition ofPRT in 1993. Although the PRT generates a relatively 
higher share of Government revenues than other instruments, its share is mainly derived 
from the medium and large fields. As such, given the current state of the UKCS, where 
the majority of fields are very small, the PRT share is most probably going to be very 
small, as those fields do not pay PR T due to the oil allowance hence leaving the 
Government with almost nothing. 
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Another point that can be raised is the complication ofPRT, associated mainly with the 
computation of its reliefs, which further can lead to inefficiency as discussed in the 
previous chapters. In this case, one can question the possibility of the application of 
simpler instruments that could generate similar amount of revenues. This point is further 
addressed in Chapter 8, where the UK PRT is compared with the Resource Rent Tax in 
Australia and the Special Tax in Norway. 
The following two tables, 6.12 and 6.13 summanse the profitability of the selected 
fields under the various scenarios, using DCF and MAP techniques respectively. 
Table 6.12. Oil Field Profitability under DCF- Summary 
Scenarios Base UK2 UK3 UK4 UK5 UK6 UK7a UK7b UK7c 
Fields (£M) (£M) (£M) (£M) (£M) (£M) (£M) (£M) (£M) 
Argyll 292.3 108.1 162.7 187.7 203.4 192.1 153.4 87.6 154.8 
Arkwright 81.4 27.7 51.9 54.6 54.6 45.6 45.6 27.5 45.6 
Birch 57.5 13.7 31.9 34.6 35.8 28.6 26.2 13.1 27.3 
Blake 276.0 85.2 144.2 163.9 189.1 160.1 129.0 84.0 138.5 
Kappa 171.4 -0.7 71.0 80.3 82.5 52.8 50.3 4.1 50.8 
Highlander 350.2 97.5 173.3 201.4 257.2 226.2 164.8 102.7 147.7 
Janice 182.4 -171.8 -26.9 -8.5 -3.4 -65.4 -79.1 -86.9 -75.4 
Tiffani -208.1 -237.8 -218.4 -217.4 -217.4 -220.5 -220.5 -224.3 -224.3 
Thelma 224.1 68.5 120.1 134.7 151.3 127.1 132.2 67.6 107.1 
Toni 182.6 47.3 89.5 102.7 118.2 96.8 80.0 44.7 83.5 
Arbroath 503.1 132.9 186.5 263.0 345.0 292.4 214.2 147.5 207.1 
Auk 385.4 105.9 160.6 20Ll 266.9 227.3 166.9 119.4 170.6 
Balmoral 161.4 -4.3 58.6 70.2 77.6 49.7 38.4 14.2 49.7 
Beatrice 165.4 -11.1 53.7 67.2 79.3 50.6 23.5 16.8 25.0 
Heather 170.9 25.2 78.2 89.1 99.9 76.2 54.1 37.4 61.3 
Leadon 571.4 113.9 215.1 259.7 373.6 307.7 184.1 160.5 208.1 
Montrose 257.1 77.5 129.4 148.8 174.1 146.5 121.3 76.6 124.7 
Osprey 277.8 74.7 131.1 153.7 184.3 153.2 116.8 80.9 126.9 
Scapa 399.2 130.6 202.9 233.7 276.2 235.2 183.8 130.4 198.8 
Captain 541.4 77.8 164.4 215.7 350.9 287.3 142.1 148.8 164.0 
Clair 418.3 59.8 115.7 162.0 275.6 228.1 118.3 105.8 130.1 
Maureen 495.2 57.2 133.7 180.7 296.7 230.5 95.5 97.7 111.2 
Tern 719.5 92.4 148.7 252.2 467.9 384.1 181.1 152.8 199.2 
Alba 1040.1 116.4 228.1 377.1 683.7 564.9 264.4 253.9 301.6 
Schiehallion 1481.2 223.7 436.9 610.2 994.9 832.8 463.8 463.3 445.0 
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Table 6.13. Oil Field Profitability under MAP- Summary 
Scenarios Base UK2 UK3 UK4 UK5 UK6 UK7a UK7b UK7c 
Fields (£M) (£M) (£M) (£M) (£M) (£M) (£M) (£M) (£M) 
Argyll 318.1 116.7 195.5 208.9 221.6 202.5 175.8 96.1 178.5 
Arkwright 92.2 31.4 59.3 62.3 62.3 52.3 53.7 35.7 52.3 
Birch 55.8 12.8 33.6 35.6 35.6 28.9 19.2 9.9 28.9 
Blake 280.1 92.3 151.9 172.5 193.1 164.1 138.6 100.1 138.4 
Kappa 137.6 -58.5 32.6 41.4 36.3 11.4 10.1 -37.1 10.1 
Highlander 370.9 104.8 194.1 220.4 254.3 215.4 182.8 108.7 161.2 
Janice 170.6 -231.7 -66.2 -44.6 -44.6 -116.4 
-105.6 -125.9 -121.1 
Tiffani -30l.0 -32l.9 -30l.0 -301.0 -30l.0 -30l.0 -301.0 
-301.0 -301.0 
Thelma 252.8 80.4 147.1 159.8 174.1 147.9 138.7 95.2 130.7 
Toni 234.1 64.5 132.8 149.1 156.9 131.2 115.1 81.8 120.9 
Arbroath 651.3 178.0 305.8 353.0 447.9 380.1 286.3 199.8 296.8 
Auk 604.4 143.9 225.1 296.1 415.8 352.9 246.0 172.5 249.9 
Balrnoral 199.9 -25.9 79.4 90.4 90.4 53.9 48.1 16.5 53.9 
Beatrice 143.8 -18.9 65.0 42.0 72.2 48.3 48.3 41.7 48.3 
Heather 208.1 45.1 124.9 206.8 133.3 108.3 104.4 82.1 108.3 
Leadon 677.2 181.4 355.7 370.1 462.8 391.3 314.4 265.6 301.0 
Montrose 272.2 85.5 154.4 169.0 181.7 151.5 136.6 72.5 140.6 
Osprey 329.2 114.6 197.5 213.4 224.7 189.9 169.0 123.9 173.7 
Scapa 511.5 177.1 265.2 303.1 355.9 304.0 253.7 174.9 258.8 
Captain 643.8 161.9 346.9 384.3 422.1 348.2 282.1 281.6 246.4 
Clair 758.7 218.1 342.4 400.8 515.1 433.9 289.2 291.9 290.0 
Maureen 455.0 34.3 216.3 258.5 279.4 220.9 161.7 170.1 144.2 
Tern 1097.1 227.8 355.7 471.2 747.3 630.7 362.2 338.1 391.1 
Alba 1501.3 285.0 505.3 683.2 1007.1 842.4 461.3 524.3 587.4 
Schiehallion 2092.8 563.0 699.7 921.9 1443.2 1226.7 736.6 714.9 721.1 
6.5. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has proceeded with the evaluation of the UK petroleum fiscal regime, 
taking into consideration both the industry and Government interests, in an attempt to 
identify whether a fiscal package that is preferable for those two main players exists. 
The chapter has evaluated the effects of different tax scenarios on a sample of oil fields' 
profitability and Government revenue in the UKCS, in the light of the debate 
surrounding this subject, as the previous chapters demonstrated. 
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The evaluation was carried out using two evaluation techniques, the traditional DCF 
method and the more modem approach using MAP. Such a comparison permits to 
discern if the more new technique gives significant difference than the traditional 
method and whether it should be recommended as a replacement to the traditional 
technique. Further, it allows investigating the consistency in results. 
The most severe fiscal package in terms of Government take on profitability is the one 
that applied to oil activity before 1983, based on the combination of Royalty, PRT and 
CT (Scenari02). This is the only Scenario that rendered several fields unprofitable. 
Scenario 7b, where the application of PRT alongside CT and ST but without the oil 
allowance, generated a similar reduction in profitability particularly for the smaller 
fields, although less severe. In fact, the oil allowance is found to be the most important 
relief for smaller fields, while all of the three PR T reliefs are of equal importance for 
larger fields. For instance, despite the high PRT rates the very small and small fields, 
especially those which were rendered loss making under Scenario 2, were nonetheless, 
profitable under Scenario 3. 
Some of the very small and small fields are protected against the payment of PRT due 
mainly to oil allowance relief. For larger fields, all PRT reliefs are equally important. 
Furthermore, for fields in PR T paying position, the reliefs are also important as they 
delay payment of the tax. For instance, in the case of Heather field, under Scenario 2, 
Royalty hits 2 years before CT but 8 years before PRT. 
In terms of Government revenue generated under the different tax scenarios, Scenario 2 
generated the highest fiscal take, followed by a similar finding under Scenario 7b. 
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Scenario 3 (75 per cent PRT and 33 per cent CT) generated the third highest level of 
Government take. In the scenarios where PRT applies, the major source of Government 
take is from the larger fields. Scenario 7c (no Safeguard) produced almost the same 
amount of Government revenues as in Scenario 3. Scenario 4 (50 per cent PRT and 30 
per cent CT) generated the fifth highest amount of revenues followed by a close figure 
from Scenario 7a (no Uplift). 
The lowest fiscal take is generated under ScenarioS, where CT of 30 per cent applies. 
The imposition of the 10 per cent ST in 2002 has produced a higher Government take 
compared with Scenario 5. Notwithstanding, the 2002 structure still generates the 
second lowest take relatively to other scenarios. This is particularly true when compared 
with the results arising from the application ofPRT and CT, despite the fact that PRT is 
not paid by all fields and affords several reliefs. For instance, although the abolition of 
PR T does not induce significant reduction in Government revenue in the case of very 
small fields, in the case of medium and large fields the revenues are almost halved. 
Consequently, one can question the effectiveness of the abolition of PRT in 1993, on 
fields that received development consent after that date. However, with the majority of 
fields currently developed in the UK North Sea being small, PRT is likely to be a poor 
source of revenues for the Government, given its generous reliefs. Further, abolishing 
anyone of those reliefs would have a discriminating effect with respect to fields' size. 
Also, PR T has high administrative costs as compared with the other instruments, 
namely Royalty and CT. 
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As such, from the analysis done in this chapter, it can be concluded that maintaining the 
pre-1983 structure would have resulted in many fields abandoned or undeveloped. 
Maintaining the post-1983/pre-1993 structure would have resulted in low fiscal 
revenues generated. The changes made to the UK petroleum fiscal regime in 2002 may 
not have increased dramatically the fiscal receipts as compared with imposing 30 per 
cent CT. Nevertheless, the post-2002 structure based on Income Tax only makes the 
regime more neutral, easier to administer and better attuned to the current mature state 
of the UK oil province. 
Regarding the evaluation techniques used DCF and MAP produced different project 
NPV. The difference is particularly significant for larger, long-term projects. This is 
mainly due to the DCF method's use of a high constant discount rate, which tends to 
undervalue long term projects. Whereas in the case of MAP, given the Mean Reversion 
Model, the risk discounting tends to decline over time. As such, DCF undervalues 
profitability while at the same time over-estimates the impact of taxation. Therefore, 
MAP can provide a more useful evaluation than its DCF counterpart. 
In principle, the MAP method is preferable than DCF because it discounts revenues and 
costs using discount rates which reflect the risks inherent in each of these components. 
MAP discounts revenue using a discount factor that includes components such as oil 
price volatility, financial risk, mean reversion of oil prices and time (Emhjellen & 
Alaouze, 2001). Additionally, MAP can more readily exploit a sophisticated dynamic 
model of oil prices as compared with the DCF technique. 
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Nevertheless, the main findings regarding the impact of taxation on oil field's 
profitability are consistent between MAP and DCF, although with MAP evaluation, the 
impact of taxation is less severe compared with DCF. This supports the findings of 
Bjerkedal (2000) who argues that the taxes are overestimated in any project where taxes 
are discounted at a rate above the risk free rate. However, in terms of projects ranking, 
the results are not very consistent. This can be of particular significance in the case 
where a company is selecting between projects, but this goes beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
This chapter presents a particular approach to evaluate the fiscal regime that applies to 
oil activity in the UKCS. The study done in this chapter is a time-line analysis, 
evaluating the principal fiscal packages that applied to oil activity since 1975, using and 
contrasting two evaluation techniques, the traditional commonly used DCF and the 
more modem technique, MAP, which can also be considered as an evolved version of 
DCF. The study further sets the basic concepts for the evaluation techniques hence it is 
complemented with the analysis done in the following chapter. The same tax scenarios 
and fields are considered for evaluation but an additional assumption is taken in 
consideration. This is the flexibility in decision making, requiring the use of the Real 
Options Theory, which can be considered to be an expansion of MAP. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE IMPACT OF TAXATION ON THE TIMING OF FIELD 
DEVELOPMENT 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter evaluated the effects of the principal fiscal packages in the UK on 
both oil field profitability and Government revenue, comparing the findings using two 
evaluation techniques DCF and MAP. This chapter proceeds with the evaluation of the 
regime and expands the empirical analysis undertaken in Chapter 6, taking into 
consideration another important dimension namely the effect of taxation on the timing 
of an oil field development. The chapter investigates whether the tax structure and rates 
have any effect on the delaying of the decision to develop a field, thereby identifying 
any related investment distortions and addressing the neutrality of the regime82 . 
When economic conditions are not favourable, companIes are able to delay their 
investment decisions to a more profitable period and, when faced with an uncertain 
situation, companies can also choose to wait for more information to reduce the 
uncertainty and then proceed with the investment. The change in investment timing in 
turn affects the timing of fiscal receipts. Kemp & Rose (1982) argue that the 
Government normally aims to collect a part of the fiscal take at the early stage of an oil 
field life. If the development of an oil field is delayed, the fiscal receipts from that 
project are delayed as well. Accordingly, both oil companies and Government interests' 
can be affected by a change in the development timing. 
82 See Chapter 2, Section 2.3 
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In the UK, several fields were discovered and explored in the 1970s and early 1980s, 
but were developed only in the 1990S83 . Kemp, Rose & Dandie (1992) ague that a very 
large number of fields have been discovered in the UKCS but have not yet been 
developed. This is due to several factors including taxation, technology and oil price. 
Martin (1997) maintains that fiscal tenns are the main factors affecting the timing of the 
decision to develop an oil field in the UKCS, where the 1983 and 1993 fiscal changes84 
led to peaks in production in the years 1985 and 1995. Technology is the next important 
factor, followed by the oil price (Martin 1997). 
This chapter concentrates on analysing the possible effects of different fiscal 
instruments and packages on the timing of oil field development in the UKCS. This is 
of particular significance nowadays given the maturity of the UK North Sea and the 
need to develop discovered fields so as to maintain production and sustain self-
sufficiency. 
The ability to affect the timing of investment introduces a new aspect to the research, 
which is flexibility in decision-making. "Flexibility is the degree to which a project is 
able to adjust to changes in different parameters" (Emhjellen, 1999, p.59). Dixit & 
Pindyck (1994) argue that such flexibility can add value to a project, hence the need for 
an evaluation technique that captures it and allows a useful evaluation of field 
profitability as well as the appropriate impact of taxation on that profitability. An 
inappropriate technique can result in an incorrect measure of the taxation impact. 
83 For example, Tiffani was discovered 1979 and Toni in 1977, but they were developed in 1990. 
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Laughton (1998b) argues that one of the main limitations of DCF technique is that it 
does not consider the timing of investment or production, as applied in its simplistic 
fonn. As such, DCF is unable to capture flexibility in decision-making since it is a static 
approach based on a "now or never" decision (Laughton, 1998b). Because DCF does 
not make provision for flexibility, it can undervalue oil projects (Laughton, Sagi & 
Samis (2000), Watkins, (2002)). 
The use of a more useful technique, more precisely, the Real Options Theory (ROT), for 
the valuation of petroleunl projects is gaining interest in the academic literature85 (Zett!, 
2001). Laughton, Sagi & Samis (2000) argue that over the past years, an increasing 
number of organizations in the upstream petroleum industry have been experimenting 
with the use of the Real Options technique, which is becoming the focus of almost all of 
the attention and writing in the energy industry. Laughton (1998b) maintains that ROT 
is one technique that avoids some of the limitations of the DCF methodology. 
ROT was originally developed for the appraisal of financial derivatives. The most 
common types of derivatives are forward contracts and financial options. An analogy 
exists between financial options and real investments, such as petroleum projects. It was 
this similarity that led to the adoption of ROT for the valuation of such projects86 . 
Because ROT is based on the concept of "wait and see" in decision-making, it provides 
management with certain degree of flexibility, which in turn produces an option value. 
84 S ee Chapter 3. 
85 Among others, Dixit & Pindyck (1994), Laughton (1998), Laughton et al (2000), Zettl (2001), and Dias 
(2002) 
86 This analogy is developed in Section 7.3.2. 
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"The option value is the value of making a future decision after the outcome of an 
uncertain variable is known and therefore avoiding the risk of a poor outcome 
(Emhjellen, 1999, p. 59). Dixit & Pindyck (1995) argue that ignoring the option value 
can lead to a significant underestimation of a project's value, in this case an oil reserve. 
By treating an undeveloped oil reserve as an option, its value can be determined 
correctly. Additionally, ROT can be considered as an expansion to MAP but applied in 
situations where the management of future flexibility is analysed concurrently87 
(Laughton, Sagi & Samis, 2000). As such, ROT also benefits from the major advantages 
of the MAP approach namely separate discounting of the individual Cash Flow 
components and the incorporation of a more rigorous oil price model. 
Although a number of studies have addressed the subject of investment timing in the oil 
industry and the application of ROT to evaluate petroleum projects, only limited 
attempts have been made to evaluate the effects of taxation on timing. Among those 
attempts, Zhang (1997) applied ROT to evaluate the neutrality of PR T, but his analysis 
was limited to PR T without considering other combinations of tax instruments. Besides, 
Zhang's (1997) study was based on hypothetical fields, which is the case with most of 
the published studies on the application of ROT. Such a simplification may not reflect 
the real complications resulting from uncertain production rates or development costs. 
Furthermore, while other studies focused on the effect of some parameters, such as the 
time to expiration and the amount of oil price uncertainty on the value of flexibility, this 
chapter focuses on the effect of taxation on investment timing. 
87 This point is further developed in Section 7.4.3 
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The chapter in vesti gates whether taxation enhances or deters a rca l op ti on \ aluc anu 
hence flexibility. Accordingly, it brings a new perspective with respec t to e\ aluatin g the 
effect of taxation on real options value and as such on investment and de\ elopment 
incentives, particularly in the UKCS . 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 de\'e]ops the basic 
concepts of Real Option Theory, highlightin g th e limitations of DCF with respect to the 
value of waiting. The section further reviews the concepts of financial options and their 
analogy to real options. Section 7.3 proceeds with the eva luati on of different fiscal 
scenarios using ROT. Section 7.4 presents and discusses the results. Sec ti on 7.5 
summarises and concludes the chapter. 
7.2. DCF "NOW OR NEVER" CONCEPT 
This section develops a simple two-period exampl e to illustrate the "now or never" 
concept using the simplistic f0l111 of DCF technique. The example highlights the 
limitations of DCF in considering any increase in the project \'alue , in the case where 
the investor chooses to wait for new infol111ation to alTi ve and for better economic 
co nditions before undcI1aking hi s il1\'estment. 
Assuming an oi I projec t with an instant investment! = S 160 , producing 10 balTel or oi I 
per period, with lero operating cost. 
The current price of a barrel of oil is Po = $20 , but in year 1, there is q=0.5 probability 
that the price will be $25, and (l-q) probability that it will be $15. After that, the price 
will stay at the new level. Using discrete DCF discounting, with a 10 per cent discount 
rate, the NPV of this project is equal to: 
NPV = -160 +200/(1.1) = $21.8 
Under the DCF approach, since the project NPV is positive, one should invest now. 
However, such a conclusion is not necessarily correct because it ignores the opportunity 
cost of investing now instead of waiting and keeping open the possibility of not 
investing should the price fall. For instance, if instead of investing now investors decide 
to wait and invest next year, the NPV in each price scenario is given as in the following: 
NPVh (High Price Scenario): NPVh = (-160/1.1) + (250/1.1) = $81.8 
NP~ (Low Price Scenario): NP~ = (-160/1.1) + (150/1.1) = -$9 
And the expected NPV in year 1, ENPV, is given by: 
ENPV 0.5 NPVh +0.5 NP~ =$36.4 
This result indicates that it would be correct to delay the investment by one year. Since 
companies have the option to delay their investments, it is assumed that they will go 
ahead only if prices are high, as such earning NPVh of $81.8 on their investment. 
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In this case, delaying the investment to year 1 allowed the company to earn extra $60 
(81.8-21.8) on its project. This difference between the profitability from investing in 
year 1 and the profitability of investing today can be regarded as the value of waiting. 
However, this value is not incorporated in the DCF technique, which assumes an 
inability to initiate actions to take advantage of changes in prices. In this case, 
companies are faced with a strict choice: either to invest now or to abandon the project. 
The lack of flexibility in DCF is one of the major limitations of this technique. 
Dentskevich (1991) argues that DCF tends to miss value investments. This is 
particularly true in situations of high uncertainty where management can respond 
flexibly to new information (Copeland & Keenan, 1998). In the DCF technique, a high 
level of risk is normally reflected in a high discount rate, which in tum reduces the 
value of a project. However, "that would grossly underestimate the value of the project, 
as it completely ignores the flexibility that a company has regarding when to develop 
the project" (Dixit & Pindyck, 1995, p.113). 
Lund (2001) argues that flexibility can increase the value of a project by almost 95 per 
cent, while Pike & Neale (1996) maintain that the "true" NPV from a project should be 
expressed as the sum of the NPV of the basic project and the NPV of waiting (p.336). 
The authors further add that this partly explains the reason for which companies 
frequently defer wealth creating projects or accept uneconomic projects. Ekern (1998) 
maintains that a traditionally calculated positive NPV is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for a project to be profitable. 
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7.3. REAL OPTIONS THEORY: BASIC CONCEPTS 
ROT was developed to overcome the limitation of DCF in terms of incorporating 
flexibility in project evaluation. The options evaluation technique was originally applied 
in the pricing of complex financial instruments, but the origin of the term "real options" 
can be attributed to Myers (1977) who first identified the similarity between real assets 
and financial options. This analogy led to the development of options technique for the 
valuation of real projects. 
This section reVIews the basic concepts of ROT and analyses financial options, 
addressing their similarity with real investments and more precisely with the 
development of an oil field. 
7.3.1. IRREVERSIBILITY AND TIMING 
Dixit & Pindyck (1995) argue that the DCF technique is based on questionable 
assumptions. Firstly, DCF assumes that investments are reversible (i.e. they can be 
undone and expenditures recovered should market conditions turn unfavourable). 
Secondly, if investments are irreversible they are a now-or-never proposition that is, if 
the firm does not undertake the investment now it will lose the opportunity forever 
(Dixit & Pindyck, 1995). Although it is possible that some types ofprojects can fall into 
these categories, several do not. These assumptions undermine the robustness of the 
DCF approach (Siew, 2001). 
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When a firm makes an irreversible investment it gives up the possibility of waiting for 
new information that might affect the desirability or timing of the expenditure. This lost 
value is an opportunity cost that must be included as part of the cost of the investment 
and investment rules that ignore this can be significantly in error (Dixit & Pindyck, 
1994). 
In order to incorporate the opportunity cost into the evaluation of a project, both 
irreversibility and timing are required. Irreversibility refers to the fact that once 
investment is taken, some costs cannot be recovered if the investor changes his mind. 
Timing refers to the ability to delay investment as an alternative to investing today, until 
new information arrives. 
While the DCF rule compares investing today with never investing, a more useful 
comparison can be to examine a range of possibilities: investing today, or waiting 
longer and perhaps investing next year, or waiting longer and perhaps investing in two 
years and so on (Dixit & Pindyck, 1995). Dias (2001) argues that this ability to delay an 
irreversible investment can profoundly affect the decision to invest. 
Irreversibility and timing constitute the key assumptions III ROT. They provide a 
company with the opportunity or option to invest. Because this option can be valuable, 
as Section 7.2 demonstrated, it can be inappropriate to ignore it from the evaluation of 
projects' profitability, particularly when analysing the effect of taxation on that 
profitability. 
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The opportunity to invest is similar to holding a financial call option. Therefore, to 
understand the way flexibility is incorporated into the evaluation, the next section 
develops the concept of financial call options and expands the analysis to real projects, 
such as to the development of oil fields in the UK North Sea. 
7.3.2. FINANCIAL OPTIONS 
Options in real investments originate from the idea of financial options. Like a forward 
oil contract, financial options are the most common derivatives and are used to manage 
exposure to the risks associated with the underlying asset88. A financial option is "a 
contractual arrangement giving the owner the right, but not the obligation to buy (call 
option) or sell (put option) the underlying asset, at a given price, at some time in the 
future" (Pike & Neale, 1996, p.319). The fixed price specified in an option contract is 
called the Exercise or strike Price, E, and the date after which an option can no longer 
be exercised is called the Expiration or Maturity date, T M • 
Financial options are widely used in the financial community, where it is possible to 
buy options on all kinds of assets such as shares, bonds, foreign currency and 
commodities. The rest of this section focuses on options over shares. Furthermore, there 
are two types of options: An American type, which can be exercised at any time up to 
and including the expiration date and a European option, which can only be exercised 
on the expiration date (Bodie & Merton, 2000). 
88 See Chapter 6, Section 6.3 
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This chapter considers the American call option, because in the upstream oil industry, 
several real options are of American nature. For example, purchasing an oil lease 
normally gives the E&P company the right but not the obligation to develop the field 
should commercial oil be discovered. It is most likely that such an option can be 
exercised at any time during the life of the lease (Siew, 2001). 
For illustrative purpose, assume an American call option that expires in 3 months time. 
Its underlying price, which is the closing price on the current date, is 120. The strike 
price is 115 and the last price at which the option was traded was 7. The hypothetical 
value of an option if it were to expire immediately is called its intrinsic value (Bodie & 
Merton, 2000, p.385). Therefore, if the American option considered in this example is 
expiring immediately, it would be worth the difference between its underlying price 
(120) and its striking price (115), as such if exercised immediately the intrinsic value of 
the call is 5. However, the option price is 7, therefore exceeding its intrinsic value by 2. 
This difference is called the option's time value89, also called the option premium (Dias, 
2001). 
Let F be the option value, which is the sum of its intrinsic value (Stock price, Sp less 
the Exercise price, E) and its time value. As the expiration date of the option 
approaches, the time value decreases but at expiration the option is worth its intrinsic 
value (Zettle, 2002). Figure 7.1 illustrates the call option payoff that depicts the relation 
between the value of the option (measured on the vertical axis) and the price of the 
underlying asset (on the horizontal axis). It is this payoff that affects investment-timing, 
in the following way: 
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If the exercise price, E, is higher than the stock price, ST' the option is out-ol-the 
money or worthless (F = 0), and investors would not take the option, so as not lose 
money since exercising the option today would yield a negative net payoff. In this 
case, the intrinsic value of the option is zero, since it cannot be negative (Dias, 
2001). 
If E is equal to ST' the option is at-the-money and exercising the option today would 
yield a zero payoff (F = 0). 
If E is lower than ST' the option is in-the-money and exercising the option today 
would yield a positive net payoff (F = (ST - J) + Time Value ). However, the fact 
that the option is in-the-money does not necessarily mean that investors should 
exercise the option (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). Dias (2001) argues that investors 
should wait until the option is deep-in-the-money to invest, where there is no value 
for waiting, or the value of waiting is too low compared with the intrinsic value 
(F=ST- J )· 
In Figure 7.1, the dotted line represents the actual option value as a function of the stock 
price, while the lower limit shows that the value of the option equals the payoff if 
exercised immediately. It also shows that the option value never falls below this payoff, 
hence at expiration, the value of the call can be expressed as max (ST-E, 0). 
89 This example is adapted from Bodie & Merton (2000). 
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Figure 7.1.Call Option Payoff Diagram90 
-~ - I ntrinsic value 
-- ...--
-"' .--
Exercise price Stock price 
7.3.3. ANALOGY BETWEEN FINANCIAL OPTIONS AND OIL PROJECTS 
The analogy between financial and real options is the basis for using ROT in the 
valuation of corporate investments. The common element for using this theory in the 
evaluation of real proj ects is that the future is uncertain, and in an uncertain 
environment having the flexibility to decide what to do after some of that uncertainty is 
resolved definitely has value. Options pricing theory provides the means for assessing 
that value (Bodie & Merton, 2000). Investment opportunities are "options- rights but not 
obligation to take some action in the future" (Dixit & Pindyck, 1995, p.105). As such, 
an irreversible investment opportunity can be compared to a financial call option. The 
holder of the call option has the right, for a specified period, to pay the Exercise price 
and to receive, in return, the asset, for example a share that has some value. 
90 Adapted from Zettl (2002) 
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Similarly, a company with an investment opportunity has the option to spend money 
now or in the future (the Exercise price) in return of an asset of some value (the 
entitlement to the stream of profits from the project). Siew (2001) argues that this 
flexibility may have value and should be reflected in the appraisal of a project. 
The earlier applications of ROT are in evaluating exhaustible resources, namely 
petroleum projects, which require long term planning horizons. "Nowhere is the idea of 
investments as options better illustrated than in the context of decisions to exploit 
deposits of natural resources" (Dixit & Pindyck, 1995, p.113). Given the technical and 
economic uncertainties in oil projects, the application of ROT for the evaluation of such 
projects can be of particular significance (Dias, 2001). 
The classical model of Paddock, Siegel & Smith (1988) is one of the earliest and most 
popular models to evaluate oil reserves using option-pricing techniques (Dias, 2001). 
An undeveloped reserve is an option; it gives the owner the right to invest in 
development of the reserve, immediately or later, depending on market conditions. By 
valuing this option, the value of the reserve can be determined as well as the optimum 
point cut which it should be developed (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). "Developing the oil 
reserve is like exercising a call option", (Dixit & Pindyck, 1995, p.113), and the 
exercise price is the cost of development. Oil activity is rich in real options, which if 
managed optimally enhance the value of the portfolio of projects and real assets in 
general for the oil company (Dias, 2001). An oil company has various options, such as 
the option to explore, to appraise, to develop, to produce and to abandon91 . 
91 For a field life cycle, See Chapter 5, Section 5.2.1. 
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In the Exploration phase, the finn has the option to drill the well or to wai t. If it decides 
to explore and in situation of discovering an oil reserve, the finn has the option to in est 
in the Appraisal phase to ascertain the geological characteristics of the field. If the 
appraisal is undertaken, then, the company has the option of committing a large 
investment in development of the reserve or to wait. If the field is developed, then the 
company has the option to produce or to wait. If it produces and economic conditions 
tum unprofitable, the company has the option to abandon. 
The focus of the analysis in this chapter is on the Development option, where flexibility 
is of particular importance92 . The Development strategy has a significant impact on the 
profitability of an oil project. It requires large investment costs, and is made early in the 
project's lifetime where infonnation concerning future oil prices is uncertain. Hence, the 
selection of the development strategy is a challenging task for the decision-maker 
(Lund, 2001). 
7.3.4. VALUING REAL OPTIONS 
The most familiar model for the pncmg of options is the Black-Scholes model, 
developed in the early 1970s. Under the Black-Scholes fonnula, there are five variables 
that need to be estimated in order to calculate the option value93 . 
92 When development plans are made Exploration and Appraisal costs are sunk costs and are normall y 
disregarded (Lund, 1987). At the Production stage operators may choose to wait (i.e. temporari ly top 
production) if, for instance, oil prices decline. In this case, although th re are no direct cos t as oClated 
with the decision to wait, the operator is still faced with the fixed operating 0 t , hence making 
po tponing production Ie s attractive (Lund, 200 1). Furthermore, und (19 7) argue that the ec nomic 
ignificance of flexibility at the abandonment stage i mall. 
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These are: 
1. The current price of the underlying stock, ST' 
2. The Exercise price, E. 
3. Annual volatility of stock price, cr (a measure of the amount by which the stock 
price could change during the time to maturity of the option). 
4. Risk free interest rate, i 
5. Time to expiration, T. 
In addition to these factors, Merton (1973) generalised the Black-Scholes model to 
allow the incorporation of a sixth parameter, dividend yield, d, which is the dividend per 
share divided by the market price at time of purchase94. 
The development of an oil field is analogous to a financial option. To acqUIre an 
offshore oil field, the company must first bid for an exploration license for exclusive 
rights to explore a particular offshore block. In general, the exploration license lasts five 
years during which the oil company has to make a decision on whether to proceed with 
the development or to return the block to the host government (Siew, 2001). Table 7.1 
summarizes the analogies between financial options, real options and extends the 
comparison to a petroleum development project. 
93 See Appendix H for a review of the Black Scholes model. 
94 As referred to by Boddie & Merton (2000), p.400. 
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Using the financial options analogy, the current estimate of the expected value of the 
undeveloped reserve on which the oil company has an option to invest in (current asset 
value) can be viewed as the current stock price. 
The Exercise pnce for the undeveloped reserve would refer to development cost 
(investment) incurred should the project be carried out. The annual volatility of the 
option refers to the measure of the amount by which the current asset estimate can 
change during the length of the option. Since the current value of the undeveloped 
reserve is assumed to be only a function of the oil price, the annual volatility is that of 
oil price. 
Table 7.1. Analogy between Financial and Real options95 
Option Terminology Financial Options Real Options Petroleum Project 
Value of underlying asset Stock price Gross project value (Present Value Present Value of the developed 
of expected Cash Flow) Reserve 
Exercise price Exercise price Present Value of investment Present Value of capital costs 
Expenditure 
Maturity Time Time to expiration Time span during which Negotiated development 
The investment can be undertaken Period (Relinquishment Requirement) 
Volatility Volatility of stock Volatility of gross Volatility of oil price 
price Project value 
Risk free interest rate Risk free interest rate Risk free interest rate Risk free interest rate 
Dividend Dividend Net convenience yield Net convenience yield 
The risk free rate of interest used to calculated financial options is the same for real 
options. 
95 Adapted from Dias (2001) and Zettl (2002). 
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The time to expiration is related to the maximum time that the investment decision can 
be postponed. The length of the exploration license or the relinquishment date96 can be 
viewed as the time to maturity of the option. At expiration, if the option was not 
exercised before, the firm either presents the development investment plan (commit to 
start the investment immediately) or returns the concession to the Government (Dias, 
2002). Finally, the dividend of the oil project is the net production revenue less the rate 
of depletion, also called the cash flow rate (net cash flow as a percentage of the project 
value) or the net convenience yield (Dias, 2001). 
Let Vet be the present value of the expected cash flows from the project, in other words, 
Vet is the present value of the operating revenues less operating costs and tax. 
(7.1) 
Where: 
Ret is the present values of the expected revenue cashflow in period t. 
DE
et is the present values of the expected cost cashflow in period t. 
T
et is the present values of the expected tax cashflow in period t. 
Let [' be the present value of the investment expenditure net of fiscal benefits. 
et 
96 "When the lease must be given back to the Government because the development of the project has not 




let is the present value of capital expenditures in period t. 
FB et is the present value of investment fiscal benefits in period t. 
The project cash flows can be obtained when the company decides to develop the field. 
In this case, the company exercises its option by paying the exercise price, let' net of 
fiscal benefits97 . Therefore, the immediate exercise of the option generates a net payoff, 
or the net value of the project, which is the NPVet , where: 
(7.3) 
Let Fr be the value of the real option, in this case the undeveloped oil field. This value 
is determined from the partial differential equation based on the Black-Scholes model, 
1 2 2 " , 
-(j VVetF (V) + (i - 8)VetVF (V) - iF = 0 2 
This equation is solved subject to the following boundary conditions99: 
97 I' is equivalent to the Exercise Price, E, in the case of a financial option, as assumed on p. 208. et 
98 For a derivation of this equation see Appendix H. 




8 is the dividend yield 
F' is the first derivative of F 
F(O ,t)=O 
F(V ,t) = max(V
I 
-1,0) 
F(V ' ,f)=V'- 1 
F '(V ·, t)=l 
F " is the second derivative ofF 
(7.5) 
V· is the threshold, which is the critical value of V where the real option is deep-ill-
th e-money and the value of waiting is zero (Cappuccio & Morettor, 2001). 
The decision to exercise the option and develop of the field is taken in the light of the 
option value, as explained below and further illustrated in Figure 7.2. 
If Vel > 1~1' NPV(,I > 0 and the option IS ill-the-money. However, the company 
should consider exercising its option when it is deep in the money, where V > V· , 
the option premium is zero and the option value, Fr , is equal to its intrinsic value, 
If V
CI 
= 1:'1' NP VCI = 0 and the option is at-the-l1loney. In this case, Fr = 0 . 
') ') 
If Vet < I~t' NPVet < 0 and the option is out-of-the-money. Also, in this case, 
Fr = 0, because the option value cannot be negative lOO • 
Subsequently, because the option value cannot be negative, it can be said that the payoff 
from a real option is equal to: 
Figure 7.2. Investment Decisions & Real Options101 
F 
100 See Section 7.3.2. 
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Through its double effect on the net payoff, firstly on the project value and secondly on 
the investment expenditure, taxation is likely to affect the decision to exercise the 
option or the timing of the investment. 
The following section covers the empirical analysis used to evaluate the effect of 
taxation on investment timing through its effect on project value as well as the post-tax 
cost of investment. 
7.4. METHODOLOGY & ASSUMPTIONS 
This section details the methodology adopted to evaluate the UK fiscal regime with 
respect to its effect on investment timing. The section also presents the main 
assumptions that are needed to complete the analysis, in addition to those presented in 
Chapters 5 and 6. Furthermore, since the study performed in this chapter is an extension 
of the empirical analysis undertaken in Chapter 6, the relation between ROT and MAP 
is explained. 
7.4.1. METHODOLOGY 
The analysis performed in this chapter is based on the 25 oil fields selected in the 
previous chapter. The profitability of these fields as well as Government revenues are 
evaluated under the nine tax scenarios presented in Chapter 5, using the ROT technique. 
The findings are then compared with the DCF values calculated in the previous chapter. 
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To compute the real option value, as well as the value of waiting, the Timing 
Software 1 02 developed by Dias (2002) is used. This software comprises Excel 
spreadsheets that use a simple model analogy of real options with American call option. 
For the purpose of this chapter, the software is used to calculate the real option value. 
However, the software requires inputs, namely the discounted values of the expected 
cash flow, Vet' and of the investment expenditures, I~t' the time to expiration, the 
dividend yield and the nominal risk free interest rate. As such, separate spreadsheets are 
developed for each field and for each tax scenario in order to determine the values of 
both Vet and I ~t . 
Further, in order to isolate the fiscal effects on investment expenditures, the following 
steps are adopted: 
Firstly, the total field's profitability, NPVet , is calculated as follows: 
(7.6) 
Secondly, the field's profitability, Vet' is calculated in the same way as NPV but this 
time assuming Capital Expenditures, CEet , equal to zero. 
102 The software is available for download from the following website: http: !ww\\' .puc-
rio.brlmarco.indlmain.html 
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Finally, the difference between NPVet and Vet glVes the value of investment 
expenditures net of fiscal benefits, I~t. 
Once calculated, the values are inserted into the Timing Software in order to determine 
the option value. 
7.4.2. ASSUMPTIONS 
The analysis in this chapter uses the same economic assumptions and tax scenarios as 
presented in both Chapters 5 and 6. However, certain additional assumptions are used in 
this chapter namely: 
The time to expiration, T, is assumed to be 5 years. In the UK, the Production 
license covers the most important stages of exploration and development as well as 
actual production. Under the first four licensing rounds the rights under a production 
license last for an initial period of six years, under the fifth licensing round, licenses 
are granted for a period of four years (Hayllar & Pleasance, 1977). Also, Emhjellen 
(1999), Dias (2001) and Siew (2001) assume an expiration period of 5 years, as a 
typical time for relinquishment. 
The dividend yield, 8, is assumed to be 2 per cent in annual terms, similarly to the 
real risk-free rate. Pickles & Smith (1993) and Dias (2001) argue that the risk free 
interest rate is a good practical value for the dividend yield. 
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A, the speed of reversion of oil prices, is assumed to tend to zero , hence, oi I prices 
are assumed to follow a Geometric Brownian Motion rather than a Mean Reversion , 
as done in Chapter 6. This assumption is adopted for the following reasons. Firstly 
early models of Black & Scholes (1973), and Paddock, Siegel & Smith ( 1988) 
assume a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM), which is much simpler to use than 
the Mean Reversion Model. 
The same assumption is also implemented in several recent studies, such as those of 
Zhang (1997) and Lund (2001). Laughton (1998) considers the GBM assumption 
when taking into consideration investment flexibility. "There may be problems with 
the use of this particular class of models of price reversion in the consideration of 
projects with timing flexibility" (Laughton, 1998, p .93). Pindyck (200 1) argues that 
the GBM assumption is unlikely to lead to large errors in the optimal investment 
rule, as the speed of reversion is relatively very slow. Secondly, the Timing software 
uses the same assumption and as such the chapter adopts the same assumption for 
reasons of consistency. 
Since uncertainty is modelled differently in GBM and Mean Reversion ModeI IO], 
the two models have different implications for the term structure of the risk discount 
factor (Bradley, 1998). Under the Mean Reversion assumption, the risk discount rate 
declines from a short-tem1 rate toward zero in the long term, whereas the risk 
discount rate is constant under GBM. Consequently, hi gher values are likely to 
result under the Mean Reversion assumption. According to Bradley (1998), 
10J ee hapter 6, ec tion 6 .3 .2.3 . 
227 
although there are quantitative di fferences in the two oi I pnce model . the 
qualitative features of the two models are the same. 
Under GBM, the risk discount factor used to adj ust oil revenues for risk, is assumed 
as fo llows: 
RDF t = exp( -rpm) (7.7) 
With rp, the price ofrisk 104 . 
The discounted values are obtained by applying the time discount factor, TDF, 
where: 
TDF, = exp( -it) (7.8) 
The evaluation is carried out firstly in nominal temlS then the results are deflated, and 
given in f M. 
7.4.3. REAL OPTIONS THEORY AND MAP 
ROT is based on the same concepts as MAP, namel y Derivati e Asset Pricing and 
Contingent Claims Analysis . To value an asset, the cash flo\\'s occurring at each period 
are sp lit into different components, then valued separately depending on the ri k 
inherent to each component. 
I O~ As dcfin cu in Chapler 6. "' ce llon 6.3.2.2. 
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As oil price is assumed to be the only source of uncertainty, revenues are adjusted for 
risk while the other components, mainly costs, are discounted at the risk free rate. Once 
the individual components of the cash flow are valued, the project value is determined 
by adding up the individual components' values. Hence, because ROT is based on the 
same concepts applied in MAP, it also benefits from the major advantages of the MAP 
approach, namely this separate discounting of the Cash Flow components and the 
incorporation of a rigorous oil price model. 
However, while MAP assumes a forward contract to model oil price uncertainty, ROT 
considers financial options. Both forward contracts and financial options are the most 
common financial derivatives used, but they differ in the following way. While a 
forward contract105 obliges the holder of the contract to exercise its right at a specified 
price and day, the option "gives its owner the right (not the obligation) to buy or sell 
some asset at a specified price" (Bodie & Merton, 2000, p.384). As such, the option 
gives more flexibility than the forward contract. 
Consequently, the application of ROT to value real projects, which are analogous to 
financial options, allows the incorporation of management flexibility in decision-
making. Furthermore, when MAP is extended to incorporate flexibility, the model is 
referred to as Real Options technique (Laughton, Sagi & Samis, 2000). 
lOS See Chapter 6, Section 6.3.2.2. 
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7.5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
This section summari ses the main results of the evaluation of oil fi eld profit abilit y and 
Government revenue under nine tax scenarios (as defined in Chapter 5, p.150)' usin g 
the Real Options technique. The section further compares those findings with the results 
of the DCF technique, as calculated in Chapter 6 (Section 6.4.2 .2). Results from the 
models are then used to investigate whether a clearly preferable ta.\ regime can be 
found. Each of the tax scenarios 2-7c is evaluated against the Base Scenario, in which 
taxes are set to zero. This enables a more explicit comparison between DCF and ROT. It 
also pennits to identify whether the imposition of a particular fiscal package affects the 
value of waiting and as such the timing of development of a pal1icular field . 
7.5.1. DCF VERSUS ROT 
Table 7.2 displays the profitability of the 25 selected oil fields eva luated using both 
techniques under the Base scenario. The main finding is that the two discounting 
methods produce different proj ects NPY. The ROT values are always lower than DCF, 
most probably as a result of the discrete discounting of the cash flow components under 
ROT. The difference is particularly significant for the fields with positive NPY under 
DCF, but with a negative NPY as calculated with ROT. This is the case of Birch , 
Beatrice, Heather, and Captain. The di fferenc e between the t\\'o methods is sometimes 
more pronounced relatively to the difference between M A P and DeL as di sc ussed in 
the previous chaptcr I O(,. Such a variance relates mainl y to th e underl yin g model . 
10(. Sec C hJpler 6, Table 6.2 
Table 7.2. Oil Field Profitability- Base Scenario 
Base Scenario DCF ROT Difference Option Value Value of Waiting 
£M £M % £M £M 
Very Small 
Argyll 292.3 202.4 30.8% 202.4 0.0 
Arkwright 81.4 49.2 39.6% 49.2 0.0 
Birch 57.5 -7.1 87.7% 14.0 21.1 
Blake 276 212.8 22.9% 212.8 0.0 
Kappa 171.4 79.5 53.6% 79.5 0.0 
Highlander 350.2 268.2 23.4% 268.2 0.0 
Janice 182.4 108.7 40.4% 125.9 17.2 
Tiffani -208.1 -412.1 98.0% 3.5 415.6 
Thelma 224.1 193.5 13.7% 193.5 0.0 
Toni 182.6 147.1 19.4% 147.1 0.0 
Small 
Arbroath 503.1 289.2 42.5% 289.2 0.0 
Auk 385.4 177.3 54.0% 177.3 0.0 
Balmoral 161.4 38.2 76.3% 95.6 57.4 
Beatrice 165.4 -200.8 221.4% 19.6 220.4 
Heather 170.9 -97.2 156.9% 19.3 116.5 
Leadon 571.4 531.4 7.0% 531.4 0.0 
Montrose 257.1 79.2 69.2% 84.0 4.8 
Osprey 277.8 164.1 40.9% 167.7 3.6 
Scapa 399.2 288 27.9% 288.0 0.0 
Medium 
Captain 541.4 -28.8 105.3% 102.5 131.3 
Clair 418.3 326.3 22.0% 326.3 0.0 
Maureen 495.2 271.5 45.2% 303.4 31.9 
Tern 719.5 414.7 42.4% 414.7 0.0 
Large 
Alba 1040.1 594.6 42.8% 600.1 5.5 
Schiehallion 1481.2 1202.8 18.8% 1202.8 0.0 
Firstly, with MAP the use of Mean Reversion model for oil price reduces the long-term 
discounting for revenues. With ROT, however, revenues' discounting grows over time, 
due to the Geometric Brownian Motion assumption. Secondly, while revenues are 
adjusted for risk, costs are discounted at the risk free rate under ROT, similarly to MAP. 
With DCF, however, both revenues and costs are discounted at the risk-adjusted rate. 
Consequently, the difference between DCF and ROT is more significant for low 
revenue and high cost fields, like Beatrice, Heather and Captain. 
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For instance, in the case of Captain, the discounted costs' value is higher than the 
discounted revenue value, because CAPEX, alone, constitute about 50 per cent of 
revenues on an undiscounted basis. However, for fields, like Leadon and Schiehallion, 
with high revenues and low costs, the difference between the two techniques is small. 
For Schiehallion, for example, the total costs constitute only 25 per cent of the total 
revenues, on an undiscounted basis. 
Furthermore, under DCF, all fields have a positive NPV, except Tiffani field. Following 
the concept of "now or never", the development of all of the 24 oil fields can be carried 
out. With ROT, however, 11 fields have a value of waiting, significant in the case of 6 
fields. As such, under the ROT concept of "wait and see", the development of such 
fields can be delayed instead of being carried out today. This can explain why authors, 
like Ekern (1998), argued that the option analysis may yield results partly conflicting 
with the recommendations of the traditional DCF. 
In fact, if a field has a negative NPV under DCF, it is probably that its development 
would never be undertaken. But ROT leads to a more flexible outcome, where the 
development would be delayed and undertaken under more favourable conditions. For 
instance, the development of Tiffani field can be delayed instead of defected. However, 
because the value of waiting for this field is substantial, it is unlikely that the 
development of the field will be undertaken. When the value of waiting is small or zero, 
both ROT and DCF lead to the same conclusion with regard to the development 
decision. This applies to 19 fields from the selected sample. 
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7.5.2. EFFECT OF TAX ON INVESTMENT TIMING 
The following section presents the results of oil field profitability and Government 
revenue under different tax scenarios. The analysis concentrates on the effects different 
tax packages have on the value of waiting and the option value of different fields. As 
discussed in Section 7.3, taxation can affect the option value through its effect on V, the 
present value of the expected cash flows and I, the present value of Capital 
Expenditures. While an increase in taxation is likely to reduce the value of V, higher tax 
reliefs have the opposite effect on I. The total effect depends on the amount of the tax 
and its capital expenditure relief. 
Consequently, tax instruments, like Royalty, are expected to increase the value of 
waiting, since they are imposed on revenues and may offer limited reliefs for 
development costs. However, profits-related tax instruments, like PRT and CT, are 
expected to encourage early development, as they offer several capital expenditure 
reliefs, particularly PRT. Table 7.3 displays the results of the 25 oil fields under both 
Scenarios 2 and 3, where under Scenario 2 Royalty applies alongside PRT and CT, but 
in Scenario 3, only PRT and CT apply. 
Under Scenario 2, there is a significant reduction in the profitability of all fields, 
regardless their size (e.g. Janice, Leadon, Tern and Schiehallion). Four fields, two very 
small (Kappa and Janice), and two small (Balmoral and Beatrice107) even have a 
negative profitability compared with the Base Scenario. 
107 As calculated under DCF 
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Under Scenario 3, there is a reduction in profitability but it is less pronounced compared 
with Scenario 2. In fact, compared with the Base Scenario, the profitability of only one 
very small field, Janice, becomes negative. 
Table 7.3. Oil Field Profitability- Scenarios 2 & 3 
Scenario2 12.5% Royalty, 70% PRT, 52%CT Scenario3 75% PRT, 50%CT -] 
DCF ROT Option Value of DCF ROT Option Value of 
Value Waiting Value Waiting 
£M £M £M £M £M £M £M £M 
Very Small Very Small 
Argyll 108.1 60.2 60.2 0.0 Argyll ./ 162.7 117.1 117.1 0.0 
Arkwright 27.7 11.0 12.3 1.3 Arkwright 51.9 30.1 30.1 0.0 
Birch 13.7 -19.1 2.1 21.2 Birch 31.9 -9.1 6.9 16.0 
Blake 85.2 60.5 60.5 0.0 Blake 144.2 116.2 116.2 0.0 
Kappa -0.7 -92 A 0.0 92.3 Kappa 71.0 -17.9 7.l 25.0 
Highlander 97.5 61.3 61.3 0.0 Highlander 173.3 129.l 129.1 
~ 
0.0 / 
Janice -171.8 -268.8 0.1 268.9 Janice -26.9 63.8 65.6 -'1-..8/ 
Tiffani -237.8 -429.1 0.0 412.0 Tiffani -218A -412.1 0.0 412.1 
Thelma 68.5 66.8 66.8 0.0 Thelma 120.1 120.6 120.6 0.0 
Toni 47.3 43.0 43.0 0.0 Toni 89.5 91.6 91.6 0.0 
Small Small 
Arbroath 132.9 29.8 31.6 1.8 Arbroath../ 186.5 147.7 147.7 0.0 
Auk 105.9 -24.6 5.9 30.5 Auk 160.6 33.3 39.4 6.1 
Balmoral -4.3 -70.5 lA 71.9 Balmoral 58.6 -28.8 15.0 43.8 
Beatrice -11.1 -255.7 0.0 255.7 Beatrice 53.7 -200.8 0.8 201.6 
Heather 25.2 -140.5 0.0 140.5 Heather 78.2 -105.8 2.0 107.8 
Leadon 113.9 167.3 167.3 0.0 Leadon 215.1 274A 274.4 0.0 
Montrose 77.5 -19A 7.6 27.0 Montrose 129A 31.8 36.6 4.8 
Osprey 74.7 38.9 44A 5.5 Osprey 131.1 101.8 101.8 0.0 
Scapa 130.6 93.2 93.2 0.0 Scapa 202.9 155.6 155.6 0.0 
Medium Medium 
Captain 77.8 -140.1 1.0 141.1 Captain 164A -80.0 11.9 91.9 
Clair 59.8 200.5 200.5 0.0 Clair 115.7 200.5 200.5 0.0 
Maureen 57.2 -23.9 40.8 64.7 Maureen 133.7 -23.9 53A 77.3 
Tern 92A 89.1 89.1 0.0 Tern v 148.7 197.l 197.1 0.0 
Large Large 
Alba 112.2 126.0 126.0 0.0 Alba 223.7 271.1 271.1 0.0 
Schiehallion 223.7 322.4 322A 0.0 Schiehallion 436.9 495.0 495.0 0.0 
Furthennore, the imposition of the pre-1983 and post-1983 packages does generate a 
value of waiting for certain fields, although those fields have a zero value of waiting 
under the Base Scenario. Under Scenario 2, the ROT results indicate that 14 oil fields 
have a value of waiting, significant in the case of 11 fields. 
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Such a result is not surpnslng. Since Royalty is imposed on revenues, and when 
combined with costs discounted at the risk free rate under ROT, the result is a 
significantly lower NPV value, and as such consequently a higher value of waiting. 
Under Scenario 3, 10 fields have a value of waiting, significant for 8 fields. Janice and 
Montrose have a notable higher value of waiting under Scenario 2 than Scenario 3. This 
indicates that both the pre-1983 and post-1983 packages impact the development timing 
and can lead to postponing development activity, but the effect of pre-1983 structure is 
more substantial. 
Nevertheless, for certain fields, namely Captain and Alba, there is a reduction in the 
value of waiting, particularly under Scenario 3. This is possibly due to investment 
expenditures fiscal benefits, which are significant for fields with large capital 
expenditures, like Captain. This point is further discussed in the analysis of Scenarios 
7a, 7b and 7c, where no Uplift, oil allowance nor Safeguard applies respectively. 
Table 7.4 displays the results of profitability under both Scenarios 4 and 5. 
Scenarios 4 and 5 generate close profitability, particularly for the very small and small 
fields, such as Arkwright, Birch and Kappa. Such fields are in a PRT paying-position 
but are normally protected by the available reliefs. Four fields (Osprey, Tern, Alba, and 
Schiehallion) do not have any waiting value under Scenario 4 but under Scenario 5 
those fields have a waiting value, even though small. This can be explained by the PRT 
fiscal benefits for Capital Expenditures from which those fields benefited under 
Scenario 4 and which do not apply when PRT is not imposed. 
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Table 7.4. Oil Field Profitability- Scenarios 4 & 5 
Scenario4 50% PRT, 30% CT Scenario5 30%CT I DCF ROT Option Value of DCF ROT Option Value of 
Value Waiting Value Waiting £M £M £M £M £M £M £M £M 
Very Small Very Small 
Argyll 187.7 126.9 126.9 0.0 Argyll 203.4 137.2 137.2 0.0 
Arkwright 54.6 31.8 31.8 0.0 Arkwright 54.6 31.8 31.8 0.0 
Birch 34.6 -8.9 7.9 16.8 Birch 35.8 -8.9 8.6 17.5 
Blake 163.9 128.4 128.4 0.0 Blake 189.1 143.6 143.6 0.0 
Kappa 80.3 -9.1 10.8 19.9 Kappa 82.5 -9.1 11.4 20.5 
Highlander 201.4 150.8 150.8 0.0 Highlander 257.2 180.8 180.8 0.0 
Janice -8.5 67.9 73.3 5.4 Janice -3.4 67.9 96.8 28.9 
Tiffani -217.4 -412.1 1.5 413.6 Tiffani -217.4 -412.1 0.7 412.8 
Thelma 134.7 126.8 126.8 0.0 Thelma 151.3 132.5 132.5 0.0 
Toni 102.7 96.2 96.2 0.0 Toni 118.2 97.8 97.8 0.0 
Small Small 
Arbroath 263.0 164.9 164.9 0.0 Arbroath 345.0 193.4 193.4 0.0 
Auk 201.1 60.2 90.0 29.8 Auk 266.9 98.8 98.8 0.0 
Balmoral 70.2 -22.7 25.7 48.4 Balmoral 77.6 -22.7 40.8 63.5 
Beatrice 67.2 -200.8 2.3 203.1 Beatrice 79.3 -200.8 7.0 207.8 
Heather 89.1 -139.2 2.1 160.2 Heather 99.9 -105.0 6.7 111.7 
Leadon 259.7 305.7 305.7 0.0 Leadon 373.6 360.4 360.4 0.0 
Montrose 148.8 36.1 41.9 5.8 Montrose 174.1 36.1 45.3 9.2 
Osprey 153.7 107.5 107.5 0.0 Osprey 184.3 107.5 111.8 4.3 
Scapa 233.7 172.2 172.2 0.0 Scapa 276.2 192.7 192.7 0.0 
Medium Medium 
Captain 215.7 -69.2 27.4 96.6 Captain 350.9 -69.2 25.5 94.7 
Clair 162.0 279.9 279.9 0.0 Clair 275.6 279.9 279.9 0.0 
Maureen 180.7 -23.9 106.8 103.7 Maureen 296.7 -23.9 120.3 144.2 
Tern 252.2 223.6 223.6 0.0 Tern 467.9 269.1 272.9 3.8 
Large Large 
Alba 377.1 321.1 321.1 0.0 Alba 683.7 387.8 397.1 9.3 
Schiehallion 610.8 612.0 612.0 0.0 Schiehallion 994.9 809.9 815.0 5.1 
In order to evaluate the effect of the imposition of the 10 per cent Supplementary charge 
in 2002 changes, Scenario 6 is compared with Scenario 5, where only CT applies. 
Table 7.5 presents the profitability of oil fields under Scenarios 6 and 7a. In general, the 
additional ST does not generate a critical difference in the profitability of fields, nor in 
the value of waiting. 
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a e . . I leld Profitability- Scenarios 6 & 7a 
Scenario6 30% CT, 10% ST Scenario7a I 50% PRT (no uplift), 10%ST, 30%CT. DCF ROT Option Value of DCF ROT Option Value of 
Value Waiting Value Waiting £M £M £M £M £M £M £M £M 
T bl 75 0'1 F' 
Very Small Very Small 
Argyll 192.1 124.0 124.0 0.0 Argyll 153.4 103.7 103.7 0.0 
Arkwright 45.6 26.0 26.0 0.0 Arkwright 45.6 26.0 26.0 0.0 
Birch 28.6 -9.5 6.8 16.3 Birch 26.2 -9.5 8.0 17.5 
Blake 160.1 120.5 120.5 0.0 Blake 129.0 99.5 99.5 0.0 
Kappa 52.8 -38.6 2.7 41.3 Kappa 50.3 -38.6 2.4 41.0 
Highlander 226.2 151.7 151.6 0.0 Highlander 164.8 122.8 122.8 0.0 
Janice -65.4 54.3 68.3 14.0 Janice 
-58.7 54.3 60.4 6.1 
Tiffani -220.5 -412.1 0.3 412.4 Tiffani -220.5 -412.1 0.0 412.1 
Thelma 127.1 112.2 112.2 0.0 Thelma 132.2 107.2 107.3 0.0 
Toni 96.8 81.4 81.4 0.0 Toni 80.0 74.4 74.3 0.0 
Small Small 
Arbroath 292.4 161.5 161.5 0.0 Arbroath 212.0 120.7 120.7 0.0 
Auk 227.3 72.7 74.3 1.6 Auk 166.9 38.1 43.7 5.6 
Balmoral 49.7 -43.1 26.3 69.4 Balmoral 38.4 -44.8 13.8 58.6 
Beatrice 50.6 -200.8 4.4 205.2 Beatrice 23.5 -200.8 1.1 201.9 
Heather 76.2 -107.6 3.7 111.3 Heather 54.1 -108.0 1.8 109.8 
Leadon 307.7 303.4 303.4 0.0 Leadon 184.1 247.4 247.4 0.0 
Montrose 146.5 21.8 33.1 11.3 Montrose 121.3 24.6 31.6 7.0 
Osprey 153.2 88.6 93.1 4.5 Osprey 120.8 82.8 83.8 0.0 
Scapa 235.2 160.9 160.9 0.0 Scapa 183.8 134.4 134.4 0.0 
Medium Medium 
Captain 287.3 -82.6 6.0 88.6 Captain 142.1 -82.6 17.9 100.5 
Clair 228.1 264.4 264.4 0.0 Clair 118.3 264.4 264.4 0.0 
Maureen 230.5 -23.9 104.1 128.0 Maureen 95.5 -23.9 90.0 113.9 
Tern 384.1 220.5 225.8 5.3 Tern 181.1 147.9 148.9 0.0 
Large Large 
Alba 564.9 318.9 329.8 10.9 Alba 264.4 191.2 196.6 5.4 
Schiehallion 832.8 679.0 679.0 0.0 Schiehallion 459.7 438.1 438.1 0.0 
In order to evaluate the possible effects of PRT reliefs on the value of waiting, 
Scenarios 7a, 7b and 7c are compared consecutively. 
Table 7.6 presents the results under Scenarios 7b and 7c, where CT and ST apply with 
PRT but without the oil allowance nor Safeguard respectively. 
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Table 7.6. Oil Field Profitability- Scenarios 7b & 7c 
Scenario7b No oil allowance Scenario7c No Safeguard I DCF ROT Option Value of DCF ROT Option Value of 
Value Waiting Value Waiting £M £M £M £M £M £M £M £M 
Very Small Very Small 
Argyll 87.6 53.5 53.5 0.0 Argyll 154.8 106.7 106.7 0.0 
Arkwright 27.5 18.5 18.5 0.0 Arkwright 45.6 26.0 26.0 0.0 
Birch 13.1 -9.5 2.4 11.9 Birch 27.3 -9.5 6.2 15.7 
Blake 84.0 71.6 71.6 0.0 Blake 138.5 107.5 107.5 0.0 
Kappa 4.1 -71.3 0.0 71.3 Kappa 50.8 -38.6 2.4 41.0 
Highlander 102.7 74.3 74.3 0.0 Highlander 147.7 99.4 99.4 0.0 
Janice -86.9 54.3 54.3 0.0 Janice -75.4 56.1 61.3 5.2 
Tiffani -224.3 -412.1 0.0 412.1 Tiffani -224.3 -412.1 0.0 412.1 
Thelma 67.6 78.3 78.3 0.0 Thelma 107.1 103.7 103.7 0.0 
Toni 44.7 58.7 58.7 0.0 Toni 83.5 77.4 77.4 0.0 
Small Small 
Arbroath 145.3 99.6 99.6 0.0 Arbroath 204.9 131.7 131.7 0.0 
Auk 119.4 -0.7 14.6 15.3 Auk 170.6 39.0 44.4 5.4 
Balmoral 14.2 -60.0 2.1 62.1 Balmoral 49.7 -43.1 14.1 57.2 
Beatrice 16.8 -190.6 0.1 190.7 Beatrice 25.0 -200.8 1.1 201.9 
Heather 37.4 -108.0 0.0 108.0 Heather 61.3 -108.0 1.8 109.8 
Leadon 160.5 210.4 210.4 0.0 Leadon 208.1 231.0 231.0 0.0 
Montrose 70.3 -8.0 7.5 15.5 Montrose 125.4 21.8 23.0 1.2 
Osprey 84.7 72.4 72.4 0.0 Osprey 129.6 84.4 84.6 0.2 
Scapa 130.4 94.3 94.3 0.0 Scapa 198.8 143.3 143.3 0.0 
Medium Medium 
Captain 148.8 -82.6 9.2 91.8 Captain 164.0 -74.5 19.4 93.9 
Clair 105.8 264.4 264.4 0.0 Clair 130.1 242.2 242.2 0.0 
Maureen 97.7 -23.9 39.6 63.5 Maureen 111.2 -23.9 50.8 74.7 
Tern 152.8 142.6 142.6 0.0 Tern 199.2 154.9 162.1 7.2 
Large Large 
Alba 253.9 233.4 233.4 0.0 Alba 134.1 242.2 242.2 0.0 
Schiehallion 459.0 461.7 461.7 0.0 Schiehallion 441.1 405.2 405.2 0.0 
Uplift is an important relief on capital expenditures. Hence, the abolition of this relief is 
likely to generate an increase in the value of waiting particularly for fields, which have 
significant CAPEX. Maureen field, for example, has a value of waiting of £113.9M 
under Scenario 7a compared with £63.SM under Scenario 7b. However, the difference 
is not critical because when Uplift does not apply, the payback period is shorter, 
speeding up both the Oil Allowance and the Safeguard. 
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Although the oil allowance is the most important PR T relief for the very small and 
small fields, as discussed in the previous chapters, the three reliefs have similar impact 
on the value of waiting of the selected fields. Balmoral field, for example, has a value of 
waiting of £58.6M under Scenario 7a where the Uplift is abolished, £62.7M under 
Scenario 7b where the oil allowance does not apply and £57.2M in the absence of the 
Safeguard under Scenario 7 c. Such a finding highlights that the three PR T reliefs are 
inter-related and are equally important. If the oil allowance is abolished the 
development of 10 oil field might be delayed, in the case of the abolition of both the 
Uplift and Safeguard, the development of a total of 8 fields might be postponed, under 
the ROT concept. 
Under the nine tax scenarios evaluated, the development timing of approximately 14 
fields is not affected. Those fields (Argyll, Arkwright, Blake, Highlander, Thelma, 
Toni, Arbroath, Leadon, Osprey, Scapa, Clair, Tern, Alba and Schiehallion) have either 
a zero or insignificant value of waiting under the various scenarios considered. 
On average, Scenarios 3-7a and Scenario 7c generate a value of waiting for 8 fields and 
as such probably affecting their development timing. However, Scenario 2 impacts the 
value of waiting of 11 fields, while Scenario 7b affects 10 fields. Such a finding is 
consistent with the previous chapter's findings, where the imposition of Royalty with 
PR T and CT and the abolition of the oil allowance lead to close results. As a 
consequence of the flexibility option, the oil fields with a significant value of waiting 
are not going to be developed today, but instead their development is postponed. This in 
tum can affect the timing of fiscal receipts, as analysed in the following section. 
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7.5.3. EFFECT OF INVESTMENT TIMING ON FISCAL REVENUE 
Table 7.7 presents the total Government take from each field, under different tax 
scenarios, if all fields are developed. The results in this table are consistent with those of 
Chapter 6 (p.196), and therefore the same interpretation applies. 
In brief, Scenario 2 generates the highest revenue, followed by Scenario 7b, Scenario 3, 
Scenario 7c, Scenario 4, Scenario 7a, then Scenario 6 while the lowest fiscal take is 
generated under Scenario 5. 
Nevertheless, uSIng the ROT concept, where the development of fields with a 
significant value of waiting can be postponed, the effect of various tax scenarios on 
Government revenues can vary. 
Table 7.8 illustrates the total Government take from the fields that do not have a value 
of waiting (or the value is insignificant) under different tax scenarios and as such are 
developed today. The table indicates that a suspension of development of certain fields 
results in a reduction in Government revenue, under all scenarios. 
Scenario 2, illustrating the pre-1983 fiscal package, has the most significant impact. If 
this scenario is imposed on the 25 oil fields selected, it can generate a reduction in 
Government revenue by almost a half (47.9 per cent). This results from the fact that the 
development of 11 oil fields, particularly small fields, is not profitable today and as 
such it is suspended. 
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Table 7.7 Total Government Revenue from Individual Fields 
Scenario2 Scenario3 Scenari04 Scenario5 Scenario6 Scenario7a Scenario7b Scenario7c 
Very Small 
Argyll 475.0 341.6 283.4 235.0 284.4 367.4 544.5 363.1 
Arkwright 156.0 86.9 79.0 79.0 105.3 105.3 169.2 105.3 
Birch 164.0 93.7 84.8 83.6 111.4 116.6 176.2 115.5 
Blake 376.2 253.7 218.0 176.7 235.6 284.9 396.5 271.0 
Kappa 320.7 184.3 168.7 165.2 220.3 223.3 331.9 223.5 
Highlander 534.0 364.1 3l3.0 217.6 290.1 398.1 575.1 404.0 
Janice 555.4 324.8 297.9 294.6 392.8 371.1 446.3 407.7 
Tiffani 65.0 21.8 19.8 19.8 26.4 26.4 34.3 34.3 
Thelma 343.6 226.9 196.7 165.4 220.6 205.1 363.0 258.1 
Toni 386.3 256.1 223.2 187.7 250.2 286.8 412.4 279.9 
Total (£M) 3376.2 2153.9 1884.5 1624.5 2137.1 2384.9 3449.4 2462.5 
Small 
Arbroath l394.0 1353.5 901.4 6l3.0 817.3 1086.6 1424.7 1224.8 
Auk 2l39.8 1922.2 1528.5 811.0 1081.5 1703.2 1875.2 1697.0 
Balmoral 515.4 315.9 282.3 266.0 355.0 377.9 507.1 355.0 
Beatrice 780.6 544.6 480.4 404.0 538.4 680.8 767.7 659.4 
Heather 886.6 683.5 570.8 400.0 533.6 738.8 847.8 701.3 
Leadon 973.6 767.6 664.7 430.0 573.2 822.9 925.0 776.5 
Montrose 710.2 556.1 410.4 305.7 434.5 569.5 735.7 552.4 
Osprey 635.7 486.4 371.2 306.0 407.6 525.2 670.9 497.4 
Scapa 938.4 703.8 592.9 439.0 585.2 819.9 995.2 717.3 
Total (£M) 8974.3 7333.6 5802.6 3974.7 5326.3 7324.8 8749.3 7181.1 
Medium 
Captain 2303.3 1951.4 1639.8 924.0 1232.5 1956.9 1992.8 1872.9 
Clair 2638.4 2302.7 1903.2 1029.0 l372.7 2185.6 2318.7 2121.8 
Maureen 1455.0 1261.5 1084.3 681.0 908.3 1357.7 1415.9 l311.5 
Tern 2990.1 2770.4 2229.9 1161.0 1547.8 2512.6 2659.8 2464.1 
Total (£M) 9386.8 8286.0 6857.2 3796.0 5061.3 8012.8 8387.2 7770.3 
Large 
Alba 4209.7 3837.6 3057.4 1565.3 2087.0 3464.6 3556.0 3373.8 
Schiehallion 4622.8 4079.4 3057.4 1778.7 2371.6 3789.3 3849.5 3850.5 
Total (£M) 8832.5 7917.0 6114.8 3344.0 4458.6 7253.9 7405.5 7224.3 
Tota] Revenue 30569.8 25690.5 20659.1 12739.2 16983.3 24976.4 27991.4 24638.2 
(£M) 
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Table 7.8. Government Revenue under ROT Concept 
Scenario2 Scenario3 Scenario4 ScenarioS Scenario6 Scenario7a Scenario7b Scenario7c 
Very Small 
Total(£M) 2271.1 1854.1 1611.2 1356.0 1779.0 2018.7 2907.0 2089.1 
Reduction in 48.7% 16.2% 17.0% 19.8% 20.1% 18.1% 18.7% 17.9% 
Revenue 
Small 
Total (£M) 3941.7 5789.6 4469.1 2904.7 3899.3 5527.3 4015.8 5465.4 
Reduction in 127.7% 26.7% 29.8% 36.8% 36.6% 32.5% 117.9% 31.4% 
Revenue 
Medium 
Total (£M) 5628.5 5073.1 4133.1 2190.0 2920.5 4698.2 4978.5 4585.9 
Reduction in 66.8% 63.3% 65.9% 73.3% 733% 70.6% 68.5% 69.4% 
Revenue 
Large 
Total (£M) 8832.5 7917.0 6114.8 3344.0 4458.6 7253.9 7405.5 7224.3 
Reduction in 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Revenue 
Total 
Total Revenue 20673.8 20633.8 16328.2 9794.7 13057.4 19498.1 19306.8 19364.7 
(£M) 
Reduction in 47.9% 24.5% 26.5% 30.1% 30.1% 28.1% 45.0% 27.2% 
Revenue 
The abolition of the oil allowance results in 45 per cent reduction in Government 
revenue, the second most significant impact. This is mainly produced by a reduction of 
117.9 per cent of revenue from small fields, and which further emphasises the 
importance of the oil allowance for such fields. The other scenarios generate less critical 
effects, with a reduction of 28 per cent, on average, in fiscal receipt, particularly from 
the medium fields. 
In fact, compared with Scenarios 2 and 7b, the impact of the other fiscal packages is 
less pronounced, as both PR T and CT provide significant fiscal reliefs encouraging by 
this early development 
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7.5. SUMMARY & CONCLUSION 
This chapter has expanded the empirical analysis of Chapter 6, evaluating the effects of 
different tax scenarios on the timing of oil field development and the available 
Government revenue generated in the UKCS, as such taking into consideration both the 
industry and Government interests. The chapter examines whether different tax 
structures and rates can delay the development activity, as such identifying any related 
investment distortions and addressing the neutrality of the regime. 
Flexibility in decision making permits companies to postpone the development of an oil 
field, until economic conditions become more favourable or uncertainty is reduced, for 
example. The petroleum industry has a significant managerial flexibility due to the long 
life nature of oil projects. Previous studies argued that such flexibility can add value to 
projects and neglecting it in oil ventures can lead to an under-valuation of assets and a 
consequential miss-allocation of resources in the economy. Consequently, a growing 
body of empirical work suggests that because the DCF technique, in its simplistic form, 
is based on the static concept of "now or never", it does not account for the existence of 
flexibility in investment decisions and as such it can undervalue a project. The Real 
Options Technique is suggested as a more useful technique than DCF, because it allows 
the incorporation of flexibility in the valuation of projects. Although ROT was 
originally developed for the appraisal of financial derivatives, the analogy between 
petroleum projects and financial options allows the application of ROT to value oil 
projects. Accordingly, in this chapter, the analysis is carried out using ROT in order to 
evaluate oil field profitability under various tax scenarios. 
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The main finding is that taxation can affect the development timing of an oil field. On 
the one hand, taxes can reduce the value of expected cash flows, and consequently they 
can increase the value of waiting and the possibility of delaying investment. But on the 
other hand, fiscal benefits can reduce the investment expenditure value, leading to an 
opposite effect on the value of waiting. The chapter demonstrates that tax instruments, 
such as Royalty with limited Capital Expenditure reliefs, can lead to a significant 
increase in the value of waiting thereby encouraging investment delay and leading to 
delay and probably loss of fiscal revenue, unlike PRT and CT. 
Furthermore, the analysis identifies that, in the UK, none of the tax structures evaluated 
can be described as entirely neutral. In particular, the pre-1983 fiscal package results in 
the suspension of the development of 44 per cent of oil fields, leading to halving the 
total fiscal take, the most significant reduction as compared with other scenarios. The 
abolition of the oil allowance (Scenario 7b) generates a similar result, due to the 
importance of this relief particularly for the small fields. 
The impact is less pronounced with the other tax scenanos, which affect the 
development timing of on average result 32 per cent. In fact, imposing income tax 
solely (Scenarios 5 and 6) generates a similar outcome to the imposition of PR T 
alongside CT and ST, despite the PRT higher tax rate. This is mainly due to the fact that 
PRT offers various reliefs that can reduce the value of waiting and thereby encourage 
early development. 
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In mature provinces, such as the UKCS, developing existing fields is likely to be the 
most important concern (as discussed in Chapter 4), in order to sustain production as 
well as maintain the interest of oil companies in the province. Further, any delay in the 
development of certain fields is not an outcome preferred by the Government, who 
generally aims to receive receipts as early as possible. As such, it can be concluded that 
the major changes to the fiscal regime, particularly that of 1983, have maintained 
investment and Government revenue in response to the changing nature of the North 
Sea province. However, the abolition of PRT in 1993 had a less significant impact in 
terms of investment timing, due to the fact that small fields are protected against the 
payment of this tax. 
As regards the evaluation techniques, for certain fields, the DCF technique leads to 
different conclusion as compared with ROT. This is particularly true for fields with a 
significant value of waiting, as evaluated under ROT. In this case, under ROT, delaying 
development would be more profitable than investing today, whereas under DCF, 
companies should carry out their development activity. Nevertheless, when the value of 
waiting is insignificant, the two techniques lead to the same conclusion. 
Up to this stage, the evaluation of the UK petroleum fiscal regime is undertaken by 
comparing the effects of the principal fiscal packages that applied since 1975 on the 
UKCS on both the industry and Government interests. In the following chapter, the 
evaluation of the regime is completed as it is carried out on an international level. The 
UK fiscal regime is compared with five other international representative regimes in 
order to assess the international competitiveness of the regime. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
UKCS FISCAL REGIME: A COMPARISON WITH FIVE 
REPRESENTATIVE INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 
8.1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapters 6 and 7 evaluated the impact of the major fiscal packages that applied to UK 
oil activity between 1975 and 2002, on oil field profitability and Government revenue. 
This chapter expands and completes the study in this thesis by assessing the UKCS tax 
regime international competitiveness and comparing it with five other international 
regimes. Studying other regimes may reveal a benchmark fiscal regime with features 
that have not been revealed in previous chapters' analysis. 
This analysis is of particular significance to mature provinces like the UK North Sea. 
Oil companies have international activities and often compare their available investment 
options in various countries (Rowland & Hann, 1987). Each country offering 
investment opportunities has a different profile with regard to key investment 
parameters, such as field size, costs and fiscal terms, and investors weigh these together 
to decide which areas to target for acquiring new business (WoodMackenzie, 2002). As 
the previous chapters demonstrated, taxation substantially affects the profitability of oil 
fields as well as the development timing, and thereby the attractiveness of the province. 
Consequently, in countries where oil production has started to decline, fiscal regimes 
can be tuned to compensate for the decline in production by encouraging existing and 
new companies to sustain production and develop the remaining less profitable fields. 
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For instance, in Norway, in an attempt to relax the fiscal regime, Royalty was tapered 
off for the fields that are still liable to Royalty payments (Bjerkedal, 2000). Similarly, 
Middle Eastern oil producing countries, like Iraq108, have been actively searching for 
mechanisms to facilitate foreign investment in their upstream oil sector for various 
economic and political reasons (International Petroleum Enterprises, 2001). In contrast 
to such measures, the UK tightened its regime by imposing the Supplementary Tax in 
2002, although the country is the most-mature province in the North Sea. 
Furthermore, there IS a notable controversy surrounding the international 
competitiveness of the UK petroleum fiscal regime, as Chapter 3 demonstrated. Authors 
like Quinlan (1998) argue that the regime in the UK is the most attractive of any 
established producing country worldwide. Similarly, Kemp & Stephens (1997) maintain 
that although the level of take is certainly low by international standards, the system is 
very attractive and there is no other major producing province that offers only one 
simple fiscal instrument at a modest rate. Furthermore, the survey results in Chapter 4 
imply that all respondents consider that the regime is well attuned to the reality of the 
North Sea. At the other extreme, authors like Rutledge & Wright (1998) and Miller et al 
(2000) argue that in the UK oil companies do not pay their fair share of taxes and the 
petroleum fiscal regime is weak by international standards. 
The previous chapters, particularly Chapter 2, discussed the difficulty in determining a 
single impartial yardstick that balances the two competing objectives of Government 
and oil companies. This partly explains the wide range of fiscal regimes in the world, as 
countries try to improve the trade-off between those two main players' interests. 
108 The Iraqi regime is analysed on a pre-2003 basis. 
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Johnston (1998) argues that "there are more petroleum fiscal systems in the world than 
there are countries" (p.5). Furthermore, each country has its own political and economic 
environment, which can affect the design of its fiscal regime. But despite the diversity 
of petroleum fiscal regimes, these can be grouped into two broad types namely, 
Concessionary and Contractual regimes, which are discussed in more detail in Section2. 
In this chapter, the UK petroleum fiscal regime is compared with five international 
regimes, the Norwegian, Australian, Indonesian, Chinese and Iraqi regimes, in order to 
critically evaluate how these countries attempt to ensure an appropriate share of revenue 
for the Government whilst safeguarding oil companies' interests. These countries are 
selected for the following reasons. 
The UK, Norwegian and Australian regimes follow a concessionary regime, whereas 
the three other countries follow a contractual system. 
The Norwegian regime has often been compared with the UK oil tax regime 109. A 
divergence in Government policies was often noticed (Nelsen, 1991). Andersen (1993) 
argues that in the UK, the 1980s were characterised by a reduction of Government 
participation, unlike Norway where the period up to 1986 was one of continuous 
tightening and increased Government intervention. However, in 1998, while the UK 
was thinking about tightening its regime, the Norwegian Government was seeking 
relaxing its system (Quinlan, 1998). 
109 Robinson & Morgan (1978), Robinson & Rowland (1978), Brent (1991), Quinlan (1998) 
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In Australia, the Government tries to recoup economic rent by the application of a 
special petroleum tax, the Resource Rent Tax, which is often claimed to be the most 
efficient and neutral tax instrument 11 0. Indonesia has adopted a Production Sharing 
Contract (PSC) 111 type of contractual regime. The Indonesian model "is the standard of 
comparison for all production sharing contracts" (Johnston, 1998, p.22). China also 
adopts a contractual regime but combines some features of a concessionary regime, 
namely Royalty and Income tax (Johnston, 2002). Iraq uses a Service contract, which is 
the other common type of contractual regime 112. In Iraq, the large size of oil reserves, 
the low exploration cost and the high political risk make the petroleum fiscal regime in 
this country worthy of note. 
The chapter contributes to the academic literature in the following three main ways. 
Firstly, the chapter compares the principal fiscal packages that applied to UK oil 
activity from 1975 to 2002 with five international fiscal packages. As such, it covers a 
time line analysis instead of focusing on one specific package and to date no similar 
work has been published. Secondly, the chapter evaluates the most recent fiscal changes 
that were implemented in the countries considered for analysis, and as such, the study is 
up-to-date. Finally, the chapter derives fully transparent cash flow models for each of 
the country selected, including Iraq for which information is not easily accessible. In 
fact, the analysis of the Iraqi regime is very limited in the academic literature. In this 
chapter, the Iraqi cash flow model was developed after intensive consultation with 
specialists in international petroleum regimes. 
110 See Chapter 2, Section 2.5 
111 See Section 8.2.2.1 
1\2 See Section 8.2.2.2 
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The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section two compares the 
characteristics of the two main fiscal regimes, which are the concessionary and 
contractual systems. The section also compares qualitatively the fiscal packages in the 
six countries selected. Section 3 covers the methodology and assumptions used to 
complete the analysis. Section 4 presents and discusses the principal findings. Section 5 
covers the concluding remarks. Appendix I presents an example of the calculation of 
field profitability and Government take under the various regimes selected. 
8.2. WORLD FISCAL REGIMES 
Johnston (1998) argues that world petroleum fiscal regimes can be divided into two 
broad categories, which are: 
1. The concessionary systems that allow private ownership of mineral resources. 
Oil companies take title to produced oil at the wellhead and then pay the 
appropriate royalties and taxes. 
2. The contractual based systems, where the Government retains ownership of 
minerals. Oil companies receive a fee for exploration, development and 
production operation services. If this fee is a share of production, the system is 
called a "Production Sharing Contract" (PSC), and in this case the oil company 
takes title to its share of petroleum extracted. If the fee is in cash, the system is 
known as a "Service Contract", and the company does not take title to any 
petroleum extracted (Johnston, 1998). 
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Mommer (2001) describes the two categories of fiscal regtmes as the liberal and 
proprietorial regimes respectively. The author argues that in liberal regimes, oil 
companies are in a much stronger position compared with the proprietorial systems, 
where the Government exercises a stronger control over the exploitation and production 
of the natural resource. 
The concessionary system originated with the very beginning of the petroleum industry 
(mid 1800), while the contractual system emerged a century later (mid-1950) (Blinn et 
aI, 1986). In the following section, the characteristics of each system are analysed and 
compared in more detail. 
8.2.1. CONCESSIONARY SYSTEMS 
This section analyses the general features of concessionary systems, focusing on their 
most relevant characteristics to this thesis, namely the tax instruments imposed and their 
principal deductions. The theoretical background of the principal tax instruments 
applied in concessionary systems was discussed in detail in Chapter 2. The analysis 
done in this section attempts to identify the general trends as well as divergence in the 
application of those instruments in countries following a concessionary regime. The 
section further derives the cash flow model specific to each regime and compares the 
fiscal structures in three countries adopting a concessionary regime, the UK, Australia 
and Norway. 
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8.2.1.1. GENERAL FEATURES 
A concession is defined as "an agreement between a Government and a company, that 
grants the company the right to explore for, develop, produce, transport and market 
hydrocarbons or minerals within a fixed area for a specific amount of time" (Johnston, 
1998, p.296). There are 55 countries applying a concessionary system to petroleum 
activity (Johnston, 2001). A common way of taxing oil companies in a concessionary 
regime involves a combination of Income Tax, Special Petroleum Tax and Royalty. 
That is why concessionary regimes are commonly known as "Royalty/Tax Systems". 
Royalties are typically either specific levies (based on the volume of oil and gas 
extracted) or ad valorem (based on the value of oil and gas extracted). Some countries 
have introduced a profit element in Royalties by having them depend on the level of 
production (Sunley, Baunsgaard & Simard, 2002). This is known as a sliding scale 
Royalty. 
Income tax is generally the most common instrument used in oil producing countries of 
the world (Sarma & Naresh, 2001). Commonly, the Income Tax comprises a basic rate 
structure i.e. a single rate, provisions for deduction of certain items from the tax base, 
supplementary levies and tax incentives. Currently, the overall corporate Income Tax 
rate in several countries lies in the range 30 to 35 per cent (Sarma & Naresh, 2001). 
Various countries provide an incentive for Exploration and Development by allowing 
Exploration costs to be recovered immediately and allowing accelerated recovery of 
Development costs (tax depreciation), for example, over five years. 
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Accelerated cost recovery brings forward payback for the investor (Sunley, Baunsgaard 
& Simard, 2002). In addition to tax deductions, losses carried forward and/or back are 
commonly allowed tax incentives (Sarma & Naresh, 2001). 
In addition to Income tax, oil-producing countries impose a special petroleum tax, such 
as Resource Rent Tax (RRT), in order to capture a larger share of economic rent from 
oil production. The special tax is normally based on cash flow but is imposed only when 
cumulative cash flow is positive. In countries where the special petroleum tax exists, the 
tax is usually imposed as a supplement to the general corporate Income Tax. Sarma & 
Naresh (2001) argue that an issue arises as to whether the special tax should be imposed 
before or after the Income Tax. If imposed before, then it can be treated as a deductible 
cost (like in the UK), but if imposed after, the payment of Income Tax can be treated as 
a cash outflow in calculating the special tax's income base. 
Sunley, Baunsgaard & Simard (2002) argue that some countries ring-fence their oil and 
gas activities whilst others ring-fence individual projects. Ring fencing imposes a 
limitation on deductions for tax purposes across different activities or projects 
undertaken by the same taxpayer. The authors argue that such rules matter for two main 
reasons. Firstly, the absence of ring fencing can postpone Government tax receipts 
because a company that undertakes a series of projects is able to deduct Exploration and 
Development costs from each new project against the income of projects that are 
already generating taxable income. Secondly, as an oil and gas area matures, the 
absence of ring fencing may discriminate against new entrants that have no income 
against which to deduct Exploration or Development expenditures. 
253 
8.2.1.2. CASH FLOW MODEL 
This section derives a representative cash flow model that can apply to any 
concessionary regime. The analysis done in this chapter is largely based on that of 
Chapter 5, where the cash flow model for the UK was determined. In a concessionary 
system, the Net Cash Flow after tax at period t, NC~, can be illustrated by the 
following: 
Where: 
R is the gross revenue 
ROY is the Royalty take 
OE is the operating cost 
CE is the capital expenditure 
(8.1) 
T is the total tax take, which is usually the sum of the Income Tax and the special 
petroleum tax. 
t is the time period. 
8.2.1.3. UK CONCESSIONARY SYSTEM 
The UK fiscal regime is fully explained in Chapter 5. The post-tax Net Cash Flow that 
applies to fields that received development approval after 1993 is expressed as: 
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(8.2) 
where CT is assumed to incorporate the Supplementary Tax imposed in 2002. 
The post-tax NCF of fields that received development before 1993, is expressed as: 
NCF =R -OE -CE -PRT -CT t t t t t t (8.3) 
Prior to the abolishing of Royalty in 2002 for all fields, the post-tax NCF of oil fields 
that received development approval before 1983 is expressed as: 
NCF =R -ROY -OE -CE -PRT -CT t t t t t t t (8.4) 
8.2.1.4. AUSTRALIA CONCESSIONARY SYSTEM 
The Australian tax regime that applies to offshore activities has the following features. 
Royalty used to apply at a rate of 10 per cent but was abolished in 1990. The Corporate 
Income Tax (CIT) is currently charged at 30 per cent, and it is the same income tax that 
applies to all companies operating in Australia. Capital expenditures are depreciated on 
a straight-line basis over field life. In addition to Income Tax, petroleum projects are 
subject to a special taxation, the Petroleum Resource Rent Tax (PRRT) , which is 
deductible for CIT purposes. 
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PRRT applies at 40 per cent on net cash flow, but only when net cumulative receipts 
tum positive. Hence it is levied after the company has recouped all Exploration and 
Development costs. Undeducted Capital Expenditures are compounded forward at an 
Uplift rate, which is a specified return on capital that supposedly will yield a fair return 
on investment (Barrows, 2000). For Exploration costs the Uplift rate is approximately 
23 per cent, while for Development costs, it is equivalent to 15 per cent. As such, 
compounded Capital Expenditures are carried forward and deducted from positive cash 
flows in later periods. The accumulation process is continued until a positive net cash 
flow is generated. No tax is payable until the finn has recovered its costs inclusive of 
the Uplift rate. 
For Income Tax, deductible expenses are offset against income from any source. For 
PRRT, however, there is a ring fence around all offshore activities for Exploration 
expenses and around the field for development expenses (Barrows, 2000). Furthermore, 
the Australian regime does not provide Abandonment costs reliefs. 








tap the PRR T rate 
up at the uplift rate 
t ac the CIT rate 
D ac the depreciation 
8.2.1.5. NORWAY CONCESSIONARY SYSTEM 
(8.7) 
The Norwegian petroleum fiscal regime is based mainly on the Corporate Income Tax 
(CIT) and Special Petroleum Tax (SPT). Prior to 1986, Royalty (also called the 
production fee) used to apply. Before 1972 Royalty was applied at a 10 per cent flat 
rate. After 1972, Royalty was applied on a sliding scale, ranging from 8 to 16 per cent, 
depending on production. However, in 1986 Royalty was abolished for all fields 
receiving development approval from 1 January 1986 (Barrows, 2000). 
The Corporate income tax (CIT) currently applies at a rate of 28 per cent. It was 
reduced from 50.8 per cent in 1992. This is the general Income tax that applies to all 
companies operating in Norway. The Special Petroleum Tax (SPT) applies to offshore 
production income at 50 per cent. Unlike PRT in the UK, and PRRT in Australia, the 
SPT is not deductible for CIT purposes. 
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For both CIT and SPT purposes, depreciation for Capital Expenditures is allowed on 6-
year straight-line basis. Hence, for SPT deductions and depreciation are the same as for 
CIT, except that for SPT an additional Uplift applies. For all fields approved before 
1986, the SPT uplift is an extra 100 per cent on expenditures incurred for each asset 
used in production and pipeline transportation. For fields whose development plan was 
accepted after 1 January 1986 the uplift applies at a rate of 5 per cent over 6 years 
(Samuelsen, 2002). 
For SPT purposes, there is a ring fence around the field. For CIT purposes, losses from 
operations on the Continental Shelf may be offset against profits from producing fields. 
Only 50 per cent of losses from other activities may be offset against profits from 
Continental Shelf activities (Barrows, 2000). 
SPT and CIT allow losses to be carried forward, hence no tax is paid unless all losses 
have been absorbed. Abandonment costs are not fully deductible like in the UK, but a 
grant exists, and which allows the deduction of abandonment costs at a rate equal to the 
effective tax rate. 




SPTt = t (R - DE - D - un ) w t t m Ym (8.9) 
and, 
CIT = t . (R - DE - D ) 
nt nCI t t nt (8.10) 
with: 
t ns the SPT rate 
UPnt the 5 per cent uplift for 6 years 
t nc the CIT rate 
D ns the depreciation 
8.2.1.6. CONCESSIONARY SYSTEMS: QUALITATIVE COMPARISON 
Table 8.1 summarises the main characteristics of the concessionary systems as they 
apply in the UK, Australia and Norway. It can be seen that a certain hannonisation 
exists between the concessionary regimes applied in the three selected countries. Firstly, 
none of the UK, Australian and Norwegian regimes currently apply Royalty. Secondly, 
the Income tax rate is around 30 per cent. However with the additional 10 per cent 
Supplementary charge imposed in April 2002, the UK has the highest rate at 40 per 
cent. 
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Table 8.1. Concessionary Systems: Summary 
Country Royalty Income Tax Special Petroleum Tax Tax Reliefs 
Australia Post 1990 - 30% PRRT Uplift (15-23%) 
40% 
Pre-1990 10% Deductible from CIT taxable Abandonment cost not deductible 
base 
Norway Post 1986 - 28% SPT 50% Uplift 5% 
Pre 1986 8-16% Not Deductible from CIT Abandon Relief «100%) 
Taxable Base 
UK Post 2002 - 40% PRT 50% Uplift 35% Allowance Safeguard 
Post 1993 - 30% PRT 50% Uplift 35% Allowance Safeguard 
1983- 93 - 33% PRT75% Uplift 35% Allowance Safeguard 
Pre 1983 12.50% 52% PRT70% Uplift 35% Allowance Safeguard 
Deductible from CT taxable Abandonment cost deductible (100%) 
base 
Thirdly, this Income Tax is the general tax that applies to all companies operating in the 
three countries respectively. Hence, oil companies are treated on the same basis as any 
other company in the country. Fourthly, given the special characteristics of the oil sector 
(availability of economic rent, high risks, long time lags involved in prospecting and 
extraction and high capital intensity), there is a special treatment of the oil sector. That 
is why the three countries have incorporated a special resource tax, which is between 40 
and 50 per cent. Additionally, the three countries provide tax incentives and extra 
expenditure reliefs, such as Uplift and the ability to carry losses forward. In fact, the 
UK, Australia and Norway regimes allow losses to be carried forward and taxes to be 
paid only when Net Cash Flow turns positive. 
However in terms of expenditure reliefs, the UK offers the most generous reliefs 
compared with Australia and Norway. For instance, the UK PRT offers three significant 
reliefs namely Uplift (35 per cent), Oil Allowance and Safeguard, compared with Uplift 
of 15 and 5 per cent in Australia and Norway respectively. 
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Furthennore, the UK offers 100 per cent relief for Abandonment costs unlike Norway, 
where only a certain percentage, nonnally equal to the effective fiscal take (i.e. on 
average 76 per cent) is allowed for deductions, while in Australia there are no 
Abandonment costs reliefs. Consequently, Norway seems to impose the strictest terms, 
especially in that it does not allow the Special Petroleum Tax to be deducted for Income 
Tax purposes, unlike the UK and Australian regimes. 
The comparison is further expanded in the quantitative part of the analysis, covered in 
Section 8.4. The following section evaluates the other common type of fiscal regimes in 
oil producing countries, where divergence is more noticeable compared with the UK 
regIme. 
8.2.2. CONTRACTUAL BASED SYSTEMS 
Sunley, Baunsgaard & Simard (2002) argue that the contractual regime is an alternative 
to concessionary regime. This section analyses the main features of contractual regimes 
and studies those applied in Indonesia, China and Iraq in order to compare them with 
the UK fiscal regime. 
8.2.2.1. GENERAL FEATURES 
As the name indicates, the contractual regime is based on a contract between the 
Government and the oil company, also called the Contractor. The Government enters 
into a contract with the operator for a given area (Johnston, 1998). 
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An essential characteristic of this system is that the Government retains ownership of 
the resource, hence all production belongs to the Government and the oil company is 
appointed as a contractor to assist the Government in developing the resource. The 
parties agree that the contractor will meet the Exploration and Development costs in 
return for a share of production or a fee for this service, if production is successful. 
If the contractor receives a share of production after the deduction of Govemment share, 
the system is known as a Production Sharing Contract (PSC). If the contractor is paid a 
fee (often subject to taxes) for conducting successful Exploration and Production 
operations, the system is known as a Service Contract, also called Risk-Service 
Agreement. The latter is called so because in a Risk-Service Contract, the host 
Government (or its national oil company) hires the services of an international oil 
company and in case of commercial production out of the contractual area, the oil 
company is paid in cash for its services (Blinn et aI, 1986). 
There are 64 countries adopting a PSC system to their petroleum activities and typical 
examples are Indonesia and China while there are only 12 countries following a service 
contract, a typical example of which is Iraq (Johnston, 2001). 
In contractual regimes, the contractor bears all the costs and risks of Exploration and 
Development. The contractor has no right to be paid in the event that discovery and 
development does not occur. However, if there is a discovery the contractor is allowed 
to recover the costs it has incurred, and this is known as Cost Recovery or Cost Oil. 
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Cost Recovery is similar to cost deductions under the concessionary systems. It includes 
mainly unrecovered costs carried over from previous years, Operating Expenditures, 
Capital Expenditures, Abandonment Costs and some investment incentives. Interest 
expense is generally not a recoverable cost. However, in general there is a limit for cost 
recovery that on average ranges from 30-60 per cent of Gross Revenue, in other words, 
for any given period the maximum level of costs recovered is 60 per cent of Revenue. 
This is further analysed in Section 8.2.2.3. 
Contractual systems normally offer certain investment incentives. For instance, 
unrecovered costs in any year can be carried forward to subsequent years. Also, some 
contracts allow these costs to be uplifted by an interest factor to compensate for the 
delay in cost recovery. Investment credits can also be provided to allow the contractor 
to recover an additional percentage of Capital Costs through cost recovery. There is 
usually a ring fence on petroleum activities, hence all costs associated with a particular 
block or licence must be recovered from revenues generated within that block. 
The principle of Cost Recovery applies to both a Production Sharing Contract and in 
Risk-Service Agreement. However, the basis of the contractor's remuneration after it 
has recovered its cost differs in type. 
In a PSC, the remaining oil after cost recovery is termed "Profit Oil" and is divided 
between the Government and the contractor according to some formula set out in the 
contract (Sunley, Baunsgaard & Simard, 2002). Hence, in this case, the remuneration of 
the contractor is a share of the production. 
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In a Service Agreement, the Government allows the contractor to recover its costs. 
Additionally, the Government pays the contractor a fee based on a percentage of the 
remaining revenue. Because the remuneration of the contractor is in cash in a Service 
Contract, the system has met some resistance on the part of some oil companies who 
would prefer a PSC as it provides them with a ready access to all parts of the production 
process (Blinn et aI, 1986). Since the contractor does not receive a share of production, 
terms such as production sharing and Profit Oil are not appropriate even though the 
arithmetic will often carve out a share of revenue in the same fashion that a PSC shares 
production (Johnston, 1994). 
Additionally, in a PSC, the share of Profit Oil can be subject to Income Tax, while in a 
Service Contract the fixed fee remuneration of the contractor can be subject to tax. 
Royalty is not a common instrument in contractual regimes (Johnston, 2001), however 
countries like China still apply it. In this case, Royalty is paid to the Government before 
the remaining production is split. Nevertheless, an alternative to Royalty is to have the 
limit on Cost Oil, to ensure that there is Profit Oil as soon as production commences. 
Sunley, Baunsgaard & Simard (2002) argue that such a limit on cost recovery has 
similar economic impact as a Royalty, with the Government receiving revenue- its share 
of Profit Oil- as soon as production commences. 
In some countries, the Government has the option to purchase a certain portion of the 
contractor's share of production at a price lower than the market price. This is called 
Domestic Market Obligation (DMO) (Johnston, 2001). 
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Also, there can be an additional Government take in fonn of Bonus Payments, which 
can be on Exploration, in this case called "Signature Bonus" or Production, hence called 
"Production Bonus". In the latter case, Bonuses are nonnally on a sliding scale of 
production, therefore if daily production reaches a certain level the Government takes a 
fixed sum, which increases if daily production reaches higher levels. 
8.2.2.2. CASH FLOW MODEL 
Detennining the Net Cash Flow under contractual systems is not as straightforward as 
under concessionary systems. Several stages must be detennined; these are presented in 
the following. 
Firstly, Net Revenue IS detennined. This IS the Gross Revenue less Royalty, if 
applicable. 
Secondly, Cost Oil is detennined. This includes broadly the Operating Expenditures, 
Depreciation of Capital Expenditures and any Investment Credit and Uplift. Investment 
Credit applies only to facilities such as platfonns, pipelines and processing equipment, 
while Uplift applies to all Capital Costs. 
Thirdly, the costs available for recovery are then compared to the limit imposed on 
Revenue in order to detennine the level of costs allowed for deduction at a particular , 
period. For instance, if the cost recovery limit is 80 per cent, in a given period the 
maximum costs that can be deducted is 80 per cent of Revenue. 
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If costs exceed that limit, the difference between the actual value of costs and the 
allowed value is carried forward to a future period. 
The following stage differs between a PSC and a Service contract. 
In a PSC, the difference between Net Revenue and Cost Oil determines the Profit Oil 
that will be shared between the contractor and the Government, depending on the split 
rate. As such, the contractor's share can be expressed as in the following: 
Contractor Profit Oil = Net Revenue - Cost Recovery - Government Share (8.11) 
Finally, the contractor Profit Oil can be subject to Income Tax. In this case, the 
contractor Profit Oil can be considered as the taxable income under a concessionary 
system. In general, Investment credits and Uplifts are cost recoverable but not 
deductible for calculation of Income Tax. The opposite is true for Bonuses, which are 
not cost recoverable by they are tax deductible (Johnston, 1998). 
Consequently, the contractor entitlement can be calculated as follows: 









Contractor share of Profit Oil 
DMO 
Government Tax 
Royalty (if applicable) 
(8.12) 
Government total share can be expressed as the sum of: 
• Royalty (if applicable) 




In a Service Contract, the contractor entitlement includes its cost recovery (normally 
plus interest) and an agreed rate of return, as the remuneration fee. This sum covering 
Cost Recovery, interest and the rate of return is paid over a certain number of months in 
equal instalments. Once the contractor receives all its payment, that period is known as 
the "Handover date", at which the foreign contractor hands over facilities to the 
Government (or the national company) and as such it is no longer involved in the 
project (Sarkis, 2003). Consequently, up to the Handover date, the contractor 
entitlement can be expressed as in the following: 











Royalty (if applicable) 
(8.13) 
The Government share in this case is any remaining profitability of the oil field, once 
the contractor received the remuneration for its service. 
8.2.2.3. INDONESIA PRODUCTION SHARING CONTRACT 
Indonesia is one of the most active countries in the Southeast Asia. The country is a 
"pioneer" of the PSC, with the first contracts signed in the early to 1960s. 
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It has been famous for the 85/15 per cent split in favour of the Government. Several 
changes have altered the Indonesian regime, among others the reduction in the split rate 
to 64/36 per cent in favour of the Government. Additionally, the current system (based 
on the 1990 PSC model) has the following characteristics. 
The Indonesian system does not charge a Royalty. Instead, it imposes what is known as 
the First Tranche Petroleum (FTP) contract, which requires that 20 per cent of the 
production be shared at 64/36 per cent in favour of the Government before cost 
recovery. The FTP acts like a Royalty since it is imposed on Gross Revenue and 
guarantees the Government a minimum income just as production commences. The 
Government FTP share will be added to the total Government take, while the contractor 
FTP will be added to his taxable income, and is subject to Income Tax (Barrows, 2000). 
An interesting peculiarity of the Indonesian regime is that there is no limit for cost 
recovery. But in reality, the 20 per cent FTP acts as a cap since it reduces the available 
Gross Revenue for cost recovery to 80 per cent. In other words, the FTP is similar to 80 
per cent cost recovery limit. 
The Indonesian PSC offers 15.5 per cent Investment Credit, which is cost recoverable 
but not tax deductible. Depreciation on oil Capital Expenditures is at 25 per cent per 
year using the Declining Balance method with the undepreciated amount written off in 
year five. 
Income Tax applies at a rate of 44 per cent. It was reduced from 48 per cent in 1994. 
Furthermore, there is a ring fence for each licence. 
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Production Bonuses apply as follows (Sunley, Baunsgaard & Simard, 2002): 
If daily production reaches 50,000 barrel per day (bblld) the contractor pays the 
Government £ 10M. 
If daily production exceeds 50,000 bblld but less than 100,000 bblld, the 
contractor pays the Government an additional £10M. 
If daily production exceeds 250,000 bblld, the contractor pays the Government 
an additional £25M. 
The Indonesian DMO requires the contractor to sell 25 per cent of its share of oil to the 
national oil company Pertamina. After 60 months of production from a given field, the 
price the contractor receives for the DMO crude is 25 per cent of the market price 
(Barrows, 2000). 
8.2.2.4. CHINA PRODUCTION SHARING CONTRACT 
China adopts a PSC for its petroleum activity, but also combines with this system 
Royalty and Income tax. Such combination makes the system an interesting case to 
study as Royalty is not common in PSCs (Johnston, 2002). Furthermore, the Royalty 
applies on a sliding scale where it varies with the level of production, unlike the fixed 
rate on Gross Revenue in the UK (prior to 2002). Table 8.2 summarises the Royalty 
rates as they apply since in 1989. The maximum rate is 12.5 per cent, while a lower 
Royalty can be negotiated for medium sized fields if commercially marginal. 
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Table 8.2. China Sliding Scale Royalty1l3 
Field size Royalty rate 
Barrels of oil per day % 






Another important feature of the Chinese PSC (based on the 1996 model) is that profit 
oil is split at a negotiable rate, depending on the annual level of production and as such 
the rate varies from one field to another. A factor "X" is determined for each field in 
accordance with the successive incremental tiers on the basis of the annual gross 
production of crude oil from an oil field during that calendar year, as presented in Table 
8.3. To determine the single "X" factor for each field, firstly the annual production (Qn) 
is multiplied by the corresponding "X" factor (X n)' secondly the total amount 
(Qn * X n) is divided by the total production of the field and multiplied by 100. The 
resulting figure is the rate at which the profit oil is divided between the Government and 
the contractor for a particular field. 
Table 8.3. China "X" Factor 
Production Factors (X) Applicable to 
(Thousands Barrel per day) Each Production Tier 
(Qn) (Xn) 
Up to 9,999 bid X1=4% 
10,000 b/d-19,999 bid X2=8% 
20,000 b/d-39,999 bid X3 = 15% 
40,000 b/d-59,999 bid X4=20% 
60,000 b/d-99,999 bid X5 =28% 
100,000 b/d-149,999 bid X6 =45% 
150,000 b/d-199,999 bid X7 = 55% 
Over 200,000b/d X8=70% 
113 Source: Barrows (2000) 
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Cost recovery is 62.5 per cent of annual gross revenue. Operating Costs incurred are 
recovered first, then Capital Costs are fully recovered, any unrecovered balance is 
carried forward to the following period and is compounded at a 9 per cent interest rate. 
A Value Added Tax (VAT) of 5 per cent applies on Gross Revenue and Corporate 
Income tax applies at a rate of 33 per cent. A ring fence exists around the contract area 
for cost recovery only but not for Income Tax. 
8.2.2.5. IRAQ SERVICE CONTRACT 
In Iraq, the fiscal arrangement that applies to petroleum activity is a Risk-Service 
Agreement. This is also known as a BuyBack contract, and is similar to the system 
adopted by other countries, such as Iran. In these countries, the arrangements with 
foreign companies "shall in no way entitle the companies to any claims on the crude oil" 
(Barrows, 2000, p.l 05). 
Under the Iraq Service Agreement (based on the 2000 model), the oil company 
undertakes all development work at its own cost and receives a sum that reimburses it 
for its costs plus interest and agreed remuneration. Cost recovery is allowed at 50 per 
cent of gross revenue, and a Remuneration Index is introduced in order to enable the 
contractor to make return on its cumulative investment. The Remuneration Index is also 
called "R Factor", which is typical in Service Contracts (Johnston, 1994). 
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The R factor can be determined as in the following (Wells, 2002): 
R = Cumulative Contractor's Cost Recovery Payments + Cumulative Contractor's Profit Payment 
Cumulative Contractor's Cost Recovery Payments 
(8.14) 
where Cumulative Contractor's Profit Payment is the cumulative 10 per cent of gross 
revenue. On average, a 1.5 is assumed as a Remuneration Index. 
As soon as the contractor recovers 1.5 times his cumulative investments, the Handover 
Date is reached and if at that date there are any unrecovered costs, the sum is paid by 
equal instalments over 8 quarters or 2 years after the Handover date. After that, the Iraqi 
State is entitled to all the future net incomes (Barrows, 2000). As such, the Iraqi 
Government take can be on average between 85-90 per cent. Johnston (2001) argues 
that a Government take of 95-97 per cent is considered typical under a Risk Service 
arrangement. 
The contractor is exempt from any Income Tax. There are typically negotiable 
Production Bonus payments payable if production reaches 50,000 bbVd, 100,000 bbVd 
and 200,000 bbVd. 
8.2.2.6. CONTRACTUAL SYSTEMS: QUALITATIVE COMPARISON 
Table 8.4 summarises the characteristics of the contractual systems as they apply in 
Indonesia, China and Iraq. Several similarities exist in the way the systems work but the 
process of sharing revenue is different. 
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The three basic economic and fiscal elements of a PSC are Cost Recovery, the Profit Oil 
Split between the contractor and the Government and the Income Tax. The four basic 
economic and fiscal elements of a Service Contract are Cost Recovery, the 
Remuneration Fee, the Handover date and the Income tax. 
Table 8.4. Contractual Systems: Summary 
Country Royalty Income Cost Investment Credit Bonus DMO Profit Split 
Tax Recovery 
Indonesia FIP 20% 44% - 15.5% Yes Yes 64%/36% 
China Sliding scale 33% 62.5% 9% - - X Factor 0-12.5% 
Iraq - - 50% 1.5 Remuneration Yes - -Index 
In concessionary regimes, the international oil company usually owns the oil reserves. 
In contractual regimes, the Government maintains ownership of the resource, however it 
maximises its control under a Risk Service Agreement (Wells, 2002). Blinn et al (1986) 
argue that the Service system emphasises the principles of Government sovereignty and 
for that reason it is hardly surprising that this type of agreement is mostly in use in Latin 
American countries "where the nationalist sentiment concerning hydrocarbons is the 
strongest" (p.97). Wells (2002) also argues that concessionary systems are not a suitable 
form of contract for the Middle East oil producers. These countries are influenced by 
Islamic law, the Shari'ah, which forbids foreign ownership of national resources (Blinn 
et aI, 1986). Furthermore, because fiscal terms are fixed upon signature of the contract 
between the Government and contractor, contractual systems offer a more stable 
environment than the concessionary systems. 
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The main difference between the PSC and a Service Agreement lies in the mechanism 
used to remunerate the oil company. In a Concessionary system, the oil company 
receives the net income after costs, tax and Royalty. Under a PSC, the company gets 
cost recovery and a share of the remaining profit, while under a Service Contract, it 
receives the cost recovery and a profit fee or remuneration until Handover date. 
Although the principles are the same under PSC and Service Contract, such a difference 
in remuneration generates further distinction in terms of duration of contract, cost-
reduction incentives and impact of changes in oil price and reservoir characteristics. 
PSCs can be long term in nature (25 years) but in Service Agreements the contractor 
involvement depends on the Handover date, which in turn is affected mainly by the 
Capital Expenditure and oil revenue (Jankowski, 2000). Generally speaking, Service 
Agreements are short-term, normally lasting for 9 years, compared with up to 30 years 
under a PSC (Wells, 2002). As such, under PSC, the contractor receives profit 
throughout the life of the contract, which is normally the life of the field, whereas under 
a Service Agreement the contractor cost recovery and profit remuneration end at the 
Handover date. 
As a consequence of the limit on Cost recovery, contractors are normally encouraged to 
reduce their Capital Cost. However, in the Service Contract, the contractor has no 
incentive to reduce the long-term costs, since the field is likely to be under the control 
of the Government. 
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Sarkis (2003) argues that this is a major limitation of the Service Contract, while Wells 
(2002) maintains that a long-term partnership with a contractor may result in better 
overall field performance and much more value for the state than in the short-term 
approach. The author further adds that Service Agreements are suited to low-risk, short-
term projects, but not to marginal oil fields. 
Furthermore, in both types of contractual agreements, the contractor is largely exposed 
to reservoir and oil price risks. In case of unsuccessful Exploration, the contractor does 
not receive any compensation. Similarly, if the oil price declines then the share of 
revenue allowed for cost recovery decreases as well. However, under the Service 
Contract, unlike the PSC, the contractor does not benefit from any upside in reservoir or 
oil price, since it receives a pre-determined remuneration fee (Sarkis, 2003). 
Given such analysis, it is expected to identify that the toughest fiscal terms from a 
company standpoint are likely to be found under contractual regimes while more lenient 
terms are expected under concessionary regimes. This is investigated in the following 
section. 
8.3. METHODOLOGY & ASSUMPTIONS 
The empirical analysis is conducted under the same economIC assumptions of the 
previous three chapters, namely a constant real oil price of$19.5 a barrel, with 2002 as 
a base year, a constant annual inflation rate of 2.5 per cent and a constant exchange rate 
of 1.5$/£. 
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Additionally, four fields are selected randomly from the sample of 25 oil fields, which 
were used to complete the analysis in Chapters 6 and 7. The four fields selected are: 
Argyll, a very small field 
Arbroath, a small field 
Tern, a medium field 
Schiehallion, a large field. 
The nine UK tax scenarios, which were developed in Chapter 5, are compared with the 
fiscal packages under the Australian, Norwegian, Indonesian, Chinese and Iraqi 
regimes. The analysis mainly compares the impact of the selected fiscal regimes on 
different field size, cost structure, and Government revenue. In other words, the study 
focuses on determining the ways those countries attempt to achieve the balance between 
maintaining the attractiveness of their oil province to international investors while 
generating a satisfactory share of revenue for the country. Furthermore, the analysis 
focuses on the change in the international competitiveness of the UK fiscal regime from 
an investor standpoint from 1975 until 2002. 
A spreadsheet is developed to illustrate the petroleum fiscal package for each 
country114. The different economic and fiscal assumptions for each country are those 
that apply effectively in those countries and which were summarised in Tables 8.1 and 
8.4. Under each scenario, the fields' profitability is calculated, and both the contractor's 
and Government shares are derived. All results are calculated firstly in nominal tenns 
than deflated. 
114 See Appendix I. 
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For simplification, the profitability is calculated usmg the Discounted Cash Flow 
technique, with a real discount rate of 10 per cent. This also allows a more explicit 
comparison of the effects of the different fiscal structures on that profitability. 
Furthermore, as Chapter 6 demonstrated, in general there was a consistency between the 
effects of taxation under both DCF and MAP, except that under DCF the effects were 
more significant. A Real Options analysis is not performed. In fact, for the four fields 
selected, both ROT and DCF generate the same outcome. Further, oil companies may 
not have a significant flexibility to defer their investment timing under contractual 
systems, since they do not own the mineral resource and they have to respect the fixed 
terms in the contract. 
8.4. FINDINGS & ANALYSIS 
This section presents and discusses the tax performance of the UK compared with the 
other five selected countries. One criterion to assess that performance is through the 
effects of the different fiscal packages on the profitability of the four selected oil fields. 
The second criterion is Government revenue generated and the effective tax rates. 
8.4.1. FIELD PROFITABILITY UNDER VARIOUS FISCAL PACKAGES 
Table 8.5 illustrates fields' profitability (NPV) under the nine UK fiscal regimes and 
under the five other international regimes. 
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The table further shows the profitability ranking on a range from 1, the highest, to 13, 
the lowest, for each field then for the total profitability of the four fields. The second 
column in the table, called "Pre-tax", refers to the Base Scenario, where fields' NPVs 
are calculated on a pre-tax basis 115 . 
Table 8.5. Oil Fields Profitability under Different Tax Scenarios 
Scenario Pre-tax UK2 UK3 UK4 UK5 UK6 UK7 UK8 UK9 Australia Norway Indonesia China Iraq 
£M £M £M £M £M £M £M £M £M £M £M £M £M £M 
Field 
Argyll 293 108 163 188 203 192 153 88 155 173 53 44 165 35 
Ranking 9 6 3 1 2 8 10 7 4 11 12 5 13 
Arboath 503 131 184 261 343 290 214 145 205 177 92 59 237 75 
Ranking 10 7 3 1 2 5 9 6 8 11 13 4 12 
Tem 724 92.4 149 252 468 384 181 153 199 224 79 35 227 81 
Ranking 10 9 3 1 2 7 8 6 5 11 13 4 12 
Schiehallion 1487 218 439 607 999 837 466 465 447 495 240 167 430 262 
Ranking 12 8 3 1 2 5 6 7 4 11 13 9 10 
Total 3007 550 935 1307 2013 1703 1012 851 1006 1069 464 305 1058 453 
Ranking 10 8 3 1 2 6 9 7 4 11 13 5 12 
The current fiscal structure that applies to UK oil activity (Scenario UK6) provides the 
second highest profitability, after Scenario UK5, which illustrates the imposition of the 
30 per cent CT alone. This is followed by UK Scenari03 where 50 per cent PRT applies 
alongside 30 per cent CT. These results are consistent for all fields. 
The fourth highest level of total profitability is noted under the Australian regime. This 
applies to the very small field, Argyll, and the largest field, Schiehallion. However, for 
the small and medium fields, China generates the fourth highest level of profitability. 
But in fact, there is a small difference between the profitability values determined under 
lIS In the tables, the UK tax scenarios are referred to as UK2-VK7c, instead of Scenario 2-Scenario 7c. 
See Chapter 5, p.150. 
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the Australian and Chinese regimes, for the medium field, Tern. The overall ranking 
puts China in the fifth position. Such a ranking can largely be due to China Sliding 
Scale Royalty and X factor, as both depend on annual production from the field. This 
can explain the fact that under the Chinese regime, smaller fields have relatively high 
profitability. The results are reversed for the larger field, with significant annual 
production. In fact, for Schiehallion field, China has a ranking of nine. 
The order in ranking is less consistent for levels 6-9, but on average, the UK tax 
scenarios namely, UK7a, UK7c, UK3 and UK7b generate the sixth, seventh, eighth and 
ninth highest profitability. The order differs from one field to another given the relative 
importance of PR T reliefs for each field, and which depend on the production and costs 
profiles, as discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. For instance, Scenario UK3, with 75 per cent 
PRT and 33 per cent CT results in the sixth highest profitability for Argyll field, a very 
close NPV to China Scenario. However, the abolition of the oil allowance results in the 
tenth level of profitability for this field, a lower level than Scenario UK2, where 
Royalty applies with PRT and CT. This emphasises the importance of the oil allowance 
to the smaller fields. The abolition of Uplift (Scenario UK7a) then Safeguard (Scenario 
UK7c) have a limited effect on Arbroath field, probably due to the field shorter payback 
period. 
For the larger fields, particularly Tern and Schiehallion, Scenario UK3 generates lower 
profitability (ranking 9), most probably resulting from the 70 per cent rate of PRT. In 
fact, imposing 50 per cent PRT under Scenario 4 results in one the highest profitability 
levels. 
279 
For all the fields, the pre-1983 UK structure (Scenario UK2) generates one of the lowest 
profitability, compared with the other eight UK tax scenarios as well as Australian and 
Chinese fiscal packages. Although the Chinese tax scenario and UK2 scenario include 
Royalty, the taxable base for Royalty differs. Whilst it is a fixed rate of Gross Revenue 
12.5 per cent in the UK, it is on a sliding scale of production in China, varying with the 
annual production and further exempting the first tranche of production of 20,000 bbVd 
from the payment of the tax. This makes the Chinese Royalty more progressive than the 
UK Royalty. 
However, the UK Scenario 2 is still more favourable relatively to the Norwegian, 
Indonesian, and Iraqi regime, for all fields, except Schiehallion. For this large field, the 
pre-1983 structure is "tougher" then both the Norwegian and Iraqi regimes, with respect 
to its level of profitability. 
In general, the following lowest levels of profitability are noticed in Norway (ranking 
11), Iraq (ranking 12) and Indonesia (ranking 13). The results with regard the 
Norwegian petroleum fiscal regime are consistent among the various fields. Indonesia is 
the least favourable regime for the small, medium and large fields, while for the very 
small field, Iraq generates the lowest profitability. The Iraqi regime is not as tough as 
the field size increases (ranking 12 for the small and medium fields, and ranking 10 for 
the large field). As such, the Iraqi regime can be described as regressive, with respect to 
fields' size. 
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The total profitability ranking results concur with those of the qualitative comparison 
done in earlier sections, particularly for concessionary regimes. The results are also 
consistent to with those of a study done by Van Meurs Associates (1999), with respect 
to the UK and Australia petroleum fiscal regimes. In fact, the study compares the extent 
to which a regime is favourable relative to other regimes from an investor standpoint. 
According to that study, the UK profitability ranking is 10, which means that there are 
nine other countries that have petroleum regimes more favourable to the international 
investor (Barrows, 2000). Australia has a ranking of 113. 
The ranking of the other regimes is less consistent particularly if the different field sizes 
are taken in consideration. For example, according to the Van Meurs study, China has a 
ranking of 158 compared with 142 for Indonesia, but this does not conform with the 
findings of this chapter. Furthermore, according to Van Meurs study Norway has a 
ranking of 221, making the country less attractive to investors compared with the other 
countries selected, particularly Indonesia. Given the lack of information provided to 
explain Van Meurs' ranking, it can be concluded that this ranking for Norway may have 
included the participation of the national oil company, Statoil, whose share could have 
been assumed to form a part of the total Government take. 
The Van Meurs study also gives Iraq a ranking of 312, indicating that the regime is the 
least favourable for investors. However, the study does not refer to the differing effects 
on various fields' size. Furthermore, it is likely that that study takes into consideration 
other factors such as the unstable political environment of Iraq, which is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
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8.4.2. GOVERNMENT REVENUE UNDER DIFFERENT FISCAL PACKAGES 
Table 8.6 represents the total Government take from each field under the different fiscal 
packages. The ranking shows the lowest Government revenue generated (ranking 1) to 
the highest take (ranking 13). 
Table 8.6. Fiscal Revenue under Different Tax Scenarios 
Scenario UK2 UK3 UK4 UK5 UK6 UK7 UK8 UK9 Australia Norway Indonesia China Iraq 
£M £M £M £M £M £M £M £M £M £M £M £M £M 
Field 
Argyll 475.0 342 283 235 284 367 545 363 456.9 608.1 663.6 333.4 709.2 
Ranking 9 5 2 1 3 7 10 6 8 11 12 4 13 
Arboath 1394 1353 901 613 817 1087 1425 1225 1217.4 1596 1772.1 964.1 1783 
Ranking 9 8 3 1 2 5 10 6 7 11 12 4 13 
Tern 2990 2770 2230 1161 1548 2513 2660 2464 2216.6 2957 3247.3 2043.7 3173 
Ranking 11 9 5 1 2 7 8 6 4 10 13 3 12 
Schiehallion 4644 4079 3325 1779 2361 3789 3850 3849 3403.8 4498 4885.2 3462.5 4541 
Ranking 10 9 3 1 2 6 8 7 4 11 13 5 12 
Total 9503 8536 6740 3788 5009 7756 8480 7901 7295 9659 10568 6803.7 10206 
Ranking 10 9 3 1 2 6 8 7 5 11 13 4 12 
Imposing only a 30 per cent CT (Scenario UK5) in the UK from 1993 to 2002 generates 
the lowest Government revenue from all fields. It is followed by the imposition of the 
Supplementary charge in 2002 (Scenario UK6), then the combination of 50 per cent 
PRT with 30 per cent CT (Scenario UK4). The revenues generated under these 
scenarios are lower than the post-1983/pre-1993 fiscal package (Scenario UK4). In fact, 
the results regarding the fiscal revenue generated under the various UK tax scenarios are 
consistent with those of the previous chapters. 
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The Chinese fiscal regime results in the fourth level of Government take, followed by 
the Australian regime. In fact, China produces a close figure of fiscal receipt as 
compared with Scenario UK3. 
Australia with its 30 per cent CIT and 40 per cent PRRT generates a close fiscal take 
from the very small as compared with Scenario UK2 with Royalty, PRT and CT. 
However, for the small field, Arbroath, the revenues generated are closer to those under 
Scenario UK3, while for the larger fields, the figure is similar to that of Scenario UK4. 
Despite the higher rate of PRT, this tax offers relatively generous reliefs namely Uplift, 
oil allowance and Safeguard, compared with Uplift only for PRRT in Australia. 
Furthermore, the Abandonment costs are allowed for deduction in the UK fiscal regime 
unlike the Australian system. The difference is widened for the smaller fields, where 
PRT reliefs can be of critical significance. The importance of the PRT reliefs in 
reducing the overall Government take can be noted in the higher share of revenue 
generated under UK Scenarios 7a, 7b and 7c relatively to the revenue generated under 
the Australian regime. 
The pre-1983 fiscal package in the UK generates the highest level of revenue as 
compared with the other UK tax scenarios. 
In Norway, the Government adopted some measures to relax the regime, among others 
the abolition of Royalty. Despite the fact that this tax does not apply anymore, the 
Norwegian fiscal regime still generates the highest share of revenue compared with the 
other two concessionary regimes. 
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This can be due to the fact that the Special Petroleum tax is not allowed as a deduction 
for Corporation Income Tax, unlike both the UK and Australia. 
Table 8.7 permits a clearer comparison of the different fiscal components of these three 
concessionary systems. For instance, ST generates higher revenue from Schiehallion 
field, as compared with all the other scenarios, except for Scenario UK3, with 75 per 
centPRT. 
Table 8.7. Government Revenue under UK, Australian and Norwegian Regimes 
Scenario UK2 UK3 UK4 UK5 UK7 
£M £M £M £M £M 
Field 
Total Roy PRT CT Total PRT CT Total PRT CT Total Total PRT CT 
(CT) 
Argyll 475 109 32.1 334 342 124 218 283 69.2 214 235 367 90.2 277 
Arboath 1394 263 398 733 1353 999 354 901 403 498 613 1087 436 650 
Tern 2990 513 1525 952 2770 2229 541 2230 1527 703 1161 2513 1608 905 
Schiehallion 4644 824 2469 1359 4079 3181 898 3325 2220 1105 1779 3789 2380 1409 
Scenario UK6 UK8 UK9 Australia Norway 
£M £M £M £M £M 
Field 
Total (CT+ST) Total PRT CT Total PRT CT Total PRRT CIT Total ST CIT 
Argyll 284 545 385 159 363 83 280 457 314 143 608 391 223 
Arboath 817 1425 999 426 1225 666 559 1217 829 388 1596 1032 595 
Tern 1548 2660 1853 807 2464 1527 937 2217 1456 760 2957 1919 111 1 
Schiehallion 2361 3850 2480 1368 3867 2493 1374 3404 2272 1132 4498 2876 1682 
The Indonesian and Iraqi regimes produce the highest share of revenue. The Iraqi 
regime take is higher for the smaller field, whilst the result is reversed for the 
Indonesian regime. In fact, in Indonesia different fiscal elements apply to ensure the 
Government receives a significant share of revenue, particularly from the larger fields. 
For instance, although no Royalty or cost recovery limit applies, the 20 per cent FTP 
acts like a Royalty. Additionally, Bonus and DMO apply and they are linked to the 
annual production. 
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8.4.3. EFFECTIVE RATES UNDER DIFFERENT FISCAL PACKAGES 
Government take can also be analysed by considering the effective average tax rate 
under each tax scenario. These are presented in Table 8.8, where the last row 
summarises the average effective rate of each scenario and country. 
Table 8.8 Effective Tax Rates 
Scenario UK2 UK3 UK4 UK5 UK6 UK7 UK8 UK9 Australia Norway Indonesia China Iraq 
% % % % % % % % % % % % % 
Field 
Argyll 60.9 43.8 36.3 30.0 36.5 47.1 69.8 46.6 58.3 77.6 84.7 42.6 91.0 
Arboath 66.8 64.9 43.3 29.0 39.2 52.2 68.4 58.8 58.4 76.6 85.1 46.3 85.6 
Tern 77.7 72.0 57.9 30.0 40.0 65.3 69.1 64.0 57.3 76.4 83.9 52.8 82.0 
Schiehallion 78.7 69.1 56.6 30.0 40.0 64.2 65.2 65.2 57.4 75.9 82.4 58.4 76.6 
Average 71.0 62.5 48.5 29.8 39.0 57.2 68.1 58.7 57.9 76.6 84.0 50.0 84.0 
A proportional regime indicates that the same percentage tax take occurs in fields of 
quite different profitability (Kemp & Rose, 1982). As such, UK5, UK6, Norway, 
Australia and to a lesser extent Indonesia, can be described as proportional. When the 
percentage take increases with the field size and profitability, the system can be 
described as progressive. Consequently, all the other UK scenarios, those incorporating 
PRT, in addition to China tax scenario can be described as progressive. Iraq, however, 
can be considered as a regressive system, with the effective tax rate declining with the 
field size. 
The pre-1983 effective tax rate in the UK is closer to the current Norwegian, 
Indonesian, and Iraqi regimes than it is to the recent UK fiscal structures, which are in 
fact the lowest. 
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Although tough fiscal terms are expected to be found under contractual regime, the 
analysis indicates that concessionary systems like the Norwegian, can be even tougher, 
while some PSC, like in China, can lead to similar conclusions as other concessionary 
regImes. 
Furthermore, Service Agreements are expected to offer the toughest terms among the 
contractual arrangement. In fact, the Iraqi regime does impose the highest rate on the 
smaller fields, reaching 90 per cent. This can explain the arguments of, for example, 
Wells (2002) and Sarkis (2003) who maintain that Service Contracts are not suited for 
small fields. The high level of Government take is particularly discernible if the total 
field life is considered. However during the period of the contracts' duration (i.e. up to 
the Handover date) the Government take is less significant. The analysis has also shown 
that, on average, both the Indonesian and Iraqi regimes provide a similar outcome (84 
per cent effective rate). 
Johnston (2002) determined a world average rate of 65 per cent on a study covering 133 
regimes. Figure 8.1 compares the countries selected effective rates with this average 
rate. 
Indonesia, Iraq, Norway, the 1975-UK regime, and the application ofPRT without the 
Oil Allowance all fall above the world average Government take, while the other 
scenarios, including China and Australia fall below. 
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Tax Scenarios 
The 2002 changes to the UK fiscal regime did increase the effective tax rate but the 
regime still offers the lowest total fiscal rate, particularly as it applies on fields that 
received development consent after 1993. Nevertheless, it would be inadequate to 
describe the UK fiscal regime as the weakest in the world. Currently, maintaining the 
level of activity is a serious concern for the UK Government, as the UKCS is 
considered to be a mature province where significant discoveries are unlikely to be 
made. 
One would expect that in a competitive world, areas with the least favourable geology, 
highest development and operating costs and lowest wellhead prices would offer lenient 
terms (Harbinson & Westwood, 2002). The findings of Chapter 4 strongly confirm such 
argument 1 16. Furthermore, with the decline in production in the foreseeable future, 
countries like Norway have started considering reforms to their petroleum sector (Lund, 
2002). 
116 For instance, Respondent 04 argues that "whilst in headline terms the fisc~l regime for new 
developments in the UKCS is more attractive than, for instance, Norway, the fields slz.e are maller and 
unit costs higher in the UKCS than for typical new fields in Norway. At the exploratIOn level OTWay 
offers the potential for large discoveries the UKCS does not". 
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8.5. SUMMARY & CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, the fundamental UK petroleum fiscal packages are compared with five 
international regimes. The analysis focused on the effects of different packages firstly 
on the profitability of four selected oil fields of different size, and secondly on the level 
of Government revenue generated. A broad range of fiscal instruments and structures is 
available to policy makers to design a fiscal regime for the petroleum sector in order to 
attract investment and secure a reasonable share of economic rent for the Government 
(Sunley, Baunsgraad & Simard, 2002). The study undertaken in this chapter investigates 
the way the Government in the six countries attempt to maintain a balance between 
these two conflicting objectives. In fact, each of the countries analysed in this chapter 
has developed its own fiscal package, where several fiscal elements interact in different 
ways. 
There are two broad categories of fiscal regImes namely, Concessionary and 
Contractual, where the main difference between the two systems is of a legal nature, i.e. 
the holding of the mining rights and the title to production. Under a concessionary 
regime, the oil company takes ownership of the resource and often pays a Royalty 
combined with a special resource tax and an Income tax. Under a contractual system, 
the Government maintains ownership of the resource and the oil company is appointed 
as a contractor to assist the Government in exploiting the resource. In this case, the oil 
company receives compensation for its service. If the compensation is a share of 
production, the system is known as a Production Sharing Contract (PSC). If the 
compensation is in cash, the system is known as a Service Contract. 
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The UK, Australia and Norway adopt a Concessionary regime and the three countries 
imposed Royalty, an Income Tax and a special petroleum tax- a Petroleum Revenue 
Tax (PRT) in the UK, a Petroleum Resource Rent Tax (PRRT) in Australia and a 
Special Petroleum Tax (SPT) in Norway. Indonesia, China and Iraq follow the 
contractual system. More precisely, Indonesia and China adopt a PSC, while a Risk-
Service Contract is found in Iraq. In PSCs, the main fiscal elements are Cost Recovery, 
sharing of profit oil and, often, an Income tax. In Service Agreement, the elements are 
the Cost Recovery, Remuneration Fee and the Handover date. 
The analysis shows that in terms of oil field profitability, the current fiscal regime in the 
UK is the most favourable compared with all the other countries as well as past 
structures that applied since 1975. The other UK scenarios, except for the pre-1983 
structure and the abolition of the oil allowance, also offer the most lenient tenns, 
similarly to China and Australia. 
In fact, compared with the Australia and Norway, the UK offers the most generous 
reliefs, particularly with respect to PRT, the treatment of Abandonment costs and the 
deduction of PR T from the CT taxable base. Australia implements a similar structure to 
the post-1983/pre-1993 UK regime, but it limits its reliefs to Uplift, while 
Abandonment costs are not allowed for deduction. Norway has relatively limited reliefs, 
like Australia, but although the country allows a certain deduction of Abandonment 
cost, the Special Tax is not deductible from the Income Tax base, rendering the total tax 
take more significant compared with the other two countries. In fact, Norway has fiscal 
takes very close to the countries under contractual regimes. 
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However, the Norwegian regIme IS significantly simpler than the other t\\'o 
concessionary systems, while in the UK, the computation of the fiscal take is the most 
complicated. 
China offers the most lenient terms among the contractual arrangements, particularly in 
the case of the smaller fields, given the progressive aspect of both its sliding scale 
Royalty and the negotiable profit split. In contrast, both Indonesia and Iraq generate the 
lowest profitability and the highest fiscal take and the lowest oil profitability. Iraq can 
also be a regressive regime with its highest effective tax take on the smallest field, 
compared with a lower take from the larger fields. Apart from Iraq, the PSCs in 
Indonesia and China and the concessions in Norway, Australia and the UK based on 
Income tax are found proportional to the field size. The UK scenarios including PR T are 
found rather progressive. 
In terms of Government revenue, the introduction of the 10 per cent supplementary 
charge in 2002 increased the Government take, compared with precedent structure but 
still the system generates the lowest take compared to the other scenarios. This could 
partly explain some criticisms such as oil companies are not paying their fair share of 
taxes (Miller et al (2000), Rutledge & Wright (1998)). 
There is no doubt that the UK offers significant opportunities for investors, mainly as a 
result of its political stability. Furthermore, the industry benefits from an intensive 
continuous partnership between the Government and the companies. 
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Nevertheless, as Raja (1999) argues, although political stability is an important criterion 
affecting the direction of investment, the size of the reserves and the exploration risk 
play a significant role in attracting investments. The UK being a mature area chose 
relaxing its regime and offering low fiscal rates in order to sustain the oil production 
and maintain the international competitiveness of the province from an investor 
standpoint. Johnston (2002) argues that, although the average Government take 
worldwide is around 65 per cent, this rate is very high for "average" geological 
potential. "For countries with better-than-average potential the Government take is 
closer to 80 per cent. However, better-than-average geological potential is rarely 
sufficient to sustain such a high Government take" (Johnston, 2002, p.25). 
In fact, the April 2002 changes may not have increased dramatically the fiscal take, but 
since the Supplementary charge does not include a deduction for financial expenses, it 
can place a burden particularly on smaller UKCS E&P companies who are the new 
generation of investors. Furthermore, although the UK offers a stable political 
environment, its petroleum fiscal regime witnessed frequent amendments 117, which can 
affect adversely investor confidence, even though not all those changes can be described 
as substantial. Any attempt to further strengthening the regime must allow for the fact 
that the UK is a mature province, with remaining small marginal fields to be developed 
(Nakhle & Rawdon, 2003). 
The analysis carried out in this chapter further shows that each fiscal system has its 
advantages and disadvantages. 
117 See Chapter 3 
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In brief, in PSC and Service Agreements tax rates are held constant during the contract 
while in concessionary regimes amendments are possible at anytime (Barrows, 2000). 
On the other hand, PSC and Service Agreements with a high fixed profit/production 
split rate in favour of the Government do not seem suitable for the development of small 
marginal fields, given the limit on cost recovery. Furthermore, Exploration is conducted 
at the contractor's own risk, with no reimbursement in case of unsuccessful Exploration. 
Service Contracts can be more rigid than PSCs given their short duration and the fixed 
remuneration fee. Varzi (2002) argues that this may be of advantage for the oil company 
especially at times of low prices but not in periods of high prices. 
Accordingly, it is impossible to categorise fiscal regimes as "good" or "bad", because 
each regime is applied under specific circumstances. For instance, while contractual 
arrangements are imposed to ensure a higher Government control, such structures are 
unlikely to be applied in liberal economic environments such as the UK. Further, it can 
be very restrictive to judge about the performance of the regime simply by looking at its 
type of arrangement or at its tax rates. The analysis performed in this chapter shows that 
several factors, such as fiscal reliefs and the process of calculating the tax base, can lead 
to significant differences among fiscal packages, while same targets can be achieved 
with different structures and regimes. 
The chapter likewise emphasises the argument raised in Chapter 2 that clearly there is 
no one ideal fiscal regime suitable for all petroleum projects in all countries. V arzi 
(2002) argues that no two PSCs are the same, Sarma & Naresh (2001) maintain that 






Similarly, Johnston (2001) argues that there are more fiscal regimes than there are 
countries while Helliwell (1982) maintains that generalisation about anything as 
complex as taxation can be dangerous. 
This chapter completes the empirical analysis in this thesis. The following chapter 
summarises and concludes the research undertaken in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
SUMMARY & CONCLUSION 
9.1. THESIS SUMMARY 
The principal objectives of this thesis are to critically evaluate the petroleum fiscal 
regime in the UK North Sea since 1975, and to identify a fiscal regime that is acceptable 
to Government and oil industry alike. 
Government and oil companies are the principal players in the upstream sector of 
petroleum industry. However, their individual focus is one of competing rather than 
complementary objectives. For example, Governments seek to generate high levels of 
take from oil related activity. Since Governments in oil producing countries are 
considered to be the natural resource owner, "it has been widely argued ... that the lion's 
share of economic rent should accrue to host governments" (Crowson, 2004, p.IO). 
Additionally, Governments prefer to receive a part of the fiscal take comparatively early 
in the life of an oil field. On the other hand, the principal objective of oil companies is 
to ensure an acceptable and sufficient level of profitability in its operations (Blinn et aI, 
1986). Since taxation removes a considerable slice of the producer's profits, oil 
companies prefer fiscal systems that result in a low overall tax level thereby allowing 
high post-tax returns. In addition, their preferred systems are those geared to facilitating 
a risk sharing position together with the rapid recovery of development costs. 
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Consequently, if tax rates are set too high, investment is discouraged. Alternatively, if 
they are set too low Governments will be left with an inequitable share of economic 
rent. Given the existence of these competing objectives, a trade off will always be 
necessary. Over the years achieving this balance has given rise to significant 
controversy in the UK. 
Nevertheless, because of the significant financial resources required in the exploration 
and exploitation of oil, the high inherent risk, as well as the contribution that the oil 
industry makes to economic development, a balance between the various parties' 
interests is required. The design of an appropriate regime can improve the trade off and 
a balance can be reached between Government and oil companies. 
This thesis seeks to ascertain the type of fiscal package that can be acceptable to both 
the Government and the industry alike, based upon a time-line analysis covering the 
evolution of the UKCS petroleum fiscal regime, since its passage into legislation in the 
1975 Oil Taxation Act. Accordingly, the thesis considers two principal criteria for 
assessing that regime namely, the impact of petroleum taxation on oil field profitability 
and its corresponding effect on Government revenue. Other criteria, such as stability 
and simplicity of the regime, are also considered but these are generally of a qualitative 
nature. 
The first stage of the analytical process has been to establish the basis for evaluating the 
regime. This is undertaken in Chapter 2, where criteria with which to evaluate tax 
instruments are examined so as to identify the key features of an ideal tax system. 
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The mostly frequently identified criteria In the literature are efficiency, neutrality, 
equity, risk sharing, stability, clarity and simplicity. Further, the chapter analyses the 
concept and nature of economic rent associated with petroleum exploitation activity. 
This is important since the majority of previous studies contend that a tax based on 
economic rent is likely to be an ideal tax. The chapter proceeds with an analysis of the 
various instruments proposed in previous studies and used to capture economic rent. 
The next chapter examines the establishment of the regime in 1975 and its subsequent 
evolution through to the Budget changes introduced in 2002. This analysis focuses on 
the four main evolutionary phases, starting with the originating legislation and the 
subsequent amendments introduced in 1983, 1993 and 2002, each of which generated 
significant controversy. 
In the subsequent stages, a qualitative and quantitative evaluation of the regime IS 
undertaken using an approach, which differs from those adopted in previous studies. 
Chapter 4 carries out a qualitative assessment of the regime. The chapter discusses the 
"Survey of Opinions" solicited from key players in the UK oil sector, with respect to the 
fiscal regime. This analysis complements later chapters, in so far as a comprehensive 
evaluation of the regime requires both a qualitative and quantitative assessment, 
recognising that not all features can be fully captured quantitatively. 
In Chapter 5, a cash flow model is developed that clearly demonstrates how the tax take 
is calculated and its impact on both profitability and Government revenue. 
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Details of the principal assumptions and the methodology adopted in the analysis set out 
in subsequent chapters are also included. In total, nine tax scenarios are assumed in 
order to evaluate and compare the outcome of the principal changes made to the UK 
regime over the last 27 years. Further, some 25 oil fields currently in production in the 
UKCS are selected for analysis. 
Chapter 6 evaluates the effects of different tax scenanos on selected oil field 
profitability and Government revenues. The evaluation is carried out using two 
evaluation techniques, the traditional and commonly used DCF method and the more 
modem approach using MAP. In order to assess the impact of taxation, an appropriate 
evaluation technique is crucial. This is of particular importance when measuring 
economic rent. MAP was developed to facilitate a more efficient evaluation of risk and 
profitability. 
Chapter 7 complements the analysis undertaken in Chapter 6. The same tax scenarios 
and fields are considered for evaluation but an additional concept based upon the notion 
of flexibility in decision making is introduced. In essence, the capacity to postpone 
development decisions to more favourable periods is examined as well as the 
consequential effect of taxation on the field development timing. Such an analysis is of 
particular importance for several reasons. Firstly, any change in investment timing can 
affect the timing of fiscal receipts. Secondly, in a mature province such as the UKCS, 
any delay in oil field development is not desirable due to the need to maintain oil 
production and thereby sustaining self-sufficiency. In order to incorporate flexibility in 
the analysis, the Real Options Theory is used. 
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Finally, Chapter 8 completes the quantitative evaluation of the UKCS regIme by 
assessing its international competitiveness and comparing it with those of oil producing 
countries such as Australia, Norway, Indonesia, China and Iraq. As part of this 
comparison the principal types of international petroleum arrangements are introduced 
namely the Concessionary and Contractual systems, including Taxes and Royalties 
Arrangements, Production Sharing Contracts and Risk-Service Agreements. 
9.2. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS 
Chapter 2 identifies several complications associated with petroleum taxation. The 
principal sources of complication are associated with determining economic rent and the 
distinctions to be drawn between the various types of rents. A further source of 
complication is the inevitable compromises to the criteria that are required to categorize 
an optimal tax. As an example, a neutral and progressive tax is complex to administer 
and typically delays revenue generation. Although regime stability is advisable, 
flexibility needs to be built in so that the regime can adjust to and evolve with major 
changes in the external environment. Consequently, it is not surprising to find that none 
of the tax instruments proposed in previous studies represents an optimal tax. The thesis 
finds that RRT and Income Tax are superior instruments as compared with Royalty and 
Brown Tax insofar as they create the least distortion between Government and oil 
company interests. 
Arising from the analysis in Chapter 3, Royalty is found to be a simple instrument to 
administer while at the same time generating early revenues for the Government. 
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However, since it is regressive, non-neutral and not targeted on economic rent, it is less 
desirable as compared with PRT and/or CT. PRT allows companies to achieve a 
minimum return before any tax is paid and the nature of its reliefs ensures that it is 
progressive. Nevertheless, its complex structure and its tendency to delay fiscal receipts 
tend to count against it. Finally, CT is a simple tax that applies without exception to all 
UK industries. However, the fact that it is levied on a company basis, delays fiscal 
revenues and is set at a relatively low rate means that it is not an optimal tax instrument. 
As a consequence of the advantages and disadvantages of each tax, controversy 
surrounded the major changes made to the regime. However, on the balance of 
arguments, this thesis concludes that the regime suffered from several limitations, 
including the lack of neutrality, simplicity, and stability, resulting in a high degree of 
uncertainty for investors and a relatively low level of tax revenues. 
The various amendments in the UK petroleum tax system since 1975 further emphasise 
the difficulty of designing an ideal tax system. Moreover, any future concerns about 
UKCS taxation must take into account the current maturity of the petroleum reserve 
base, where opportunities still exist and taxation will play a critical role. The 
Government, through the implementation of an appropriate fiscal policy that improves 
the trade off between revenues and companies' interests, can ensure both the longevity 
of the UKCS and a continuing high level of investment in the sector. The life of the 
UKCS can be considerably extended if players are encouraged to squeeze out reserves 
previously seen as uneconomic (Reuters, 2004). 
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In Chapter 4 tax instruments such as Royalty and PRT are found to be non-neutral. This 
is confirmed by their respective abolition in 1983 and 1993 having been seen as 
affecting the level of activity on the UKCS. Royalty is perceived to be a regressive tax 
and its abolition is considered essential. In contrast, the abolition of PRT has given rise 
to a number of differing opinions. The principal controversy surrounding PRT is that it 
can lead to an inefficient allocation of expenditures as a result of its various reliefs and 
can actually give rise to investment disincentives in larger fields. PRT is also found to 
be neutral on small and marginal fields, but also a poor source of revenue. CT generates 
the least controversy, insofar as it is a simple tax applying to all industries (with the 
exception of the ring fence pertaining to petroleum exploration and extraction 
activities ). 
This thesis concludes that the existing regime can be improved by the abolition of all 
upstream taxes, combined with an increase in the CT rate. Notwithstanding, the current 
regime is well attuned to the economic realities of a mature petroleum province. 
Although it is less risk sharing than the pre-1993 package, particularly as a result of the 
abolition of PR T reliefs, improving Government partnership with industry can 
compensate for this. In this regard the stability of the regime is considered equally 
important to maintaining investors' confidence. 
Chapter 5 demonstrates the significant complexity of the UK fiscal regime as reflected 
in the derivation of the tax model and particularly with regard to PRT and its various 
reliefs. It is important to stress that the level and combination of taxes vary significantly 
with the date on which a particular field received development consent. 
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Chapter 6 finds that the most severe fiscal package in terms of government take on field 
profitability is the combination of Royalty, PRT and CT. This is the only scenario that 
rendered several fields unprofitable. The application of PRT alongside CT and ST. but 
without the oil allowance, generates a similar though less severe reduction in 
profitability particularly as regards the smaller fields. The highest profitability is 
generated under the application of CT at 30 per cent. In the scenarios where PRT 
applies, the major source of government take is from the larger fields. The lowest take 
resulted from the application of CT only. The oil allowance is found to be the most 
important relief for smaller fields, protecting some of them from the payment of the tax, 
while each of the three PR T reliefs are of equal importance for larger fields. 
Furthermore, for fields in a PR T paying position, the reliefs are also important in that 
they delay payment of the tax. 
Regarding the evaluation techniques applied, it is noted that DCF and MAP produce 
different project NPV results, which is particularly significant in the case of larger, long 
life projects. This is principally due to the DCF method's use of a constant discount rate, 
which tends to undervalue long life projects. Whereas in the case of MAP, given the use 
of an oil price forecast based upon the Mean Reversion Model, the risk discount rate 
tends to decline over time. 
MAP can provide a more appropriate evaluation than its DCF counterpart because it 
discounts revenues and costs using rates which reflect the risks inherent in each of these 
components. Further, the use of this technique can more readily exploit a sophisticated 
dynamic model of oil prices as compared with the more static DCF technique. 
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Chapter 7 demonstrates that the upstream petroleum industry has both the opportunity 
and the requirement to utilise managerial flexibility particularly in the case of long life 
projects. It is shown that the existence of flexibility can add significant value to 
projects, which might otherwise be under-valued, and, as a consequence, result in a 
miss-allocation of resources. Critics insist that DCF analysis does not account for the 
existence of flexibility in investment decisions because of the static nature of "the now 
or never" decision process, hence the need to use a technique that takes into account 
flexibility, namely the Real Options Theory. 
Tax has two opposite effects on project evaluation. On the one hand, taxes reduce the 
value of expected cash flows, thereby increasing the possibility of delayed investment. 
On the other hand tax allowances have the opposite effect. As a result, the higher 
(lower) these deductions, the lower (higher) the option premium and the less (more) 
noticeable are the effects of taxation on investment timing. The thesis finds that tax 
instruments, like Royalty, with limited expenditure reliefs, can encourage investment 
delay leading to deferral and/or loss in fiscal revenues. This is unlikely to be desirable 
in a mature province such as the UKCS where there is a need to sustain development 
and future production while maintaining the interest of oil companies in a high cost 
province. Consequently, it can be concluded that if the Government had maintained the 
1975 fiscal structure, many fields would have not been developed. For less profitable 
fields, the DCF valuation technique can contradict the findings using ROT. While DCF 
provides a positive NPV and hence encourages development, ROT provides a negative 
NPV encouraging investors to wait for more appropriate conditions before development 
takes place. For marginal fields, DCF provides a negative NPV, which in tum may lead 
to a decision to abandon the project for good, while ROT recommends waiting. 
302 
Chapter 8 demonstrates that, in terms of oil field profitability, the current UKCS fiscal 
regime is the most attractive compared with the five other countries selected. This is 
also the case when compared with UK petroleum fiscal regimes applying since 1975. 
More generally, except for the pre-1983 regime, the various fiscal levels in the UK are 
found to be more attractive than those applied in the other countries, due mainly to the 
generous reliefs applying to UKCS activity. In order of ranking the UKCS was followed 
by Australia and China, while in Norway the fiscal take is very close to that of countries 
operating under Contractual regimes. Hence, the thesis finds that it is possible to arrive 
at a similar tax take irrespective of the type of agreement. 
Among the contractual regtmes, China offers the most lenient terms due to the 
progressive nature of both its Sliding-Scale Royalty and the negotiable profit split. Of 
the six countries compared Indonesia and Iraq are found to be the toughest regimes, 
representing the highest fiscal take and on a corresponding basis the lowest profitability. 
In terms of Government revenue, the UK current petroleum regime generates the lowest 
take compared to the other previous regimes. Nevertheless, given the maturity of the 
province, such a low take can be necessary to sustain oil production and maintain the 
international competitiveness from an investor standpoint. Also, as analysis in previous 
chapters has demonstrated, the regime has suffered from several limitations, not 
captured directly in the quantitative analysis. These relate mainly to the instability of the 
regime arising principally from frequent amendments, many of which appear to be less 
than essential. 
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Chapter 8 further demonstrates that each system has its own advantages and 
disadvantages, resulting from the need to balance the competing objectives of 
Government and the oil companies. Each regime is applied under specific 
circumstances and there is no one ideal fiscal regime suitable for all petroleum projects 
in all countries. Due to the significant differences in geological prospect and economic 
environment between various countries, a fiscal package that is appropriate for one 
country may prove to be inappropriate for another. 
The overriding objectives of this thesis are to evaluate the various fiscal packages that 
applied to the UKCS since 1975, and to identify a fiscal regime that is acceptable to 
Government and oil industry alike. The main conclusion of this thesis is that, although 
the UK fiscal regime was unstable, complicated, and non-neutral particularly when 
formally legislated in 1975, it is now simple and relatively neutral by international 
standards. Maintaining the 1975/pre-1983 structure would have resulted in many fields 
abandoned or undeveloped. Maintaining the post-1983/pre-1993 structure would have 
resulted in low fiscal revenues generated, in addition to the high administrative costs 
and wasteful investment in Exploration. Imposing 40 per cent Income Tax is currently 
acceptable to the Government and most favourable to oil companies, especially in the 
light of the current mature state of the UK oil province. 
Another important conclusion is that it is difficult to formulate one ideal regime that 
suits various provinces with different geology and cost structures. It is important to 
tailor the fiscal terms in such a way as to be attractive for both for large as well as small 
discoveries while safeguarding the economic long-term interests of the oil companies. 
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9.3. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Limiting the evaluation of a fiscal regime to the level of tax rates can be very restrictive. 
A high level of Government take is not recommended in cases of high-risk exploration, 
high-cost development, or for those provinces with modest petroleum potential, as is the 
case in the UK North Sea. The ideal regime would improve the profitability of marginal 
fields in order to persuade oil companies to develop these discoveries. 
This thesis argues that profit related taxes are superior to revenue or production based 
ones. However, in the case of the larger more profitable discoveries, an accurate 
evaluation of the field's profitability is recommended, so that government's targets the 
resource rent rather than the quasi rent. Otherwise activity is likely to be discouraged. 
If future changes to the UK regime are to be introduced the Government would on 
balance appear to favor the use of fiscal reliefs as a means of encouraging the 
development of the remaining high-cost fields. As Condray (2002) argues, maximizing 
the economic recovery of reserves in the North Sea is surely in everyone's interest - the 
companies, the nation, employment, for export of know how and enhancing security of 
supply. Nevertheless, such changes, if introduced, should be undertaken in consultation 
with the industry and not in an ad hoc manner, otherwise they will adversely affect the 
stability of the regime as well as investor confidence. 
As for the evaluation techniques, MAP is still in its infancy and both MAP and ROT 
require detailed knowledge of advanced financial and statistical theories. 
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In contrast DCF is relatively simple, easy to understand and has been applied over a 
long period of time. Due to the complexity of the petroleum industry with its high risk 
operating environment, the use of simple but accurate techniques is imperative. Whilst 
MAP and ROT are more evolved than DCF it is unlikely that they will replace 
traditional DCF methods in the short term especially when, as Chapter 4 demonstrated, 
such techniques are unfamiliar to 99 per cent of the respondents. Consequently, this 
thesis recommends that these new techniques can be used as a complement to rather 
than an alternative for existing DCF techniques. 
9.4. FURTHER RESEARCH 
A number of theoretical implications follow from this research, suggesting a number of 
areas that merit further research. 
One key area that merits further research is to extend the fiscal analysis to include full 
cycle exploration economics rather than only the appraisal and development phases, 
which because of data limitations, formed the basis of the analytical work contained in 
this thesis. This would have the benefit of introducing the concept of exploration risk, 
which is a fundamental investment driver in the upstream petroleum sector. 
A basis premise of the analysis contained in this thesis is the assumption of one 
company operating one field. Further research could be undertaken by relaxing this 
assumption and considering a company with a portfolio of fields. 
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As such the effect of the various tax instruments on oil company profitability could be 
examined in a more dynamic manner. Furthermore, a more precise evaluation of PR T 
cross-fields allowances could be captured as well as the tax shelter impacts on a 
company's CT liabilities following from sequential field development. 
Further research should also be undertaken as regards evaluation techniques, 
particularly MAP and ROT. Complementary to this research further work is required to 
produce more sophisticated oil price models such as mean reversion with jumps, as 
developed by Dias (2001). Also, ROT could usefully be expanded to include other 
phases of the project life cycle such as the Exploration and Abandonment phases. 
Another possible expanSIOn to this research could be in the area of international 
comparison taking into consideration a greater number of countries, particularly those 
considering reform or designing a new petroleum fiscal regime. Other work related to 
this thesis would be to take into account the macroeconomic effects of particular fiscal 
packages in various countries. 
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GLOSSARy118 
Abandon: To cease work on a well, which is non-productive. Also used in the context 
of field abandonment. 
Abandonment Allowance: A 100 per cent allowance for expenditure incurred III 
respect of abandoning a field. 
Appraisal Expenditure: Costs incurred in survey, exploitation and appraisal of licence 
areas not yet under development or in production. 
Appraisal Well: A well drilled as part of an appraisal drilling programme which is 
carried out to determine the physical extent, reserves and likely production rate of a 
field. 
Barrel: A unit of volume measurement used for petroleum and its products 
7.5 barrels = 1 ton 
Barrel of Oil Equivalent (boe): A term used to express the gas volume in terms of its 
energy equivalent in barrels of oil. 6 thousand cubic feet of gas equals 1 bbl of crude oil. 
bbl: Abbreviation of one barrel of oil. 
bId: Abbreviation of Barrel per day 
bn: Abbreviation of Billion. 
bnbbl: Abbreviation of Billion of Barrels 
bnbbloe: Abbreviation of Billion Barrels of oil equivalent. 
bot: Abbreviation of Billion Tonnes 
118 The definitions are taken from various sources, namely DTI (2003) and Johnston (1994). 
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BT: Abbreviation of Brown Tax. 
CAPEX: Abbreviation of Capital Expenditure. 
Commercial Discovery: The tenn applies to any discovery that would be economically 
feasible to develop under a given fiscal system. A field that satisfied these conditions 
would then be granted commercial status, and the contractor would then have the right 
to develop the field. 
Commercial field: Field judged to be capable of producing sufficient net income to be 
worth developing. 
Concession: An agreement between a Government and a company that grants the 
company the right to explore for, develop, produce, transport, and market hydrocarbons 
or minerals within a fixed area for a specific amount of time. The concession and 
production and sale of hydrocarbons from the concession is then subject to rentals, 
royalties, bonuses, and taxes. Under a concessionary agreement the company would 
hold title to the resources that are produced. 
Contractor: An oil company operating in a country under a production sharing contract 
or a service contract on behalf of the host government for which it receives either a 
share of production or a fee. 
Contractor take: The total contractor after-tax share of profits. 
Cost of Capital: The minimum rate of return on capital required to compensate debt 
holders and equity investors for bearing risk. Cost of capital is computed by weighting 
the after-tax cost of debt and equity according to their relative proportions in the 
corporate capital structure. 
Cost Oil: A tenn most commonly applied to production sharing contracts which refers 
to the oil (or revenues) used to reimburse the contractor for exploration costs, 
development capital costs, and operating costs. 
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Cross Field Allowance (CFA): An element (up to 10 per cent) of immediate relief 
qualifying field development costs where a participator on a new taxable deyelopment 
has, or expects to have, PRT profits in another taxable field. 
CT: Abbreviation of Corporation Tax 
DCF: Abbreviation of Discount Cash Flow Technique. 
Decommissioning: Term used for the re-use, recycling and disposal of redundant oil 
and gas facilities. 
Development expenditure: All costs including financing costs, E&A expenditures 
incurred in bringing a field to commercial production and is defined as tangible assets. 
Development Phase: The phase in which a proven oil or gas field is brought into 
production by drilling production (development) wells. 
Discovery: An Exploration well which has encountered hydrocarbons. 
DTI: Abbreviation of Department of Trade & Industry 
E&A: Abbreviation of Exploration and Appraisal. 
E&P: Abbreviation of Exploration and Production. 
Enhanced Oil Recovery: A process whereby oil is recovered other than by natural 
pressure in a reservoir. 
Exploration drilling: Drilling carried out to determine whether hydrocarbons are 
present in a particular area or structure. 
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Entitlements: The shares of production to which the operating company and the 
government or government agencies are authorized to lift. Generally, legal entitlement 
equals Profit Oil plus Cost Oil in a PSC. 
Exploration expenditure: All costs, including premium payments, associated with 
acquisition of new acreage, drilling of exploratory wells and other costs incurred in 
evaluating commercial viability of geological entities. 
Exploration phase: The phase of operations which covers the search for oil or gas by 
carrying out detailed geological and geophysical surveys followed up where appropriate 
by exploratory drilling. 
Exploration well: A well in an unproven area or prospect, may also be known as a 
"wildcat well". 
Field: A geographical area under which an oil or gas reservoir lies. 
Fiscal System: Technically, the legislated taxation structure for a country including 
royalty payments. The term includes all aspects of contractual and fiscal elements that 
make up a given government-foreign oil company relationship. 
Gold Plating: When a company or contractor makes unreasonably large expenditures 
due to lack of cost-cutting incentives. This kind of behaviour could be encouraged 
where a contractor's compensation is based in part on the level of capital and operating 
expenditure. 
Government Take: The total government share of profit oil or revenues not associated 
with cost recovery. Same as government after-tax equity split and government marginal 
take. 
Incentives: Fiscal or contractual elements emplaced by host governments that make 
petroleum exploration or development more economically attractive. Includes such 
things as tax credits, lower Government take, uplift, and investment credit. 
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Investment Credit: A fiscal incentive where the government allows a company to 
recover an additional percentage of tangible capital expenditure. 
M: Abbreviation of Million. 
MAP: Abbreviation of Modem Asset Pricing Technique. 
mmbbl: Abbreviation of Million Barrels 
mmbbl/d: Abbreviation of Million Barrels per day 
mmboe: Abbreviation of Million Barrels Oil Equivalent. 
Mt: Abbreviation of Million Tonnes. 
Marginal Field: A field that may not produce enough net income to make it worth 
developing at a given time; should technical or economic conditions change, such a 
field may become commercial. 
Oil Allowance: A gross production relief that reduces effective PRT rate, but cannot be 
used to create a loss. 
Oil Equivalent: Used when adding together volumes of oil, gas and NGL. It is defined 
as the energy obtained from burning the various types of petroleum. One tonne of oil 
equivalent = one tonne of oil = 100 cubic meters of natural gas. 
Operator: The company that has legal authority to drill wells and undertake production 
of hydrocarbons are found. 
Operating Profit (or Loss): The difference between business revenues and the 
associated costs and expenses exclusive of interest or other financing expenses, and 
extraordinary items, or ancillary activities. Synonymous with net operating profit (or 
loss), operating income (or loss), and net operating income (or loss). 
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OPEX: Abbreviation for Operating Expenditure. 
Oil Taxation Act (OTA): Came into force in 1975, introducing PRT. 
Petroleum: A generic name for hydrocarbons, including crude oil, natural gas liquids, 
natural gas and their products. 
Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT): Applies to UK oil production and associated profits 
oflicensees. Applies only to fields which received consent before 18 March 1993. 
Possible Reserves: Those reserves which at present cannot be regarded as 'probable' but 
are estimated to have a significant but less than 50 per cent chance of being technically 
and economically producible. 
Probable Reserves: Those reserves which are not yet proven but which are estimated 
to have a better than 50 per cent chance of being technically and economically 
producible. 
Production Sharing Agreement: This (PSA) is the same as a Production Sharing 
Contract (PSC). While at one time this term was quite common, it is used less 
frequently now, and the term Production Sharing Contract is becoming more common. 
Production Sharing Contract: A contractual agreement between a contractor and a 
host government whereby the contractor bears all exploration costs and risks and 
development and production costs in return for a stipulated share of the production 
resulting from this effort. 
Progressive Taxation: Where tax rates increase as the basis to which the tax increases. 
Or where tax rates decrease as the basis decreases. The opposite of regressive taxation. 
Proven Field: An oil and/or gas field whose physical extent and estimated reserves 
have been determined. 
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Proven Reserves: Those reserves that on the available evidence are virtually certain to 
be technically and economically producible (i.e. having a better than 90 per cent chance 
of being produced). 
Recoverable Reserves: That proportion of the oil and/gas in a reservoir that can be 
removed using currently available techniques. 
Resource Rent Tax (RRT): Some economists refer to additional profits taxes as a 
resource rent tax. Normally the RRT is levied after the contractor or oil company has 
recouped all capital costs plus a specified return on capital that supposedly will yield a 
fair return on investment. 
Ring-fencing: A cost centre based fiscal device that forces contractors or 
concessionaries to restrict all cost recovery and or deductions associated with a given 
license (or sometimes a given field) to that particular cost centre. The cost centres may 
be individual licenses or on a field-by-field basis. For example, exploration expenses in 
one non-producing block could not be deducted against income for tax calculations in 
another block. Under PSC, ring-fencing acts in the same way: cost incurred in one ring 
fenced block cannot be recovered from another block outside the ring fence. 
Royalty payments: As part of some early UKCS licence round conditions there was an 
obligation to pay a royalty on "value of the petroleum" which is deductible in 
computing PR T and CT. 
ROT: Abbreviation of Real Options Theory. 
Significant Discovery: A DTI definition of a well which flow tested, or would have 
flowed, at a rate of 1000 barrels of oil a day or 15 million cubic feet of gas a day. 
Sliding Scales: A mechanism in a fiscal system that increases effective taxes and/or 
royalties based upon profitability or some proxy for profitability, such as increased 
levels of oil or gas production. 
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UKCS: Abbreviation of United Kingdom Continental Shelf 
UKOOA: Abbreviation of United Kingdom Oil Offshore Association 
Uplift: Common terminology for a fiscal incentive whereby the government allows the 
contractor to recover some additional percentage of tangible capital expenditure. 
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APPENDIX A 
FIELDS DISTRIBUTION BY SIZE 
The following graph shows the distribution of fields by size from 1975 to 2000. The 
graph shows that more fields were developed in the 1990s compared to previous 
periods. However, the graph indicates that the first fields that were brought to 
production in the mid-1970s are much larger than the fields brought to production in 
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APPENDIXB 
B.1. COVER LETTER 
A cover letter accompanying the questionnaire was sent to all respondents. 
Dear Sir/Madam], 
I am doing PhD in Energy Economics at the University of Surrey. My research 
project is concerned with the impact of taxation on oil exploration and production 
activity in the UK Continental Shelf. 
To understand the real nature of oil operations in the UK North Sea and the impact of 
taxes on these operations, I am conducting a survey among oil companies operating in 
the North Sea, Government institutions and major consulting companies. 
I kindly request you to take part of the survey. I enclosed the questionnaire with this 
letter and I would like you to fill in the questions that apply to your 
company/institution. All information provided will be treated with strict 
confidentiality and will be used for the purpose of my research only. 
I would very much appreciate your assistance in this regard and trust that I will hear 
from you soon. 
My contact address is: 
Economics Department 





Thank you in anticipation. 
Yours sincerely, 
Miss Carol Nakhle 
I 
The letter was individually addressed. 
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B.2. QUESTIONNAIRE 
This section includes firstly the final version of the questionnaire, and secondly the 
questions adjusted from the original version. 
B.2.1. Final Version 
Name of the company: 
Name of the person in charge of the questionnaire: 
The Impact of The UK Petroleum Fiscal Regime On Oil Company 
Performance on The UKCS. 
Ql) How has the company's willingness to invest been affected by the following 
changes to the tax system: 
a- Abolition of Royalty in 1983 
b- Abolition ofPRT in 1993 
Q2) If we consider the 1975 oil taxation structure, how does the company evaluate 
the impacts of the key components of the UKCS fiscal regime namely Royalty, 
PR T and CT in terms of: 
a- The development of marginal fields 
b- Early abandonment 
Q3) Which of the following allowances does the company find essential to reduce the 
burden of tax and encourage the activities within the North Sea: 




b- CT allowances 
Q4) To generate extra revenue from the North Sea activity, the Government has been 
thinking of changing the structure of the tax system in 1998. Two options were 
discussed; either an increase in the CT rate, or a reintroduction of the PRT. In its 
latest 2002 Budget release, the Government opted for a 10% supplementary CT. 
a- How does the company perceive the latest changes? 
b- Would a reintroduction ofPRT be preferred? 
c- Is there a third alternative that you would like to suggest? 
Q5) There are different evaluation methods to incorporate the risk related to oil 
projects, such as the Net Present Value and the Modem Asset Pricing model, etc. 
a- How does the company incorporate risk III the evaluation of project 
attracti veness? 
b- To what extent does the fiscal regime affect this risk? 
Q6) After 1983, oil companies were required to pay only CT on UKCS oil and gas 
profits for those fields that received development consent after that date. This led 
some observers to describe the British regime as the weakest in the world. 
a- How would you evaluate the current UKCS fiscal regime? 
b- Do you agree or disagree with the previous statement and why How do you 
evaluate the current regime? 
c- On an international scaling, how would you evaluate the UK petroleum fiscal 
regime? 
Q7) What are the company's current expectations regarding the level of activity and 
profitability of the UK North Sea oil industry? 
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B.2.2. QUESTIONS ALTERED 
Two main adjustments were made to the original version of the questionnaire for two 
reasons. The first reason was to reflect the 2002 fiscal changes that took place during 
the course of the survey. More precisely, the original formulation of Question 4 was 
as such: 
"To generate extra revenue from the UK North Sea, the Government has been considering 
certain changes to the structure of the tax system effective as of 1998. Two options were 
discussed; either an increase in the CT rate, or a reintroduction of the PRT. 
a. Which of these options does the company find more appropriate? 
h. Are there alternative that the company would like to suggest?" 
Further, as a consequence of the 2002 changes, which led to the abolition of Royalty, 
Question 5 in the original version was omitted from the final version of the 
questionnaire SInce it was not relevant anymore. Question 5 was formulated as 
follows: 
Q5) Lately the issue of the tax burden on mature oil and gas fields has been the subject to 
considerable discussions. On one hand these fields are now well into their decline phase of 
production but are still under the burden of three components of Government take, namely 
Royalty, PRT and CT. On the other hand, they do not face any residual major capital costs, 
other than abandonment costs. Hence is it fair for the UK Government to continue extract rent 
from these fields? In your opinion, should there be a special treatment for such fields, i.e. a 
relief in the level of Government take? If yes, which measures should be taken? 
The second reason for adjustment was made to adapt Question 1 to respondents 
working with Government institutions and three tax specialists from consulting 
companies but with previous experience with the Government. As such, instead of 
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asking respondents about the impact of different tax changes on company's 
willingness to invest, the experts where asked the following: 
Q 1. What are the economic justifications for applying each of Royalty, PRT and CT? 
Q2. What are the reasons that led to the abolition of both Royalty and PRT reciprocally in 
1983 and 19937 
B.2.3. REPLIES 
B.2.3.1. NOTATIONS 
For reasons of confidentiality, respondents' identity IS not revealed. Instead, the 
following notations are adopted: 
• "Respondent Gn" if the respondent works for Government Institution n. In total 
there are 2 respondents from Government institutions- Respondents Gland G2. 
• "Respondent On" if the respondent works for an oil company n. In total, there are 
7 respondents from oil companies- Respondents 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06 and 07. 
• "Respondent Cn" if the respondent works for a consulting company. In total, there 




In the following, are presented the original answers to all questions, including the 
adjusted questions. That's why there are a total of 10 questions instead of 7. 
1. (Altered) 
What are the economic justifications behind imposing each of Royalty, PRT and 
CT? 
Respondent G 1 
Respondent G2 
Respondent C 1 
Royalty is a payment that companies make to get the license or right of 
extracting and exploiting the resources owned by the Government. 
PRT was applied to extract a share of the excess profit/economic rent 
from oil and gas activities. It was developed after a consultation between 
the Government and the industry so both sides agreed its application. The 
Government doesn't have an explicit definition for economic rents. 
Several factors are taken in consideration when determining the rents of a 
particular field, such as for example the size of the field (the larger the 
field is, the more likely the higher the rent is) or the Internal Rate of 
Return (usually higher that 10%) ... Also, with the oil allowance, half of 
the profit is not being taxed, in this case this profit (less than the half) is 
considered normal while the second half is considered the rent, and on 
which PRT should apply. In theory, because PRT is an excess profit tax 
(so after tax, the field should still be profitable), marginal fields do not 
payPRT. 
CT was applied because all companies operating in the UK pay this tax. 
Royalty is usually applied as a compensation for the Government because 
its owned assets are being used and depleted. 
There is always the question of achieving a balance between generating 
resources to the nation and keeping companies motivated. PRT was able 
to realize such a balance (start up costs, full deduction, no PRT until 
positive CF ... ). PRT is imposed to capture the excess of profits. In fact, 
under PRT a company gets profits earlier because costs are amortized 
over years, and as such, it can create value for shareholders earlier since 
reporting profits will impact share price and ability to pay dividends. PRT 
does not cause you to think about incurring certain expenditure, because 
the expenditure is deducted. It is however an expensive tax, but if you 
invest more in another field, you get more deduction 
CT is imposed on all companies operating in the UK 
Royalty: oil was a new experience to the UK. The Government followed 
what was applied elsewhere in its fiscal policy, and Royalty IS a common 
fiscal instrument. 
CT: this tax applied to all companies operating in the UK. so, in structural 
terms, it was very difficult to exclude it. From technical terms. compaOles 
operating in the North Sea also have other businesses. ~uch as In other 
companies so they incur costs that are not related to the l\orth Sea. It IS a 




PRT: ~ith Royalty and CT there was no need for PRT. A possible 
alte~atIv~ would have been to apply a higher Royalty rate. This is 
pOSSIble If all fields were onshore. However. this was not feasible 
because. of the cost problem in North Sea. This problem is rather 
s~bstantIal than ~~antifiable given the different characteristics (thus 
d~fferent profitabIlIty) of each field. Since Royalty does not allow 
dIfferent costs to be deducted, PRT was created. This tax was like a 
Royalty but unlike Royalty, it allowed the deduction of direct costs. Had 
Royalty applied to a homogeneous cost base, the Government wouldn't 
have needed the complicated PRT. Further, the PRT takes a layer down 
from CF. It applies after the oil is brought onshore and after minimum 
cleaning out process. In this case, the company can sell the oil, make 
some profit and then pay the tax. This encourages in particular the 
development of marginal fields and keeps companies motivated. 
In the 1970s, oil prices increased sharply, and this necessitated a windfall 
tax in addition to Royalty, which was imposed on the top of barrel. The 
CT is the normal income tax that applies to all companies in the UK. 
Why Royalty was abolished on fields given development consent after 1983 and 
PRT abolished on fields given development consent after 1993? 
Respondent G 1 
Respondent G2 
PR T was the main source of revenue for the Government in early years of 
its imposition. But in 1992, Government revenues were negative and 
almost zero in 1993. This was due to offsets of companies for their 
appraisal expenditures (quite a generous relief, with the oil allowance 
being the most expensive to the Government) and exploration 
expenditures (cross-fields allowances: a part of the profit is used to invest 
elsewhere ... ). After abolishing PRT on new fields in 1993, more 
revenues are generated, mainly as a result of abolishing offsetting 
exploration costs. 
The Government is not currently giving too many reliefs because it 
realized that the past era will not be alive again 
Royalty does not allow deduction of all costs. Consequently, it can distort 
marginal activity especially that big developments have been achieved. 
The Government wants Royalty to be abolished because it does distort 
investment in marginal fields. But this is difficult to prove in practice, 
because of the volatility of oil prices. Since Royalty is allowable against 
PRT and CT, its impact would be greater if fields are reliable for PRT but 
do not pay PRT. When Royalty was abolished in 1983, the Government 
did not lose revenue because if Royalty still applied, the development of 
many fields would have been stopped and the Government wouldn't haw 
generated more revenues. . 
PRT is expensive to the Government. There were lot of exploratIOns but 
the fields discovered did not bring money for the Gm'ernment, gl \'en the 
different reliefs. Its abolition stimulated the activity but did not generate a 
big effect on marginal fields, which did not pay PRT as they \\i'erc 
protected by the different allowances. 
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Respondent C 1 
Respondent C2 
Respondent C3 
The combination of 12.5% Royalty, 50% PRT. and a 52% CT was 
upsetting the oil industry. The taxes themselves are not complicated but it 
is the working down sequence, which is complicated. Such complication 
results from detailed rules, for instance, to deal with CAPEX under PRT 
and under CT. As such, to calculate the tax base, we need different 
information, a different gathering system, and extra administration 
burden. 
Royalty was abolished because it creams off something from the top. 
This can be very discouraging especially when you don't know if you will 
make returns. 
PR T: Big and medium size fields are already in production. They are all 
in a position of tax paying because there are no more capital expenditure, 
except abandonment costs, to be deducted. In addition to these big tax 
bills that companies are paying on older fields, there is too much to be 
spent on newly developed marginal fields. Further, the impact of these 
marginal fields on companies' profit is marginal. Thus, if after tax profits 
are small, no shareholder value is created. In fact, with a higher risk 
resulting from the uncertainty surrounding the field and the volatile oil 
price, let alone environmental pressures, oil companies require higher 
after tax returns. As a result, rather than bothering in undertaking the 
investment, the company can use the money for a different type of 
expenditure, where it is more likely to get a better payback return and 
more importantly it avoids all those problems of abandonment, leaking, 
environmental pressures ... 
The 1975 system combined the best features of Royalty and PRT, but 
also their worst features. The Government needed to combine something 
more sensitive to prices, and lot of work has been done. 
In 1983, there was a strong lobby for relaxation of the regime. In fact, 
there was a partnership between practitioners in the oil industry and the 
Government. They wanted to find what could be done to encourage 
investments and to bring marginal fields to development. The problem 
was that the industry couldn't come with good examples to convince the 
Government that fields are small (prior to 1983). But in 1983, the lobby 
was stronger. And since Royalty was not a huge source of revenue to the 
Government, the latter took measures that were unexpected by the 
industry: abolishing Royalty. They were unexpected because the industry 
was rather worrying about changing the structure of PR T. 
In 1993, similarly to 1983, the Government abolishment of PRT was 
unexpected. This created lot of uncertainties 
PR T is a super profit tax, so to charge a super profit tax, companies 
should be making super profits in each field (since PRT is on a field by 
field basis); this is not the case anymore. 
Royalty hits in more aggressive way (front-~nd). The Govemm~nt 
recognized this in the 1998 proposals, where It suggested abolIshmg 
Royalty, in addition to other fiscal measures. 
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1) Final version 
How does the company evaluate the impact of key components of the 1975 L'KCS 
fiscal regime (Royalty, PRT and CT) mainly on: 
a. The development of marginal fields 








Respondent C 1 
Investments within an eXIstmg PRT field ring fence are adversely 
impacted by the 69% RoyaltylPRT/CT regime. 
No impact on decision 
All valuations are run using eXIstmg fiscal terms and there is no 
presumption that terms will change. The group does not currently hold 
and has not previously held any assets that were liable to UK PR T or 
Royalty and therefore, from the group perspective, there is a view that 
fiscal terms alone will not influence marginal developments or the timing 
of abandonment 
The industry remains concerned that the tax regime for older fields (pre 
1993) levies a marginal tax rate of up to 69% which acts as disincentive 
to investment in these fields. 
The pre-1993 fiscal regime subsidized exploration activity which led to 
an inefficient allocation of capital 
The pre-1983 fiscal package imposed a high burden particularly on 
marginal fields. The abolition of Royalty in 1983 reduced the fiscal 
burden and encouraged the development of marginal fields. 
The abolition of PRT and its different reliefs resulted in a reduction in 
drilling activity but in the main PRT does not alter the development of 
marginal fields nor cause premature abandonment. 
See answer above. 
No impact on decision because the company does not operate any field 
subject to Royalty. 
No impact of PRT on marginal fields that do not pay the tax mainly 
because of the oil allowance. 
Royalty can adversely impact particularly older fields and possibly lead 
to premature abandonment. . 
PRT does not have any impact on the development of margmal fields nor 
premature abandonment. And despite the large reductions in the fiscal 
burden on new fields, effective tax rates on mature fields are stIll 
substantial. 
PRT is a remarkable tax as designed. For fields of less than 60\.tMBBL 
no PRT is paid. Additionally, the safeguard ensur~s thatcompame~ have 
recovered their costs before they pay PRT. IncentIve eXIsts for margmal 






Royalty is a regressive tax and the Government has been convinced of 
this aspect of Royalty. 
PRT is complex concerning abandonment. All the carry back rules ... end 
up with; no effective economic relief. The system as it is, creates no 
incentives; no interest relief (no relief for financial costs, whereas this 
relief exists in CT). 
Royalty has a minor effect on marginal fields. As for PRT, the impact 
depends on the size of the field; marginal fields don't pay PRT. Regarding 
CT, there is an important effect but it will vary from company to 
company- how much allowance they have, loss carried forward, etc. 
Royalty plays an important part particularly with regard to relief 
(possibility of using a part of abandonment costs against Royalty relief). 
For PRT, very much dependent on the field, such as under Oil Taxation 
Act the carry back of abandonment costs doesn't trigger relief 
immediately; it will first displace oil allowances and whatever is left of 
taxable income, then get PR T relief for abandonment. The Argyll field is 
an example of ineffective relief for abandonment; this field was the fist to 
start production and the first to be abandoned. It is like gambling; if oil 
price increases then you win, but if oil price decreases then you lose. 
Finally, as for CT, the effect will depend on the company 
Neither Royalty nor CT is a major component. PRT has no major impact 
provided that you have the oil allowances out ofPRT net. 
The point of abandonment is where marginal revenues equate to marginal 
costs. This means that Royalty is a more important determinant of 
abandonment than either PRT or CT since it is a fixed cost of production 
I do not think I can help with this 
2) How has the company's willingness to invest been affected by the following 
changes in the tax system: 
a. Abolition of Royalty in 1983 




The abolition of Royalty, together with enhancements to the PRT regime 
(doubling oil allowance) made a substantial difference to both my 
company & industries willingness to invest. 
The abolition of PRT for fields developed after 1993 had a marginally 
positive impact on investments' attitudes. Prior 1993 few fields were la~ge 
enough & profitable enough to pay PRT, so the impact of PRT abolItIOn 
was not dramatic 
The group was not involved in UK activities until 1998 and therefore the 
changes were irrelevant 
See a 
The fiscal system has a direct impact on company. in\"t:st~ent decisIO,~S 








ch~n?es of 1983 and 1993 both led to significant increases in imcstment 
actlvIty by the company. In particular, the fiscal changes of 1993, which 
removed PRT for new fields directly encouraged the development of 
Andrew, ETAP and the first production West of Shetland. The 
Schiehallion field is now the largest producing oil field in the UKCS. 
Immediately prior to the fiscal changes in 1983 development activities 
had dried up due to the very high marginal tax rates then in place (up to 
90%). The improvements in the fiscal regime made in 1983 led to a 
material increase in the development activity that lasted through the 
1980's despite the rapid real decline in the oil price 
Since 1984, the company policy has been to expand overseas and 
diversify away from the UK tax changes have influenced this- ego The 
abolition of PRT relief for exploration wells resulted in less UK drilling 
but in the main it has not altered the main strategy. 
Royalty hits revenues before any profit is made. Its abolition had 
significantly improved the position of marginal fields. 
The abolition of PRT stimulated the development and production 
activities, but it did not have a big effect on marginal fields. 
The company was not involved in the UKCS before 1991 so the abolition 
of Royalty did not have any effect on the company performance 
The abolition of PRT meant a reduction in the tax burden so it did 
stimulate the activity. But in the other hand, PRT was a generous tax 
offering different reliefs. Overall the effect was positive. 
The abolition of Royalty had a positive effect because of the front-end 
aspect of this tax. 
The reduction of PRT to zero has helped but it is not as simple to say 
there is no tax. There are of course some benefits because mainly less tax 
encourages the activity. However because the sharing in risk has been 
reduced, the effectiveness in exploration has been reduced as well. 
The recent conditions in the UK North Sea are as follows: 
Small companies are the new entrants, applying for licenses. That's in fact 
where we need to look at the impact of tax 
Large companies are interested in large projects such as the Caspian ~ea 
(where approximately we can find 30bbl recoverable). These compames 
are happy with the projects they already took in the past but not attracted 
for remaining projects. 
Therefore, reducing tax has reduced the problem of tax on small players. 
Nevertheless, a low level of tax means less sharing of risk 
The abolition of Royalty had a modest impact but nonetheless positive 
because Royalty is deducted for PRT and CT, so the net impact is Ycry 
small. 
The abolition of PRT had a significant effect but that has been mitigated 
by E&A expenditures adjustments .. In terms. of large compames, the 
benefit was positive but not necessanly of major conSIderatIOns. But the 





The abolition of Royalty is not a material factor in detennining 
investment decisions. It only affects the end of field life and any 
incremental expenditure to extend the field life. 
The abolition of PRT had an impact in tenns of cross-field allowances 
and Exploration and Appraisal (E&A) relief, which had an adverse effect 
on exploration activity. Also, the size and type of companies are 
important to differentiate. Smaller companies will effectively use the 
Government to fund their exploration activity through E&A. So, when 
this relief was removed the number of exploration wells decreased; small 
companies don't have the same access to capital as large companies. who 
can fund all exploration costs themselves. 
At the time it was particularly important for some new developments to 
proceed. 
There has been a marked decline in exploration activity since Exploration 
and Appraisal (E&A) was abolished and PRT for new fields. There have. 
however, been a number of marginal fields developed, which probably 
would not have happened ifPRT had applied 
3) Which of the following allowances does the company find essential in 
reducing the burden of Government take and at the same time encouraging 
activity in the UKCS: 
a. PRT allowances:- Uplift 
Safeguard 
Oil allowance 




These allowances only apply to fields approved for development before 
1993, and therefore have little impact on current development activity. 
Prior to 1993 all 3 allowances had a significant beneficial impact in 
encouraging activity. 
It is essential that any tax regime taxes profit and not revenue. The CT 
25% writing down allowance (WDA) ensures this condition is met. The 
relative fast depreciation provided by WDA ensures that the after tax 
return is not significantly less than the before tax return, and consequently 
the CT regime does not inhibit activity. 
Although PRT is not currently an issue for the group, the retention o~ oil 
allowance is considered to be or prime importance to the more margInal 
fields 
The recently introduced 1 00% capi~al ~llowances ar~ likely to e?courage 
new capital expenditure and to aSSIst III the ratIOnalIzatIOn of ~orth Sea 
interest by way of the sale and purchase of assets. 
CT has almost no effect because of the low rate. 
Under the CT abandonment losses are carried back for 3 years. But is the 






PRT reliefs go simultaneously. Oil allowances are significant to so 
fields. Uplift was important because no interest deduction in PR T me 
CT: scientific allowances, plant and machinery, extraction relief. CT 
allowances are the most important and broadly neutral. But the UK gives 
reliefs for all businesses. 
Uplift & Safeguard: more important for larger fields 
Oil allowances: more important for small fields 
Most new developments will be under CT rate, so anything done under 
CT must be seen as generating a positive aspect to return 
All depend on the size of the fields: 
Uplift & Safeguard: the more the larger fields, the more these reliefs are 
important. 
Oil allowances: most important for smaller fields because the uplift & 
safeguard period is small. 
Relatively insensitive to investment decisions for the following reasons: 
1. It is only a timing effect (we get the relief at a certain stage) 
2. In the early days of field life, it is likely that profits are smaller and 
there are other expenditures that reduce the taxable income. 
A more important relief is the relief against interests, which is a crucial 
deduction. 
In terms of fields within the scope of PRT I would have thought the oil 
allowance must be the most valuable relief. 
CT allowances: The 100% Scientific Research Allowance pre the Finance 
Act 2002 but now the First Year Allowance for virtually all capital costs. 
It is the only thing that compensates for the new 10% SCT. 
[The following two questions (i.e. 6a & 6b) addresses the same issue, but Q.6b is a developed 
version of Q.6b to incorporate the 2002 changes.] 
4) Original Version 
To generate extra revenue from the UK North Sea, the Government has been 
considering certain changes to the structure of the tax system effective as of 1998. 
Two options were discussed; either an increase in the CT rate, or a 
reintroduction of the PRT. 
a. Which of these options does the company find more appropriate? 
b. Are there alternatives that you would like to suggest? 
Respondent G 1 The Government listened to academics in 1998, when the proposed 
changes were developed after consultations. Droppi~g the proposed 
changes after a decline in oil prices doesn't mean that It would nevCf be 
considered. 









Respondent C I 
1. Companies should pay a fair share of their profit in tax, but 
2. The Government doesn't want to affect negatively the attractiveness of 
the North Sea in the long-term 
Technically, nothing is wrong with the PRT. But re-introducing PRT 
would be messy for fields, and the problem is that PRT is a field by field 
basis. A better way to raise money may be to apply RRT similar to 
Australia or increasing CT on oil companies, but CT is inefficient. 
However, there isn't a technical issue but rather a confidence issue. For 
instance, the 1993 changes were unsustainable; companies believed that 
the Government will re-apply PR T. The need for a bigger share of profits 
will affect incremental activity especially that exploration is already very 
low. There is a trade off between short-term revenues and long term 
activity; the industry argues stability of the regime. 
Neither option is appropriate. Companies require a stable fiscal regime if 
they are to invest in long timeframe high-risk projects 
The most appropriate fiscal system is the one in place today for new 
developments, namely CT only. This ensures that the upstream industry 
is treated in the same way as any other industry in the UK. Since the 
returns in the oil sector in recent years have been below those that can be 
earned elsewhere in the economy, the intellectual case for additional 
taxation on oil and gas activities is not sustainable. Capital cannot be 
attracted into the oil and gas industry unless shareholders can be offered 
comparable returns to those on offer in other sectors, e.g. information 
technology, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals 
The CT only regime applying to post 93 fields. Looking at it from today's 
viewpoint it provides a fully consolidated system with early deductions 
for capital expenditure. This best suits the nature of geological risk in the 
UK. 
Applying only CT for all fields with the abolition of Royalties and a 
higher CT rate than the current 30%. 
The Government could level the fields by abolishing all upstream taxes 
and replace this with a supplementary rate of CT, which delivers the same 
overall yield. This would remove the unnecessary complexity of the 
current system and remove disincentives to invest in mature fields 
The company is supportive of the current fiscal regime (CT only). By 
establishing such an attractive tax regime the Government ensures that 
the UK is a competitive place for E&P activities. 
The abolition of Royalty as a non-profit based levy is the most obvious 
measure. However if this has to "paid for" by robbing Peter, then the 
status quo is overall better .. . 
A tightening of the fiscal regime would damage act1vlty' mYcstment and 
jobs. 
Tax in the UK is a complex regime but leave it alone for the issue of 
stability. If changes occur, there will ?e winners and . losers, . bl~t PR~ 




4. Final Version 
(when the North Sea activity is already on a downward track), small 
com~anies (who are willing to take over fields at the end of their life) are 
heavIly dependent on banks. Are the banks going to accept to take this 
risk? 
Compared with CT, PRT is more focused but again the big losers are 
small companies since there are no interest reliefs. Dilemma: the 
Government wants to increase tax and increase activity. But losers are 
small companies, who will revitalize the North Sea. 
There are some fundamental problems with hybrid taxes. 
1. Re-introducing PRT? PRT structure could lead to counter investment 
decisions, or gold-plating (the more you invest, the higher the return. 
which is non sense). Safeguard can give more than 100% of the relief. 
2. Ar1 alternative would be to apply a flat CT. But fields, such as Don, 
need subsidy. Lot of oil still to come but given technology barrier, it 
has been abandoned. 
The oil industry is a competitive industry, thus over the long-term no 
super profits, and it will be unfair to chase profitability over the oil price 
track. Even when prices were high, introducing a windfall tax will deter 
future investments over the long term. Ar1 important issue for the 
Government: security of supply rather than Government revenues. 
Companies when analyzing a project, they consider an average over 20 
years of life, they include in their analysis a stable tax, given the 
variations in price. Oil contracts may be tougher but at least they offer 1) 
a stable take and 2) allow the contribution of companies. Thus, the main 
issue is the issue of stability. In 1998, the Government created 
uncertainty, its proposal of applying some changes to tax gave some 
pausal thoughts for oil companies. 
To generate extra revenue from the North Sea activity, the Government has been 
thinking of changing the structure of the tax system in 1998. Two options were 
discussed; either an increase in the CT rate, or a reintroduction of the PRT. In 
its latest 2002 Budget release, the Government opted for a 10% supplementary 
CT. 
a. How does the company perceive the latest changes? 
b. Would a reintroduction of PRT be preferred? 
c. Is there a third alternative that the company would like to suggest? 
Respondent 02 The latest changes, although unaccepted to industry, primarily because of 
their destabilizing affect, were in fact not totally unexpected and ~robably 
represented the simplest method for the Government to achle\"c the 
revenue that they required. . . 
Reintroduction of PRT is likely to produce a less eqUItable Incremental 





We have no real third alternative to suggest. 
No PRT because it is ~ complicated tax as it stands, plus it is likely to 
create greater uncertamty, thus affecting investment decisions while 
c?angi?g CT is simpler, more direct and unlikely to cause si~ificant 
dIstortIOns and create greater uncertainty. 
A third alternative would be to possibly link CT changes to the behavior 
of oil prices. But increasing the CT is not appropriate currently, so better 
to leave it alone 
At least worse option is to change CT rather than applying PR T. CT is a 
corporate tax thus it takes into account the company's overall portfolio, 
not a single project. Although the Government has changed the headline 
rate of CT, it made fundamental changes to CT: the supplementary 10% 
does not allow the deduction of interests. This can affect companies' 
decisions in the manner in which they finance their investments. As a 
consequence, small companies will use more imaginative and more risky 
routes to raise capital. Another consequence of the latest changes is the 
law of non-intended consequences, particularly the adverse effects on 
foreign companies in particular American and French who are major 
investors 
The original PRT was, I believe, a fair system which guaranteed to the 
company a full return of costs and an annual return on investment before 
any special levy applied. However, reintroduction after nearly ten years 
would be very difficult. The recent changes need to be supplemented at 
the very least by additional incentives to explore (say, a 25% supplement 
on exploration costs). Early abolition of Royalty is also important not 
least of all to let the Government retain its creditability 
[The following question was removed from the questionnaire after the 2002 changes]. 
5. Original Version 
Lately the issue of the tax burden on mature oil and gas fields has been the 
subject to considerable discussions. On one hand these fields are now well into 
their decline phase of production but are still under the burden of three 
components of Government take, namely Royalty, PRT and CT. On the other 
hand, they do not face any residual major capital costs, other than abandonment 
costs. Hence is it fair for the UK Government to continue extract rent from these 
fields? In your opinion, should there be a special treatment for such fields, i.e. a 
relief in the level of Government take? If yes, which measures should be taken? 
Respondent G 1 If Royalty can be shortening the field life, then companies, can apply fo~ 
Royalty remission (concession), which is present~d to 01 I \\'ho. ]omtl}, 
with the Treasury give the remission approvaL I hIS year (2()() I.) then: 
have been couple of fields that received thIS rchef. It IS a leal. not 
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Respondent C4 
Respondent C5 
5. Final version 
theoretical option. 
Thus, Royalty is a burden but when it affects the im'estment decision 
companies can ask for concession, this is to avoid undesirable effects. 
This is rather a remission procedure not abolishing 
There is a discretionary provision to repay Royalty to particular oil 
producers if they consider that it will facilitate or maintain the 
development of petroleum resources of the UK. This mechanism would 
encourage incremental production from older, Royalty-paying fields. 
For fields coming to an end, it is not a reason to have a blanket against 
PRT, but yes for Royalty abolishing 
The regime needs to be kept under review of mature fields, such as 
abolishing Royalty and reducing PRT. But it is difficult for one size to fit 
all circumstances 
The bigger factor in investment decisions is certainty. Although you 
might think about this (i.e. abolishing Royalty) positively, you think that 
the Government will act in other way negatively. So better no changes. 
There are different evaluation methods to incorporate the risk related to oil 
projects, such as the Net Present Value and the Modern Asset Pricing model, etc. 
a. How does the company incorporate risk in the evaluation of project 
attractiveness? 




By considering all potential risks, quantifying them and conducting 
economic sensitivities. 
To the extent fiscal regime is profit based, an equitable sharing of risk 
between Government and industry occurs. Royalty does not result in an 
equitable risk sharing since it is not profit based. 
It does not especially alarm us. Risk and uncertainty are inherent in the 
business and the UK is no more risky than anywhere else 
The company has been a key player in the development of the ~CS for 
over 30 years and has learnt to live with the fiscal risk. The fiscal ~sk wIll 
never go away but with a meaningful discussions between the mdustry 
and Government at such forms as PILOT we believe that the Government 
is committed to ensuring that the UKCS remains competitive. The fiscal 
regime is responsive and appropriate to the cO.mpetiti.\"e circumstances of 






Respondent G 1 
Respondent G2 
Respondent C 1 
Explora~ion and other reservoir risks are initially factored into the 
calculatIOns of future expected cash flows. These cash flows are then 
further discounted to reflect the required group minimum rates of return. 
The uncertainties of a fiscal regime are not generally factored into risk 
analysis. The only related risking would be in respect of political rather 
than fiscal risk. The group would be unlikely to consider investments in 
countries where the fiscal system is not properly defined or is knmvn to 
be unstable 
Normal evaluation of after-tax Cash flows. Risk is normally incorporated 
through sensitivity analysis or higher discount rates. 
Investors dislike uncertainty; the real threat of an adverse tax change as 
proposed in March 1998 caused investment decisions to be deferred until 
the fiscal uncertainty was resolved. Maintaining fiscal stability is a key 
element of delivering investor confidence and UKCS competiti\'eness. 
No one will invest with just a positive NPV for 10% discount rate. So we 
cannot consider the negative or positive NPV as a criteria because of the 
high risk. Sensitivity analysis to handle risk. 
Different scenarios for oil price and costs, probability of a successful 
well, etc ... The main technique is to discount the future cash flow. The 
Real Options Theory is currently on fashion but it is too complicated to 
be applied in the daily operations of the company. 
A cash flow tax is when the Government takes an equity share, which 
equals a percentage tax take from the cash flow. In this case, the 
Government is facing a risk-sharing situation. Both the Government and 
companies will have the same CF (e.g. negative tax at the early stage of 
investment), and NPV of the project should be halved (shared equally) 
between the Government and the companies. 
PR T works well as a CF tax but losses are carried forward instead of 
result in a tax refund straight away. But if we look at late field 
development (plus abandonment costs), PRT works exactly like a CF tax. 
One needs to understand companies' decision criteria or project 
evaluation, but this is time consuming. Look at NPV under range of 
scenarios, spider curve with range of positive and negative outcomes ... 
To incorporate risk, companies can take different scenarios of e.g. prices 
and costs, with different probabilities, and change the discount rate, or 
assessing probabilities of certain account, i.e. applying market ri~k-rate. 
The different values of NPV should be considered under dIfferent 
scenarios. But how do we include the risk coming from Government 
political action? . . 
Usually tax is seen as a cost, but it also has some cha~actenstIcs such as 
risk sharing, since it is not based on gross amount. HIgh tax rates \\ork 
perfectly as risk sharing, especially when the stat~ acts to create certam 
behavior pattern, such as increasing activity. PRT IS an enormous tax b,ut 
high risk-sharing with Government means if a . field IS not succ~sstul 








The NPV is the most commonly used evaluation technique, with different 
scenarios. The Real Options theory is less likely to work in the long term 
Expected Net Present Value methodology; allowing probabilities for the 
chances of success and failure ... Using different factors: political risk 
exploration risk. ' 
The question is not only the impact of higher tax burden but also the risk 
sharing. In Norway for example, although the Government take is high, 
the Government takes exploration risk (approximately 78% of C APEX) 
in addition no ring fence. In the UK, lower tax thus less/no sharing of 
economic rents but also no sharing of exploration risk 
Higher discount rates, applying risk (MAP). 
The regime in its early stages was risk absorbing, this doesn't apply for 
new investments 
Higher threshold of discount rate. Applying probabilities. Individual 
component of project should be treated separately. 
We need to look at post-Government take if higher marginal tax rate can 
distort investment decisions, because the Government is paying for 
higher share for taking exploration risk 
Again, better addressed by companies but the recent change has made the 
UK again an unstable tax regime and there will be companies who will 
not invest in marginal projects with a long payback period for fear they 
will get hit again later. It's easy to increase SCT! 
6) After 1983, oil companies were required to pay only CT on UKCS oil and gas 
profits for those fields that received development consent after that date. This 
led some observers to describe the British regime as the weakest in the world. 
a. How would you evaluate the current UKCS fiscal regime? 
b. Do you agree or disagree with the previous statement and why? 




I disagree. The regime is well attuned to the economic realities of the UK 
North Sea. 
Judging the weakness of the regime is not a simple question. The. fiscal 
regime cannot be seen in isolation from the prospectIvIty. WhIl:t m 
headline terms the fiscal regime for new developments III the UK( S IS 
more attractive than, for instance, Norway, the fields size are smaller and 
unit costs higher in the UKCS than for typical new fields in Norway. At 
the exploration level Norway offers the potential for large dlsco\:cne~ t~e 
UKCS does not. For mature fields the UKCS applIes margmal tlL\. In LIs 
of up to 69% including Royalty, which acts in a regre~slve manner. 
B19 
Norway recently abolished Royalty and can offer more attractiyc 
economics for investment in mature fields 
Respondent 03 The current UK fiscal regime largely reflects the maturity of the UKCS 
and the marginality of likely future developments. It is in fact comparable 
to many other regimes in the taxation of marginal developments. It is 
important to avoid the comparison between current UK rates and the 
highest marginal rates in other countries. Many of these other countries 
provide benefits for marginal developments and many of the players in 
those countries would not expect to pay any of the higher special taxes. 
Respondent 04 Statement is not factually correct. Fields approved for development after 
1993 are not required to pay PRT. I do not agree with statement "UKCS 
is weakest regime in world". Regime needs to be considered in context of 
costs & geological environment in which it has to operate. I refer you to a 
UKOOA publication p. 21-23 (mailed separately) which puts UKCS into 
context 
Respondent 05 In Alaska, there is bad weather but large fields. The Caspian Sea is also 
better than the UK North Sea from a geological view (of course there is a 
different risk profile- political but not geological). So companies now 
have a choice and they are looking for the best payback return. Taxation 
can play an important role in this case. That's why the Government in the 
UK should offer attractive fiscal terms to maintain activity in the North 
Sea. 
Respondent 06 The North Sea oil fields are one of the most difficult and costly offshore 
areas to develop. There is no denial that the regime is attractive, but this 
should be the case in a mature area. Under such circumstance, the 
Government needs to offer attractive fiscal terms if it wants to maintain 
international competitiveness of the county. Describing the regime as the 
weakest in the world is an extreme view. 
Respondent 07 The question is impossible to answer, as each country is appropriate to its 
own geological facts and circumstances. That is Norway, for example, 
still has large fields with economic rents. Over time Norway will have to 
reduce its tax rates if it wishes to maintain investment. As a matter of 
principle we think fully consolidated regimes are preferable and would 
obviously like tax rates to be minimized 
Respondent G 1 Other countries are more generous, more favourable to oil companies 
Respondent G2 Better to fit to purpose rather than weak; high costs, small fields, 
exploration success is pretty low. 
Respondent C 1 There are two important things to consider: 
1. The risk profile of the sector, if the Government got it right 
2. The high risk environment 
_ We need to look at what the regime is trymg to achieve; so for example, 
there are lot of differences between what you are trying to achIeve In 
fi 1 · R . UK USA Saudi Certain forms of behaVIOr are Isca m USSIa, ' , ... 







"like with like". 
Further, how do you define weak and strong, worse risk/reward ratio?! 
The weaknesses of a regime can be an underestimation of expected 
production peak and time length. Thus, the weaknesses or the strengths of 
the system cannot be measured by the marginal tax rate on fields. For 
instance, we would rather look at the partnership, or benefits to balance of 
payment, self-sufficiency .... Thanks to tax, the Government has achieyed 
the desired objectives, which is maximise the production of oil and gas. 
Further, the changes in tax have reflected a successful partnership 
between the Government and oil companies 
In Ireland, the tax is very low; the effective Government take per barrel is 
on average 50%. The tax that is appropriate for on one hand large fields, 
and on the other hand, marginal fields, cannot be compared. 
Further, in 1998, UKOOA compared different industries in the UK and 
found that the pharmaceuticals have higher returns than the North Sea. 
The North Sea has moderate returns and moderate drilling levels plus 
high risk. When looking at profits of large companies, a small portion 
comes from the North Sea. For example, 80% of BP profits corne from 
other activities in other areas 
International comparison is not appropriate, several things should be 
taken in consideration: geological risk, political risk, size of discoveries, 
tax regimes (UK has 7 regimes within the North Sea for different 
prospects) 
Don't agree. The regime is competitive relatively to the international oil 
and gas industry worldwide. It is also geared to maximise UKCS 
resources 
It is the best relatively to the maturity of oil province. 
The regime is appropriate to current state of development of UKCS, 
which is currently generating minimum amount of economic rent. The 
size and nature of current fields developed could not stand a harsher 
fiscal regime 
Low overall of Government take, which is appropriate to the UKCS 
maturity and it fits its circumstances. Under the existing regime, the oil 
industry is treated similarly to other industries so no discrimination. 
The problem is that the recent Buzzard discovery might never be 
repeated. Future fields are expected to be small and will depend on 
existing infrastructure to get developed. A normal CT system probably 
suits that kind of new project. However, there is also a need to ensure 
that old fields are not abandoned early since there will then be no 
infrastructure in place from which to produce/transport the new finds., 
Taxes like the SeT will make old fields uneconomic earlier partIcularly If 
the Government does not abolish Royalty 
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7) What are the company's current expectations regarding the level of activity 
and profitability of the North Sea UK oil industry? 









Respondent (' 1 
Check the survey by DTI and UKOOA (2001) 
Lot of discoveries are waiting to be developed 
The G?vernmen.t believes that new smaller companies are the key to 
exten~mg the lIfe of the North Sea production. I refer you to the 
expenence of the Gulf of Mexico. 
Both are highly dependent on oil price trends, however a gradual decline 
in activity as the UKCS matures must be expected 
The level of activity has probably only been sustained by the recent and 
continued high oil price. As the UKCS matures further, and particularly if 
oil price fall appreciably from current levels, there will be little real 
prospectivity to encourage further investment in the UKCS and activity 
level will inevitably fall 
There is a serious decline in the size of new discoveries in the mature 
shallow water area of the UK North Sea. Major operators are now 
attracted to deepwater areas where major fields are still to be found. The 
remaining UKCS opportunities are of insufficient scale to attract further 
investment. 
UK activity will decline over time with wide price related variations over 
the short term. Total profitability will follow this decline but again short 
run oil price variations will cause wide variations. Internationally oil and 
gas production will continue to expand. 
UK oil production peaked in 1999. Exploration activity has significantly 
declined over the last 10 years, and is expected to further decline. Recent 
discoveries are quite small and inefficient to offset the decline from the 
older fields. 
The Government, however, can play an important role in extending the 
life of the UK North Sea province. By adopting favourable fiscal policies. 
the Government can largely contribute to increased industry efficiency. 
The UKCS is already suffering from a maturing production base. whIch 
is negatively affecting its international competitiveness. Any reduction in 
profitability will alter the country's investment outlook. Th~ key of 
course is the price of oil and gas, but taxation also plays a SIgnIficant 
role. 
The remaining fields to be exploited in the UK are small and technicaIly 
challenging. Both a favourable fiscal policy and advance In technology 
are required to extend the life of the oil pro\'ince. 







likely spending money on development of existing fields, such as new 
drilling techniques, new seismic, etc ... to recover more oil from these 
fields. Thus, in the future, the level of development acti\'ities will 
increase in addition to some recoveries as the big companies are bein~ 
replaced by small companies. As a result two big changes: ne\~' 
technology plus changes in ownership 
No forecast, but could say that the tax changes will have adverse effects 
because they will reduce the amount of capital companies have access to 
both internal and external funds. Capital markets are unlikely to be 
impressed by changes in the perceived stable regime 
The behavior of oil and gas prices is a major determinant of the 
profitability of the region. 
Activity level will be determined by the development of newly 
discovered fields. The small independent will playa role in the UKCS to 
develop the remaining resource base. 
Pre-1983, an oil company declared that there is more oil to come from 
well-established fields such as Forties, as there is from new investments. 
The cost structure in 1983 was very high compared to now. Even a 75-
150mmb was seen as marginal. The race now is more towards increase 
the use of new technology, in addition the structure is already there (the 
platforms). 
The North Sea has a brilliant future, unless Government interferes, 
companies will make normal profits at modest production and modest 
prices but no super profits. Thus, the future of UK North Sea depends on 
Government measures: take more and activity decreases; the Government 
would be damaging in particular what they depend on to revitalize the 
industry i.e. the small companies. 
On an international level, the competition over capital will be more 
significant over the next few months, many places for hunting for big 
companies, UK is not on the list 
Most companies are pessimistic! 
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APPENDIXC 
EXAMPLE OF TAX TAKE COMPUTATION IN THE UKCS 
Table 1: Pre-tax & Post-tax Net Cash Flow 
Year Production Oil Price Revenues Total Total Pre-tax Total Gov Post-Tax Real 
OPEX CAPEX NCF Take NCF NCF 
OOOb/d £lbbl £M £M £M £M £M £M £M 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) 
2002 0 13 0 0 110 -110 0 -110 -110 
2003 0 13.3 0 0 235 -235 0 -235 -229.2 
2004 0 13.7 0 0 220 -220 0 -220 -209.3 
2005 44 14 224.8 54 50 120.8 2.5 118.3 109.7 
2006 69.5 1404 364 58.7 25 280.3 25.7 254.6 230.4 
2007 70 14.7 375.8 58.8 58 259 49.6 209.4 184.8 
2008 92 15.1 506.3 66.8 73 366.5 231.9 134.5 115.8 
2009 81 15.5 456.9 6804 121 267.4 202.1 65.4 54.9 
2010 73.4 15.9 424.3 69.3 37 318 217 100.9 82.6 
2011 77.6 16.3 460.1 65.7 11 383.4 314.2 69.3 55.3 
2012 78.2 16.7 474.7 63.9 70 340.8 277.3 63.5 49.5 
2013 74 17.1 460.7 64.1 50.9 345.7 281.1 64.6 49 
2014 86 17.5 548.8 7204 10.4 466 385 81 60 
2015 74 18 484 68.8 5.4 409.8 335.4 74.4 53.8 
2016 60 1804 402.3 63.1 0 339.2 273.1 66.1 46.6 
2017 48 18.9 329.9 57.4 0 272.5 214.4 58.1 39.9 
2018 42 1904 295.8 4904 0 246.5 203.3 43.2 29 
2019 34 19.9 245.5 48.5 0 197 172.2 24.8 16.2 
2020 29 2004 214.6 46.8 0 167.8 146.7 21.1 13.5 
2021 25 20.9 189.6 47.3 0 142.4 124.5 17.9 11.1 
2022 23.5 2104 182.7 41.9 0 140.8 123.2 17.7 10.7 
2023 22 22 175.3 34.9 0 140.5 122.8 17.6 lOA 
2024 0 22.5 0 0 110 -110 -94.2 -15.8 -7.9 
2025 0 23.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 
Totals: 1103.2 6816.2 1100.1 1186.7 4529.4 3607.8 921.6 
666.9 
(A) Daily oil production in OOObbl, as given in GEM (2000) 
(B) Base Brent oil price of $19.5Ibbl, constant exchange rate of US $1.5=£lSTG and 
constant inflation rate of 2.5%. 
(C) Annual oil revenue in £M, where: (C) = (A) x (B) x365/1000 
(D) Operating expenditures in £M, as given in GEM (2000) 
(E) Capital expenditures in £M, as given in GEM (2000) 
(F) Pre-tax NCF = (C) - (D) - (E) 
(G) Total Government take = Royalty + PRT + CT (See tables 2-6) 
(H) Post-tax NCF = (F)-(G) 
L. (I) Real post-tax NCF = (H)/Inflation factor 
Cl 
Table 2: PRT Calculation (Part!) 
Year Period Revenues Royalty Total Total Uplift Net Cumulative Loss elf Net 
OPEX CAPEX 35% Profit 1 Losses Set-Off Profit 2 
£M £M £M £M £M £M £M £M £\1 
(J) (K) (L) (M) (N) (0) (P) (Q) I R. I 
2002 1 0 0 0 25 8.8 -33.8 -33.8 0 0 
2002 2 0 0 0 85 29.8 -114.8 -148.5 0 0 , I 
2003 1 0 0 0 125 43.8 -168.8 -317.3 0 0 
2003 2 0 0 0 110 38.5 -148.5 -465.8 0 0 
2004 1 0 0 0 115 40.3 -155.3 -621 0 0 
2004 2 0 0 0 105 36.8 -141.8 -762.8 0 0 
2005 1 71.6 0 25.6 35 12.3 -1.2 -764 0 0 
2005 2 153.4 2.5 28.5 15 5.3 102.2 -661.7 102.2 0 
2006 1 178.3 12.4 29.2 15 5.3 116.4 -545.3 116.4 0 
2006 2 186.2 13.3 29.5 10 3.5 129.9 -415.5 129.9 0 
2007 1 190.9 15.3 29.5 27.5 9.6 109 -306.5 109 0 
2007 2 185.5 15.5 29.3 30.5 10.7 99.6 -206.9 99.6 0 
2008 1 259.1 22.5 33.6 33 11.6 158.4 -48.5 158.4 0 
2008 2 248.1 20.5 33.2 40 14 140.4 0 48.5 91.9 
2009 1 248.7 15.9 34.2 72.5 0 126.1 0 0 126.1 
2009 2 209.1 9 34.2 48.5 0 117.5 0 0 117.5 
2010 1 212.9 11.1 34.7 21 0 146.1 0 0 146.1 
2010 2 212.4 17.1 34.7 16 0 144.6 0 0 144.6 
2011 1 247 23.4 32.8 6 0 184.8 0 0 184.8 
2011 2 214.3 20.8 32.8 5 0 155.7 0 0 155.7 
2012 1 232.4 22.3 31.9 32.5 0 145.8 0 0 145.8 
2012 2 243.7 23 31.9 37.5 0 151.3 0 0 15\.3 
2013 1 231.1 23.4 31.9 27.8 0 148 0 0 148 
2013 2 231.1 23.4 32.3 23.1 0 152.4 0 0 152.4 
2014 1 275.4 28.4 36 5.2 0 205.8 0 0 205.8 
2014 2 275.4 28.4 36.4 5.3 0 205.4 0 0 205.4 
2015 1 243 24.9 34.2 2.7 0 181.2 0 0 181.2 
2015 2 243 25 34.6 2.7 0 180.7 0 0 
180.7 
2016 1 202 20.4 31.3 0 0 150.2 0 0 
150.2 
2016 2 202 20.5 31.7 0 0 149.8 0 0 
149.8 
2017 1 165.7 16.8 28.5 0 0 120.3 0 0 
120.3 
2017 2 165.7 17.1 28.9 0 0 119.7 0 
0 119.7 
2018 1 148.7 15.5 24.5 0 0 108.6 0 
0 108.6 
2018 2 148.7 15.5 24.8 0 0 108.3 0 
0 108.3 
2019 1 127 12.9 24.1 0 0 90 0 
0 90 
2019 2 119.8 12 24.4 0 0 83.4 0 
0 83.4 
2020 1 111.6 11.2 23.3 0 0 77.2 
0 0 77.2 
2020 2 104.2 10.3 23.6 0 0 70.4 
0 0 70.4 
2021 1 99.2 9.7 23.5 0 0 66 
0 0 66 
2021 2 91.6 8.7 23.8 0 0 59 
0 0 59 
2022 1 93.9 9.4 20.8 0 0 63.7 
0 0 63.7 
i 2022 8.8 21.1 0 
0 60.1 0 0 60.1 2 90 
2023 17.3 0 0 61.9 
0 0 61.9 
i 1 88.2 9.1 
i 
2023 0 0 61.7 
0 0 61.7 
I :: 88.2 9 17.5 
2024 110 0 -110 
0 0 0 
, 1 0 0 0 
, 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 
L 2()24 2 0 0 0 3677.5 ;(\4 37875 
I \\tJI~ M<J9.2 605 1100.1 1186.7 2699 
'--
C2 
Table 2: PRT Calculation (Part!) Explained 
(1) Oil revenues per 6-months period 
(K) Royalty = 12.5% x (J) - C&T costs. 
The Conveying & Treating (C&T) Costs are approximately 70% of the 
CAPEX of the platform depreciated over eight years or the life of the field, 
whichever is the shorter, 60% of total platform operating costs and 100% of 
the costs of transportation. All these costs are given in GEM (2000). 
(L) Operating expenditures per 6-month period 
(M)Capital expenditures per 6-month period 
(N) Uplift = 35% x (M). 
It applies until the field reaches payback (i.e. when Net Profit 2 (R) turns 
positive). 
(0) Net Profit 1 = (J) - (K) - (L) - (M) - (N) 
(P) Cumulative losses = Losses in period t + losses from period t-J 
(Q) Losses carried-forward: when Net Profit 1 (0) turns positive, Cumulative 
losses (P) start to be written off. Any loss, which is not written off, is carried 
forward to the following period, until all losses are written off (in this case, in 
year 2008). 
(R) Net Profit 2 = Net-Profit 1 after all losses are written off. 
C3 
Table 3: PRT Calculations (Continued) 
Net Oil Taxable PRT Mainstream Safeguard Base PRT Loss PRT 
Profit 2 Allowance Profit Rate PRT Limit PRT Repayment Paid 
£M £M £M % £M £M £M 0.1 £M 
(R) (S) (T) (U) (V) (W) eX) (1") (Z) 
0 0 0 70 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 70 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 70 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 70 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 70 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 70 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 70 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 70 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 70 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 70 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 70 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 70 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 70 0 0 0 0 0 
91.9 28.3 63.6 70 44.5 63 44.5 0 44.5 
126.1 29 97 70 67.9 66.3 66.3 0 66.3 
117.5 29 88.4 70 61.9 40.3 40.3 0 40.3 
146.1 29.8 116.4 70 81.5 41.2 41.2 0 41.2 
144.6 29.8 114.9 70 80.4 36 36 0 36 
184.8 30.5 154.3 70 108 0 108 0 108 
155.7 30.5 125.2 70 87.6 0 87.6 0 87.6 
145.8 31.3 114.5 70 80.1 0 80.1 0 80.1 
151.3 31.3 120 70 84 0 84 0 84 
148 32.1 115.9 70 81.2 0 81.2 0 812 
152.4 32.1 120.3 70 84.2 0 84.2 0 84.2 
205.8 32.9 172.9 70 121.1 0 121.1 0 12l.1 
205.4 32.9 172.5 70 120.7 0 120.7 0 120.7 
181.2 33.7 147.5 70 103.3 0 103.3 0 103.3 
180.7 33.7 146.9 70 102.8 0 102.8 0 102.8 
150.2 34.6 115.6 70 80.9 0 80.9 0 80.9 
149.8 34.6 115.2 70 80.6 0 80.6 0 80.6 
120.3 35.5 84.9 70 59.4 0 59.4 0 
59.4 
119.7 35.5 84.3 70 59 0 59 0 
59 
108.6 36.4 72.2 70 50.6 0 50.6 0 
50.6 
108.3 0 108.3 70 75.8 0 75.8 0 
75.8 
90 0 90 70 63 0 63 0 
63 
83.4 0 83.4 70 58.4 0 58.4 
0 58.4 
77.2 0 77.2 70 54 0 54 
0 54 
70.4 0 70.4 70 49.3 0 49.3 
0 4<) "\ 
66 0 66 70 46.2 0 46.2 
0 46.2 
59 0 59 70 41.3 0 
41.3 0 41.3 
63.7 0 63.7 70 44.6 0 
44.6 0 44.6 
60.1 0 60.1 70 42 0 
42 0 42 
61.9 0 61.9 70 43.3 0 
43.3 0 4.U 
61.7 0 61.7 70 43.2 0 
4~ :: 0 43.2 
0 0 70 0 0 
0 77 -77 
0 
0 0 70 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 
3787.5 22008 246.7 
20929 77 20159 ()4.\5 3144 
Table 3: PRT Calculations (Continued) Explained 
(R) Net Profit 2 = Net-Profit 1 after all losses are written off (as calculated in 
Table 2). 
(S) The Oil Allowance starts to apply when Net Profit 2 becomes positiYe. 
For detailed computation of the allowance, see Table 4. 
(T) Taxable Profit = (R) - (S) 
(U) PR T rate that applies to the taxable profit (T) 
(V) Mainstream PRT = (U) x (V)/IOO 
At this stage the Safeguard applies. This is a form of tapering relief. 
(W) Safeguard Limit. For detailed computations of the Safeguard, see Table 5 
(X) Base PRT: During the period where the Safeguard applies (the period until the 
field has reached payback plus half of that number of periods), the mainstream 
PRT (V) is compared with the Safeguard limit (W). The field pays whichever 
is less. 
(Y) PRT loss repayment represents the repayment of Abandonment costs. 
(Z) PR T paid = (X) - (Y) 
Table 4: Oil Allowance Calculation 
Year Period Oil Oil Allow. Allow. Total Allow. AI\,\\ Cumulatl\e 
Product. Rev. 1 period Available Available Utilized Ctdized . .i.lIow. 
Mmbbl £M 8bl £ £ bbl L·tilized 
bbl 
(AA) (1) (88) (CC) (DD) (EE) (FF) (GG) 
2002 1 0 0 1.9 0 0 0 0 0 
2002 2 0 0 1.9 0 0 0 0 0 
2003 1 0 0 1.9 0 0 0 0 0 
2003 2 0 0 1.9 0 0 0 0 0 
2004 1 0 0 1.9 0 0 0 0 0 
2004 2 0 0 1.9 0 0 0 0 0 
2005 1 5.1 71.6 1.9 0 0 0 0 0 
2005 2 11 153.4 1.9 0 0 0 0 0 
2006 1 12.4 178.3 1.9 0 0 0 0 0 
2006 2 13 186.2 1.9 0 0 0 0 0 
2007 1 13 190.9 1.9 0 0 0 0 0 
2007 2 12.6 185.5 1.9 0 0 0 0 0 
2008 1 17.2 259.1 1.9 1.9 0 0 0 0 
2008 2 16.4 248.1 1.9 1.9 28.3 28.3 1.9 1.9 
2009 1 16.1 248.7 1.9 1.9 29 29 1.9 3.8 
2009 2 13.5 209.1 1.9 1.9 29 29 1.9 5.6 
2010 1 13.4 212.9 1.9 1.9 29.8 29.8 1.9 7.5 
2010 2 13.4 212.4 1.9 1.9 29.8 29.8 1.9 9.4 
2011 1 15.2 247 1.9 1.9 30.5 305 1.9 11J 
2011 2 13.2 214.3 1.9 1.9 30.5 30.5 1.9 13.1 
2012 1 13.9 232.4 1.9 1.9 31.3 31.3 1.9 15 
2012 2 14.6 243.7 .1.9 1.9 31.3 31.3 1.9 16.9 
2013 1 13.5 231.1 1.9 1.9 32.1 32.1 1.9 18.8 
2013 2 13.5 231.1 1.9 1.9 32.1 32.1 1.9 20.6 
2014 1 15.7 275.4 1.9 1.9 32.9 32.9 1.9 22.5 
2014 2 15.7 275.4 1.9 1.9 32.9 32.9 1.9 
24.4 
2015 1 13.5 243 1.9 1.9 33.7 33.7 1.9 
26.3 
2015 2 13.5 243 1.9 1.9 33.7 337 1.9 
28.1 
2016 I 11 202 1.9 1.9 34.6 34.6 1.9 
30 
2016 2 11 202 1.9 1.9 34.6 34.6 1.9 
31.9 
2017 1 8.8 165.7 1.9 1.9 35.5 35.5 
1.9 33.8 
2017 2 8.8 165.7 1.9 1.9 35.5 35.5 
1.9 35.6 
2018 1 7.7 148.7 1.9 1.9 36.4 36.4 
1.9 375 
2018 2 7.7 148.7 0 0 0 0 
0 0 
2019 1 6.4 127 0 0 0 0 
0 0 
2019 2 6 119.8 0 0 0 0 
0 0 
2020 1 5.5 111.6 0 0 0 0 
0 0 
2020 2 5.1 104.2 0 0 0 0 
0 0 
2021 1 4.7 99.2 0 0 0 
0 0 0 
2021 2 4.4 91.6 0 0 0 
0 0 0 
2022 93.9 0 0 0 0 
0 0 
1 4.4 
2022 0 0 0 0 
0 0 
2 4.2 90 
2023 0 0 0 0 
0 0 
I 4 88.2 
2023 0 0 0 
0 0 0 
2 4 88.2 
2024 0 0 
0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
21)24 0 0 0 0 
0 
2 0 0 0 
-
~ -;' 5 
Totals 402.7 6839.2 
'--
C6 
Table 4: Oil Allowance Calculation Explained 
(AA) Oil production in Million Barrel per 6-month period. It is equal to daily 
production (A) x (365/2)/1 000 
(J) Similar to revenues as determined in Table 2 
(BB) Oil Allowance per period is limited to a maximum of 250,000 tonne. 
As 1 tonne = 7.5 bbl (WoodMackenzie, 2000), the Oil Allowance per period is 
250x7.5/1 000 = 1.9. 
(CC) The available Oil Allowance per period depends on the oil production per 
period (AA): 
If (BB) > (AA), the Oil Allowance available is equal to (AA) 
If (BB) < (AA), the Oil Allowance available is equal to (BB) 
(DD) Oil Allowance per period expressed in £. 
(EE) Oil Allowance utilised in £. The Oil Allowance per period (DD) is compared 
with Net Profit 2 (R): 
If (DD) < (R), then the Oil Allowance utilised in £ is equal to (DD) 
If (DD) > (R), then the Oil Allowance utilised in £ is equal to (R). 
(FF) The Oil Allowance utilised is expressed in Barrel. 
(GG) The cumulative Oil Allowance utilised. When it reaches 37.5 (=7.5bblx5Mt, 
where 5 Mt is the maximum cumulative Oil Allowance available for an oil 
field), the Oil Allowance relief stops applying. 
C7 
Table 5: Safeguard Calculation 
Year Period Adjusted Payback Safeguard Safeguard Safeguard 
Profit Base Period Limit 
£M £M £M £M 
(HH) (II) (JJ) (KK) (w) 
2002 1 0 -33.8 25 0 0 
2002 2 0 -148.5 110 0 0 
2003 1 0 -317.3 235 0 0 
2003 2 0 -465.8 345 0 0 
2004 1 0 -621 460 0 0 
2004 2 0 -762.8 565 0 0 
2005 1 46 -764 600 0 0 
2005 2 122.5 -661.7 615 0 0 
2006 1 136.7 -545.3 630 0 0 
2006 2 143.4 -415.5 640 0 0 
2007 1 146.1 -306.5 667.5 0 0 
2007 2 140.7 -206.9 698 0 0 
2008 1 203 -48.5 731 0 0 
2008 2 194.4 91.9 771 0 63 
2009 1 198.6 218 771 1 66.3 
2009 2 166 335.4 771 2 40.3 
2010 1 167.1 481.6 771 3 41.2 
2010 2 160.6 626.2 771 4 36 
2011 1 190.8 811 771 0 0 
2011 2 160.7 966.8 771 0 0 
(HH) The Adjusted Profit = Revenues (J) - Royalty (K) - OPEX (L) 
(II) The payback period, K, can be found as the minimum value of K for which the 




-RQ~ -QEt ) > ICEt (1+uPt) 
t=1 (=1 
As such, 2008 is the year during which the field reaches payback. From the start of 
production, payback is reached after 8 periods (4 years) therefore the Safeguard will 
apply for 4 additional periods (2 years), until 2010. 
(JJ) Safeguard base is the cumulative Capital Expenditures (M) 
(KK) Safeguard period is the period during which the Safeguard applies. It is equal to the 
Payback period (from the startg of production) plus half of that period. 
(W) Safeguard limit = 80%x [(HH)-15%x (JJ)] (see Table 3). The Safeguard limit is then 
compared to the mainstream PRT as calculate in Table 2 (V): 
If(HH) < 15% of (JJ), no PRT is paid. 
If (HH) > 15% of (11), mainstream PRT is compared to the Safeguard limit (\\') 
and the company pays whichever is the smaller amount. 
rx 
Table 6: Corporation Tax Calculation 




OPEX Allow. Paid Income Losses Set-Off Income Rate Repay Paid 
£M £M £M £M £M £M £M £M £M % £M £\1 t\1 
(J) (K) (L) (LL) (Z) (MM) (NN) (00) (PP) (QQ) (RR) (SS) (T II 
0 0 0 25 0 -25 -25 0 0 52 0 0 0 
0 0 0 85 0 -85 -110 0 0 52 0 0 0 
0 0 0 125 0 -125 -235 0 0 52 0 0 0 
0 0 0 110 0 -110 -345 0 0 52 0 0 0 
0 0 0 115 0 -115 -460 0 0 52 0 0 0 
0 0 0 105 0 -105 -565 0 0 52 0 0 0 
71.6 0 25.6 35 0 11 -554 11 0 52 0 0 0 
153.4 2.5 28.5 15 0 107.5 -446.5 107.5 0 52 0 0 0 
178.3 12.4 29.2 15 0 121.7 -324.8 121.7 0 52 0 0 0 
186.2 13.3 29.5 10 0 133.4 -191.5 133.4 0 52 0 0 0 
190.9 15.3 29.5 27.5 0 118.6 -72.8 118.6 0 52 0 0 0 
185.5 15.5 29.3 30.5 0 110.2 0 72.8 37.4 52 19.4 0 19.4 
259.1 22.5 33.6 33 0 170 0 0 170 52 88.4 0 88.4 , 
248.1 20.5 33.2 40 44.5 109.9 0 0 109.9 52 57.1 0 57.1 
248.7 15.9 34.2 72.5 66.3 59.7 0 0 59.7 52 31.1 0 31.1 
209.1 9 34.2 48.5 40.3 77.2 0 0 77.2 52 40.2 0 40.2 
212.9 11.1 34.7 21 41.2 104.9 0 0 104.9 52 54.6 0 54.6 
212.4 17.1 34.7 16 36 108.6 0 0 108.6 52 56.5 0 56.5 
247 23.4 32.8 6 108 76.8 0 0 76.8 52 39.9 0 39.9 
214.3 20.8 32.8 5 87.6 68.1 0 0 68.1 52 35.4 0 35.4 
232.4 22.3 31.9 32.5 80.1 65.6 0 0 65.6 52 J·U 0 34.1 
243.7 23 31.9 37.5 84 67.3 0 0 67.3 52 35 0 35 
231.1 23.4 31.9 27.8 81.2 66.9 0 0 66.9 52 34.8 0 34.8 
231.1 23.4 32.3 23.1 84.2 68.2 0 0 68.2 52 35.5 0 35.5 
275.4 28.4 36 5.2 121.1 84.8 0 0 84.8 52 44.1 0 
44.1 
275.4 28.4 36.4 5.3 120.7 84.6 0 0 84.6 52 44 0 
44 
243 24.9 34.2 2.7 103.3 78 0 0 78 52 40.6 0 
40.6 
243 25 34.6 2.7 102.8 77.8 0 0 77.8 52 40.5 0 
40.5 
202 20.4 31.3 0 80.9 69.3 0 0 69.3 52 36 
0 36 
202 20.5 31.7 0 80.6 69.1 0 0 69.1 52 36 
0 36 
165.7 16.8 28.5 0 59.4 60.9 0 0 60.9 52 31.7 
0 31.7 
165.7 17.1 28.9 0 59 60.8 0 0 60.8 52 
31.6 0 31.6 
148.7 15.5 24.5 0 50.6 58 0 0 58 52 
30.2 0 302 
148.7 15.5 24.8 0 75.8 32.5 0 0 32.5 52 
16.9 0 16.9 
127 12.9 24.1 0 63 27 0 0 27 52 
14 0 14 
119.8 12 24.4 0 58.4 25 0 0 25 52 
\3 0 13 
111.6 11.2 23.3 0 54 23.2 0 0 23.2 
52 12 0 12 
104.2 0 49.3 21.1 0 0 21.1 52 
11 0 II 
10.3 23.6 
99,2 46.2 19.8 0 0 19.8 52 
10.3 0 103 
9.7 23.5 0 
91.6 17.7 0 0 17.7 52 
9.2 0 9.2 
8.7 23.8 0 41.3 
93.9 19.1 0 0 19.1 
~, 9.9 0 9.9 I 
9.4 20.8 0 44.6 
_ L 
0 0 18 52 9.4 0 
I) .j 
90 8.8 21.1 0 42 18 
0 0 18.6 52 9.6 " 
l) (l 
88.2 9.1 17.3 0 43.3 18.6 
0 0 18.5 52 9.6 
0 9.6 
88.2 9 17.5 0 43.2 18.5 
0 0 -33 52 0 
]7~ ·172 
0 0 0 110 -77 -33 
0 0 0 52 0 
0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
19315 1021 5 I 
1 ~ I~ !4 ~ 
6839.2 605 1100,1 1186.7 2015.9 1931.5 565 .---
Table 6: Corporation Tax Calculation Explained 
(LL) Capital Allowances providing 100% deduction of CAPEX (M) 
(MM) Pre-tax Income = J - K- L- AL- Z 
(NN) Cumulative Losses = Losses in period t + losses from period t-1 
(00) Losses carried-forward: when the pre-tax income (MM) becomes positi\'e. 
Cumulative losses (NN) start to be written off. Any loss, which is not wri tten 
off, is carried forward to the following period, until all losses are written off (in 
this case, in year 2007). 
(PP) Taxable Income = pre-tax income (MM) after all losses are written off. 
(QQ) CT rate 
(RR) CT income = (QQ) x (PP) 
(SS) Loss repayment represents the relief for Abandonment costs 
(TT) CT paid = (RR) - (SS) 
CIO 
APPENDIXD 
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM FISCAL REGIMES} 
I.JltCrll~lliHnal ·Pctrolpllm F.Xplfu;1IiO". 1I.mllh:n'!upmcnl Omtracts 
<';yt. 




"L~W 7,',III$1nn ('I 
l'allodJUId I ~llIn"~ () 
Art~lIlilllJ j) 
US OCS t) 
SiJutlJ ;\I'rit:Ol ~.tl 

















\liLhaY";la n.I:'I=·,~·.J,~~r I,} 
A:.a:rhllijsm .' l'X H) 
Th .. illand 111 - -r~:,-
Cotnada :..110;:1 I~ ' U 
Aug"'''!. : ~I) 
C(Jtumbiii ::'1) 
IlItlllm:~ill I·n'("lll,·r 0 
TurJ~mcllisiun ii 
l : ;:.amla 
Ru~~ia ;:;ullolll'lI rr 
l'NG 
N(u ~' .. ~ 
TUlli~iOl 

































'---- - , 
.I'~;t . 
KIT"~Li,' w 
noplo~ lhIM '1~ 
11)~ \o .I 





I (T, i 
































91r.., , --~*~t\'''''''1;,---::;7mtrlv,.u. -- ~'\'.--""5Il';"';"".---:;" ~'.""'-
ource John ton (2001) 
G.werllllU!nJ TIIl;, •. ~ 
L ti)1 (1jll 
Dl 
Very Small Fields 
Argyll 




2002 0.0 0.0 
2003 0.0 0.0 
2004 10.0 6.8 
2005 22.5 14.2 
2006 17.0 15.8 
2007 14.0 14.4 
2008 17.0 14.5 
2009 16.0 15.0 
2010 10.0 22.6 
2011 16.0 22.3 
2012 15.0 32.7 
2013 8.5 16.5 
2014 10.5 17.8 
2015 10.0 16.0 
2016 9.0 14.0 
2017 7.0 12.5 
2018 6.0 14.8 
2019 4.7 11.0 
2020 4.0 11.0 
2021 4.0 11.0 
2022 0.0 0.0 
2023 0.0 0.0 



























































Total Total Total Total 
Production 
Capex Liquids Opex Capex 
£M OOOb/d £M £\1 
15.0 0.7 1.8 15.0 
40.0 0.7 1.8 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 45.0 
3.0 7.0 8.3 55.0 
0.0 25.0 30.6 17.0 
0.0 18.5 23.9 0.0 
0.0 12.0 15.8 0.0 
0.0 5.3 9.0 0.0 
0.0 2.4 4.3 0.0 
0.0 3.4 4.4 0.0 
0.0 4.0 5.1 0.0 
0.0 3.5 4.6 0.0 
0.0 2.5 3.6 0.0 
0.0 2.0 3.1 0.0 
0.0 1.5 2.6 0.0 
0.0 0.5 15 0.0 
3.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
61.0 89.0 120.3 145.0 
FIELDS DATA (Continued) 
Very Small Fields 
Blake Kappa Janice 
Year Total Total Total Total Total Total Total Total Total 
Production Production Production 
Liquids Opex Capex Liquids Opex Capex Liquids Ope x (apex 
OOOb/d £M £M OOOb/d £M £M OOOb/d £M £M 
2002 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 85.0 
2003 0.0 0.0 72.0 0.0 0.0 64.0 0.0 0.0 157.5 
2004 18.2 10.9 78.0 11.5 10.0 12.0 41.1 25.2 33.0 
2005 34.0 21.0 0.0 15.0 13.6 0.0 27.2 25.2 5.0 
2006 26.0 16.9 0.0 15.0 13.9 0.0 24.3 21.5 3.0 
2007 20.0 13.8 0.0 12.0 12.1 0.0 24.0 21.8 28.0 
2008 16.0 11.7 0.0 12.0 12.4 0.0 22.5 20.0 0.0 
2009 13.0 10.1 0.0 10.0 12.0 0.0 16.3 18.8 14.0 
2010 11.0 19.1 0.0 9.0 10.7 0.0 13.2 16.3 0.0 
2011 10.0 20.8 0.0 8.0 10.6 0.0 8.2 13.9 0.0 
2012 9.0 21.6 0.0 7.0 10.5 0.0 5.1 13.3 0.0 
2013 8.0 22.6 0.0 6.0 10.4 0.0 4.1 13.4 0.0 
2014 7.0 25.2 0.0 4.0 8.5 0.0 3.1 12.8 0.0 
2015 5.0 26.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 3.1 12.9 0.0 
2016 0.0 0.0 15.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.0 
2017 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Totals: 177.2 220.1 165.0 178.1 124.7 81.0 192.1 215.0 355.5 
E2 
FIELDS DATA (Continued) 
Very Small Fields 
Tiffani Thelma Toni 
Year Total Total Total Total Total Total Total Total Total 
Production Production Production 
Liquids Opex Capex Liquids Opex Capex Liquids Opex Capex 
OOOb/d £M £M OOOb/d £M £M OOOb/d £\1 £\1 
2002 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 00 
2003 0.0 0.0 275.0 0.0 0.0 70.0 0.0 0.0 30.0 
2004 0.0 0.0 270.0 3.5 2.8 60.0 0.0 0.0 700 
2005 4.5 14.9 120.0 24.5 12.4 5.0 0.0 2.5 .+5.0 
2006 38.5 40.6 30.0 24.3 12.3 18.0 9.0 8.3 0.0 
2007 42.0 41.8 20.0 20.5 10.8 0.0 31.0 16.3 5.0 
2008 37.5 40.2 10.0 17.1 9.5 0.0 23.5 13.6 0.0 
2009 31.5 35.0 0.0 15.1 8.3 10.0 14.5 10.3 0.0 
2010 21.5 24.2 0.0 15.0 8.4 10.0 18.0 10.2 0.0 
2011 9.5 19.8 0.0 12.0 7.4 0.0 1.+.8 9.0 0.0 
2012 8.1 19.4 0.0 8.0 5.4 0.0 10.2 7.3 0.0 
2013 6.7 18.0 0.0 6.0 4.4 0.0 8.1 6.0 0.0 
2014 8.0 18.8 0.0 3.0 3.2 0.0 6.0 5.3 0.0 
2015 6.0 18.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 
2016 5.0 12.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.5 5.0 0.0 
2017 4.0 12.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.5 4.7 0.0 
2018 3.0 11.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.5 4.1 0.0 
2019 2.0 9.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 2.9 0.0 
2020 1.5 7.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 3.0 0.0 
2021 0.0 0.0 121.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.0 
2022 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 
Totals: 229.3 344.4 896.1 148.9 85.0 185.0 154.6 113.4 
162.0 
FIELDS DATA (Continued) 
Very Small Fields Small Fields 
Highlander Arbroath Beatrice 
Year Total Total Total Total Total Total Total Total Total 
Production Production Production 
Liquids Opex Capex Liquids Opex Capex Liquids Opex Capex 
OOOb/d £M £M OOOb/d £M £M OOOb/d £M £M 
2002 0.0 7.5 39.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 j-ll 
2003 20.0 15.0 46.0 0.0 0.0 55.0 0.0 0.0 21.0 
2004 28.0 18.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 70.0 0.0 0.0 98.6 
2005 28.0 18.0 6.0 25.0 39.1 60.0 0.0 0.0 169.9 
2006 13.0 13.5 10.0 34.0 43.7 15.0 7.0 6.9 135-1 
2007 22.0 22.6 8.0 35.5 40.2 0.0 33.0 39.9 76.1 
2008 18.0 21.7 15.0 33.5 39.2 0.0 30.0 46.0 82.0 
2009 14.0 20.3 0.0 32.0 38.5 0.0 46.0 52.6 47.6 
2010 11.5 22.4 0.0 35.5 40.2 5.0 53.5 56.0 9.6 
2011 8.5 21.1 10.0 31.5 38.2 10.0 42.0 53.6 9.8 
2012 8.5 15.1 8.0 24.0 34.5 0.0 34.0 50.4 10.0 
2013 5.9 14.0 2.0 24.5 49.3 0.0 30.5 40.0 3.2 
2014 5.5 11.7 0.0 26.7 27.7 0.0 26.0 40.0 2.3 
2015 2.5 10.2 0.0 21.3 30.2 5.0 25.0 35.0 0.0 
2016 4.0 9.9 0.0 17.4 53.1 5.0 21.0 40.0 0.0 
2017 2.1 8.2 0.0 20.0 43.1 7.0 15.5 40.0 0.0 
2018 3.2 6.1 1.0 20.0 21.7 10.0 12.5 40.0 0.0 
2019 3.9 3.6 2.0 19.0 20.4 1.0 11.5 35.0 0.0 
2020 4.0 3.7 2.0 17.0 21.2 1.0 9.5 30.0 0.0 
2021 3.5 3.7 2.0 14.0 21.9 1.0 9.0 30.0 0.0 
2022 3.0 4.2 2.0 11.0 20.1 1.0 9.5 28.0 6.0 
2023 2.5 3.6 1.0 9.0 18.7 1.0 8.0 21.5 5.0 
2024 2.5 3.7 1.0 8.0 17.9 1.0 4.2 20.0 0.0 
2025 2.5 3.4 1.0 7.0 17.2 1.0 3.0 20.0 0.0 
2026 2.5 3.1 0.5 6.0 16.4 0.0 4.0 16.7 32.0 
2027 2.0 3.0 0.5 6.0 16.7 0.0 9.5 17.0 0.0 
2028 2.0 3.1 0.5 5.0 16.4 0.0 5.0 15.6 
0.0 
2029 0.0 0.0 15.0 5.0 16.8 0.0 3.5 14.6 
0.0 
2030 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 40.0 3.0 13.8 
0.0 
2031 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
75.0 
2032 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 
Totals: 223.1 290.4 183.5 487.9 742.4 289.0 166.3 
802.6 797.6 
IA 
FIELDS DATA (Continued) 
Small Fields 
Auk Heather Montrose 
Year Total Total Total Total Total Total Total Total Total 
Production Production Production 
Liquids Opex Capex Liquids Opex Capex Liquids Opex Capex 
OOOb/d £M £M OOOb/d £M £M OOOb/d £M £M 
2002 0.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 18.1 0.0 0.0 12.7 
2003 0.0 0.0 8J 0.0 0.0 55.5 0.0 0.0 45.6 
2004 0.0 0.0 12.7 0.0 0.0 80.6 2.0 4.9 26.2 
2005 0.0 0.0 22.8 3.0 4.0 64.9 17.0 28.6 10.8 
2006 25.0 15.8 11.2 17.0 16.8 40J 25.0 32.6 10.6 
2007 48.0 17.5 11.6 14.0 17.2 21.9 28.0 34J 9.4 
2008 27.0 17.1 15.7 25.0 22.4 22J 25.0 32.9 0.0 
2009 17.0 16.9 4.8 33.5 25.8 29.0 23.0 34J 2.7 
2010 13.0 16.8 8.6 27.0 29.6 27J 18.0 35.2 8.7 
2011 13.0 20.0 9.4 24.5 33.8 20.1 15.0 38.2 3.4 
2012 12.5 22.8 5.4 23.0 35.9 15.0 16.0 45.2 36.1 
2013 12.0 26.3 0.0 20.0 33.1 4.0 13.5 31.7 0.0 
2014 12.0 30.0 0.0 18.5 25.0 1.0 13.0 29.5 0.0 
2015 9.0 32.0 0.0 15.0 20.0 5.0 11.0 28.8 0.0 
2016 10.0 29.6 40.0 12.0 20.2 5.0 10.0 25.2 4.0 
2017 10.0 17.0 20.0 11.0 22.0 11.0 4.0 21.5 2.0 
2018 9.5 14.0 0.0 10.0 23.0 4.0 1.5 3.9 2.0 
2019 6.0 14.0 0.0 9.0 26.0 0.0 1.5 3.9 0.8 
2020 9.0 12.0 0.0 8.5 26.0 0.0 2.5 4.9 0.8 
2021 9.0 12.0 0.0 7.5 25.0 0.0 2.0 14.5 0.0 
2022 7.5 . 14.0 3.0 6.5 23.0 0.0 3.5 5.2 5.0 
2023 8.5 14.0 26.0 7.0 23.0 0.0 2.5 4.7 0.0 
2024 11.5 14.0 6.0 6.0 23.0 0.0 2.0 4.5 0.0 0 
2025 12.5 14.0 10.0 5.0 22.8 0.0 1.3 3.8 8.0 
2026 9.5 14.0 10.0 5.0 21.6 0.0 1.4 3.8 8.0 
2027 13.5 18.4 10.0 4.7 20.7 17.0 1.3 4.0 
OJ 
2028 16.0 19.8 1.0 6.0 21.0 4.0 0.9 1.8 
0.1 
2029 12.8 18.0 0.0 6.1 21.5 8.1 1.1 1.7 
0.1 
2030 11.3 17.2 0.0 6.6 18.7 12.5 3.0 
3.4 13.1 
2031 9.5 14.2 7.0 7.7 19.4 10.7 4.0 
2.5 13.0 
2032 11.0 15.3 14J 7.7 16.6 0.0 6.0 
4J OJ 
2033 16.0 18.5 26.1 6.4 16.3 0.0 5.0 
4.1 0.3 
2034 19.0 20.8 10.6 5.4 12.5 0.0 4.0 
5.1 OJ 
2035 18.0 20.7 0.0 4.6 12.5 0.0 3.5 
4.9 OJ 
2036 17.0 20.6 0.0 3.9 9.0 0.0 
3.0 4.8 OJ 
2037 9.0 16.1 0.0 3.3 6.5 0.0 
3.0 4.9 0.3 
2038 8.0 14.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 42.7 
2.5 4.5 OJ 
2039 7.0 13.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2.0 4.3 0.0 
2040 6.0 12.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2.0 4.4 0.0 
2041 0.0 0.0 30.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 2.0 4.5 0.0 
2042 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 2.0 4.7 0.0 
2043 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 58.6 
0.0 
2044 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
536.1 284.0 
Totals 465.6 623.8 328.5 370.4 693.9 520.1 
283.9 
E5 
FIELDS DATA (Continued) 
Small Fields 
Balmoral Leadon Osprey 
Year Total Total Total Total Total Total Total Total Total 
Production Production Production 
Liquids Opex Cape x Liquids Ope x Capex Liquids Opex Cape x 
OOOb/d £M £M OOOb/d £M £M OOOb/d £\1 £M 
2002 0.0 0.0 135.1 0.0 0.0 420.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 
2003 0.0 0.0 150.3 30.0 17.8 4.1 0.0 0.0 70.0 
2004 1.0 9.1 120.0 50.0 22.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 85.0 
2005 35.0 38.7 20.0 50.0 22.6 0.0 18.5 13.8 35.0 
2006 35.0 38.7 0.0 50.0 23.1 0.0 27.5 26.0 25.0 
2007 35.0 38.7 0.0 45.0 22.7 0.0 33.5 28.2 20.0 
2008 36.5 39.6 0.0 37.0 21.6 0.0 25.0 25.1 20.0 
2009 27.5 37.1 8.0 29.0 20.4 0.0 28.5 26.4 10.0 
2010 28.0 36.9 4.0 22.0 19.4 0.0 26.5 25.7 20.0 
2011 21.5 30.5 8.0 19.0 19.2 0.0 24.0 20.8 20.0 
2012 17.0 28.2 1.0 16.0 19.0 0.0 15.5 17.7 0.0 
2013 13.5 19.9 0.5 14.0 19.0 0.0 10.6 15.9 0.0 
2014 8.5 16.8 0.5 12.0 19.0 0.0 6.6 11.3 10.0 
2015 10.0 15.6 0.0 10.0 18.9 0.0 9.8 11.5 0.0 
2016 8.5 13.8 0.0 7.0 18.6 0.0 9.0 8.9 0.0 
2017 7.7 12.4 0.0 6.0 18.8 0.0 8.0 8.6 10.4 
2018 5.9 7.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.2 7.0 7.6 0.0 
2019 5.6 7.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 6.8 0.0 
2020 3.0 6.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 6.4 0.0 
2021 2.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 6.5 0.0 
2022 1.5 5.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 6.1 0.0 
2023 1.0 4.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 6.1 0.0 
2024 1.0 4.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.5 5.8 0.0 
2025 1.0 4.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.0 
2026 0.0 0.0 19.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2027 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Totals 305.8 423.2 466.9 397.0 302.2 444.3 277.4 285.1 348.4 
E6 
FIELDS DATA (Continued) 
Small Fields Medium Fields 
Scapa Captain Clair 
Year Total Total Total Total Total Total Total Total Total 
Production Production Production 
Liquids Opex Cape x Liquids Opex Capex Liquids Opex Cape x 
OOOb/d £M £M OOOb/d £M £M OOOb/d £M £:\.1 
2002 3.0 2.1 15.0 1.5 10.0 0.0 1.5 5.3 0.0 
2003 8.0 16.6 85.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2004 21.0 27.6 20.0 0.0 0.0 210.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2005 13.0 21.5 10.0 0.0 0.0 190.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2006 11.0 14.6 5.0 23.5 47.3 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2007 25.0 24.3 10.0 51.0 67.3 20.0 0.0 0.0 15.0 
2008 26.0 26.0 10.0 45.8 66.4 95.0 0.0 0.0 81.6 
2009 28.0 29.4 0.0 44.7 88.2 85.0 0.0 0.0 177.6 
2010 27.5 29.1 25.0 66.1 96.1 100.0 2.5 6.8 168.9 
2011 23.5 26.3 5.0 85.0 101.4 65.0 30.0 28.6 39.5 
2012 17.0 21.8 5.0 85.0 99.7 20.0 50.0 31.6 40.5 
2013 19.0 20.2 7.5 80.0 97.0 0.0 60.0 34.0 41.5 
2014 18.5 19.8 7.5 60.0 88.8 0.0 67.0 37.2 21.3 
2015 15.7 16.9 0.0 45.0 81.2 0.0 63.0 39.1 0.0 
2016 13.1 12.5 0.0 33.0 68.0 0.0 57.0 39.6 0.0 
2017 9.4 9.5 0.0 30.0 59.6 100.0 53.0 40.6 0.0 
2018 8.2 8.4 1.5 28.0 46.1 0.0 44.0 40.6 0.0 
2019 9.0 8.9 0.0 24.0 43.9 0.0 34.0 40.5 0.0 
2020 8.0 12.3 0.0 20.0 40.3 0.0 31.0 40.4 0.0 
2021 6.0 7.1 0.0 18.0 38.2 0.0 28.0 40.9 0.0 
2022 5.0 6.5 0.0 16.0 36.0 0.0 26.0 40.7 0.0 
2023 3.5 9.5 0.0 14.0 30.2 0.0 24.0 40.6 0.0 
2024 3.0 5.0 0.0 13.0 27.9 0.0 22.0 40.4 0.0 
2025 2.5 4.4 0.0 12.0 25.5 0.0 21.0 39.5 0.0 
2026 2.3 8.9 0.0 10.0 22.6 0.0 19.0 38.3 0.0 
2027 2.0 3.9 0.0 9.0 22.1 0.0 17.0 37.3 0.0 
2028 1.8 3.8 0.0 8.0 22.4 0.0 14.0 35.9 
0.0 
2029 1.7 8.5 0.0 7.0 22.7 0.0 12.0 36.4 
0.0 
2030 1.6 3.5 0.0 6.0 23.0 0.0 9.0 36.7 
0.0 
2031 1.4 3.2 0.0 5.0 23.2 0.0 0.0 
0.0 80.0 
2032 1.3 3.1 0.0 4.0 23.5 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
2033 1.2 2.8 0.0 3.0 11.5 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
2034 1.2 2.9 0.0 2.0 10.5 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
2035 1.1 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 120.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
2036 1.1 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
2037 1.0 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
2038 0.0 0.0 24.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
2039 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
665.9 
Totals 341.6 428.9 230.9 849.6 1440.6 1015.0 
685.0 770.9 
E7 
FIELDS DATA (Continued) 
Medium Fields 
Maureen Tern 
Year Total Total Total Total Total Total 
Production Production 
Liquids Ope x Cape x Liquids Opex Capex 
OOOb/d £M £M OOOb/d £M £M 
2002 0.0 0.0 42.2 0.0 0.0 31.0 
2003 0.0 0.0 124.7 0.0 0.0 125.0 
2004 0.0 0.0 173.8 0.0 0.0 130.0 
2005 0.0 0.0 188.7 0.0 0.0 80.0 
2006 16.0 28.0 164.7 17.5 25.6 52.0 
2007 75.0 60.0 51.1 34.0 44.0 15.0 
2008 78.0 64.1 14.4 53.0 50.0 12.0 
2009 75.0 59.0 0.0 73.5 50.0 6.0 
2010 70.5 42.0 0.0 69.0 50.0 20.0 
2011 61.0 35.0 0.0 64.5 50.0 41.0 
2012 52.5 35.0 0.0 68.0 50.0 30.0 
2013 46.0 30.0 0.0 57.0 48.0 25.0 
2014 36.5 30.0 5.0 54.0 47.0 25.0 
2015 25.0 25.0 12.5 46.9 43.3 25.0 
2016 18.0 25.0 2.5 43.6 38.0 20.0 
2017 15.5 23.0 0.0 37.0 35.6 35.0 
2018 10.8 20.0 0.0 35.4 34.2 10.0 
2019 9.0 18.5 0.0 30.0 31.9 15.3 
2020 10.0 18.3 5.0 30.0 29.0 15.7 
2021 9.5 18.0 5.0 30.0 26.5 16.1 
2022 3.7 12.5 2.0 26.0 24.6 16.5 
2023 0.0 0.0 3.0 23.0 22.2 0.0 
2024 0.0 0.0 54.0 20.0 19.9 0.0 
2025 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.0 18.0 0.0 
2026 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 17.0 0.0 
2027 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.5 16.1 0.0 
2028 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 96.1 
2029 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Totals 611.9 543.4 848.6 843.9 771.0 841.5 
E8 
FIELDS DATA (Continued) 
Large Fields 
Alba Schiehallion 
Year Total Production Total Total Total Production Total Total 
Liquids Ope x Capex Liquids Ope x Capex 
OOOb/d £M £M OOOb/d £M £\1 
2002 0.0 0.0 110.0 2.0 5.0 5.0 
2003 0.0 0.0 235.0 0.0 0.0 1-+0.0 
2004 0.0 0.0 220.0 0.0 0.0 392.5 
2005 44.0 54.0 50.0 18.0 16.8 17::.5 
2006 69.5 58.7 25.0 79.9 49.3 9,,).2 
2007 70.0 58.8 58.0 106.0 51.2 49.2 
2008 92.0 66.8 73.0 102.0 51.2 65.0 
2009 81.0 68.4 121.0 108.0 53..+ 20.0 
2010 73.4 69.3 37.0 108.0 55.1 0.0 
2011 77.6 65.7 11.0 108.0 55.5 0.0 
2012 78.2 63.9 70.0 105.0 54.9 0.0 
2013 74.0 64.1 50.9 100.0 55.7 0.0 
2014 86.0 72.4 10.4 90.0 55.0 0.0 
2015 74.0 68.8 5.4 80.0 52.0 0.0 
2016 60.0 63.1 0.0 70.0 51.6 0.0 
2017 48.0 57.4 0.0 55.0 47.7 0.0 
2018 42.0 49.4 0.0 40.0 45.9 0.0 
2019 34.0 48.5 0.0 30.0 44.0 0.0 
2020 29.0 46.8 0.0 20.0 42.6 0.0 
2021 25.0 47.3 0.0 17.0 41.0 0.0 
2022 23.5 41.9 0.0 15.0 37.9 0.0 
2023 22.0 34.9 0.0 12.0 35.4 0.0 
2024 22.0 32.6 0.0 11.0 34.3 0.0 
2025 20.0 30.4 0.0 10.0 35.2 0.0 
2026 18.0 30.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 78.0 
2027 16.0 31.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2028 14.0 32.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2029 12.0 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 
2030 0.0 0.0 110.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 
2031 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 
10164 
Totals: 1205.2 1291.4 1186.7 1286.9 970.7 
E9 
APPENDIXF 
OIL PRICE MODEL 
GEOMETRIC BROWNIAN MOTION! 
The GBM considers price changes in tenns of two components: a constant drift, a, 
and a random deviation from the tendency written as the product of a volatility 
parameter, cr, and an error term, Uf+l : 
(F. 1) 
Over a short interval of time, dt, the discrete time process is illustrated as: 
(F.2) 
When dt approaches zero, hence d~ = lim(~+dl - ~) , the left hand side becomes an 
instantaneous percentage change in price: d~ . The first tenn on the right side of the 
~ 
equation remains unchanged. As for the second tenn, the uncertain component, the 
series of discrete variables, u1 ' are substituted with a tenn, dz, called the standard 
Brownian Motion, where dz = limul+1Jdi , as dt approaches zero. 
The continuous time equation illustrating the GBM process is: 
dP 
_I = adt + (J'dz (F.3) 
~ 
I Source: Baker, Mayfield & Parsons (1998) and Emhejellen (1999). 
FI 
Because the percentage changes in P are normally distributed, and since these 
changes are in the natural logarithm of x, the absolute changes in Pare lognormally 
distributed. 
IfP(t) is given by equation (F.3) then F(t) = log P is given by: 
dF = (a -! ()2 )dt + ()dz 
2 (F.4) 
Over a finite time interval t, the change in the logarithm of P is normally distributed 
with mean (a - !()2)t and variance of ()2t. For P itself, ifP(O) = Po' the expected 
2 
value of pet) is: 
(F.5) 
and the variance ofP(t) is: 
(F.6) 
MEAN REVERSION MODEL 
Brownian Motion tends to wander far from its starting point (EmhjeIIen, 1999). 
However, under Mean Reversion Model (MRM), price might fluctuate as a 
consequence of various events, but in the long run it might be drawn back towards an 
initial value. 
The continuous time equation illustrating the MRM process is: 
dP = a(P' - P)dt + ()dz (F.7) 
where A is the speed of reversion and P'is the normal level ofP. 
F2 
If the value of P is currently Po and P follows Equation (F.7), then the expected 
value ofP(t) is: 
(F.8) 
and the variance of (~ - PI) is: 
2 
v(P -PI) =~(l-e-U/) 
t 2A (F.9) 
2 
As t becomes large, &(~) converges to P' and the variance converges to ~. Also 
2A ' 
as A tends to infinite, the variance tends to zero, and when A tends to zero, 
~ becomes a simple GBM. 
In both GBM and Mean Reversion Model the distribution of futures pnces IS 
lognormal. However, under GBM, oil prices in the future have a lognonnal 
distribution with variance growing proportionally to the time interval. Whereas under 
Mean Reversion model, the variance of the distributions grows in the beginning until 
a certain time t and remains constant after this. 
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APPENDIXG 
DCF VERSUS MAP RESULTS: ALBA FIELD EXAl\IPLE 
Table 1. Base Scenario (Pre-tax Scenario) 
Base Scenario DCF 'lAP 
Year Revenues Total Total Pre-tax Real Discounted Revenues Pre-tax Real Discounted 
Liquids OPEX CAPEX NCF NCF NCF Liquids NCF NCF NeF 
£M £M £M £M £M £M £M £:Vl £\1 £;"1 
(A) (8) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) 
2002 0.0 0.0 110.0 -110.0 -110.0 -110.0 0.0 -110.0 -110.0 -110.0 
2003 0.0 0.0 235.0 -235.0 -229.2 -207.4 0.0 -235.0 -229.2 -2247 
2004 0.0 0.0 220.0 -220.0 -209.3 -171.3 0.0 -220.0 -209J -20 l.l 
2005 224.8 54.0 50.0 120.8 112.1 83.0 189J 85.3 79.1 74.5 
2006 364.0 58.7 25.0 280.3 253.6 170.0 293.6 209.9 189.9 175.3 
2007 375.8 58.8 58.0 259.0 228.6 138.6 291.9 175.2 154.6 139.9 
2008 506.3 66.8 73.0 366.5 315.4 173.1 380.7 240.9 207J 183.9 
2009 456.9 68A 121.0 267.4 224.5 111.5 333.9 144.5 12 \.3 105.4 
2010 424.3 69.3 37.0 318.0 260J 117.0 302.5 196.2 160.6 136.9 
2011 460.1 65.7 11.0 383A 306.2 124.5 321.1 244.4 195.2 163.0 
2012 474.7 63.9 70.0 340.8 265.4 97.6 325.1 191.2 148.9 121.9 
2013 460.7 64.1 50.9 345.7 262.6 87.4 310.4 1954 148.4 119.1 
2014 548.8 72A lOA 466.0 345.2 104.0 364.6 281.8 208.7 164.2 
2015 484.0 68.8 5.4 409.8 296.1 80.7 317.6 2434 175.9 135.6 
2016 402.3 63.1 0.0 339.2 239.0 58.9 261.2 198.1 139.6 105.5 
2017 329.9 57A 0.0 272.5 187.3 41.8 212.2 154.8 106.4 78.8 
2018 295.8 49A 0.0 246.5 165.2 33.4 188.7 139.4 93.4 
67.8 
2019 245.5 48.5 0.0 197.0 128.8 23.5 155.5 107.0 70.0 
49.8 
2020 214.6 46.8 0.0 167.8 107.0 17.7 135.1 88J 56.3 
39.3 
2021 189.6 47.3 0.0 142.4 88.5 13.2 118.8 71.5 
44.4 30.4 
2022 182.7 41.9 0.0 140.8 85.4 11.6 113.9 72.0 
43.7 29.3 
2023 175.3 34.9 0.0 140.5 83.1 10.2 108.8 
74.0 43.8 28.7 
2024 179.7 32.6 0.0 147.1 84.9 9.4 111.2 
78.6 45.3 29.2 
2025 167.5 30A 0.0 137.0 77.1 7.7 103.3 
72.9 41.0 25.9 
2026 154.5 30.9 0.0 123.6 67.8 6.2 95.0 
64.1 35.2 21.8 
2027 140.8 31.7 0.0 109.1 58.4 4.8 86.4 
54.7 29.3 17.8 
2028 126.2 32.5 0.0 93.8 49.0 3.6 77.3 
44.8 23.4 13.9 
2029 110.9 33.3 0.0 77.6 39.5 2.7 67.8 
34.5 17.6 10.2 
2030 0.0 110.0 -110.0 -54.6 -3.3 
0.0 -110.0 -54.6 -31.2 0.0 
2031 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
1976.2 15013 
Totals: 7695.7 1291.4 1186.7 5217.6 3728.0 1040.1 
5265.9 2787.7 
Gl 
TABLE 1. BASE SCENARIO EXPLAINED 
(A) Oil Revenue as given in Appendix E, Table 1 
(B) aPEX as given in Appendix E, Table 1 
(C) CAPEX as given in Appendix E, Table 1 
NPV DCF Calculation 
(D) Pre-tax Net Cash Flow = Revenues - OPEX - CAPEX 
(D) = (A) - (B) - (C)) 
(E) Real pre-tax NCF = Pre-tax NCF (D) / Inflation Factor 
(F) Discounted Real NCF is equal to Real NCF mUltiplied by the discount factor 
(F) = (E) * e- rf , 
where r is the discount rate assumed to be 10% in real tenns and, t is the 
period, with year 2002 considered as period O. 
The total of column (F) gives the NPV using DCF technique. 
NPV MAP Calculation 
(G) Revenues adjusted for oil price risk. They are equal to revenues multiplied by 
the Risk Discount Factor (RDF), as given in Table 2, Column L. 
(G) = (A) * RDF 
(H) Pre-tax NCF is Revenues adjusted for risk less aPEX and CAPEX 
(H) = (G) - (B) - (C) 
(I) Real pre-tax NCF = Pre-tax NCF (H) / Inflation Factor 
(J) Discounted Real NCF is equal to Real NCF discounted for time only, i.e. it is 
equal to Real NCF multiplied by the Time Discount Factor TDF, as calculated 
in Table 2, Column K. 
The total of column (J) gives the NPV using MAP technique. 
G2 
Table 2. DISCOUNT FACTORS COMPARISOl\ 
Risk adjustment factor of oil prices 
Volatility factor of oil prices 
Rate of mean reversion 
Real risk free rate 
Year Period TDF 
(Real) 
(K) 
2002 0 1 
2003 1 0.9801987 
2004 2 0.9607894 
2005 3 0.9417645 
2006 4 0.9231163 
2007 5 0.9048374 
2008 6 0.8869204 
2009 7 0.8693582 
2010 8 0.8521438 
2011 9 0.8352702 
2012 10 0.8187308 
2013 11 0.8025188 
2014 12 0.7866279 
2015 13 0.7710516 
2016 14 0.7557837 
2017 15 0.7408182 
2018 16 0.726149 
2019 17 0.7117703 
2020 18 0.6976763 
2021 19 0.6838614 
2022 20 0.67032 
2023 21 0.6570468 
2024 22 0.6440364 
2025 23 0.6312836 
2026 24 0.6187834 
2027 25 0.6065307 
2028 26 0.5945205 
2029 27 0.5827483 
2030 28 0.5712091 
2031 29 0.5598984 
(G) TDF = e -j't 
¢ = 0.3503 
() = 0.2 
A = 0.139 


































(H) RDF = exp(-rpa(l - exp(-At))/A) 
(I) Total MAP Discounting = TDF * RDF 
(1) DCF Discounting = e -rt 
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Table 3. DCF versus MAP: Scenarios 2 
DCF MAP 
Year Total GOY Post-Tax Real Discounted Total GOY Post-Tax Real Discounted 
take NCF NCF NCF take NCF ~CF ~CF 
£M £M £M £M £M £M £M £M 
2002 0.0 -110.0 -110.0 -110.0 0.0 -110.0 -110.0 -110.0 
2003 0.0 -235.0 -229.2 -207.4 0.0 -235.0 -229.2 -22.+.7 
2004 0.0 -220.0 -209.3 -171.3 0.0 -220.0 -209.3 -201.1 
2005 2.5 118.3 109.7 81.3 2.1 83.2 77.2 727 
2006 25.7 254.6 230.4 154.4 20.7 189.2 171.2 158.0 
2007 50.2 208.8 184.3 111.8 23.9 151.3 133.5 120.8 
2008 233.0 133.4 114.9 63.0 141.1 99.8 85.9 76.2 
2009 202.9 64.5 54.2 26.9 88.0 56.5 47.4 41.2 
2010 217.9 100.1 81.9 36.8 113.1 83.1 68.0 58.0 
2011 315.1 68.3 54.6 22.2 142.3 102.1 81.5 68.1 
2012 278.4 62.5 48.6 17.9 114.8 76.5 59.6 48.8 
2013 282.2 63.4 48.2 16.0 138.4 57.0 43.3 34.8 
2014 386.5 79.5 58.9 17.7 232.9 48.8 36.2 28.4 
2015 336.8 73.0 52.8 14.4 199.2 44.3 32.0 24.7 
2016 274.3 64.9 45.7 11.3 159. I 38.9 27.4 20.7 
2017 215.4 57.0 39.2 8.7 121.0 33.7 23.2 17.2 
2018 204.3 42.1 28.2 5.7 107.3 32.1 21.5 15.6 
2019 173.2 23.8 15.6 2.8 94.5 12.5 8.2 5.8 
2020 147.6 20.2 12.9 2.1 78.1 10.2 6.5 4.5 
2021 125.4 17.0 10.6 1.6 63.4 8.1 5.0 3.4 
2022 124.0 16.8 10.2 1.4 63.8 8.2 5.0 3.3 
2023 123.7 16.8 9.9 1.2 65.5 8.5 5.0 3.3 
2024 129.6 17.5 10.1 1.1 69.5 9.1 5.2 3.4 
2025 120.7 16.3 9.2 0.9 64.5 8.4 4.7 3.0 
2026 109.0 14.6 8.0 0.7 56.8 7.3 4.0 2.5 
2027 96.2 12.8 6.9 0.6 48.6 6.1 3.3 2.0 
2028 82.8 11.0 5.7 0.4 39.9 4.9 2.6 1.5 
2029 68.6 9.0 4.6 0.3 30.9 3.6 1.9 1.1 
2030 -94.2 -15.8 -7.9 -0.5 -94.2 -15.8 -7.9 -4.5 
2031 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Totals: 4232.0 985.6 698.9 112.2 2185.2 602.5 402.9 
278.8 
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Table 4. DCF versus MAP: Scenarios 3 
DCF .\IA.P 
! Year Total Gov Post-Tax Real Discounted Total Gov Post-Tax Real Discounted 
I take NCF NCF NCF take NCF \1CF NCF 
£M £M £M £M £M £M £M £M 
I 
2002 0.0 -110.0 -110.0 -110.0 0.0 -110.0 -110.0 -110.0 
2003 0.0 -235.0 -229.2 -207.4 0.0 -235.0 -229.2 -22-U 
2004 0.0 -220.0 -209.3 -171.3 0.0 -220.0 -209.3 -201.1 
2005 0.0 120.8 112.1 83.0 0.0 85.3 79.1 74.5 
2006 0.0 280.3 253.6 170.0 0.0 209.9 189.9 175.3 
2007 31.8 227.2 200.5 121.6 0.0 175.2 154.6 139.9 
2008 180.0 186.4 160.5 88.1 99.9 141.0 121.3 107.6 
2009 179.8 87.7 73.6 36.5 59.2 85.3 71.6 62.2 
2010 208.4 109.6 89.7 40.3 65.0 131.2 107.4 91.5 
2011 289.6 93.8 74.9 30.5 84.0 160.4 128.1 107.0 
2012 253.5 87.3 68.0 25.0 101.7 89.6 69.8 57.1 
2013 256.8 88.9 67.5 22.5 141.8 53.6 40.7 32.7 
2014 356.5 109.4 81.1 24.4 213.7 68.0 50.4 39.7 
2015 308.9 100.9 72.9 19.9 181.5 62.0 44.8 34.5 
2016 249.1 90.1 63.5 15.7 143.3 54.8 38.6 29.2 
2017 192.5 80.0 55.0 12.3 106.7 48.0 33.0 24.5 
2018 206.4 40.1 26.9 5.4 105.1 34.2 22.9 16.7 
2019 165.1 31.9 20.9 3.8 89.8 17.3 11.3 8.0 
2020 140.7 27.1 17.3 2.9 74.1 14.2 9.0 6.3 
2021 119.4 22.9 14.3 2.1 60.1 11.4 7.1 4.8 
2022 118.2 22.7 13.7 1.9 60.5 11.5 7.0 4.7 
2023 117.9 22.6 13.4 1.6 62.2 11.8 7.0 4.6 
2024 123.5 23.6 13.6 1.5 66.0 12.5 7.2 4.7 
2025 115.1 22.0 12.4 1.2 61.3 I\.6 6.5 4.1 
2026 103.8 19.7 10.8 1.0 54.0 10.2 5.6 3.4 
2027 91.7 17.4 9.3 0.8 46.1 8.6 4.6 2.8 
2028 78.9 14.9 7.8 0.6 37.8 7.0 3.7 2.2 
2029 65.4 12.2 6.2 0.4 29.2 5.3 2.7 \.6 
2030 -91.6 -18.4 -9.1 -0.6 -91.6 -18.4 -9.1 
-5.2 
2031 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 
Totals: 3861.4 1356.2 981.9 223.7 1851.4 936.3 666.3 
498.6 
( ''I I. 
Table 5. DCF versus MAP: Scenarios 4 
DCF \IAP 
Year Total GOY Post-Tax Real Discounted Total GOY Post-Tax Real Discounted 
take NCF NCF NCF take NCF NCF 1\CF 
£M £M £M £M £M £M £M £M 
2002 0.0 -110.0 -110.0 -110.0 0.0 -110.0 -110.0 -110.0 
2003 0.0 -235.0 -229.2 -207.4 0.0 -235.0 -229.2 ,') 1 'i - __ ""t. I 
2004 0.0 -220.0 -209.3 -171.3 0.0 -220.0 -209.3 -201.1 
2005 0.0 120.8 112.1 83.0 0.0 85.3 79.1 7-+.5 
2006 0.0 280.3 253.6 170.0 0.0 209.9 189.9 175.3 
2007 28.9 230.1 203.1 123.2 0.0 175.2 154.6 139.9 
2008 163.2 203.3 175.0 96.0 93.6 147.3 126.8 112.-+ 
2009 154.2 113.3 95.1 47.2 55.3 89.1 74.8 65.1 
2010 180.3 137.6 112.7 50.6 59.1 137.1 112.3 95.7 
2011 228.7 154.7 123.6 50.2 76.8 167.6 133.8 111.8 
2012 200.6 140.2 109.2 40.2 84.3 107.0 83.3 682 
2013 203.2 142.4 108.2 36.0 112.6 82.8 62.9 50.5 
2014 281.2 184.8 136.9 41.2 168.7 113.0 83.7 65.9 
2015 244.0 165.8 119.8 32.6 143.6 99.9 72.2 55.6 
2016 197.4 141.8 99.9 24.6 113.8 84.3 59.4 44.9 
2017 153.3 119.2 81.9 18.3 85.3 69.5 47.8 35.4 
2018 161.2 85.3 57.2 11.5 83.1 56.3 37.7 274 
2019 128.9 68.1 44.5 8.1 70.1 36.9 24.1 17.2 
2020 109.8 58.0 37.0 6.1 57.9 30.4 19.4 13.5 
2021 93.2 49.1 30.5 4.6 46.9 24.6 15.3 10.4 
2022 92.3 48.6 29.5 4.0 47.3 24.7 15.0 10.1 
2023 92.0 48.4 28.6 3.5 48.5 25.4 15.0 9.9 
2024 96.4 50.7 29.3 3.2 51.6 270 15.6 10.0 
2025 89.9 47.2 26.6 2.7 47.8 25.0 14.1 8.9 
2026 81.1 42.5 23.3 2.1 42.1 22.0 12.1 7.5 
2027 71.6 37.5 20.1 1.6 36.0 18.7 10.0 6.1 
2028 61.6 32.2 16.8 1.2 29.6 15.3 8.0 47 
2029 51.1 26.6 13.5 0.9 22.8 11.7 6.0 3.5 
2030 -88.0 -22.0 -10.9 -0.7 -71.5 -38.5 -19.1 -10.9 
2031 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 
Totals: 3076.0 2141.6 1528.5 373.6 1505.1 1282.6 905.4 
677.7 
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Table 6. DCF versus MAP: Scenarios 5 
DCF MAP 
Year Total GOY Post-Tax Real Discounted Total GOY Post-Tax Real Discounted 
take NCF NCF NCF take :\CF NCF NCF 
£M £M £M £M £M £M £M £\1 
2002 0.0 -110.0 -110.0 -110.0 0.0 -110.0 -110.0 -110.0 
2003 0.0 -235.0 -229.2 -207.4 0.0 -235.0 -229.2 -22-U 
2004 0.0 -220.0 -209.3 -171.3 0.0 -220.0 -209.3 -201.1 
2005 0.0 120.8 112.1 83.0 0.0 85.3 79.1 74.5 
2006 0.0 280.3 253.6 170.0 0.0 209.9 189.9 175.3 
2007 28.9 230.1 203.1 123.2 0.0 175.2 154.6 139.9 
2008 110.2 256.2 220.6 121.0 72.5 168.4 144.9 128.6 
2009 80.5 186.9 156.9 77.9 43.6 100.9 84.7 73.7 
2010 95.7 222.3 182.0 81.8 59.1 137.1 112.3 95.7 
2011 115.4 268.0 214.0 87.0 73.6 170.8 136.4 113.9 
2012 102.7 238.1 185.5 68.2 57.7 133.6 104.0 85.2 
2013 104.2 241.5 183.4 61.1 58.9 136.5 103.7 83.2 
2014 140.4 325.6 241.2 72.6 84.9 196.8 145.8 114.7 
2015 123.5 286.3 206.9 56.4 73.4 170.0 122.8 94.7 
2016 102.3 236.9 167.0 41.2 59.8 138.3 97.5 73.7 
2017 82.2 190.3 130.8 29.2 46.7 108.0 743 55.0 
2018 74.4 172.1 115.4 23.3 42.1 97.3 65.2 47.3 
2019 59.5 137.5 89.9 16.4 32.4 74.7 48.8 34.8 
2020 50.7 117.1 74.7 12.3 26.7 61.6 39.3 274 
2021 43.0 99.3 61.8 9.2 21.6 49.8 31.0 21.2 
2022 42.6 98.2 59.6 8.1 21.8 50.2 30.4 20.4 
2023 42.5 98.0 58.0 7.1 22.4 51.6 30.5 20.0 
2024 44.5 102.6 59.2 6.6 23.8 54.8 31.6 20.4 
2025 41.5 95.6 53.8 5.4 22.1 50.8 28.6 18.0 
2026 37.4 86.2 47.3 4.3 19.4 44.7 24.5 15.2 
2027 33.1 76.0 40.7 3.3 16.6 38.1 20.4 12.4 
2028 28.4 65.3 34.1 2.5 13.6 31.2 16.3 9.7 
2029 23.6 54.1 27.5 1.9 10.5 24.0 12.2 7.1 
2030 -33.0 -77.0 -38.2 -2.3 -33.0 -77.0 -38.2 
-21.8 
2031 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 
Totals: 1574.2 3643.5 2592.1 682.0 870.3 1917.5 1342.1 
1004.3 
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Table 7. DCF versus MAP: Scenarios 6 
DCF 'lAP 
Year Total GOY Post-Tax Real Discounted Total GOY Post-Tax Real Discounted 
take NCF NCF NCF take NCF NCF ~CF 
£M £M £M £M £M £M £M £M 
2002 0.0 -110.0 -110.0 -110.0 0.0 -110.0 -110.0 -110.0 
2003 0.0 -235.0 -229.2 -207.4 0.0 -235.0 -229.2 -224.7 
2004 0.0 -220.0 -209.3 -171.3 0.0 -220.0 -209.3 -201.1 
2005 0.0 120.8 112.1 83.0 0.0 85.3 79.1 74.5 
2006 0.0 280.3 253.6 170.0 0.0 209.9 189.9 175.3 
2007 38.5 220.5 194.6 118.0 0.0 175.2 154.6 139.9 
2008 147.0 219.5 188.9 103.7 96.6 144.2 124.2 110.1 
2009 107.4 160.1 134.4 66.7 58.1 86.4 72.5 631 
2010 127.6 190.4 155.8 70.0 78.8 117.4 96.1 81.9 
2011 153.9 229.6 183.3 74.5 98.1 146.3 116.8 97.6 
2012 136.9 203.9 158.8 58.4 76.9 114.3 89.1 72.9 
2013 138.9 206.8 157.1 52.3 78.6 116.8 88.7 71.2 
2014 187.2 278.8 206.5 62.2 113.2 168.5 124.8 98.2 
2015 164.7 245.1 177.1 48.3 97.9 145.5 105.2 81.1 
2016 136.4 202.8 142.9 35.2 79.7 118.4 83.4 63.1 
2017 109.6 162.9 111.9 25.0 62.3 92.5 63.6 471 
2018 99.2 147.3 98.7 19.9 56.1 83.2 55.8 40.5 
2019 79.3 117.7 76.9 14.1 43.1 63.9 41.8 29.7 
2020 67.6 100.2 63.9 10.6 35.6 52.7 33.6 23.4 
2021 57.4 85.0 52.8 7.9 28.9 42.6 26.5 18.1 
2022 56.8 84.1 51.0 6.9 29.1 42.9 26.0 17.5 
2023 56.6 83.8 49.6 6.1 29.9 44.1 26.1 17.1 
2024 59.3 87.8 50.6 5.6 31.7 46.8 27.0 17.4 
2025 55.3 81.8 46.0 4.6 29.4 43.4 24.4 15.4 
2026 49.9 73.7 40.4 3.7 25.9 38.2 21.0 13.0 
2027 44.1 65.0 34.8 2.9 22.1 32.6 17.4 10.6 
2028 37.9 55.9 29.2 2.2 18.2 26.7 13.9 8.3 
2029 31.4 46.2 23.5 1.6 14.0 20.5 10.4 6.1 
2030 -44.0 -66.0 -32.8 -2.0 -44.0 -66.0 -32.8 
-18.7 
2031 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 
Totals: 2098.9 3118.7 2213.4 562.6 1160.3 1627.4 1130.8 
8386 
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Table 8. DCF versus MAP: Scenarios 7a 
DCF 'lAP 
Year Total GOY Post-Tax Real Discounted Total GOY Post-Tax Real Discounted 
take NCF NCF NCF take NCF NCF NCF 
£M £M £M £M £M £M £M £:-'1 
2002 0.0 -110.0 -110.0 -110.0 0.0 -110.0 -110.0 -110.0 
2003 0.0 -235.0 -229.2 -207.4 0.0 -235.0 -229.2 -224.7 
2004 0.0 -220.0 -209.3 -171.3 0.0 -220.0 -209.3 -201.1 
2005 0.0 120.8 112.1 83.0 0.0 85.3 79.1 74.5 
2006 0.0 280.3 253.6 170.0 0.0 209.9 189.9 175.3 
2007 59.2 199.8 176.4 107.0 0.0 175.2 154.6 139.9 
2008 240.2 126.3 108.7 59.6 142.4 98.5 84.8 75.2 
2009 170.5 97.0 81.4 40.4 78.6 65.9 55.3 48.1 
2010 205.4 112.5 92.1 41.4 106.2 90.0 73.6 62.8 
2011 251.0 132.5 105.8 43.0 158.9 85.5 68.3 57.0 
2012 220.8 120.0 93.5 34.4 121.7 69.5 54.2 44.3 
2013 223.8 121.9 92.6 30.8 124.5 70.9 53.8 43.2 
2014 307.9 158.1 117.1 35.3 185.1 96.7 71.6 56.4 
2015 268.0 141.8 102.5 27.9 158.0 85.4 61.7 47.6 
2016 217.9 121.3 85.5 21.1 126.0 72.1 50.8 38.4 
2017 181.2 91.3 62.8 14.0 95.3 59.4 40.8 30.3 
2018 173.6 72.9 48.9 9.9 98.2 41.2 27.6 20.0 
2019 138.8 58.2 38.1 7.0 75.5 31.5 20.6 14.7 
2020 118.3 49.5 31.6 5.2 62.3 26.0 16.6 11.6 
2021 100.4 41.9 26.1 3.9 50.5 21.0 13.0 8.9 
2022 99.4 41.5 25.1 3.4 50.9 21.1 12.8 8.6 
2023 99.1 41.3 24.5 3.0 52.3 21.7 12.8 8.4 
2024 103.8 43.3 25.0 2.8 55.5 23.0 13.3 8.6 
2025 96.8 40.3 22.7 2.3 51.5 21.3 12.0 7.6 
2026 87.3 36.3 19.9 1.8 45.4 18.7 10.3 6.4 
2027 77.1 32.0 17.1 1.4 38.8 15.9 8.5 5.2 
2028 66.4 27.4 14.3 1.1 31.8 13.0 6.8 4.0 
2029 55.0 22.6 11.5 0.8 24.6 10.0 5.1 3.0 
2030 -77.0 -33.0 -16.4 -1.0 -77.0 -33.0 -16.4 
-9.4 
2031 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 
Totals: 3484.8 1732.9 1223.8 260.7 1857.0 930.8 633.3 
454.7 
G9 
Table 9. DCF versus MAP: Scenarios 7b 
DCF MAP 
Year Total Gov Post-Tax Real Discounted Total Gov Post-Tax Real Discounted 
take NCF NCF NCF take NCF NCF NCF 
£M £M £M £M £M £M £M L'vl 
2002 0.0 -110.0 -110.0 -110.0 0.0 -110.0 -110.0 -110.0 
2003 0.0 -235.0 -229.2 -207.4 0.0 -235.0 -229.2 -224.7 
2004 0.0 -220.0 -209.3 -171.3 0.0 -220.0 -209.3 -201.1 
2005 0.0 120.8 112.1 83.0 0.0 85.3 79.1 74.5 
2006 0.0 280.3 253.6 170.0 0.0 209.9 189.9 175.3 
2007 38.5 220.5 194.6 118.0 0.0 175.2 154.6 139.9 
2008 210.8 155.6 133.9 73.5 96.6 144.2 124.2 110.1 
2009 181.3 86.1 72.3 35.9 58.1 86.4 72.5 63.1 
2010 209.0 108.9 89.2 40.1 78.8 117.4 96.1 81.9 
2011 269.3 114.1 91.1 37.1 99.4 145.0 115.8 96.7 
2012 239.6 101.2 78.8 29.0 134.6 56.7 44.1 36.1 
2013 243.1 102.6 77.9 25.9 137.5 57.9 44.0 35.3 
2014 327.6 138.4 102.5 30.9 198.2 83.6 61.9 48.7 
2015 288.2 121.6 87.9 23.9 171.3 72.1 52.1 40.2 
2016 238.7 100.5 70.9 17.5 139.4 58.6 41.3 31.2 
2017 191.8 80.7 55.4 12.4 109.0 45.7 31.4 23.3 
2018 173.6 72.9 48.9 9.9 98.2 41.2 27.6 20.0 
2019 138.8 58.2 38.1 7.0 75.5 31.5 20.6 14.7 
2020 118.3 49.5 31.6 5.2 62.3 26.0 16.6 11.6 
2021 100.4 41.9 26.1 3.9 50.5 21.0 13.0 8.9 
2022 99.4 41.5 25.1 3.4 50.9 21.1 12.8 8.6 
2023 99.1 41.3 24.5 3.0 52.3 21.7 12.8 8.4 
2024 103.8 43.3 25.0 2.8 55.5 23.0 13.3 8.6 
2025 96.8 40.3 22.7 2.3 51.5 21.3 12.0 7.6 
2026 87.3 36.3 19.9 1.8 45.4 18.7 10.3 6.4 
2027 77.1 32.0 17.1 1.4 38.8 15.9 8.5 5.2 
2028 66.4 27.4 14.3 1.1 31.8 13.0 6.8 
4.0 
2029 55.0 22.6 11.5 0.8 24.6 10.0 5.1 
3.0 
2030 -77.0 -33.0 -16.4 -1.0 -77.0 -33.0 -16.4 
-9.4 
2031 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 
Totals: 3577.0 1640.7 1160.1 249.9 1783.1 1004.6 
701.8 518.2 
GlO 
Table 10. DCF versus MAP: Scenarios 7c 
DCF \lAP 
Year Total Gov Post-Tax Real Discounted Total Gov Post-Tax Real Discounted 
take NCF NCF Posttax CF take NCF NCF NCF 
£M £M £M £M £M £M £M £~I 
2002 0.0 -110.0 -110.0 -110.0 0.0 -110.0 -110.0 -110.0 
2003 0.0 -235.0 -229.2 -207.4 0.0 -235.0 -229.2 -2247 
2004 0.0 -220.0 -209.3 -171.3 0.0 -220.0 -209.3 -201.1 
2005 0.0 120.8 112.1 83.0 0.0 85.3 79.1 74.5 
2006 0.0 280.3 253.6 170.0 0.0 209.9 189.9 175.3 
2007 38.5 220.5 194.6 118.0 0.0 175.2 154.6 139.9 
2008 190.9 175.5 151.1 82.9 96.6 144.2 124.2 110.1 
2009 170.5 97.0 81.4 40.4 58.1 86.4 72.5 63.1 
2010 205.4 112.5 92.1 41.4 78.8 117.4 96.1 81.9 
2011 251.0 132.5 105.8 43.0 98.1 146.3 116.8 97.6 
2012 220.8 120.0 93.5 34.4 99.7 91.5 71.3 584 
2013 223.8 121.9 92.6 30.8 124.5 70.9 53.8 43.2 
2014 307.9 158.1 117.1 35.3 185.1 96.7 71.6 56.4 
2015 268.0 141.8 102.5 27.9 158.0 85.4 61.7 47.6 
2016 217.9 121.3 85.5 21.1 126.0 72.1 50.8 38.4 
2017 170.5 102.0 70.1 15.6 95.3 59.4 40.8 30.3 
2018 162.6 83.8 56.2 11.3 91.2 48.1 32.3 23.4 
2019 138.8 58.2 38.1 7.0 75.5 31.5 20.6 14.7 
2020 118.3 49.5 31.6 5.2 62.3 26.0 16.6 11.6 
2021 100.4 41.9 26.1 3.9 50.5 21.0 13.0 8.9 
2022 99.4 41.5 25.1 3.4 50.9 21.1 12.8 8.6 
2023 99.1 41.3 24.5 3.0 52.3 21.7 12.8 8.4 
2024 103.8 43.3 25.0 2.8 55.5 23.0 13.3 8.6 
2025 96.8 40.3 22.7 2.3 51.5 21.3 12.0 7.6 
2026 87.3 36.3 19.9 1.8 45.4 18.7 10.3 6.4 
2027 77.1 32.0 17.1 1.4 38.8 15.9 8.5 5.2 
2028 66.4 27.4 14.3 1.1 31.8 13.0 6.8 4.0 
2029 55.0 22.6 11.5 0.8 24.6 10.0 5.1 3.0 
2030 -77.0 -33.0 -16.4 -1.0 -77.0 -33.0 -16.4 -9.4 
2031 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 




THE BLACK-SCHOLES MODELl 
ORIGINAL BLACK SCHOLES FORMULA 
The original Black-Scholes fonnula for the price of a European call option on stock 
has five parameters, four of which are directly observable and which are the price of 
the stock, the exercise price, the risk free rate and the time to maturity of the option. 
The fonnula is: 
Where: 
C = N(dt)S - N(d 2 )Ee-rT 
d = In(S / E) + (r + cr 2 /2)T 
1 crJT 
d 2 = d1 -crJT 
C: the price of the call 
S: the price of the stock 
E: the exercise price 
(H. I) 
r: the risk-free interest rate (the annualised continuously compounded rate on 
a safe asset with the same maturity as the option) 
T: the time to maturity of the option (in years) 
a: the standard deviation of the annualised continuously compounded rate of 
return on the stock 
In: the natural logarithm 
e: the base of natural log function (approximately 2.71828) 
N(d): the probability that a random draw from a standard normal distribution 
will be less than d 
HI 
DEDUCTION OF THE PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIO~2 
The Paddock, Siegel & Smith model is the most popular model for petroleum real 
options applications (Dias, 2001). The model is based on the Black-Scholes formula 
and is used to derive the option value of a petroleum project. This model has 
practical advantages due to its simplicity and few parameters estimation. 
The following are the variables used in the model, where: 
B
I
: the number of barrels of oil in the developed reserve 
VI : the value per barrel of the developed reserve 
R
I
: the return over an instant of time to the owner of the developed reserve. This 
return consists of the flow of profits from production and the capital gain on the 
remaining oil. 
t = T : the time to expiration. 
a
v 
: the risk adjusted expected rate of return to the owner 
(J"v: the standard deviation of the rate of return to the owner. 
dz: Wiener increment (random increment) 
OJ : the fraction of oil in the reserve produced each year. 
n : the after tax profit from a barrel of oil 
8: the dividend yield from a unit of developed reserve 
i: the risk-free interest rate (real and after tax) 
1: the investment cost per barrel 
R is assumed to follow a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM): 
t 
R dt / B V = a dt + (J"v dz I I I v 
I Adapted from Bodie & Merton (2000) 
2 Adapted from Dias (2001) and Emhjellen (1999) 
H2 
(H.2) 
The production from a developed reserve IS assumed to follow an exponential 
decline: 
dBt = -wB, dt (H.3) 
Then, R, can be written as: 




Using equation (H.S) and letting the F(V,t) denote the value of an undeveloped barrel 
of oil, with the use of Ito's Lemma, F(V,t), must satisfy: 
(H.7) 
Equation (H.7) must be solved subject to the following boundary conditions: 
F(O,t) = 0 
F(V,t) = max(V, - 1,0) 
F(V· ,t) = V· -1 
F' (V·, t) = 1 
H3 
Where: 
I is the proj ect development cost 
P(O, t) = ° condition arises from the observation that if V goes to zero, it will stay 
at zero. Therefore the option to invest will be of no value when V=O 
V· is the price at which it is optimal to invest 
P(V' ,t) = V* - I is the value matching condition where upon investing the firm 
receives V· - I 
p' (V' ,t) = 1 is the smooth pasting condition, where if F(V) were not continuous 
and smooth at the critical exercise point V· , one could do better by exercising at 



































INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON- EXAMPLE 
Table 1. Arbroath field pre-tax NCF 
Period Total Revenue Total Total Pre-tax Real Discounted 
Production Ope x Capex NCF NCF Pretax CF 
OOOb/d £M £M £M £M £M £M 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) 
0 0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 55.0 -55 -53.6 -48.5 
2 0 0 0 70.0 -70 -66.6 -54.5 
3 25 127.9 39.1 60.0 28.8 26.7 19.8 
4 34 178.3 43.7 15.0 119.6 108.2 72.5 
5 35.5 190.9 40.2 0.0 150.7 133 80.6 
6 33.5 184.7 39.2 0.0 145.5 125.2 68.7 
7 32 180.9 38.5 0.0 142.4 119.5 59.4 
8 35.5 205.7 40.2 5.0 160.5 13 1.4 59.1 
9 31.5 187.2 38.2 10.0 138.9 110.9 45.1 
10 24 146.2 34.5 0.0 111.7 87 32 
11 24.5 153 49.3 0.0 103.8 78.8 26.2 
12 26.7 171.1 277 0.0 143.4 106.2 32 
13 21.3 139.9 30.2 5.0 104.7 75.7 20.6 
14 17.4 117.3 53.1 5.0 59.2 41.7 10.3 
15 20 138.1 43.1 7.0 88 60.5 13.5 
16 20 141.6 21.7 10.0 109.9 73.6 14.9 
17 19 137.9 20.4 1.0 116.5 76.2 13.9 
18 17 126.5 21.2 1.0 104.4 66.5 I 1 
19 14 106.8 21.9 1.0 83.9 52.2 7.8 
20 11 86.1 20.1 1.0 65 39.4 5.3 
21 9 72.2 18.7 1.0 52.5 31.1 3.8 
22 8 65.8 17.9 1.0 46.9 27 3 
23 7 59 17.2 1.0 40.8 23 2.3 
24 6 51.9 16.4 0.0 35.5 19.5 1.8 
25 6 53.2 16.7 0.0 36.5 19.5 1.6 
26 5 45.4 16.4 0.0 29 15.2 1.1 
27 5 46.6 16.8 0.0 29.8 15.2 
1 
28 0 0 0 40.0 -40 
-19.9 -1.2 
29 0 0 0 0.0 0 0 
0 
/487.9 3114.2 742.4 289.0 2082.7 
1523.1 503.1 
See Appendix E and G, for more detail regarding the pre-tax NCF calculation. 
II 
Table 2. Arbroath Field under Australian Regime 
PRRT calculations CIT Calculations 
Year Gross Camp. Loss CF Taxable PRRT Dep. Taxable CT Gov. Real NCF Disc.NCF 
Revenues CAPEX Income at 40% Income at 30% Take Post-tax Post-tax 
£M £M £M £M £M £M £M £M £M 
(H) (1) (1) (K) (L) (M) (N) (0) (P) (Q) (R) 
2002 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2003 0.0 55.0 55.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -53.6 -48.5 
2004 0.0 133.3 133.3 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -66.6 -54.5 
2005 88.8 213.2 1245 0.0 0.0 7.4 81.4 24.4 24.4 4.0 3.0 
2006 134.6 158.2 23.6 0.0 0.0 8.0 126.6 38.0 38.0 73.9 49.5 
2007 150.7 27.1 0.0 123.6 49.4 8.0 93.2 28.0 774 64.7 39.2 
2008 145.5 0.0 0.0 145.5 58.2 8.0 79.2 23.8 82.0 54.7 30.0 
2009 142.4 0.0 0.0 142.4 57.0 8.0 77.4 23.2 80.2 52.2 25.9 
2010 165.5 5.0 0.0 160.5 64.2 8.3 93.0 27.9 92.1 56.0 25.2 
2011 148.9 10.0 0.0 138.9 55.6 8.8 84.6 25.4 80.9 46.3 18.8 
2012 111.7 0.0 0.0 111.7 44.7 8.8 58.2 175 62.2 38.6 14.2 
2013 103.8 0.0 0.0 103.8 41.5 8.8 53.5 16.0 57.6 35.1 11.7 
2014 143.4 0.0 0.0 143.4 57.4 8.8 77.2 23.2 80.5 46.6 14.0 
2015 109.7 5.0 0.0 104.7 41.9 9.1 58.7 17.6 595 32.7 8.9 
2016 64.2 5.0 0.0 59.2 23.7 95 31.0 9.3 33.0 18.5 4.6 
2017 95.0 7.0 0.0 88.0 35.2 10.0 49.8 14.9 50.1 26.0 5.8 
2018 119.9 10.0 0.0 109.9 43.9 10.9 65.1 195 63.5 31.1 6.3 
2019 117.5 1.0 0.0 116.5 46.6 11.0 60.0 18.0 64.6 33.9 6.2 
2020 105.4 1.0 0.0 104.4 41.7 11.1 52.6 15.8 57.5 29.9 4.9 
2021 84.9 1.0 0.0 83.9 33.6 11.2 40.2 12.0 45.6 23.8 3.6 
2022 66.0 1.0 0.0 65.0 26.0 11.3 28.7 8.6 34.6 18.4 2.5 
2023 53.5 1.0 0.0 52.5 21.0 11.4 21.1 6.3 27.3 14.9 1.8 
2024 47.9 1.0 0.0 46.9 18.7 11.6 17.5 5.3 24.0 13.2 1.5 
2025 41.8 1.0 0.0 40.8 16.3 11.8 13.7 4.1 20.5 11.5 1.2 
2026 35.5 0.0 0.0 35.5 14.2 11.8 9.5 2.8 17.0 10.1 0.9 
2027 36.5 0.0 0.0 36.5 14.6 11.8 10.1 3.0 17.6 10.1 0.8 
2028 29.0 0.0 0.0 29.0 11.6 11.8 5.6 1.7 13.3 8.2 0.6 
2029 29.8 0.0 0.0 29.8 11.9 11.8 6.1 1.8 13.7 8.2 
0.5 
2030 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -19.9 
-1.2 
2031 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 
Totals: 2371.7 635.7 336.3 2072.3 828.9 249.0 1293.8 388.1 1217.1 622.4 
177.4 
I2 
Table 2. Arbroath Field under Australian Regime- Explained 
PRRT Calculation 
(H) Gross Revenue = Revenue (B) - OPEX (C) 
(I) Compounded CAPEXt = CAPEXt (D)+ LossCFt-l (J) x 1.15 
(J) Any losses not written off are carried for the following period. 
(K) Taxable Income = Gross Revenue (H) - Compounded Capex (1) 
(L) PRRT = 40% x Taxable Profit (K) 
CT Calculation 
(M) Depreciation = CAPEX are depreciated on a straight-line basis over field 
life. 
(N) Taxable Income = Revenue (B) - OPEX (C) - Depreciation (M) - PRRT (L) 
(0) CT = 30% x Taxable Income (N) 
Pre-tax NCF Calculation 
(P) Total Government Take = PRRT (L) + CT (0) 
(Q) Real NCF Post-tax = [Pre-tax NCF (E) - Government Take (P)]/Inflation 
Factor 
(R) Discounted NCF Post-tax = Real NCF (Q) x Discount factor. 
I3 
Table 3. Arbroath Field under Norwegian Regime 
ST Calculations CT calculations 
Year Dep. Uplift ST Base Loss CF Taxable ST Payable CT Base Loss CF Taxable CT Payable 
Income 50% Income 28% 
£M £M £M £M £M £M £M £M £M £\! 
(S) (T) (U) (V) (W) (X) (Y) (Z) (AA) (BB) 
2002 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2003 9.2 2.8 -11.9 -11.9 0.0 0.0 -9.2 -9.2 0.0 0.0 
2004 20.8 6.3 -27.1 -39.0 0.0 0.0 -20.8 -30.0 0.0 0.0 
2005 30.8 9.3 48.7 0.0 9.7 4.8 57.9 0.0 27.9 7.8 
2006 33.3 10.0 91.3 0.0 91.3 45.6 101.3 0.0 101.3 28.4 
2007 33.3 10.0 107.3 0.0 107.3 53.7 117.3 0.0 117.3 32.8 
2008 33.3 10.0 102.1 0.0 102.1 51.1 112.1 0.0 112.1 31.4 
2009 24.2 7.3 111.0 0.0 111.0 55.5 118.2 0.0 118.2 33.1 
2010 13.3 3.8 148.4 0.0 148.4 74.2 152.2 0.0 152.2 42.6 
2011 5.0 0.8 143.2 0.0 143.2 71.6 143.9 0.0 143.9 403 
2012 2.5 0.0 109.2 0.0 109.2 54.6 109.2 0.0 109.2 30.6 
2013 2.5 0.0 IOU 0.0 IOU 50.6 101.3 0.0 1013 28.4 
2014 2.5 0.0 140.9 0.0 140.9 70.4 140.9 0.0 140.9 39.4 
2015 3J 0.0 106.4 0.0 106.4 53.2 106.4 0.0 106.4 29.8 
2016 3.3 0.0 60.9 0.0 60.9 30.4 60.9 0.0 60.9 17.0 
2017 2.8 0.0 92.2 0.0 92.2 46.1 92.2 0.0 92.2 25.8 
2018 4.5 0.0 115.4 0.0 115.4 57.7 115.4 0.0 115.4 32.3 
2019 4.7 0.0 112.9 0.0 112.9 56.4 112.9 0.0 112.9 31.6 
2020 4.8 0.0 100.5 0.0 100.5 50.3 100.5 0.0 100.5 28.1 
2021 4.2 0.0 80.7 0.0 80.7 40.4 80.7 0.0 80.7 22.6 
2022 3.5 0.0 62.5 0.0 62.5 31.2 62.5 0.0 62.5 17.5 
2023 2.5 0.0 51.0 0.0 51.0 25.5 51.0 0.0 51.0 14J 
2024 1.0 0.0 46.9 0.0 46.9 23.4 46.9 0.0 46.9 13.1 
2025 0.8 0.0 41.0 0.0 41.0 20.5 41.0 0.0 41.0 11.5 
2026 0.7 0.0 34.8 0.0 34.8 17.4 34.8 0.0 34.8 9.7 
2027 0.5 0.0 36.0 0.0 36.0 18.0 36.0 0.0 36.0 10.1 
2028 OJ 0.0 28.7 0.0 28.7 14.4 28.7 0.0 28.7 8.0 
2029 0.2 0.0 29.6 0.0 29.6 14.8 29.6 0.0 29.6 8.3 
2030 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2031 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Totals: 248.0 60.0 2063.7 -50.9 2063.7 1031.9 2123.7 -39.2 2123.7 594.6 
14 
Table 4. Arbroath Field under Norwegian Regime (Continued) 
Year Pre-tax NCF Total tax Abandonment Abandonment Post-tax Real NCF Dis. NCF 
Take cost grant NCF Post-tax Post-tax 
£M £M £M £M £M £\1 
(CC) (DD) (EE) (FF) (GG) (HH) (II) 
2002 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2003 -55.0 0.0 0 0.0 -55.0 -53.6 -48.5 
2004 -70.0 0.0 0 0.0 -70.0 -66.6 -54.5 
2005 28.8 12.7 0 0.0 16.1 14.9 11.1 
2006 119.6 74.0 0 0.0 45.6 41.3 27.7 
2007 150.7 86.5 0 0.0 64.1 56.6 34.3 
2008 145.5 82.5 0 0.0 63.0 54.2 29.8 
2009 142.4 88.6 0 0.0 53.8 45.2 22.4 
2010 160.5 116.8 0 0.0 43.7 35.8 16.1 
2011 138.9 111.9 0 0.0 27.0 21.6 8.8 
2012 111.7 85.2 0 0.0 26.5 20.7 7.6 
2013 103.8 79.0 0 0.0 24.8 18.8 6.3 
2014 143.4 109.9 0 0.0 33.5 24.8 7.5 
2015 104.7 83.0 0 0.0 21.7 15.7 4.3 
2016 59.2 47.5 0 0.0 11.7 8.3 2.0 
2017 88.0 71.9 0 0.0 16.1 11.1 2.5 
2018 109.9 90.0 0 0.0 19.9 13.3 27 
2019 116.5 88.0 0 0.0 28.5 18.6 3.4 
2020 104.4 78.4 0 0.0 25.9 16.5 2.7 
2021 83.9 63.0 0 0.0 20.9 13.0 1.9 
2022 65.0 48.7 0 0.0 16.2 9.8 1.3 
2023 52.5 39.8 0 0.0 12.7 7.5 0.9 
2024 46.9 36.5 0 0.0 10.3 5.9 0.7 
2025 40.8 32.0 0 0.0 8.9 5.0 0.5 
2026 35.5 27.1 0 0.0 8.3 4.6 0.4 
2027 36.5 28.1 0 0.0 8.4 4.5 0.4 
2028 29.0 22.4 0 0.0 6.6 3.5 0.3 
2029 29.8 23.1 0 0.0 6.7 3.4 0.2 
2030 0.0 0.0 40 30.6 -9.4 -4.6 -0.3 
2031 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Totals: 2122.7 1626.5 40 30.6 486.9 349.8 92.4 
15 
Tables 3 and 4. Arbroath Field under Norwegian Regime- Explained 
ST Calculation: 
(S) Depreciation for CAPEX (D) is allowed on 6-year straight-line basis 
(T) Uplift applies on CAPEX (D) at a rate of 5 per cent over 6 years 
(U) ST Base = Revenue (B) - OPEX (C) - Depreciation (S) - Uplift (T) 
(V) Any loss not written off in a particular period is carried forward to a 
following period. 
(W) Taxable Income is equal to the ST base (U) when all losses have been 
wri tten 0 ff. 
(X) ST Payable = 50% x Taxable Income (W) 
CT Calculation: 
(Y) CT Base = Revenue (B) - OPEX (C) - Depreciation (S) 
(Z) Any loss not written off in a particular period is carried forward to a 
following period. 
(AA) Taxable Income is equal to the CT base (Y) when all losses have been 
wri tten off. 
(BB) CT Payable = 28% x Taxable Income (AA) 
Post-Tax NCF Calculation: 
(CC) Pre-tax NCF excluding Abandonment Cost (EE) 
(DD) Total Government Take = ST (X) + CT (BB) 
(EE) Abandonment Cost 
(FF) Abandonment Cost Grant = 76.6% x Abandonment Cost (EE), where 
76.6% is the effective tax rate. 
(GG) Post Tax NCF = Pre-tax NCF (CC) - Government Take (DD) -
Abandonment Cost Grant (FF) 
(HH) Real NCF Post-tax = Post-tax NCF (GG)/Inflation Factor 
(II) Discounted NCF Post-tax = Real NCF (HH) x Discount factor. 
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Table 5. Arbroath Field under Indonesian Regime 
FTP calculation 
Year Total FTP Gov. Share Contractor Share Net DMO 
20% 64% 36% Revenue 
£M £M £M £~1 £M 
(JJ) (KK) (LL) (MM) (NN) 
2002 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
2003 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
2004 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
2005 25.6 16.4 9.2 102.3 -
2006 35.7 22.8 12.8 142.6 -
2007 38.2 24.4 13.7 152.7 -
2008 36.9 23.6 13.3 147.7 -
2009 36.2 23.2 13.0 144.7 -
2010 41.1 26.3 14.8 164.6 13.9 
201 I 37.4 24.0 13.5 149.7 12.6 
2012 29.2 18.7 10.5 1 17.0 9.9 
2013 30.6 19.6 11.0 122.4 10.3 
2014 34.2 21.9 12.3 136.9 11.5 
2015 28.0 17.9 10.1 112.0 9.4 
2016 23.5 15.0 8.4 93.8 7.9 
2017 27.6 17.7 9.9 110.5 9.3 
2018 28.3 18.1 10.2 IID 9.6 
2019 27.6 17.7 9.9 110.3 9.3 
2020 25.3 16.2 9.1 101.2 8.5 
2021 21.4 13.7 7.7 85.5 7.2 
2022 17.2 11.0 6.2 68.8 5.8 
2023 14.4 9.2 5.2 57.8 4.9 
2024 13.2 8.4 4.7 52.6 4.4 
2025 11.8 7.6 4.2 47.2 4.0 
2026 10.4 6.6 3.7 41.5 3.5 
2027 10.6 6.8 3.8 42.6 3.6 
2028 9.1 5.8 3.3 36.4 3.1 
2029 9.3 6.0 3.4 37.3 3.1 
2030 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2031 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Totals: 622.8 398.6 224.2 2491.3 152.0 
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Table 6. Arbroath Field under Indonesian Regime (Continued) 
Cost Recovery Calculation 
Year Intangible Tangible Dep. Inv. Total Cost Cost Recovery Cost CF Cost recovery 
CAPEX CAPEX Credits Recovery Limit allowed 
£M £M £M £M £M £M £M £:\1 
(00) (PP) (QQ) (RR) (SS) (TT) (UU) (W) 
2002 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2003 16.3 38.8 0.0 0.0 16.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2004 25.0 45.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 16.3 0.0 
2005 27.5 32.5 29.1 21.7 117.4 102.3 413 102.3 
2006 11.3 3.8 22.7 0.0 77.7 142.6 56.3 134.0 
2007 0.0 0.0 17.1 0.0 57.3 152.7 0.0 57.3 
2008 0.0 0.0 12.8 0.0 52.0 1477 0.0 52.0 
2009 0.0 0.0 37.2 0.0 75.7 144.7 0.0 75.7 
2010 3.8 1.3 1.5 0.0 45.5 164.6 0.0 45.5 
2011 7.5 2.5 0.9 0.0 46.6 149.7 0.0 46.6 
2012 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 35.2 117.0 0.0 35.2 
2013 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 49.8 122.4 0.0 49.8 
2014 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 28.3 136.9 0.0 28.3 
2015 1.3 3.8 1.7 0.0 33.2 112.0 0.0 33.2 
2016 3.8 1.3 1.0 0.0 57.9 93.8 0.0 57.9 
2017 5.2 1.7 1.2 0.0 49.5 110.5 0.0 49.5 
2018 7.5 2.5 1.5 0.0 30.7 113.3 0.0 30.7 
2019 0.3 0.8 2.2 0.0 22.9 110.3 0.0 22.9 
2020 0.3 0.8 1.3 0.0 22.7 101.2 0.0 22.7 
2021 OJ 0.8 1.3 0.0 23.4 85.5 0.0 23.4 
2022 0.3 0.8 1.3 0.0 21.7 68.8 0.0 21.7 
2023 0.3 0.8 0.8 0.0 19.7 57.8 0.0 19.7 
2024 0.3 0.8 0.8 0.0 18.9 52.6 0.0 18.9 
2025 0.3 0.8 0.8 0.0 18.2 47.2 0.0 18.2 
2026 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 17.0 41.5 0.0 17.0 
2027 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 17.1 42.6 0.0 
17.1 
2028 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 16.7 36.4 0.0 
16.7 
2029 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 17.1 37J 0.0 
17.1 
2030 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
2031 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 




Table 7. Arbroath Field under Indonesian Regime (Continued) 
Profit oil Income Tax Gov. take & Contractor 'CF 
Total Gov. Contractor Bonus Contractor Taxable Income Gov. NCF Real Contractor 
Profit Share Share Total Income tax Take Dis. 
Oil 64% 36% Profit 44% ~CF NCF 
£M £M £M £M £M £M £M £M £i\1 f:\1 £M 
(WW) (XX) (YY) (ZZ) (AAA) (BBB) (CCC) (DOD) (EEE) (FFF) (GGG) 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -55.0 -53.6 -48.5 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -70.0 -66.6 -54.5 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.2 30.9 13.6 30.0 -1.2 -1.1 -0.8 
8.6 5.5 3.1 0.0 15.9 15.9 7.0 35.4 84.2 76.2 51.1 
95.4 61.1 34.4 0.0 48.1 48.1 21.2 106.7 44.0 38.8 23.5 
95.7 61.3 34.5 0.0 47.8 47.8 21.0 105.9 39.5 34.0 18.7 
69.0 44.2 24.9 0.0 37.9 37.9 16.7 84.0 58.4 49.0 243 
119.1 76.2 42.9 0.0 57.7 43.8 19.3 135.7 24.8 20J 9.1 
103.1 66.0 37.1 0.0 50.6 38.0 16.7 1193 19.6 15.7 6.4 
81.8 52.4 29.5 0.0 40.0 30.1 13.3 94.2 17.5 13.6 5.0 
72.7 46.5 26.2 0.0 37.2 26.9 11.8 88.3 15.5 11.8 3.9 
108.5 69.5 39.1 0.0 51.4 39.8 17.5 120.4 23.0 17.0 5.1 
78.8 50.4 28.4 0.0 38.4 29.0 12.8 90.5 14.2 10.3 2.8 
36.0 23.0 13.0 0.0 21.4 13.5 5.9 51.9 7J 5.2 1.3 
61.0 39.0 21.9 0.0 31.9 22.6 9.9 75.9 12.1 8.3 1.9 
82.5 52.8 29.7 0.0 39.9 30.3 13.4 93.8 16.0 10.7 2.2 
87.5 56.0 31.5 0.0 41.4 32.1 14.1 97.1 19.5 12.7 2.3 
78.5 50.3 28.3 0.0 37.4 28.8 12.7 87.7 16.7 10.6 1.8 
62.0 39.7 22.3 0.0 30.0 22.8 10.0 70.6 133 8.3 1.2 
47.2 30.2 17.0 0.0 23.2 17.4 7.6 54.7 10.3 6.2 0.8 
38.1 24.4 13.7 0.0 18.9 14.0 6.2 44.7 7.9 4.6 
0.6 
33.7 21.6 12.1 0.0 16.9 12.4 5.5 39.9 7.0 4.0 
0.4 
29.0 18.6 10.5 0.0 14.7 10.7 4.7 34.8 6.0 
34 0.3 
24.5 15.7 8.8 0.0 12.6 9.1 4.0 29.8 5.6 
3.1 OJ 
25.5 16.3 9.2 0.0 13.0 9.4 4.1 30.8 
5.7 3.0 0.2 
19.6 12.6 7.1 0.0 10.3 7.3 3.2 24.6 
4.4 2.3 0.2 
20.2 12.9 7.3 0.0 10.6 7.5 3.3 25.3 
4.4 2.3 0.2 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
-40.0 -19.9 -1.2 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 
58.6 
1478.2 946.1 532.2 0.0 756.4 626.1 275.5 
1772.1 310.6 230.3 
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Tables 5-7. Arbroath Field under Indonesian Regime- Explained 






First Tranche Petroleum (FTP) = 20% x Revenue (B) 
Government Share ofFTP = 64% x Total FTP (JJ) 
Contractor Share ofFTP = 36% x Total FTP (JJ) 
Net Revenue = Revenue (B) - FTP (JJ) 
Domestic Market Obligation = Revenue (B) x 75% x 25% x36% 
After 60 months of production (i.e. 5 years), the contractor sells 25% of its 
share of oil (36%) to national oil company at 25% of the market price 
(Price differentialof75%) 
Cost Recovery Calculation: 
(00) Intangible CAPEX = 75% x Development and Drilling expenditures + 
25% x Facilities (Equipment and Transportation), which are provided 
separately in GEM. 
(PP) Tangible CAPEX = Total CAPEX (D) - Intangible CAPEX (00) 
(QQ) Depreciation on tangible CAPEX at 25% per year, using the Declining 
Balance method with the undepreciated amount written off in year five 
(RR) Investment credits = 15.5% x Facilities and Equipment. 
(SS) Total Cost Recovery = OPEX (C) + Intangible CAPEX (00) + 
Depreciation (QQ) + Investment Credits (RR) 
(TT) Cost Recovery Limit = 80% x Total Revenue (B) (or 100% of Net 
Revenue (MM) 
(UU) Any cost recovery, which exceeds the limit IS carried forward to the 
following period. 
(VV) Cost Recovery Allowed = Minimum of Cost Recovery Limit (TT) and 
Total Cost Recovery (SS), taking into account Cost Carried Forward 
(UD). 
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Profit Oil Calculation: 
(WW) Total Profit Oil = Total Revenue (B) - Total FTP (JJ) - Cost Recovery 
Allowed (VV) 
(XX) Government Share of Profit Oil = 64% x Total Profit Oil (WW) 
(YY) Contractor Share of Profit Oil = 36% x Total Profit Oil (WW) 
Income Tax Calculation: 
(ZZ) Bonus = 0, because in this example, the daily production of Arbroath field 
does not reach 50,000 bbl. 
(AAA) Contractor Total Profit = Contractor Profit Oil (YY) + Contractor Share of 
FTP (LL) 
(BBB) Taxable Income = Contractor Total Profit (AAA) + Investment Credits 
(RR) - DMO (NN) - Bonus (ZZ) 
Government Take & Contractor NCF: 
(CCC) Total Government take = Government share ofFTP (KK) + DMO (NN) + 
Bonus (ZZ) + Income Tax (BBB) 
(DDD) Contractor NCF = Total Revenue (B) - OPEX (C) - CAPEX (D) - Gov. 
FTP (KK) - DMO (NN) - Gov. Profit Oil (XX) - Bonus (ZZ) - Income Tax 
(BBB) 
(EEE) Real NCF = NCF (DDD)lInflation Factor 
(FFF) Discounted NCF = Real NCF (EEE) x Discount factor. 
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Table 8. Arbroath Field under Chinese Regime 
Year Royalty VAT 5% Net Revenues Dep. Total Cost Cost Recoveryl Cost CF Cost Recovery 
Recovery Limit 62.5% Allowed 
£M £M £M £M £M £M £M £M 
(EEE) (FFF) (GGG) (HHH) (III) (JJJ) (KKK) (LLL) 
2002 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2003 0.0 0.0 0.0 55.0 55.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2004 0.0 0.0 0.0 75.0 75.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2005 1.0 6.4 120.4 66.7 105.9 79.9 0.0 79.9 
2006 3.4 8.9 166.0 15.0 58.7 111.4 25.9 84.6 
2007 3.9 9.5 177.4 0.0 40.2 119.3 0.0 40.2 
2008 3.4 9.2 172.1 0.0 39.2 115.4 0.0 39.2 
2009 2.9 9.0 168.9 0.0 38.5 113.0 0.0 38.5 
2010 4.2 10.3 191.2 5.0 45.2 128.6 0.0 45.2 
2011 2.9 9.4 174.9 10.0 48.2 117.0 0.0 48.2 
2012 1.0 7.3 137.9 0.0 34.5 91.4 0.0 34.5 
2013 1.1 7.7 144.3 0.0 49.3 95.7 0.0 49.3 
2014 1.7 8.6 160.8 0.0 27.7 106.9 0.0 27.7 
2015 0.3 7.0 132.6 5.0 35.2 87.5 0.0 35.2 
2016 0.0 5.9 111.4 5.0 58.1 73.3 0.0 58.1 
2017 0.0 6.9 131.2 7.0 50.1 86.3 0.0 50.1 
2018 0.0 7.1 134.5 10.0 31.7 88.5 0.0 31.7 
2019 0.0 6.9 131.0 1.0 21.4 86.2 0.0 21.4 
2020 0.0 6.3 120.2 1.0 22.2 79.1 0.0 22.2 
2021 0.0 5.3 101.5 1.0 22.9 66.8 0.0 22.9 
2022 0.0 4.3 81.8 1.0 21.1 53.8 0.0 21.1 
2023 0.0 3.6 68.6 1.0 19.7 45.1 0.0 19.7 
2024 0.0 3.3 62.5 1.0 18.9 41.1 0.0 18.9 
2025 0.0 3.0 56.1 1.0 18.2 36.9 0.0 18.2 
2026 0.0 2.6 49.3 0.0 16.4 32.4 0.0 16.4 
2027 0.0 2.7 50.5 0.0 16.7 33.2 0.0 16.7 
2028 0.0 2.3 43.2 0.0 16.4 28.4 0.0 16.4 
2029 0.0 2.3 44.3 0.0 16.8 29.1 0.0 16.8 
2030 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2031 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Totals: 25.9 155.7 2932.6 260.7 1003.1 1946.4 25.9 873.2 
112 
Table 9. Arbroath Field under Chinese Regime (Continued) 
Profit oil Income Tax Gov. Take & Contractor "'CF 
Total Profit Gov. Share I Gov. Share Contractor Taxable Income tax Gov. Take NCF Real Discounted 
Oil of Profit Oil Share Income 33% NCF Pretax CF 
£M % £M £M £M £M £M £M £M £M 
(MMM) (NNN) (000) CPPP) (QQQ) (RRR) (SSS) (TTT) (UUU) (VVV) 
0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0 0.0 0.0 -55.0 0.0 0.0 -55.0 -53.6 -48.5 
0.0 0 0.0 0.0 -75.0 0.0 0.0 -70.0 -66.6 -54.5 
40.5 7.8% 3.2 37.4 11.4 3.8 14.3 14.4 13.4 9.9 
81.4 9.7% 7.9 73.5 99.4 32.8 53.0 66.6 60.3 40.4 
137.2 9.9% 13.6 123.6 123.6 40.8 67.9 82.8 73.1 44.3 
132.9 9.6% 12.8 120.1 120.1 39.6 65.0 80.4 69.2 38.0 
130.4 9.4% 12.2 118.2 118.2 39.0 63.2 79.2 66.5 33.0 
146.0 9.9% 14.5 131.5 131.5 43.4 72.4 88.1 72.1 32.4 
126.7 9.3% 11.8 114.9 114.9 37.9 62.0 77.0 61.5 25.0 
103.4 7.5% 7.8 95.7 95.7 31.6 47.6 64.1 49.9 18.4 
95.0 7.7% 7.3 87.7 87.7 29.0 45.0 58.8 44.6 14.9 
133.1 8.3% 11.0 122.1 122.1 40.3 61.6 81.8 60.6 18.3 
97.4 6.6% 6.4 91.0 91.0 30.0 43.8 61.0 44.1 12.0 
53.3 5.7% 3.0 50.3 50.3 16.6 25.5 33.7 23.7 5.9 
81.1 6.0% 4.9 76.2 76.2 25.2 36.9 5l.l 35.1 7.8 
102.8 6.0% 6.2 96.6 96.6 31.9 45.1 64.7 43.4 8.8 
109.6 5.9% 6.5 103.2 103.2 34.0 47.4 69.1 45.2 8.3 
98.0 5.6% 5.5 92.5 92.5 30.5 42.4 62.0 39.5 6.5 
78.5 5.1% 4.0 74.5 74.5 24.6 34.0 49.9 31.0 4.6 
60.7 4.4% 2.6 58.0 58.0 19.1 26.1 38.9 23.6 3.2 
48.9 4.0% 2.0 46.9 46.9 15.5 2l.l 31.5 18.6 2.3 
43.6 4.0% 1.7 41.8 41.8 13.8 18.8 28.0 16.2 1.8 
37.9 4.0% 1.5 36.4 36.4 12.0 16.5 24.4 13.7 1.4 
32.9 4.0% 1.3 31.6 31.6 10.4 14.3 21.1 11.6 1.1 
33.9 4.0% 1.4 32.5 32.5 10.7 14.7 21.8 11.7 1.0 
26.8 4.0% l.l 25.7 25.7 8.5 11.8 17.2 9.0 0.7 
27.4 4.0% l.l 26.3 26.3 8.7 12.1 17.7 9.0 0.6 
0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2059.4 151.2 1908.2 1778.3 629.7 962.5 1160.2 826.3 237.3 
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Tables 8-9. Arbroath Field under Chinese Regime- Explained 









Royalty is calculated on a Sliding Scale Basis (See Chapter 8, Table 8.2). 
For example, the on the first tranche of production «=20,000 bbVd) 
Royalty rate is zero. On the second tranche of production (>20,000 bbl/d 
<=30,0000 bbl/dO Royalty rate is 4% ... Then, the total Royalty in one 
year is the sum of the Royalty payment on each tranche in that year. 
Finally, the annual Royalty value is determined by multiplying Total 
Royalty by the oil price. 
Value Added Tax = 5% x Total Revenue (B) 
Net Revenue = Total Revenue (B) - Royalty (EEE) - VAT (FFF) 
Depreciation is 100% of CAPEX as spent. Any unrecovered balance is 
carried fOlWard to the following period and is compounded at a 9 per cent 
interest rate 
Cost Recovery = OPEX (C)- Depreciation (HHH) 
Cost Recovery Limit = 62.5% x Total Revenue (B) 
Any cost recovery, which exceeds the limit, is carried forward to the 
following period. 
Cost Recovery Allowed = Minimum of Cost Recovery Limit (JJJ) and 
Total Cost Recovery (III), taking into account Cost Carried Forward 
(KKK). 
Government Take & Contractor NCF: 
(MMM) Total Profit Oil = Net Revenues (GGG) - Cost Recovery (LLL) 
(NNN) Government Share of Profit Oil (%) is determined by the X Factor (See 
Table 8.3, Chapter 8), depending on annual Production. 
(000) Government Share of Profit Oil = Government share in percentage (NNN) 
x Total Profit Oil (MMM) 
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(PPP) Contractor Share of Profit Oil = Total Profit Oil (MMM) - Government 
Share (000) 
(QQQ) Taxable Income = Net Revenue (GGG) - OPEX (C) - Depreciation (HHH) 
- Government Share of Profit Oil (000) 
(RRR) Income Tax = 33% x Taxable Income 
(SSS) Total Government Take = Royalty (EEE) + VAT (FFF) + Gov. Share of 
Profit Oil (000) + Income Tax (RRR) 
(TTT) Contractor NCF = Net Revenue (GGG) - OPEX (C) - Depreciation (HHH) 
- Income Tax (RRR) - Gov. Share of Profit Oil (000) 
(UUU) Real NCF = NCF (DDD)/Inflation Factor 
(VVV) Discounted NCF = Real NCF (EEE) x Discount factor. 
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Table 10. Arbroath Field under Iraqi Regime 
Year Total cost Limit Net Income Cumulative Cost Recovery Cost Cumulative Handover 
50% Net Income allowed Unrecovered Unrecovered Date 
£M £M £M £M £M £M £M 
(WWW) (XXX) (YYY) (ZZZ) (AAAA) (BBBB) (CCCC) (DODD) 
2002 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
2003 55.0 0.0 -55.0 -55.0 0.0 55.0 55.0 -
2004 70.0 0.0 -70.0 -125.0 0.0 70.0 125.0 -
2005 99.1 63.9 -35.2 -160.2 63.9 35.2 160.2 -
2006 58.7 89.1 30.5 -129.7 89.1 -30.5 129.7 -
2007 40.2 95.4 55.2 -74.5 95.4 -55.2 74.5 -
2008 39.2 92.3 53.1 -21.4 92.3 -53.1 21.4 -
2009 38.5 90.4 52.0 30.6 59.9 -21.4 0.0 Handover 
2010 45.2 102.9 57.6 88.2 45.2 0.0 0.0 Date 
2011 48.2 93.6 45.4 133.6 48.2 0.0 0.0 -
2012 34.5 73.1 38.6 172.2 34.5 0.0 0.0 -
2013 49.3 76.5 27.3 199.4 49.3 0.0 0.0 -
2014 27.7 85.5 57.9 257.3 27.7 0.0 0.0 -
2015 35.2 70.0 34.8 292.0 35.2 0.0 0.0 -
2016 58.1 58.6 0.6 292.6 58.1 0.0 0.0 -
2017 50.1 69.0 19.0 311.6 50.1 0.0 0.0 -
2018 31.7 70.8 39.1 350.6 31.7 0.0 0.0 -
2019 21.4 69.0 47.6 398.2 21.4 0.0 0.0 -
2020 22.2 63.3 41.1 439.3 22.2 0.0 0.0 -
2021 22.9 53.4 30.5 469.8 22.9 0.0 0.0 -
2022 21.1 43.0 21.9 491.7 21.1 0.0 0.0 -
2023 19.7 36.1 16.4 508.1 19.7 0.0 0.0 -
2024 18.9 32.9 14.0 522.1 18.9 0.0 0.0 -
2025 18.2 29.5 11.3 533.4 18.2 0.0 0.0 -
2026 16.4 25.9 9.5 542.9 16.4 0.0 0.0 -
2027 16.7 26.6 9.9 552.9 16.7 0.0 0.0 -
2028 16.4 22.7 6.3 559.2 16.4 0.0 0.0 -
2029 16.8 23.3 6.5 565.7 16.8 0.0 0.0 -
2030 40.0 0.0 -40.0 525.7 0.0 40.0 40.0 -
2031 0.0 0.0 0.0 525.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
Totals: 1031.4 1557.1 525.7 8196.8 991.4 -
I16 
Table 11. Arbroath Field under Iraqi Regime (Continued) 
Cum. CAPEX Remun. Expected Overall Contractor Cumulative Balance to be 8Quarters 
Handover Date Index Cum. CAPEX Remun. Remun. Remun. to recovered 
handover 
£M £M £M £M £M £M £M 
(EEEE) (FFFF) (GGGG) (HHHH) (IIll) (JJJJ) (KKKK) (LLLL) 
0.0 1.5 200.0 300 0.0 0.0 300.0 0 
55.0 1.5 200.0 300 0.0 0.0 300.0 0 
125.0 1.5 200.0 300 0.0 0.0 300.0 0 
185.0 1.5 200.0 300 12.8 12.8 287.2 0 
200.0 1.5 200.0 300 17.8 30.6 269.4 0 
200.0 1.5 200.0 300 19.1 49.7 250.3 0 
200.0 1.5 200.0 300 18.5 68.2 231.8 0 
200.0 1.5 200.0 300 18.1 86.3 213.7 0 
200.0 1.5 200.0 300 0.0 0.0 0.0 106.9 
200.0 1.5 200.0 300 0.0 0.0 0.0 106.9 
200.0 1.5 200.0 300 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
200.0 1.5 200.0 300 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
200.0 1.5 200.0 300 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
200.0 1.5 200.0 300 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
200.0 1.5 200.0 300 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
200.0 1.5 200.0 300 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
200.0 1.5 200.0 300 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
200.0 1.5 200.0 300 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
200.0 1.5 200.0 300 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
200.0 1.5 200.0 300 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
200.0 1.5 200.0 300 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
200.0 1.5 200.0 300 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
200.0 1.5 200.0 300 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
200.0 1.5 200.0 300 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
200.0 1.5 200.0 300 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
200.0 1.5 200.0 300 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
200.0 1.5 200.0 300 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
200.0 1.5 200.0 300 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
200.0 1.5 200.0 300 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
200.0 1.5 200.0 300 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
5565.0 86.3 247.5 2152.5 213.7 
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Table 12. Arbroath Field under Iraqi Regime (Continued) 
Year Total NCF Real Discounted Gov. Take during 
Income NCF NCF contract 
£M £M £M £M £M 
(MMMM) (NNNN) (0000) (PPPP) (QQQQ) 
2002 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2003 0.0 -55.0 -53.6 -48.5 0.0 
2004 0.0 -70.0 -66.6 -54.5 0.0 
2005 76.7 -22.4 -20.8 -15.4 51.1 
2006 107.0 48.3 43.7 29.3 71.3 
2007 114.5 74.3 65.6 39.8 76.4 
2008 110.8 71.6 61.6 33.8 73.9 
2009 78.0 39.5 33.1 16.5 102.9 
2010 106.9 106.9 87.5 39.3 53.6 
2011 106.9 106.9 85.3 34.7 32.1 
2012 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
2013 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
2014 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
2015 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
2016 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
2017 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
2018 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
2019 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
2020 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
2021 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
2022 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
2023 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
2024 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
2025 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
2026 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
2027 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
2028 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
2029 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
2030 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
2031 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
Totals: 700.7 300.0 235.8 74.9 461-.3 
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Tables 10-12. Arbroath Field under Iraqi Regime- Explained 
Cost Recovery Calculation: 
(WWW) Total Costs = OPEX (C) + CAPEX (D) 
(XXX) Cost Recovery Limit = 50% x Revenue (B) 
(YYY) Net Income = Total Costs (WWW) - Cost Recovery Limit (XXX) 
(ZZZ) Cumulative Net Income ( = Net Income ((YYY) + Cumulative 
Income H (ZZZ) 
(AAAA) Cost Recovery Allowed = Minimum between Total Costs (WWW) and 
Cost Recovery Limit (XXX) 
(BBBB) Cost Unrecovered = Cost Recovery Allowed (AAAA) - Total Costs 
(WWW) 
(CCCC) Cumulative Cost Unrecovered t = Cost Unrecovered ( (BBB) + 
Cumulative Unrecovered (-1 (CCCC) 
(DDDD) When all costs are recovered (i.e. Cumulative Unrecovered = 0), the field 
reaches Handover date, which is in this example 2009. 
Remuneration Calculation: 
(EEEE) Cumulative CAPEX - Cumulative CAPEX (D) until field reaches 
Handover date. 
(FFFF) Remuneration Index is assumed to be 1.5. 
(GGGG) Expected Cumulative CAPEX = Maximum of Cumulative CAPEX 
(EEEE) to Handover date. 
(HHHH) Overall Remuneration = Remuneration Index (FFFF) x Expected 
Cumulative CAPEX (GGGG) 
(IlIl) Contractor Remuneration = 10% x Revenue (B) 
(nn) Cumulative Remuneration of Contractor Remuneration (IIII) 
(KKKK) Balance to be recovered = Overall Remuneration (HHHH) - Cumulative 
Remuneration (JJJJ) 
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(LLLL) 8 Quarters after Handover (i.e. 2 years) means that the balance to be 
recovered at Handover will be recovered in 8 quarters, by equal 
instalments. 
Contractor NCF Calculation: 
(MMMM)Total Income = Contractor Remuneration (IIII) + 8 Quarters CAPEX 
(LLLL) + Cost Recovery Allowed (AAAA) 
(NNNN) NCF = Total Income (MMMM) - Total Costs (WWW) 
(0000) Real NCF = NCF (NNNN)/Inflation Factor 
(PPPP) Discounted NCF = Real NCF (0000) x Discount factor. 
(QQQQ) Government take during contract = Revenue (B) - Total Costs (WWW) -
Contractor NCF (NNNN). 
120 
